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OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


PRESENTED  BY 

DR.    HERBERT    FINGARETTE 
U.C.S.B. 


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in  2008  with  funding  from 

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FAMOUS   MODERN   BATTLES 


FAMOUS 
MODERN   BATTLES 


BY 


A.   HILLTARD   ATTERIDGE 

AUTHOR     OF 
«*THE   BRAVEST  OF  THE  BRAVE,"    "JOACHIM    MURAT,"    ETC. 


WITH    MAPS    AND    PLANS 
DRAWN  BY  THE  AUTHOR 


BOSTON 

SMALL,  MAYNARD   AND    COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 


Copyright,    1913 

By  Small,   Maynard  and  Company 

(incorporated) 


THE    UNIVERSITY    PRESS,    CAMBRIDGE,    U.S.A. 


UNlVEP.c^TTYOFCATTi^^oT. 
SANTA  BARBARA  " 


,^7 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    The  Battle  of  the  Alma.     September  20,  1854  .  i 

II     SOLFERINO.      June  24,  1859 35 

III  Chancellors viLLE.     May,  1863 54 

IV  Gettysburg.     July  1-3,  1863 84 

V     SadoWA.      July  3,   1866 1 16 

VI     RezONVILLE  and   GrAVELOTTE.      August  16  and  18, 

1870 145 

VII     Sedan.     September  1,  1870 187 

VIII    The  Great  Assault   on  Plevna.     September  11 

and  12,  1877 216 

IX     Tel-EL-KebiR.      September  13,   1882 229 

X     Adowa.      March  1,  1896 243 

XI    The   Battle   before   Santiago  (El  Caney  and 

San  Juan).     July  1,  1898 268 

XII     OmdurmaN.      September   2,  1898 294 

XIII  PaaRDEBERG.      February  18,  1900 325 

XIV  Mukden.      February  20-March  10,  1905 353 

XV     LulE  Burgas.      October  28-31,  1912 375 


LIST   OF   MAPS  AND   PLANS 

NO.  FACING   PAGE 

1  Battle  of  the  Alma,  September  20,  1854 18 

2  Battle  of  Solferino,  June  24,   1859:  position  about  8  a.m.  46 

3  Sketch  Map.     The  Chancellorsville  Campaign 60 

4  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  May  i  and  2,  1863 72 

5  Sketch  Map.     The  Gettysburg  Campaign 88 

6  Battle  of   Gettysburg.     First  day,   July    i,    1863:   position 

about  4  p.M 92 

7  Battle  of  Gettysburg.     Second  Day  :  position  about  4.30  p.m.     100 

8  Battle  of  Gettysburg.     Third  Day  :  the  Crisis  of  the  Day. 

Pickett's  Charge 112 

9  Sketch  Map  showing  the  converging  march  of  the  Prussian 

Armies  into  Bohemia,  1866 122 

10  Battle  of  Sadowa,  July  3,  1866:  position  about  11  a..m.    .     .  132 

1 1  Battle  of  Rezonville,  August  16,  1870  :  position  about  7  p.m.  164 

12  Sketch  Map  showing  (i)  camps  and  bivouacs  of  the  French 

and  German  armies  in  the  night  of  August  17-18,  1870; 
(2)  the  great  wheeling  movement  of  the  German  armies 
on  the  morning  of  August  18 168 

13  Battle  of  Gravelotte,  August  18,  1870:  position  about  6  p.m.     180 

1 4  The  advance  of  the  German  armies  into  France ;  MacMahon's 

flank  march  and  the  German  counter-movement,  August- 
September,  1870 188 

15  Battle  of  Sedan,  September  i,    1870:  (1)  Situation  about 

7  A.M.,  (2)  situation  about  noon 208 

16  The  Great  Assault  on  Plevna,  September  11,  1877      .     .     .  222 

17  Battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  September  13,  1882 238 

18  Battle  of  Adowa,  March  I,  1896 260 


viii  LIST  OF  MAPS  AND  PLANS 

NO.  FACING  PAGE 

19  Battle  before  Santiago,  July  i,  1898.     Situation  at  the  begin- 

ning  of  the   action    (with    inset    Sketch    Map  of  the 
country  near  Santiago) 278 

20  Stages  of  the  Advance  to  Khartoum,  1896-1898     ....     296 

21  Battle  of  Omdurman,  September  2,  1898:  I.  The  first  Der- 

vish attack 306 

22  Battle  of  Omdurman  :  II.  Movements  in  the  second  phase 

of  the  fight 318 

23  The  relief  of  Kimberley  and  Cronje's  retreat  to  Paardeberg  330 

24  Battle  of  Paardeberg,  February  18,  1900 344 

25  Battle  of  Mukden  :  I.  Positions  on  February  20,  1905,  with 

indications  of  movements  up  to  February  27  ...     .     364 

26  Battle  of  Mukden  :    II.  Movements   of   February  28,  and 

positions  on  March  i 366 

27  Battle  of  Mukden  :  III.  Movements,  March  2-6,  and  position 

on  March  6 368 

28  Battle  of  Mukden :    IV.  Movements  of  March  7  and  8,  and 

position  on  March  9 370 

29  Sketch  Map  showing  general  course  of  the  main  Bulgarian 

advance,  October-November,  191 2 384 

30  Battle  of  Lule  Burgas :  position  in  the  afternoon  of  October 

30,  1912 394 


FAMOUS   MODERN   BATTLES 


FAMOUS  MODERN  BATTLES 

CHAPTER   I 

THE    BATTLE    OF   THE   ALMA 
September  20,  1854 

The  nineteenth  century  opened  for  Europe  amid  the 
storm  of  the  revolutionary  wars.  The  guns  fired  against 
the  Bastille  on  July  14,  1789,  had  been  echoed  by  the  artil- 
lery of  a  hundred  battle-fields.  The  Atlantic  and  the  Medi- 
terranean, the  Rhine,  the  Danube,  and  the  Nile,  the  Alps 
and  the  Pyrenees,  had  heard  the  cannon  thunder  "  bellowing 
victory,  bellowing  doom."  Napoleon,  the  greatest  of  the 
world's  war  leaders,  had  sprung  into  sudden  fame.  Then, 
with  a  brief  truce  after  the  Treaty  of  Amiens,  the  Wars  of 
the  Empire  followed  the  Wars  of  the  Revolution ;  and  when 
the  end  came  at  Waterloo,  Europe  looked  back  upon  more 
than  twenty  years  of  strife,  that  had  cost  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  lives.  Even  for  the  exultant  victors  it  was  like 
waking  from  a  nightmare. 

A  long  period  of  industrial  and  commercial  development 
followed  in  which  Great  Britain  took  the  lead.  For  forty 
years  the  great  powers  of  Europe  were  at  peace.  There 
were,  indeed,  minor  conflicts,  partly  the  outcome  of  the 
movement  against  the  reaction  that  followed  Waterloo,  partly 
the  result  of  the  new  political  theory  of  the  right  of  nation- 
alities to  constitute  themselves  into  self-governing  states. 
There  were  the  war  of  Greek  Independence,  and  the  local 
conflicts  that  followed  the  revolutionary  movements  of  1830 
and  1848.  But  throughout  all  this  period  there  was  a  pre- 
vailing feeling  that  peace  was  the  first  of  national  interests, 


2  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

and  that  a  state  had  more  to  gain  from  the  triumphs  of  in- 
dustry, science,  commerce,  and  colonization  than  from  vic- 
tory on  the  battle-field  and  enterprises  of  armed  conquest. 

When  Louis  Napoleon,  the  nephew  of  the  great  emperor, 
was  aiming  at  power  in  France,  and  working  for  the  restora- 
tion of  the  imperial  system,  he  had  to  protest  that  he  had 
no  dreams  of  military  ambition,  and  that  the  restored  em- 
pire would  be  an  empire  of  peace.  As  President  of  the 
PVench  Republic  he  placed  in  the  forefront  of  his  policy  the 
development  of  the  national  wealth  of  France.  In  England 
the  Queen's  husband.  Prince  Albert  of  Saxe-Coburg,  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  a  great  international  movement  which 
found  expression  in  the  famous  exhibition  of  185 1.  Its 
leading  idea  was  that  henceforth  nations  would  compete 
with  each  other  only  in  the  peaceful  contests  of  science,  in- 
dustry, and  art. 

It  is  not  easy  for  us  to  realize  the  hopeful  enthusiasm  of 
that  May  Day  of  some  sixty  years  ago  when  Queen  Victoria, 
surrounded  by  the  ambassadors  of  the  civilized  world,  was 
the  center  of  a  pageant  of  peace,  celebrated  under  the  great 
roof  of  glass  that  seemed  a  fairy  palace,  with  its  transparent 
arches,  flooded  with  summer  sunshine,  towering  above  the 
elms  of  Hyde  Park.  It  was  noted  as  a  happy  augury  that 
the  United  States  had  sent  their  contributions  to  the  great 
display  on  board  of  a  warship  that  had  fought  against  the 
British  flag  in  1814,  and  was  now  disarmed  to  make  room 
for  the  conveyance  of  this  "  peaceful  store."  The  flags  of 
all  nations,  flying  side  by  side,  seemed  to  signal  that  war 
was  banished  from  the  earth.  Orators  and  journalists  spoke 
and  wrote  of  the  day  as  marking  a  new  epoch  in  the  world's 
progress.  Thackeray  voiced  the  feeling  of  the  time  in  his 
"  May  Day  Ode,"  in  which  he  pointed  to  the  inventions  of 
peace  as  England's  best  armaments: 

*'  Look  yonder  where  the  engines  toil : 
These  England's  arms  of  conquests  are, 


THE    BATTLE    OF   THE    ALMA 

The  trophies  of  her  bloodless  war; 

Brave  weapons  these. 
Victorious  over  wave  and  soil, 
With  these  she  sails,  she  weaves,  she  tills, 
Pierces  the  everlasting  hills, 

And  spans  the  seas." 


This  pleasant  dream  of  the  coming  of  a  new  Golden  Age 
of  universal  peace  did  not  last  long.  Seven  months  later 
Louis  Napoleon  made  himself  master  of  France  by  a  mili- 
tary revolution,  and  began  the  organization  of  a  formidable 
military  and  naval  power.  The  Crimean  War  of  1854  was 
largely  due  to  his  ambition  to  revive  the  warlike  glories  of 
the  First  Empire,  and  link  once  more  the  name  of  Napoleon 
with  victory.  It  began  a  new  period  of  frequent  wars  and 
ever-growing  armaments,  that  have  gradually  made  Europe 
a  vast  camp. 

During  the  long  peace  after  Waterloo,  comparatively  little 
had  been  done  for  the  improvement  of  armaments.  From 
the  period  of  the  Crimean  War  onward  all  the  resources  of 
science,  invention,  and  industry  have  been  devoted  to  placing 
deadlier  weapons  in  the  hands  of  the  soldier,  and  armies  and 
navies  have  seen  greater  changes  than  any  that  are  recorded 
since  the  invention  of  gun-powder  heralded  the  doom  of  the 
steel-clad  chivalry  of  medieval  war. 

The  most  interesting  way  in  which  one  can  trace  the  chief 
stages  of  this  evolution,  which  has  changed  not  only  the 
conditions  under  which  armies  meet  in  conflict,  but  also 
those  under  which  nations  live  in  a  state  of  armed  peace,  is 
to  tell  the  story  of  some  of  the  famous  battles  of  the  period 
of  little  more  than  half  a  century  that  began  with  the  allied 
expedition  against  Russia  in  the  Crimea  and  before  its  close 
saw  victories  won  against  the  same  power  on  the  battle-fields 
of  far  Eastern  Asia,  by  a  people  who,  when  the  Alma  was 
won,  were  still  armed  with  bows  and  arrows,  matchlocks, 
and  spears. 


4  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

The  battle  of  the  Alma  itself  differed  little  from  the 
battles  fought  in  the  days  of  Napoleon  and  Wellington.  The 
tactical  traditions  of  those  earlier  times  had  been  regarded 
during  the  long  peace  as  something  sacred.  The  chief 
change  in  armaments  was  that  the  infantry  of  the  French 
and  English  contingents  carried  the  muzzle-loading  rifle. 
Most  of  the  Russians  were  still  armed  with  the  old  percus- 
sion musket,  with  an  effective  range  of  about  one  hundred 
yards ;  and  even  in  the  allied  armies  it  was  still  considered 
that  to  open  fire  at  a  much  longer  range  was  only  to  waste 
ammunition,  for  musketry  meant  drill,  and  there  was  as  yet 
no  scientific  knowledge  of  the  powers  of  the  new  rifles.  The 
field  artillery  was  still  that  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  —  smooth- 
bore muzzle-loading  guns,  throwing  a  solid  iron  ball  weigh- 
ing a  few  pounds,  with  a  limited  range  and  an  unreliable 
flight.  Several  of  the  officers  of  higher  rank  had  fought  in 
the  early  wars  of  the  century.  Lord  Raglan,  who  com- 
manded the  British  contingent,  had  been  the  hero  of  many 
a  dashing  exploit  in  the  Peninsula,  and  had  lost  an  arm  while 
serving  on  Wellington's  staff  at  Waterloo.  Prince  Alex- 
ander Sergievitch  Mentschikoff,  the  Russian  commander, 
iiad  fought  against  Napoleon  in  the  campaigns  of  Moscow 
and  Leipzig,  and  in  the  invasion  of  France.  The  battle  of 
the  Alma  was  thus  a  link  between  the  Napoleonic  wars  and 
the  new  period  of  conflict  that  so  sadly  disappointed  the 
hopes  of  1 85 1. 

England  and  France  were  the  allies  of  the  Sultan.  The 
war  had  begun  when  a  Russian  army  was  on  the  Danube, 
ready  to  advance  on  Constantinople.  The  object  of  the 
Western  powers  in  intervening  was  to  prevent  the  Czar 
Nicholas  I  making  himself  the  dictator  of  the  East.  The 
landing  of  the  allied  troops  at  Varna,  and  the  threat  of  an 
Austrian  army  descending  on  the  rear  of  the  Russians,  had 
forced  them  to  withdraw  across  the  Pruth. 

In  this  stage  of  the  war  the  English  and  French  armies 


THE    BATTLE    OF   THE    ALMA  5 

never  actually  encountered  the  invaders,  and  their  losses 
were  chiefly  due  to  cholera,  which  was  then  devastating  the 
Continent,  and  to  the  malarial  fevers  of  the  Danube  marshes. 
By  the  forced  retreat  of  the  Russians  the  first  object  of  the 
war  had  been  attained,  but  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III  had 
no  wish  to  see  his  army  return  home  without  any  battle 
laurels,  and  England  accepted  his  proposal  that  though  it 
was  late  in  the  year,  and  the  Crimean  winter  would  begin 
before  long,  an  expedition  should  be  sent  to  capture  and 
dismantle  the  maritime  fortress  of  Sebastopol,  Russia's 
great  stronghold  in  the  Black  Sea. 

The  expedition  was  to  be  made  up  of  26,000  British 
troops  under  Lord  Raglan,  32,000  French  under  Marshal  St. 
Arnaud,  and  7000  Turks  under  Omar  Pasha.  In  all  it  was 
an  army  of  65,000  men  with  124  guns. 

St.  Arnaud  had  fought  as  a  volunteer  in  the  Greek  War 
of  Independence,  and  had  won  a  high  reputation  as  a  sol- 
dier in  Algeria.  He  had  been  given  his  marshal's  baton  for 
the  part  he  played  in  the  Paris  cotip  d'etat  and  the  revival 
of  the  empire.  When  he  went  to  the  Crimea  he  was  suffer- 
ing from  the  fatal  illness  that  was  soon  to  end  his  days. 
Only  his  iron  will  enabled  him  to  retain  the  command. 

Omar  was  a  Croat  renegade.  His  real  name  was  Michael 
Lattas.  After  serving  for  a  while  in  the  Austrian  army  he 
had  got  into  trouble  for  some  breach  of  discipline,  deserted 
to  avoid  a  court-martial  and  gone  to  Constantinople,  where 
he  became  a  Moslem ;  took  the  name  of  Omar,  and  entered 
the  Sultan's  army  with  the  rank  of  colonel.  He  had  become 
famous  for  his  defense  of  the  line  of  the  Danube  against 
the  Russian  invasion. 

The  troops  began  to  embark  at  Varna  on  September  i, 
the  British  on  board  a  fleet  of  transports  escorted  by  a 
powerful  squadron,  the  French  crowded  in  the  gun-decks 
of  their  warships  in  a  way  that  might  have  proved  seriously 
embarrassing  if  the  Russian  fleet  had  come  out  of  Sebas- 


6  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

topol  and  offered  battle  during  the  voyage  across  the  Black 
Sea.  On  September  8  the  allied  armada  assembled  near 
Serpents  Island,  off  the  mouths  of  the  Danube.  On  the 
fourteenth  the  landing  in  the  Crimea  began  on  the  coast 
about  thirty  miles  north  of  Sebastopol,  at  a  place  marked 
on  the  English  charts  as  "  Old  Fort/'  from  the  ruins  of  a 
fortress  built  there  by  the  Venetians  in  the  days  when  they 
had  colonies  in  the  Crimea. 

The  Russians  made  no  attempt  to  oppose  the  landing. 
A  few  Cossacks  watched  the  first  boatloads  come  ashore, 
and  then  rode  away  to  the  southward.  Mentschikoff  had 
decided  to  await  the  attack  of  the  Allies  on  a  selected  posi- 
tion formed  by  a  range  of  bold  heights  along  the  south  bank 
of  the  little  river  Alma,  between  Old  Fort  and  the  northern 
front  of  Sebastopol.  He  could  only  muster  some  35,000 
men  and  96  guns,  but  he  trusted  to  the  natural  strength  of 
the  position  to  compensate  for  the  great  disadvantage  of 
numbers. 

The  Allies  were  not  ready  to  begin  their  march  south- 
wards till  the  early  morning  of  September  19.  The  right 
flank  of  the  advance  was  protected  by  the  sea,  the  left  and 
front  were  covered  by  the  small  cavalry  force  available  — 
about  1000  British  sabers.  During  the  day  there  was  a 
skirmish  with  a  reconnoitering  detachment  of  Russians,  and 
when  the  Allies  halted  in  the  evening  they  were  so  near  the 
Alma  that  a  short  march  would  enable  them  to  attack  the 
enemy's  position  next  day. 

The  night  was  fine  and  clear,  and  from  the  allied  bivouacs 
along  the  Bulganak  River  the  Russian  watch-fires  were  in 
sight,  glowing  in  two  red  rows  of  light,  one  above  the 
other;  for  some  of  the  enemy's  troops  were  on  the  low 
ground  along  the  Alma,  and  the  rest  on  the  heights  three 
or  four  hundred  feet  above  it.  From  the  south  bank  of  the 
Bulganak  there  is  first  a  gentle  rise  and  then  a  long  even 
slope  to  the  Alma  valley.     Beyond  the  Alma  the  ground 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  7 

rises  almost  at  once  into  sharp  declivities  and  steep,  cliff-like 
bluffs.  Along  the  winding  course  of  the  river  below  the 
heights,  and  on  each  side  of  the  stream,  there  was  in  1854 
a  pleasant  region  of  orchards  and  vineyards,  with  some  farm- 
houses and  a  few  villas  belonging  to  the  wealthier  residents 
of  Sebastopol ;  and  there  were  three  villages  —  Almatamak, 
about  half  a  mile  from  the  river's  mouth,  Burliuk,  two  miles 
farther  up,  and  Tarchanlar,  another  two  miles  inland.  The 
houses  were  built  of  wood.  At  Burliuk  a  bridge  carried 
the  highroad  from  Eupatoria  to  Sebastopol  across  the  Alma. 
South  of  this  bridge  the  road  ascended  the  heights  by  a 
wide  sloping  hollow,  like  one  of  the  chines  of  the  English 
chalk  downs.  East  of  Burliuk  the  slopes,  everywhere  easily 
accessible,  run  up  to  a  bold,  flat-topped  summit  known  as 
the  Kurgane  Hill.  West  of  Burliuk  the  heights  are  steeper 
and  steeper,  till  they  end  in  precipitous  cliffs  that  look  down 
upon  the  sea. 

The  Allies  had  searched  the  whole  position  with  tele- 
scopes, in  the  hands  of  skilled  observers  perched  high  on  the 
masts  of  their  warships.  The  naval  guns  could  bring  fire  to 
bear  on  the  seaward  end  of  the  heights,  and  it  was  expected 
that  the  Russians  would  not  hold  the  western  part  of  the 
position  because  it  would  be  thus  exposed  to  fire  from  the 
flank,  and  also  because  the  cliff-like  bluffs  above  Almatamak 
were  so  difficult  to  ascend  that  Mentschikoff  would  probably 
consider  it  impossible  for  any  large  force  to  attack  on  that 
side.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  had  decided  that  the  ground 
here  was  inaccessible  for  the  Allies,  and  he  was  only  anxious 
about  the  chance  of  troops  being  landed  from  the  fleet  at  a 
gap  in  the  cliffs  a  little  more  than  a  mile  south  of  the  Alma 
mouth,  where  there  was  a  bit  of  beach,  and  a  rough  cart- 
track  led  up  to  the  village  of  Ulukul  Akles.  He  had  sta- 
tioned a  battalion  with  a  few  guns  at  the  village  to  watch 
this  point. 

This  done,  he  concentrated  everything  else  for  the  defense 


8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

of  the  ground  on  both  sides  of  the  highroad  above  Burhuk, 
Skirmishers  held  the  orchards  and  vineyards  along  the 
Alma,  with  supports  on  the  shelf  of  low  ground  between 
the  river  and  the  heights.  The  hollow  through  which  the 
road  ascends  from  the  bridge  bristled  with  cannon.  Sixteen 
battalions  and  eight  batteries  were  held  in  reserve  near  the 
road  on  the  crest  of  the  heights.  Eighteen  more  battalions 
were  on  or  behind  the  Kurgane  Hill,  and  half-way  down  its 
slope  two  earthwork  batteries,  armed  with  heavy  guns,  had 
been  erected.  In  the  narratives  of  the  day  they  are  generally 
called  redoubts,  but  they  were  really  only  open  breastworks 
pierced  for  guns.  Behind,  and  to  the  east  of  the  hill,  he  had 
some  3000  cavalry. 

The  Allies  had  numbers  on  their  side  —  roughly,  60,000 
against  35,000.  The  only  advantage  of  the  Russians  was 
that  they  held  a  natural  rampart.  The  Alma  was  no  great 
obstacle ;  it  was  fordable  in  most  places,  though  here  and 
there  were  deep  holes  that  a  rapid  current  made  more 
dangerous. 

It  is  interesting  to  consider  at  this  point  the  plan  of  at- 
tack adopted,  the  possible  alternatives,  and  the  difference 
that  the  weapons  and  methods  of  to-day  would  have  made 
in  the  problem. 

The  plan  was  a  modification  of  one  proposed  by  St. 
Arnaud  to  Raglan.  The  French  had  only  about  150 
mounted  men  —  a  squadron  of  the  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  and 
a  few  Spahis  (Algerian  native  cavalry).  The  British  had 
Lucan's  cavalry  division,  about  1000  strong,  and  they  had 
accordingly  been  given  the  left  or  landward  flank  of  the 
advance,  where  their  cavalry  could  protect  the  whole  army 
against  any  enterprise  of  the  Russian  horsemen.  St.  Ar- 
naud's  plan  was  that  the  British,  with  part  of  the  French 
army,  should  attack  the  Russian  position  in  front,  from  Bur- 
liuk  to  Tarchanlar ;  while  the  rest  of  the  French,  supported 
by  the  Turks,  should  ascend  the  bold  heights  between  Alma-. 


THE    BATTLE    OF   THE   ALMA  9 

tamak  and  the  sea,  covered  by  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  reach 
the  plateau,  and  swing  round  against  the  Russian  left  flank 
and  rear.  St.  Arnaud  answered  for  it  that  his  men  would 
not  only  climb  the  precipitous  heights  on  this  side,  but  also 
get  some  guns  up  by  rough  cart-tracks  that  ascended  through 
rain- worn  gullies  in  the  bluff.  H  this  could  be  done,  there 
was  an  attractive  easiness  about  the  rest  of  the  plan.  It 
meant  that  a  large  force  of  the  Allies  would  be  able  to  reach 
a  part  of  the  heights  that  was  all  but  undefended,  and  then 
meet  the  enemy  on  even  ground.  The  weak  point  of  the 
plan  was  the  temporary  division  of  the  Allies.  If  the  Rus- 
sians had  been  more  enterprising,  the  detached  flanking 
force  might  have  had  to  face  a  dangerous  counter-attack 
as  it  topped  the  ascent. 

There  was  a  possible  alternative  plan,  which  no  one 
seems  to  have  thought  of  till  long  after,  because  so  much 
value  was  set  on  being  in  continual  toucli  with  the  fleet. 
The  turning  of  the  Russian  left  would  drive  the  enemy  back 
on  the  roads  leading  to  Sebastopol.  To  the  allied  leaders 
it  seemed  enough  to  capture  the  Alma  heights,  and  thus 
clear  the  way  to  the  fortress.  But  a  general's  business  is 
not  merely  to  shift  the  position  of  an  enemy's  army  and 
occupy  the  ground  it  stands  upon,  but  to  destroy  it.  And 
there  would  have  been  a  fair  chance  of  accomplishing  this 
if  the  Allies  had  used  their  superior  numbers  to  demonstrate 
against  the  Russian  front,  work  round  the  enemy's  right, 
ascend  the  slopes  east  of  Tarchanlar,  and  storm  the  Kurgane 
Hill  from  this  side,  cutting  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  and 
driving  him  back  on  the  seaward  cliffs,  where  he  would 
come  under  the  fire  of  the  fleet.  The  less  heroic  and  less 
profitable  plan  was  adopted. 

Except  that  the  river  in  front  of  it  is  nearly  everywhere 
fordable,  the  Alma  position  greatly  resembles  that  of  Colenso 
in  the  South  African  War.  There  is  the  same  long  open 
slope  for  the  approach  in  front.    The  steppe  is  very  like  the 


lo  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

veldt.  There  are  the  same  heights  beyond  the  river.  If 
Mentschikoff  had  had  Louis  Botha's  weapons,  the  open 
steppe  north  of  the  Ahna  would  have  been  swept  by  the 
rapid  fire  of  long-ranging  rifles  from  trenches  along  the  low 
ground.  Quick-firing  artillery  on  the  heights  would  have 
shelled  the  allied  advance  three  miles  from  the  river,  and 
made  the  march  in  closely-formed  line  and  column  impos- 
sible. A  mere  handful  of  rifles  with  a  few  quick-firers 
would  have  stopped  the  flanking  columns  as  they  climbed 
the  heights.  It  is  true  that  a  compensating  advantage  for 
the  attack  would  be  the  long-range  fire  of  a  modern  fleet 
searching  even  the  slopes  of  the  Kurgane  Hill ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  all  the  experience  of  the  Boer  War  went  to  show 
that  even  a  heavy  bombardment  produces  little  effect  on 
brave  men  who  have  had  time  to  dig  shelters  in  the  hillsides. 

But  all  the  perplexing  tactical  problems  that  modern  arma- 
ments have  produced  were  far  in  the  future  when  on  that 
bright  September  morning  —  "like  an  English  summer  day 
in  June  "  —  the  Allies  broke  up  their  bivouacs  on  the  Bul- 
ganak  and  slowly  formed  for  the  advance.  War  was  still 
a  brilliant  spectacle,  not  a  dull,  matter-of-fact  scientific 
business.  Khaki  and  gray  uniforms  and  smokeless  powder 
have  spoiled  the  battle-field  from  the  picturesque  point  of 
view.  But  the  advance  to  the  Alma  was  all  brightness  and 
color. 

When,  after  long  delays,  the  allied  armies  at  last  moved 
forward  formed  up  for  battle,  the  sight  was  something  like 
what  is  now  to  be  seen  only  at  some  ceremonial  review.  Out 
on  the  extreme  left  there  was  the  flash  and  glitter  of  Lord 
Lucan's  brigades  of  British  cavalry,  red  and  blue  and  gold 
in  profusion  —  hussars,  lancers,  dragoons,  and  horse  artil- 
lery. Then  with  a  swarm  of  dark  green  uniformed  riflemen 
thrown  out  in  front,  four  red-coated  infantry  divisions 
marched,  arrayed  in  two  lines,  each  more  than  a  mile  and 
a  half  long,  with  a  fifth  division  in  column  behind  them  as 


THE    BATTLE    OF   THE   ALMA  ii 

a  reserve.  The  men  were  formed  two  deep,  with  field  bat- 
teries in  the  intervals  between  the  divisions.  The  Russians 
from  the  heights  saw  for  the  first  time  the  famous  *'  thin 
red  line."  On  the  left  it  was  formed  by  the  Duke  of  Cam- 
bridge's splendid  division,  the  Brigade  of  Guards  —  three 
battalions  of  tall  bearskin-capped  Grenadiers,  Cold-streams, 
and  Scots,  with  Colin  Campbell's  Highland  Brigade  on 
their  left,  an  array  of  brilliant  tartans  and  nodding  plumes. 

On  the  right,  beyond  the  highroad,  were  three  French 
divisions  in  column.  In  front  —  moving  in  loose,  irregular 
skirmishing  lines  —  went  the  blue-coated  riflemen,  the  dash- 
ing Chasseurs  de  France.  The  massive  divisional  columns 
behind  this  screen  had  each  at  its  head  a  regiment  of  Zou- 
aves in  their  quaint  semi-Arab  dress.  The  rest  were  lines- 
men in  baggy  red  trousers  and  blue  tunics.  Each  division 
was  followed  by  its  batteries ;  and  near  the  highway  rode 
St.  Arnaud  with  his  staff  and  an  escort  of  the  Chasseurs 
d'Afrique,  with  a  few  Arab  Spahis  in  their  white  mantles. 
Further  away,  marching  towards  the  cliffs  near  the  sea,  was 
Bosquet's  Division,  in  two  columns,  with  the  red-fezzed 
Turkish  infantry  tramping  after  that  which  was  furthest  to 
the  right. 

From  the  rolling  slope  of  the  steppe  there  was  a  clear 
view  over  the  sea.  Near  the  land  could  be  seen  ten  French 
and  three  British  war  steamers,  cleared  for  action,  and  mov- 
ing to  shell  the  heights.  Steam-propelled  men-of-war  were 
still  something  of  a  novelty,  and  men  looked  at  them  with 
the  sensation  of  those  who  watch  a  strange  experiment. 
Farther  out  were  the  main  British,  French,  and  Turkish 
squadrons  under  shortened  sail,  the  fleets  of  the  past  show- 
ing the  spectator  what  navies  were  in  the  days  of  Napo- 
leonic wars. 

Most  of  the  Russian  array  was  out  of  sight,  but  on  the 
green  slo])es  of  Kurgane  Hill  dull  gray  squares  marked 
where  the  enemy's  battalions  were  waiting,  and  the  two 


12  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

earthwork  batteries  showed  up  boldly  on  a  terrace  below 
the  summit.  But  the  enemy's  main  forces  were  behind  the 
visible  crest  line,  and  the  nearest  of  them  were  hidden  in  the 
orchards  and  vineyards  along  the  river. 

Of  the  British  soldiers,  who  looked  curiously  at  the 
heights  they  were  to  storm,  few  had  seen  war.  Even  among 
the  generals  there  were  some  who  had  never  yet  faced  hos- 
tile fire,  and  very  few  officers  had  even  had  the  experience 
of  handling  troops  at  manceuvers.  It  was  the  time  of  steady 
barrack-yard  drill  and  formal  parades  and  reviews.  But 
out  of  this  everlasting  round  of  drill  and  the  iron  discipline 
of  the  day  there  came  the  certainty  that  brigades  and  regi- 
ments would  move  into  action  like  animated  machines ; 
and  there  was  a  sound  tradition  from  the  old  wars  that  the 
fire  of  a  British  line,  formed  two  deep,  could  beat  off  the 
heaviest  column  of  Continental  troops,  and  that  in  the  crisis 
of  the  attack  the  bayonet  would  break  through  anything, 
provided  the  men  moved  steadily  shoulder  to  shoulder,  and 
took  no  notice  of  the  fact  that  a  certain  number  were  being 
killed.  A  few  of  the  officers  had  put  the  matter  to  the  test 
in  other  days,  and  no  one  doubted  for  a  moment  that  the 
old  method  would  work  again. 

Beside  one  of  the  brigadiers  there  rode  the  pioneer  of 
war  correspondents  —  Russell  of  the  Times  —  a  stout,  jolly- 
looking  little  Irishman.  Soldiers  and  civilians  were  far 
more  apart  than  they  are  now,  and  the  brigadier  felt  rather 
annoyed  at  the  intrusion  of  the  mere  journalist.  "  What 
are  you  doing  here  ?  "  he  said  to  Russell.  "  What  do  you 
know  about  battles?"  "Not  much,"  replied  the  Irishman 
with  a  smile ;  "  but  I  am  thinking  there  are  a  good  many 
here  in  the  same  fix." 

Russell  might  have  found  confirmation  for  his  surmise 
in  the  fact  that  presently  the  whole  array  halted  to  give 
time  for  Bosquet's  flank  attack  to  get  forward,  and  instead 
pf  halting  to  wait  where  no  useless  loss  would  be  incurred, 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  13 

Raglan  and  St.  Amaud  stopped  the  advance  only  when  they 
were  within  long  range  of  the  heavier  guns  on  the  oppos- 
ing heights,  but  just  far  off  enough  to  make  it  impossible 
for  their  own  artillery  to  engage  the  Russian  batteries  400 
feet  above  the  plain.  The  men  lay  down.  The  officers 
stood  or  walked  or  rode  about.  A  flash  on  the  heights,  a 
cloud  of  smoke,  and  then  a  round  iron  ball  came  bounding 
with  a  deadly  leap  from  its  first  touch  of  the  ground  in 
front  and  killed  a  soldier  in  the  foremost  of  the  red  lines. 
It  was  the  opening  shot  of  the  battle.  Then,  for  what 
seemed  a  weary  time,  the  Russian  guns  fired  coolly  at  the 
huge  target  presented  by  the  halted  armies.  The  French 
on  the  right  were  more  out  of  reach,  and  most  of  the  shots 
fell  in  the  British  lines.  Their  thin  formation  minimized 
the  loss,  but  even  so  there  were  many  casualties.  The  men 
stood  it  well.  They  even  made  bets  on  the  next  shot.  Some 
ate  from  their  haversacks,  some  puffed  at  a  pipe,  and  a  few 
slept  under  the  hot  sun.  Raglan  and  his  staff  were  a  favor- 
ite mark  for  the  enemy's  gunners,  and  the  large  group  of 
mounted  men  changed  their  position  frequently,  but  at  a 
slow,  leisurely  walk.  It  was  still  the  tradition  that  to  avoid 
fire  or  take  cover  was  discreditable.  There  was  more  of 
swagger  and  less  of  practical  business  about  war. 

And  now  from  the  sea  there  came  the  loud  booming  of 
the  heavy  naval  guns.  The  steamers,  with  clouds  of  sunlit 
white  powder  smoke  mingling  with  the  black  trails  from 
their  funnels,  were  firing  at  haphazard  at  the  western 
heights,  on  the  off-chance  that  there  were  some  Russians 
there  waiting  for  Bosquet's  two  columns,  which  had  now 
reached  the  river.  D'Autemarre's  Brigade  was  marching 
through  Almatamak  village,  where  there  was  a  wooden 
bridge.  Bouat's  Brigade  had  marched  for  the  river  mouth. 
A  ford  was  reported  there,  and  beyond  a  path  zigzagged  up 
the  cliff  above  the  sea.  The  infantry  found  the  ford  diffi- 
cult —  deep  rushing  water  and  a  soft  sandy  bottom.    Horses 


14  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

struggled  in  vain  to  get  the  guns  through,  wheels  sank,  and 
the  water  eddied  over  gun  muzzles  and  limber  boxes.  The 
guns  were  dragged  back  and  sent  off  to  the  Almatamak 
bridge,  where  Bouat's  chasseurs  and  linesmen  began  to  climb 
the  cliff. 

There  were  no  Russians  at  the  top  to  interfere  with  them. 
The  battalion  at  Ululuk  village  had  all  its  attention  riveted 
on  three  French  warships —  the  Megcre,  Cacique,  and  Can- 
ada —  that  had  steamed  up  opposite  the  gap  in  the  cliffs 
below  the  village,  and  were  steadily  shelling  it.  The  Rus- 
sians expected  presently  to  see  boatloads  of  men  coming 
ashore. 

When  it  was  seen  that  Bosquet's  Division  was  going  up 
the  heights,  the  welcome  order  was  given  for  the  main  body 
of  the  Allies  to  advance.  The  long  strain  of  enduring  fire 
without  replying  was  over  at  last.  Columns  and  lines  re- 
formed, and  the  united  armies  moved  in  stately  march 
towards  the  belt  of  inclosures  along  the  Alma.  The  chas- 
seurs covering  the  French  columns  on  the  right  were  the 
first  to  open  fire.  They  dashed  forward  with  a  brisk  crackle 
of  rifles,  searching  the  trees  and  fences  with  showers  of 
Minie  bullets.  A  few  shots  came  from  the  inclosures  in 
reply.  The  Russian  artillery  thundered  from  the  heights, 
but  the  allied  batteries  were  still  limbered  up,  the  teams  at 
the  walk  keeping  pace  with  the  infantry  advance.  The 
dark-green  coated  riflemen  in  the  British  front  held  their 
fire  till  they  were  close  to  the  vineyards. 

As  the  British  right  approached  the  village  of  Burliuk 
the  wooden  houses  suddenly  burst  into  flame.  It  was  like 
an  effect  at  a  firework  display,  so  rapidly  did  the  conflagra- 
tion sweep  along  the  wooden  roofs  and  vine-wreathed  bal- 
conies. The  timber  was  no  doubt  very  dry  with  the  summer 
sun,  but  it  appears  that  steps  had  also  been  taken  by  the 
Russians  to  insure  the  rapid  spread  of  the  fire.  The  de- 
struction of  the  village  seemed  to  show  that  they  meant  to 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  15 

attempt  no  prolong-ed  stand  on  the  lower  bank  of  the  river, 
and  were  anxious  only  to  bar  the  approach  to  the  bridge 
by  making  the  main  village  street  an  avenue  of  flame. 

It  was  about  two  o'clock  when  Bosquet's  Division  began 
to  scale  the  heights.  The  Zouaves  of  D'Autemarre's  Brigade 
scrambled  to  the  crest  in  a  way  that  surprised  those  who 
watched  them  from  the  fleet.  The  first  of  the  guns  stuck 
fast  in  the  steep  cart  track,  but  Zouaves  and  linesmen  set 
to  work  to  help  the  horses  to  drag  them  up,  and  two  field- 
pieces  were  over  the  crest  almost  as  soon  as  the  first  of  the 
Zouaves.  The  battalion  from  Ululuk  moved  out  to  oppose 
this  unexpected  advance  from  a  point  where  any  hostile 
attack  was  so  far  believed  to  be  impossible,  and  brought 
four  light  guns  into  action  at  long  range.  Mentschikofif, 
miles  away  to  the  eastward  on  the  Kurgane  Hill,  heard  the 
firing  and  saw  the  cannon  smoke  of  the  fight  on  the  sea- 
ward clififs.  In  sudden  alarm  at  the  danger  it  suggested  to 
his  flank,  he  rode  westward  over  the  rolling  crests  of  the 
plateau  with  a  small  escort,  thus  abandoning  all  general  con- 
trol of  the  battle  for  a  while,  and  leaving  the  Russian  army 
without  a  commander.  His  subordinates  had  to  act  on  their 
own  initiative,  and  some  of  them  awaited  orders  that  never 
came. 

One  of  them,  General  Kiriakoff,  had  been  posted  in  the 
morning  with  a  division  of  eight  battalions  on  the  riverside 
west  of  Burliuk,  below  a  swell  of  the  plateau  crowned  by 
an  unfinished  tower  with  a  semaphore  apparatus  on  its  top. 
The  tower  gave  the  height  the  name  of  "  Telegraph  Hill," 
by  which  this  ridge  of  the  plateau  is  known  in  narratives 
of  the  battle.  When  Kiriakoff  saw  Bosquet's  columns  mov- 
ing towards  the  western  heights  he  became  anxious  about 
this  flank  attack,  and  without  waiting  for  orders  he  with- 
drew from  the  river  bank,  and  brought  his  battalions  up  to 
the  crest  of  the  Telegraph  ridge.  When  he  saw  that  the 
French   were   crowning   the   heights   he   began   to   march 


i6  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

towards  the  scene  of  this  engagement.  About  the  same  time 
St.  Arnaucl,  anxious  to  assist  Bosquet,  ordered  the  divisions 
of  Canrobert  and  Prince  Napoleon,  which  were  marching 
towards  the  crossing  of  the  Alma  below  the  Telegraph 
Hill,  to  move  farther  westward  and  ascend  the  heights  near 
Almatamak. 

The  result  was  that  the  British  army  alone  was  left  to 
deal  with  the  Russian  main  position  in  the  pass  behind  Bur- 
liuk  and  on  the  slopes  of  the  Kurgane  Hill.  The  two  divi- 
sions that  formed  the  front  line  of  the  attack  were  the 
Second  on  the  right,  under  De  Lacy  Evans,  and  the  Light 
Division  on  the  left,  under  Sir  George  Brown.  Both  of 
these  officers  had  seen  service  in  the  Peninsular  War  and 
in  the  British  campaign  of  1814  in  the  United  States.  But 
Evans  had  had  a  larger  experience.  He  had  been  at  Water- 
loo, and  for  years  he  had  commanded  the  Anglo-Spanish 
Legion  in  the  Carlist  War,  and  had  commanded  in  chief  in 
hard-fought  battles  in  the  north  of  Spain.  He  was  moving 
on  Burliuk  when  the  village  suddenly  burst  into  a  mass  of 
flame,  barring  his  direct  way  to  the  river  and  the  heights 
beyond.  He  then  broke  up  his  division,  sending  one  brigade 
(Pennefather)  round  the  place  to  the  left,  and  the  other 
(Adams)  by  a  long  detour  to  the  right.  Brown,  with  the 
Light  Division  moving  forward  without  any  such  delay,  was 
first  into  the  inclosures  along  the  river  between  Burliuk 
and  Tarchanlar.  The  riflemen  in  his  front  cleared  the  vine- 
yards and  orchards  very  quickly  of  the  Russian  skirmishers, 
who  nowhere  made  any  determined  stand.  On  his  right 
Pennefather's  Brigade  advanced  more  slowly,  coming  under 
a  heavy  artillery  fire  from  the  batteries  in  the  sloping  hollow 
beyond  the  bridge  of  Burliuk.  For  the  moment  Brown's 
regiments  had  an  easier  task.  As  they  struggled  through 
the  rushing  current  of  the  Alma  and  reached  its  farther 
shore,  they  were  sheltered  from  any  heavy  fire  by  the  rise 
of  the  ground  in  their  immediate  front. 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  17 

As  they  gained  the  shore,  barrack-yard  methods  asserted 
themselves  for  a  moment.  Adjutants  and  sergeant-majors 
were  busy  placing  markers  to  re-form  the  battaHons  in  rigid 
Hues ;  but  the  eagerness  of  battle  was  now  taking  possession 
of  the  men,  and  there  was  a  cry  of  "  Get  forward  —  get  for- 
ward anyhow !  "  and  the  regiments  began  to  push  up  the 
green  slope,  re-forming  as  they  went.  Perhaps  a  little  less 
haste  would  have  given  better  results. 

On  the  left  of  the  division,  Buller's  Brigade  (Seventy- 
seventh,  Eighty-eighth,  and  Nineteenth  regiments)  did  not 
advance  much  beyond  the  river  bank.  Buller,  looking  up 
the  slopes  of  Kurgane,  saw  before  him  a  mass  of  dark- 
coated,  helmeted  infantry,  and  to  its  right  the  head  of  a 
strong  cavalry  column.  Quite  correctly  he  took  it  that  his 
business  was  to  guard  the  flank  of  the  general  advance 
against  a  possible  counter-attack  that  might  easily  roll  it  up. 
With  the  Seventy-seventh  and  Eighty-eighth  he  lined  a  stony 
ridge  and  opened  fire  upon  the  nearest  enemy.  But  his 
rciuaining  regiment,  the  Nineteenth,  edged  away  to  the  right 
and  joined  the  other  brigade  of  the  Light  Division  (under 
Codrington)  in  its  rush  up  the  hill.  A  regiment  of  Penne- 
father's  Brigade,  the  Ninety-fifth,  also  joined  in  the  advance 
on  this  side,  so  that  Codrington,  as  he  rode  up  the  slope 
amid  a  spatter  of  fire  from  the  retiring  Russian  riflemen, 
had  five  battalions  with  him  —  Nineteenth,  Thirty-third, 
Ninety-fifth,  Seventh  Royal  Fusiliers,  and  Twenty-third 
Welsh  Fusiliers.  The  men  were  rather  huddled  together, 
for  there  was  not  enough  ground  to  form  the  two-deep 
line ;  but  as  they  topped  the  first  swell  of  the  heig-hts  they 
had  come  under  fire,  not  only  from  the  Russian  infantry, 
but  from  the  heavy  guns  of  the  lower  redoubt.  Brown  on 
the  left  of  the  brigade  was  trying  to  reduce  the  partial  dis- 
order to  something  more  like  a  drill-book  diagram.  Cod- 
rington, with  a  truer  instinct,  felt  that  every  moment  of 
delay  meant  loss,  and  shouted,  "  Fix  bayonets,  advance !  " 


i8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

To  his  leJt  as  he  rode  forward  came  Colonel  Chester  of  the 
Royal  Fusiliers,  followed  by  his  regiment,  eager  to  get  to 
close  quarters  with  the  enemy ;  and  then  the  whole  brigade 
surged  up  the  hill,  hardly  firing  a  shot. 

The  green  hillside  sloped  gently  upwards  to  the  terrace 
or  shoulder,  not  quite  five  hundred  yards  away,  where  the 
low  rampart  of  the  redoubt  rose  against  the  sky-line,  now 
wrapped  in  cannon  smoke,  torn  by  the  red  flashes  of  its 
fourteen  guns.  Right  and  left  of  it  the  Russian  Rifles  were 
in  action  in  a  straggling  line.  On  both  sides  of  the  redoubt 
through  the  smoke  there  were  glimpses  of  the  heads  of  in- 
fantry columns,  each  with  a  line  of  skirmishers  on  its  flanks. 
To  the  right  were  the  four  battalions  of  the  Vladimir  Regi- 
ment ;  to  the  left,  two  battalions  of  the  Kazan  men.  Two 
more  battalions  of  the  Kazan  Regiment  had  moved  well 
down  the  slope  to  the  right  of  the  attack.  Higher  up  the 
slope  behind  the  redoubt,  and  still  unseen  by  the  attack, 
were  two  batteries  and  four  battalions  of  the  Ouglitz  Regi- 
ment. Looking  at  the  whole  position  one  cannot  help  think- 
ing that  an  umpire  at  a  war  game,  or  at  manoeuvers,  would 
have  declared  the  attack  hopeless,  and  promptly  put  Cod- 
rington's  whole  brigade  out  of  action.  One  can  imagine 
him  saying:  "This  will  never  do.  You  are  proposing  to 
attack  an  intrenched  position,  without  any  previous  artil- 
lery preparation.  You  have  not  a  gim  to  cover  your  advance. 
You  are  simply  making  a  mad  rush  with  five  battalions,  in 
no  particular  order,  against  an  unbroken  and  unshaken 
enemy  who  holds  the  higher  ground  with  a  good  field  of 
fire,  against  which  you  have  no  cover;  and  against  your 
five  battalions  he  has  fourteen  intrenched  guns,  eight  bat- 
talions in  his  front  line,  and  four  more  close  at  hand  in 
reserve.    Your  attack  is  a  piece  of  madness." 

But  in  real  war  a  "  piece  of  madness  "  sometimes  gives 
unexpected  results.  In  the  field,  tactical  problems  cannot 
be  entirely  settled  by  counting  up  numbers.     Battalions  in 


0 

^ 

I, 

1 

THE    BATTLE    OF   THE    ALMA  19 

action  are  not  the  nerveless  leaden  blocks  of  the  war  game. 
The  human  element  comes  in.  These  dense  masses  of  Rus- 
sian infantry  might  indeed  have  borne  down  the  thin  lines 
pi  redcoats  opposed  to  them,  if  they  had  crossed  bayonets 
with  them  and  brought  the  bodily  weight  of  the  column  to 
bear  on  the  more  slender  formation ;  but  neither  in  men  nor 
in  officers  on  the  Russian  side  were  there  the  energy  and 
dash  that  would  have  made  such  close  conflict  inevitable. 
There  was  lack  of  initiative  in  the  leaders,  and  every  move- 
ment was  carried  out  at  a  slow  step.  This  meant  that  there 
would  be  plenty  of  time  for  a  fire  fight  before  line  and 
column  met ;  and  in  the  column  formation  only  a  few  men 
could  fire,  while  in  the  line  every  rifle  could  come  into  ac- 
tion, and  at  such  short  ranges  the  fire  of  the  rifle  into  such 
a  target  as  the  dense  column  meant  heavy  loss  for  the  Rus- 
sians.    These  were  the  conditions  that  decided  the  result. 

The  two  columns  of  the  Kazan  Regiment,  moving  slowly 
down  right  and  left  of  the  redoubt,  were  soon  stopped  by 
the  heavy  fire  that  broke  out  in  their  front.  The  left  column 
halted  and  exchanged  fire  with  the  thin  red  line  of  the 
Royal  Fusiliers.  The  right  column  was  not  merely  stopped, 
but  was  driven  back.  Colonel  Lawrence  with  the  Rifles 
that  had  covered  the  advance  sent  showers  of  death- 
dealing  bullets  into  its  flank,  while  the  Nineteenth  Regi- 
ment poured  a  steady  fire  into  its  front.  The  Kazan  men, 
after  a  brief  attempt  to  reply,  turned  and  moved  back  up 
the  slope.  Meanwhile  the  crowd  of  soldiers  that  were  fol- 
lowing Codrington  up  the  hill  towards  the  redoubt  were 
pushing  on,  undaunted  by  the  blasts  of  canister  and  grape- 
shot  that  tore  through  them,  strewing  the  slope  with  dead 
and  wounded.  Suddenly  the  artillery  fire  slackened.  As 
the  rush  of  shouting  men  reached  the  redoubt,  it  was  seen 
that  the  enemy  were  withdrawing  their  guns.  Covered  by 
a  handful  of  riflemen,  teams  of  horses  were  struggling  up 
the  hill,  dragging  away  the  heavy  cannon. 


20  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

The  first  man  to  top  the  low  rampart  of  the  earthwork 
was  a  boy  officer  of  the  Welsh  Fusiliers,  Ensign  Anstruther, 
bearing  the  Queen's  color  of  the  regiment.  As  he  proudly 
waved  the  flag  he  dropped  dead,  pierced  by  a  Russian  bul- 
let. Sergeant  Luke  O'Connor  of  the  same  regiment  snatched 
the  color  and  held  it  up  while  his  comrades  poured  over  the 
rampart.  Struck  by  a  bullet  full  in  the  breast  he  staggered 
and  fell,  and  another  soldier  seized  the  color.  But  O'Con- 
nor rose  and,  with  the  blood  trickling  down  his  tunic, 
claimed  and  resumed  the  task  of  bearing  the  regimental 
standard ;  and  though  more  than  once  officers  or  com- 
rades urged  him  to  go  to  the  rear  and  have  his  wound 
dressed.  Sergeant  O'Connor,  pale  and  faint  with  loss  of 
blood,  insisted  on  carrying  the  color  to  the  end  of  the 
battle.^ 

General  Codrington,  waving  his  cap,  leaped  his  horse  into 
the  redoubt  through  one  of  the  embrasures.  A  brass  how- 
itzer abandoned  in  the  work  was  claimed  as  a  trophy  by  the 
Welsh  Fusiliers.  Another  gun  was  secured  by  Captain  Bell 
of  the  same  gallant  regiment.  A  single  driver  with  three 
'horses  was  dragging  it  away  when  Bell  ran  out,  pistol  in 
hand,  caught  the  bridle  of  the  leading  horse,  forced  the 
driver  to  dismount,  and  turned  the  gun  back  down  the 
hill.  Sir  George  Brown,  the  divisional  commander,  rode 
up  at  the  moment.  A  general  of  the  old,  rigid  red-tape 
school,  instead  of  a  word  of  congratulation  to  Bell,  his 
greeting  to  the  captain  was  a  sharp  "  Rejoin  your  company, 
sir !  " 

The  crowd  of  officers  and  men  who  had  now  gathered 
in  the  captured  intrenchment  came  under  fire  from  the 
upper  slope  of  the  hill.  Two  field  batteries  opened  at  short 
range,  and  the  riflemen  of  the  Vladimir  and  Ouglitz  r€gi- 

^  Sergeant  O'Connor  received  the  Victoria  Cross  and  a  commis- 
sion, and  rose  to  the  rank  of  general  before  retiring  from  the  active 
list 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  21 

ments  came  into  action  with  them.  There  had  been  severe 
losses  during  the  rush  up  the  hill,  but  the  men  now  began 
to  drop  quickly.  The  work  was  cleared  of  the  crowd,  and 
the  men  partly  took  shelter  under  its  outer  face,  replying 
to  the  enemy's  fire  with  rifles  resting  on  the  breastwork, 
partly  began  to  form  on  the  slope  immediately  below  it.  The 
loss  in  officers  was  particularly  heavy,  and  this  tended  to 
produce  disorganization.  In  the  Welsh  Fusiliers,  Colonel 
Chester  was  shot  dead,  and  12  officers  and  nearly  200  men 
were  killed  or  wounded.  The  Thirty-third  Regiment  had 
its  colonel  (Blake)  badly  wounded,  and  7  officers  and 
240  men  killed  or  wounded.  Webber,  the  colonel  of  the 
Ninety-fifth,  was  killed,  and  the  regiment  lost  16  officers 
and  more  than  150  men.  In  all,  the  losses  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  "  Great  Redoubt  "  amounted  to  some  900  offi- 
cers and  men. 

If  the  support  of  fresh  troops  had  been  at  hand,  there  is 
no  doulit  that  the  impulse  of  the  first  rush  up  the  hill  might 
have  been  renewed,  and  the  attack  carried  on  to  its  crest. 
But  the  stormers  of  the  redoubt,  torn  by  the  pelting  fire 
of  the  enemy's  guns,  unsupported  by  either  artillery  fire 
or  infantry  reinforcements,  found  themselves  isolated  on 
the  hillside,  exhausted  by  their  gallant  effort  and  crippled 
by  their  terrible  losses.  To  their  left  Buller  had  at  first 
moved  forward  the  Seventy-seventh  and  Eighty-eighth,  but 
at  the  sight  of  Russian  cavalry  formed  on  the  shoulder  of 
the  hill  the  two  battalions  had  halted  and  formed  square, 
and  the  curve  of  the  hillside  and  the  driving  smoke  that 
hung  low  upon  it  hid  from  them  the  plight  of  their  com- 
rades at  the  redoubt.  * 

The  second  line  ought  to  have  been  across  the  river  by 
this  time,  but  it  was  lagging  behind  in  the  most  unfortunate 
way.  The  Duke  of  Cambridge  had  actually  halted  his  fine 
division  of  Guardsmen  and  Highlanders  on  the  edge  of  the 
vineyards.     It  was  no  lack  of  courage  that  held  him  back, 


22  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

but  he  was  busy  arranging-  to  march  his  long  hne  through 
the  inclosures  without  disorganizing  its  beautiful  drill-book 
formation.  The  ground  was  so  utterly  unlike  Hyde  Park 
that  it  was  a  serious  problem.  To  his  right,  near  Burliuk, 
De  Lacy  Evans,  a  soldier  experienced  in  war,  had  brought 
a  couple  of  batteries  into  action  against  the  guns  in  the 
sloping  hollow  beyond  the  bridge,  and  was  pushing  Penne- 
father's  Brigade  across  the  river  to  force  the  pass.  Through 
the  drifting  battle  smoke  Evans  saw  the  capture  of  the  re- 
doubt and  the  subsequent  danger  of  Codrington's  isolated 
and  disorganized  brigade.  He  took  the  responsibility  of 
sending  one  of  his  officers  to  the  duke  to  urge  him  to  push 
forward  at  once.  At  the  same  time  Sir  Richard  Airey  of 
Raglan's  staff,  on  his  own  initiative,  rode  up  to  the  Duke 
of  Cambridge  and  told  him  that  he  must  get  across  the  river 
without  delay.  The  Guards,  with  the  Highlanders  on  their 
left,  then  moved  through  the  inclosures  in  slow  and  stately 
fashion,  re-formed  line  on  the  river  bank,  and  forded  the 
Alma. 

But  before  they  were  across,  the  Great  Redoubt  had  been 
retaken  by  the  enemy.  While  the  two  batteries  on  the  Kur- 
gane  crest  still  thundered  against  its  captors,  two  massive 
columns  of  helmeted  gray-coated  infantry  came  moving 
slowly  down  the  slope  to  right  and  left  —  the  Ouglitz  and 
Vladimir  regiments,  each  four  battalions  strong.  The  Vladi- 
mir men  were  led  by  two  generals  —  Kvetzinski,  the  divi- 
sional commander  of  the  troops  on  the  Kurgane  Hill,  and 
Prince  Gortschakoff,  Mentschikoff's  second  in  command. 
The  Russians  came  on  in  a  cloud  of  musketry  smoke,  for 
the  front  ranks  and  the  skirmishers  extended  on  the  flanks 
were  firing,  and  in  the  very  heart  of  the  columns  excited 
young  soldiers  were  discharging  their  muskets  into  the  air. 
Codrington's  men  returned  their  fire,  the  surviving  officers 
having  got  them  into  something  like  ordered  lines.  The 
Ouglitz  Regiment,  galled  by  this  steady  rifle  fire,  actually 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  23 

halted.  The  Vladimir  Regiment  might  also  have  been 
stopped,  but  at  the  critical  moment  a  British  bugle  sounded 
the  retire,  and  the  call  was  taken  up  along  the  line. 

Subsequent  inquiry  showed  that  an  unidentified  mounted 
officer  had  given  the  order  to  a  bugler  of  the  Nineteenth. 
For  a  few  moments  there  was  confusion  in  the  British  line. 
Here,  officers  were  calling  out  to  their  men  to  stand  fast ; 
there,  others  were  bidding  them  obey  the  bugle  call.  As 
it  rang  out  again  and  again,  it  was  generally  obeyed.  Some 
of  the  men  clung  doggedly  to  the  breastwork.  A  sergeant 
of  the  Welsh  Fusiliers,  standing  up  on  it,  called  to  his  men, 
"Don't  you  hear  the  bugles?  You  in  list  retire."  As  he 
spoke  a  bullet  crashed  through  his  brain ;  and  the  last  of 
the  men  turned  and  went  down  towards  the  river.  There 
was  no  panic  flight,  but  a  slow  retirement,  men  turning  to 
fire  at  the  Vladimir  men,  who  halted  as  they  regained  the 
breastwork. 

Thus,  after  a  first  splendid  success,  matters  were  going 
badly  on  the  allied  left.  With  the  French  on  the  right  the 
outlook  was  not  much  better.  Bosquet's  brigades,  miles 
away  towards  the  sea,  were  waiting  to  get  up  their  guns, 
and  had  apparently  failed  to  realize  that  they  had  no  enemy 
in  their  front  but  the  Minsk  battalion  near  Ululuk,  and 
that  there  was  nothing  to  ])revent  the  infantry  pushing  on 
along  the  heights.  On  Bosquet's  immediate  left,  in  the  gul- 
lies of  the  blufifs  above  Almatamak,  Canrobert's  Zouaves 
and  linesmen  had  climbed  the  heights  and  deployed  on  the 
plateau,  but  his  guns  were  still  in  difficulties  on  the  steep 
narrow  cart-tracks  below.  Behind  Canrobert,  packed  in  the 
gullies  and  on  the  shelf  of  low  ground  along  the  river,  were 
some  12,000  French  soldiers.  Prince  Napoleon's  Division 
and  a  brigade  of  Forey's.  The  opposition  journalists  of 
Paris  accused  the  prince  of  half-heartedness,  and  said  he 
hung  back  from  the  fight ;  but  the  simple  truth  was  that  it 
was  impossible  for  three  divisions  to  mount  simultaneously 


24  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

one  narrow,  steep  hill-track,  where  the  guns  had  almost  to  be 
lifted  up  by  men  dragging  at  limber,  trail,  and  wheel. 

The  situation  was  dangerous  in  the  extreme.  Part  of 
Canrobert's  Division  was  on  the  top  of  the  heights,  deployed 
into  line,  with  all  its  supports  and  artillery  huddled  on  the 
steep  slope  below ;  and  in  its  front,  along  the  rising  crest 
of  the  Telegraph  Hill,  General  Kiriakoff  had  set  in  battle 
array  eight  battalions  and  two  batteries,  while  eight  battal- 
ions more,  taken  from  the  reserve  by  Mentschikoff  himself, 
were  moving  round  the  Telegraph  height  to  take  Canrobert 
in  flank.  The  Russian  guns  on  Telegraph  Hill  were  in 
action  against  the  French  front,  and  Canrobert  could  only 
reply  with  long-range  rifle  fire.  On  the  advance  of  the 
heavy  flanking  column  against  his  right,  he  drew  back 
under  the  cover  of  the  topmost  swell  of  the  plateau,  lining 
the  crest  with  his  infantry,  till  the  guns  could  arrive. 
Mentschikoff,  having  set  his  columns  in  motion  against  the 
French,  had  handed  the  command  over  to  Kiriakoff,  and  was 
riding  back  to  see  how  the  battle  was  going  on  his  right. 

,Here  the  Guards  had  crossed  the  river,  and  were  moving 
up  the  slope,  when  the  Scots  Fusiliers  were  thrown  into  dis- 
order and  forced  backward  by  the  beaten  mass  of  the  Light 
Division  descending  upon  them  in  a  confused  crowd.  It 
was  a  moment  when,  if  the  Vladimir  Regiment  had  charged 
boldly  down,  there  might  have  been  disastrous  results ;  but 
the  Vladimirs,  after  a  mere  show  of  advancing,  had  again 
halted  irresolutely.  A  strange  thing  had  happened  which 
w^as  to  alter  the  whole  course  of  the  battle. 

Lord  Raglan,  gallant  soldier  as  he  was,  could  hardly  claim 
to  rank  as  a  great  general.  Having  put  his  lines  in  motion 
against  the  Russian  position,  he  did  not  take  any  steps  to 
control  or  direct  their  further  action,  but  launched  out  on 
a  piece  of  adventure  that  might  easily  have  had  an  unfor- 
tunate ending;  yet  (as  the  chapter  of  accidents  would  have 
it,  and  against  all  reasonable  probabilities)   it  enabled  him 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  25 

to  exercise  a  decisive  influence  on  the  fight,  partly  because 
the  leadership  of  the  Russian  generals  was  so  hopelessly  bad 
that  any  unexpected  incident  was  likely  to  upset  all  their 
arrangements. 

As  the  Light  Division  crossed  the  river,  Raglan  with  his 
staff,  a  score  of  riders  in  blue  uniforms,  had  ridden  down 
towards  the  river  to  the  west  of  the  burning  village  of 
Burliuk,  passing  Adams's  Brigade  on  the  way.  He  had 
then  no  British  troops  in  front  of  him  except  a  handful  of 
riflemen  who  were  driving  the  last  of  the  Russian  skirm- 
ishers out  of  the  vineyards.  Passing  through  these,  Raglan 
and  his  staff  forded  the  river  and  began  to  ride  up  a  gully 
leading  to  the  plateau.  One  of  the  officers  was  wounded 
by  a  Russian  rifle  ball,  but  as  they  rode  up  the  party  found 
no  enemy  barring  their  way.  There  was  really  no  means 
of  knowing  whether  or  not  they  would  come  upon  formed 
hostile  lines  at  the  top  of  the  track  they  were  ascending, 
and  with  a  reckless  disregard  of  possibilities  they  all  rode 
together  without  a  single  scout  in  advance  of  them. 

As  luck  would  have  it,  they  reached  the  crest  of  the 
heights  in  the  midst  of  the  wide  gap  that  separated  the 
Russian  left,  under  Kiriakoff,  from  the  right,  about  the 
Kurgane  Hill  and  the  Sebastopol  road.  On  the  undulating 
plateau  the  horsemen  found  themselves  strangely  isolated. 
More  than  a  mile  away  to  the  westward,  behind  the  ridge 
of  Telegraph  Hill,  Kiriakoff's  guns  were  thundering  against 
Canrobert.  To  this  more  distant  part  of  the  battle  Raglan 
paid  no  attention  ;  all  his  anxiety  was  for  the  nearer  struggle. 
The  roar  of  the  guns  in  the  roadway  pass  and  on  the  crest 
of  Kurgane,  the  reports  of  English  batteries  replying  from 
beyond  Burliuk,  told  him  that  the  fight  was  hotly  contested. 
He  spurred  up  a  little  knoll  and  halted  there,  surrounded 
by  his  staff.  They  looked  down  into  the  heart  of  the  con- 
flict. It  was  a  strange  position  for  a  commander-in-chief. 
^\'ith  his  few  comrades  he  was  on  the  left  rear  of  the  enemy's 


26  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

center.  Below  him  the  ground  sloped  to  the  road  pass,  and 
there  he  could  see  the  Russian  batteries  in  action  and  masses 
of  reserves  posted  behind  them.  Beyond  the  hollow  of  the 
pass,  through  jifts  in  the  cannon  smoke,  there  were  glimpses 
of  the  red  lines  struggling  up  the  lower  slopes  of  Kurgane, 
with  the  broken  Light  Division  mingled  with  the  Guardsmen 
on  the  right  of  the  attack,  higher  up  the  massed  battalions 
of  the  gray-coated  Vladimir  Regiment,  and  higher  still  the 
batteries  on  the  crest. 

To  the  Russians  the  sight  of  the  blue-uniformed  horse- 
men crowning  the  knoll  between  them  and  Telegraph  Hill 
conveyed  a  disquieting  impression.  Red  coats  would  have 
suggested  Englishmen,  but  the  blue  staff  uniform  made  the 
Russian  officers  think  of  the  French  flank  attack,  which 
they  knew  was  developing  along  the  seaward  heights ;  and 
it  seemed  to  them  that  this  handful  of  riders  would  not  be 
standing  quietly  on  the  hilltop  unless  they  had  an  army 
behind  them.  This  would  mean  that  disaster  had  overtaken 
Mentschikoff,  Kiriakoff,  and  the  Russian  left,  and  that  the 
French  attack  would  soon  come  pouring  on  to  the  ground 
about  the  Sebastopol  road.  This  impression  was  strength- 
ened when  suddenly  on  the  hilltop  there  appeared  a  couple 
of  guns,  which  came  promptly  into  action,  firing  on  and 
enfilading  the  Russian  batteries  in  the  hollow  of  the  pass  by 
which  the  highroad  climbs  the  hills. 

"  If  we  had  only  a  couple  of  guns  here!  "  Lord  Raglan 
had  exclaimed  as  he  looked  out  from  the  knoll ;  and  promptly 
two  of  his  officers  had  ridden  down  to  the  river,  found  Cap- 
tain Turner's  battery  fording  it,  and  hurried  up  to  the  two 
leading  guns  ;  while  another  officer  rode  hard  to  the  nearest 
infantry  —  Adams's  Brigade  west  of  Burliuk  —  with  the 
news  that  they  had  only  to  press  on  and  they  would  seize 
the  center  of  the  enemy's  position  without  firing  a  shot.  So 
few  gunners  had  come  up  with  the  two  guns  that  some  of 
the  staff  dismounted  and  helped  to  serve  them.     Never  did 


THE    BATTLE    OF   THE   ALMA  27 

two  cannon  produce  a  more  important  effect.  The  strange- 
ness of  the  event  seemed  to  paralyze  the  Russians.  A  more 
enterprising  enemy  would  have  attacked  and  swept  Raglan 
and  his  handful  of  officers  and  the  section  of  artillery  from 
the  hilltop,  but  the  daring  group  of  officers  and  men  was 
magnified  by  imagination  into  the  vanguard  of  a  victorious 
army ;  and  as  the  cannon-shot  crashed  into  the  Russian  bat- 
teries by  the  road,  hurtling  down  from  the  higher  ground 
on  their  flank  and  rear,  the  enemy's  gunners  began  to  limber 
up,  and  with  much  cracking  of  whips  their  guns  were  seen 
galloping  to  the  rear,  and  Evans,  with  Pennefathcr's  Bri- 
gade, began  to  force  his  way  up  the  pass  from  the  Burliuk 
crossing,  the  chief  obstacle  to  his  advance  having  been  thus 
by  a  lucky  chance  swept  away.  The  guns  then  opened  on 
the  Russian  reserves  in  the  direction  of  Kurgane  Hill.  The 
range  was  long  for  the  smooth-bore  pieces  of  the  day,  but 
this  distant  fire  from  hostile  guns,  presumably  French, 
posted  in  the  very  center  of  their  position,  helped  to  paralyze 
the  energy  of  the  Russian  defense  on  the  hill. 

The  Guards  were  now  advancing  up  the  slope  of  Kur- 
gane. On  the  right  the  Scots  Fusilier  Guards,  thrown  into 
confusion  by  the  retiring  mass  of  the  Light  Division,  and 
attacked  by  the  close  fire  of  the  Vladimir  Regiment,  had  at 
first  been  forced  to  give  way.  General  Bentinck,  who  com- 
manded the  Guards  Brigade  himself,  gave  them  the  order 
to  retire  at  a  moment  when  the  Russians  were  closing  on 
the  broken  line.  Here  and  there  bayonets  had  actually 
crossed,  and  the  colors  of  the  regiment  were  saved  from 
imminent  capture  by  one  of  the  officers,  Lord  Lindsay, 
going  to  the  rescue,  pistol  in  hand,  and  shooting  down  the 
nearest  of  the  enemy.  In  the  brief  struggle  and  the  retire- 
ment the  Guards  lost  heavily.  They  re-formed  by  the  river 
bank,  and  moved  forward  again.  By  this  time  the  Cold- 
streams  and  the  Grenadiers  had  come  into  action  to  their 
left,  and  Colin  Campbell,  with  the  three  plaided  regiments 


28  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

of  the  Highland  Brigade,  was  across  the  river  and  prolong- 
ing their  line,  while  Codrington  was  re-forming  the  rem- 
nant of  the  Light  Division. 

Before  he  crossed  the  river,  Campbell  had  addressed  a 
brief,  soldier-like  speech  to  his  Highlanders.  "  Now,  men," 
he  said,  ''  you  are  going  into  action.  Remember  this :  who- 
ever is  wounded  —  I  don't  care  what  his  rank  is  —  he  must 
lie  where  he  falls  till  the  bandsmen  come  to  attend  to  him. 
No  soldiers  must  go  carrying  off  wounded  men.  If  any 
soldier  does  such  a  thing,  his  name  shall  be  stuck  up  in  his 
parish  church.  Don't  be  in  a  hurry  about  firing.  Your 
officers  will  tell  you  when  it  's  time  to  open  fire.  Be  steady. 
Keep  silence.  Fire  low.  Now,  men,  the  army  will  watch 
us.  Make  me  proud  of  the  Highland  Brigade."  Then  he 
put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  Black  Watch  on  the  right 
of  the  line,  and  gave  the  order,  "  Forward,  Forty-second !  " 
As  he  came  up  the  slope  on  the  left  of  the  Guards  Brigade 
the  Scots  Guards  were  retiring,  and  the  two  other  battalions 
were  faced  by  advancing  masses  of  the  enemy.  The  Duke 
of  Cambridge,  riding  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  Guards,  the 
center-point  of  his  division,  spoke  to  the  Highland  general 
as  he  came  up,  and  expressed  a  fear  that  the  Guards  would 
have  to  retire  before  the  odds  arrayed  against  them.  "  No, 
sir,"  replied  Colin  Campbell ;  "  better  that  every  man  in  Her 
Majesty's  Guards  should  lie  dead  on  the  field  than  that  they 
should  turn  their  backs  on  the  enemy." 

But  the  dangerous  crisis  was  now  nearing  its  end.  A 
hard-pressed  fighting  line  is  steadied  and  carried  onward  by 
new  forces  coming  into  action.  While  the  Scots  Fusiliers 
and  the  Light  Division  re-formed,  the  Grenadiers  and  Cold- 
streams,  in  evenly-dressed  lines,  were  exchanging  fire  at  the 
shortest  of  ranges  with  the  Vladimir  and  Kazan  regiments, 
and  two  other  regiments  were  moving  down  upon  their 
flank.  Against  these  came  the  advance  of  the  Highlanders, 
prolonging  the  line  of  the  Guards.    From  that  extended  line 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  29 

there  came  a  steady,  well-directed  fire  which  told  with  ter- 
rible effect  on  the  Russian  masses.  Gortschakoft",  at  the 
head  of  the  Vladimir  men,  had  his  horse  killed  under  him, 
and,  half  stunned  by  the  fall,  staggered  back  to  the  redoubt, 
where  he  found  General  Kvetzinski.  The  latter  tells  in  his 
report  the  impression  that  the  situation  at  that  moment 
made  on  his  mind.  He  says  that  the  numbers  of  the  British 
seemed  to  increase,  and  they  had  brought  into  action  forces 
superior  to  his  own.  The  fact  is  that  his  own  men  locally 
outnumbered  the  attack,  but  packed  in  close  columns  they 
covered  less  ground  than  the  extended  red  lines,  blazing 
with  rifle  flashes  and  wrapped  in  smoke,  through  which 
could  be  seen  the  long  rows  of  tall  bearskins  to  the  right, 
the  plumed  bonnets  of  the  three  Highland  regiments  on  the 
left.  The  lines  gave  an  impression  of  superior  force.  He 
notes,  too,  that  a  "  French  battery  "  was  firing  into  the 
Vladimir  column  from  a  hill  to  its  left,  and  French  columns 
were  moving  to  cut  off  his  retreat.  The  "  French  battery  " 
he  saw  on  the  knoll  was  the  British  battery  brought  up  by 
Raglan.  From  its  presence  the  Russian  general  had  jumped 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  French  would  soon  be  upon  his 
rear.  The  shots  that  now  and  then  crashed  into  the  sorely- 
tried  Vladimir  column  came,  however,  not  from  Raglan's 
battery,  but  from  British  guns  that  had  been  brought  up  to 
a  shoulder  of  the  pass. 

Suddenly  it  was  seen  that  the  Vladimir  Regiment  was 
retiring  in  a  broken  crowd,  leaving  the  hillside  strewn  with 
gray  heaps  of  dead  and  wounded.  There  was  a  ringing 
cheer  from  the  Guards,  an  order  to  advance  firing,  and  the 
whole  line  went  forward.  On  their  left  the  Highlanders 
were  also  going  up  the  hill  with  leveled  bayonets.  The 
Russians  were  everywhere  giving  way.  The  Grenadiers 
marched  proudly  over  the  recaptured  redoubt.  The  High- 
landers carried  with  a  rush  the  smaller  work  to  the  eastward 
of  it.     The  British  line  was  well  uj)  towards  the  summit  of 


30  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Kurgane.  Evans  with  his  left  brigade  had  forced  the  pass 
of  the  highroad.  Beyond  it  his  other  brigade  appeared  in 
a  long  red  line,  topping  the  knoll  where  Raglan  had  been 
watching  the  crisis.  The  Third  Division  began  to  ford  the 
river  near  Burliuk.  Further  up  towards  Tarchanlar,  Lord 
Lucan,  without  waiting  for  orders,  moved  across  and  up  the 
hill  with  his  looo  horsemen  and  his  light  artillery. 

On  the  v/cstern  heights  at  the  same  time  impending  dis- 
aster had  been  turned  into  success.  When  KiriakofFs  ad- 
vance led  Canrobert  to  withdraw  his  division  over  the  edge 
of  the  plateau,  a  fierce  attack  by  the  Russians  might  have 
inflicted  deadly  loss  on  the  French  army,  huddled  among 
the  gullies  at  the  top  of  the  cliffs  and  crowded  on  the 
tracks  below,  where  it  was  impossible  to  form  a  fighting 
front  or  bring  guns  into  action.  But  the  Russian  general 
had  hesitated  strangely.  He  seemed  to  think  that  all  he 
need  do  was  to  keep  his  battalions  formed  to  meet  any  fur- 
ther attempt  of  the  enemy  to  advance.  He  moved  them 
out  into  a  long  line,  with  their  right  towards  the  northern 
edge  of  the  high  ground.  Suddenly  they  came  under  a 
heavy  artillery  fire.  His  report  shows  that  he  thought  he 
was  being  bombarded  from  the  fleet.  The  fire  really  came 
from  a  couple  of  French  batteries  that  had  been  brought  up 
the  pass  above  Almatamak,  and  had  come  into  action  with 
the  gun  muzzles  just  peeping  over  the  crest  of  the  wide 
gully  by  which  the  hill  road  ascends.  The  effect  on  Kiria- 
koff  was  to  lead  him  to  withdraw  his  battalions  from  what 
he  expected  would  be  the  fire  of  hundreds  of  naval  guns. 
And  the  arrival  of  artillery  support  was  followed  immedi- 
ately by  the  reappearance  of  Canrobert's  Division  on  the 
hilltop.  As  the  French  infantry  again  opened  fire,  Kiriakoff 
began  to  retire  eastwards  and  then  southwards  towards  the 
Sebastopol  road.  Fie  had  seen  Adams's  Brigade  crowning 
the  heights  above  the  Burliuk  pass,  and  masses  of  infantry 
streaming  back  from  the  Kurgane  Hill.     Bosquet's  Division 


THE    BATTLE    OF    THE    ALMA  31 

was  now  marching  to  support  Canrobert.  Tlie  Turkish 
Brigade  was  up  on  the  plateau.  Prince  Napoleon's  men 
and  one  of  Forey's  brigades  were  up.  The  greater  part  of 
the  French  army  was  on  the  heights.  Canrobert's  Division 
led  the  advance,  but  so  rapid  was  Kiriakoff's  retirement  that 
on  the  Telegraph  ridge  nothing  was  left  but  two  companies 
of  Russian  riflemen.  These  had  remained  near  the  sema- 
phore tower,  apparently  because  they  had  been  forgotten, 
and  had  no  orders.  Canrobert's  men  broke  into  a  wild  rush 
for  the  ridge.  Regiments  of  Zouaves  and  linesmen  were 
racing  for  the  honor  of  planting  the  tricolor  on  the  tower. 
They  were  met  by  a  spatter  of  rifle  fire  in  front,  and  on 
their  right  front  by  a  burst  of  artillery  fire  from  a  battery 
that  Kiriakoft*  had  placed  on  the  prolongation  of  the  Tele- 
graph ridge  to  cover  his  retreat.  The  unfortunate  Russian 
riflemen  were  simply  overwhelmed  in  a  rush  of  bayonets. 
The  scaffolding  was  still  standing  round  the  unfinished 
tower,  and  three  regimental  standard-bearers  climbed  it. 
Lieutenant  Poitevin  of  the  Thirty-ninth  of  the  line  and 
Sergeant  Fleury  of  the  First  Zouaves  were  killed  by  cannon- 
shots  as  they  planted  the  flags  of  their  regiments  on  the  top 
of  the  building. 

It  was  nearly  five  o'clock.  The  Russians  were  every- 
where retiring,  French  and  British  batteries  sending  a 
shower  of  cannon-shot  and  shrapnel  into  the  gray  columns ; 
but  there  was  no  pursuit.  The  3000  Russian  cavalry  that 
had  been  kept  idle  all  day  on  the  eastern  and  southern  slopes 
of  Kurgane  now  covered  the  retreat.  The  weary  victors 
were  well  satisfied  to  hold  the  ground  they  had  won. 

The  battle  of  the  Alma  was  begun  on  a  definite,  well- 
conceived  plan,  1)ut  fought  out  in  a  way  that  showed 
throughout  a  singular  want  of  cooperation  between  the 
Allies,  the  result  of  there  being  no  strong  central  direction. 
The  French  flank  movement  was  not  pushed  home  till  the 
event  had  been  already  decided  by  sheer  hard  fighting,  plus 


32  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

a  happy  accident,  on  the  British  side.  The  superiority  in 
numbers  possessed  by  the  AUies  was  thrown  away  by  the 
wide  division  of  their  forces.  The  French  encountered  no 
serious  opposition,  yet  they  were  very  slow  in  their  final 
advance.  They  showed  themselves  much  more  active  and 
enterprising  in  the  Italian  campaign  a  few  years  later.  The 
British  had  to  face  equal,  if  not  superior,  numbers  in  their 
attack  on  the  Russian  right,  but  the  attack  was  made  in  a 
way  that  exposed  isolated  divisions  to  disaster.  In  this  fight 
on  the  Kurgane  Hill  it  is  remarkable  how  long  Russians 
and  British  stood  up  against  each  other,  exchanging  a  deadly 
fire  at  point-blank  range.  In  the  result  we  see  the  superi- 
ority of  the  line  over  the  column,  and  we  shall  see  how 
linear  tactics  gradually  became  the  rule  for  all  armies,  as 
improvements  in  the  rifle  increased  the  rapidity  and  ac- 
curacy of  fire. 

In  the  South  African  War  there  was  frequent  exaggera- 
tion in  the  newspaper  comments  on  the  '*  terrible  losses  " 
incurred  in  modern  battles.  At  Colenso  and  at  Magersfon- 
tein  the  British  had  some  800  killed  and  wounded,  but  in 
the  three  hours'  fight  on  the  Alma  heights  the  British  lost 
nearly  3000  men,  mostly  in  the  struggle  on  the  Kurgane 
Hill.  The  French  reported  a  loss  of  1300.  The  Russian 
losses  were  over  5000  men  killed  and  wounded,  including 
five  generals.  The  heaviest  loss  fell  on  the  two  regiments 
that  had  held  the  ground  about  the  Great  Redoubt.  The 
gallant  Vladimir  Regiment  only  gave  way  after  losing  48 
per  cent  of  its  strength,  47  officers  and  1260  men.  Every 
officer  above  the  rank  of  captain  in  its  four  battalions  was 
down.  The  Kazan  Regiment  which  fought  beside  it  lost 
28  officers  and  1220  men.  The  Russians  left  two  guns  in 
the  hands  of  the  British,  but  no  unwounded  prisoners.  The 
wounded  of  both  sides  fared  badly.  The  elaborate  ambu- 
lance organization  of  armies,  that  has  done  so  much  to 
diminish  the  miseries  of  war,  was  still  in  the  future.     In 


THE    BATTLE    OF   THE    ALMA  33 

the  British  army  each  regiment  had  its  surgeon,  and  the 
bandsmen  were  detailed  to  attend  to  the  wounded  in  action. 
But  there  were  no  ambulances  or  stretcher  bearers,  no  trained 
hospital  staff.  Aseptic  surgery  was  still  unknown.  The 
unfortunate  wounded  were  laid  in  rows  on  the  field,  and 
received  help  from  a  mere  handful  of  doctors.  Later,  the 
sailors  improvised  stretchers  with  oars  and  canvas,  and  in 
the  course  of  several  days  of  hard  work  conveyed  the  sur- 
vivors of  them  on  board  the  fleet.  The  French  and  British 
were  sent  to  Scutari ;  the  Russians,  under  a  flag  of  truce, 
to  Odessa. 

One  more  comparison  between  past  and  present.  If  the 
Alma  had  been  fought  under  existing  conditions,  London 
would  have  known  on  the  morning  of  the  battle  that  an 
engagement  was  imminent.  Late  editions  of  the  evening 
papers  would  sell  by  tens  of  thousands,  and  convey  the  news 
of  the  victory  with  some  details  of  the  fighting.  Next  day's 
morning  papers  would  give  columns  of  space  to  elaborate 
narratives  of  the  day.  But  how  did  the  news  actually  reach 
the  people  of  London  in  1854? 

The  battle  took  place  on  Wednesday,  September  20.  Ten 
days  went  by  before  London  knew  that  it  had  been  fought. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  of  Saturday  the  30th,  Mr.  Harrison, 
the  publisher  of  the  London  Gazette,  was  at  his  office  in 
St.  Martin's  Lane,  when  he  was  told  by  a  messenger  that 
the  Duke  of  Newcastle,  the  Secretary  for  War,  wanted  to 
see  him  immediately  at  Downing  Street.  Harrison  hurried 
to  Whitehall,  and  found  the  duke  in  a  state  of  joyful  excite- 
ment. "  We  have  such  glorious  news,"  he  said ;  "  but  how 
are  we  to  let  the  public  know  it  on  a  Saturday  evening, 
when  there  are  no  papers  ?  "  and  he  produced  a  telegram 
from  the  British  ambassador  at  Constantinople.  It  had 
been  sent  off  by  messenger  on  September  23,  to  be  put  on 
the  wires  at  Belgrade,  the  nearest  point  where  a  telegraph 
office  was  available.     The  messenger  had  ridden  over  the 


34  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Balkans,  and  through  Bulgaria  and  Servia,  taking  a  week 
for  his  journey,  and  got  his  message  on  the  wire  at  Belgrade 
at  nine  that  morning.  This  first  report  exaggerated  the 
Russian  strength,  understated  the  British  loss,  and  made 
mistakes  about  the  time  of  events,  besides  turning  the  two 
earthworks  on  Kurgane  Hill  into  an  "  intrenched  camp." 
It  ran  as  follows : 

"  The  intrenched  camp  of  the  Russians,  containing  50,000  men, 
with  a  numerous  artillery  and  cavalry,  on  the  heights  of  the  Alma, 
was  attacked  on  the  20th  inst.  at  i  p.  m.  by  the  allied  troops,  and  car- 
ried by  the  bayonet  at  half  past  three,  with  a  loss  on  our  side  of 
about  1400  killed  and  wounded,  and  an  equal  loss  on  the  side  of  the 
French.    The  Russian  army  was  forced  to  put  itself  in  full  retreat." 

Harrison  proposed  that  it  should  be  printed  in  a  special 
Gazette,  and  that  copies  should  be  sent  to  the  theaters  to 
be  read  to  the  audiences  from  the  stage.  At  some  of  the 
theaters  the  announcement  put  a  sudden  end  to  the  perform- 
ance. Greville  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  tells  how,  as  he  passed 
the  Adelphi,  he  saw  the  audience  come  rushing  out  cheering 
for  the  victory  and  eager  to  spread  the  news.  A  note  added 
by  Lord  Newcastle  to  the  despatch  had  warned  the  public 
that  detailed  reports  could  not  be  expected  for  some  days. 
On  the  Sunday  a  supplement  to  the  Gazette  published  a 
short  telegram  from  Lord  Raglan.  Then  England  waited 
for  many  days  for  the  terrible  lists  of  the  3000  killed  and 
wounded. 


CHAPTER    II 

THE    BATTLE   OF    SOLFERINO 
June  24,  1859 

After  the  Alma,  England  became  familiar  enough  with 
the  tidings  of  war  and  battle.  In  quick  succession  there 
came  the  news  of  Balaklava  and  Inkermann,  and  there  was 
the  year-long  siege  of  Sebastopol.  After  the  peace  with 
Russia  there  was  a  brief  campaign  in  Persia,  and  then  for 
some  two  years  the  fierce  struggle  of  the  Indian  Mutiny, 
with  its  countless  episodes  of  heroism  and  horror.  Then 
Europe  was  once  more  the  scene  of  a  great  war  in  1859, 
when  Napoleon  III,  taking  up  the  policy  of  the  First  Empire, 
sent  his  armies  into  Northern  Italy  to  drive  out  the  Aus- 
trians  and  substitute  French  for  Austrian  influence  south  of 
the  Alps. 

Piedmont,  under  King  Victor  Emmanuel  and  his  minister. 
Count  Cavour,  had  taken  the  lead  in  the  movement  against 
the  Austrian  domination  in  Italy,  and  Cavour  had  worked 
hand  in  hand  with  Napoleon  III  since  the  day  when  a  Pied- 
montese  contingent,  under  La  Marmora,  had  been  sent  to 
the  Crimea.  Napoleon  provoked  the  quarrel  with  Austria 
as  soon  as  he  had  made  some  progress  with  the  reorganiza- 
tion and  rearmament  of  his  army,  begun  after  the  Russian 
War.  The  most  important  change  was  the  introduction  of 
rifled  field  artillery.  The  work  of  designing  and  manufac- 
turing the  new  guns  was  carried  through  very  quietly  — 
almost  secretly  —  in  the  French  arsenals,  and  the  possession 
of  these  long-ranging  cannon  gave  an  undoubted  advantage 
of  great  value  to  the  French  in  the  campaign  of  Northern 


36  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Italy.  In  Forey's  fight  with  the  Austrians  at  Montebello, 
one  of  his  batteries  of  rifled  guns  put  three  of  the  enemy's 
batteries  out  of  action  —  the  French  gunners  shooting  as 
coolly  and  as  safely  as  if  they  were  on  a  practice  range,  for 
the  projectiles  from  the  Austrian  smooth-bore  guns  could 
not  reach  them. 

The  war  was  begun  on  April  26  by  the  Austrian  army 
from  Pavia,  under  Count  Gyulai,  entering  Piedmontese 
territory  and  advancing  towards  Turin.  Gyulai  hoped  to 
strike  at  King  Victor  Emmanuel's  little  army  before  it  could 
be  joined  by  its  French  allies,  some  of  whom  were  march- 
ing over  the  Alps  by  the  Mont  Cenis  Pass,  while  the  rest 
were  being  transported  by  sea  to  Genoa.  The  Emperor 
Napoleon  was  to  command  in  person  the  combined  armies. 
His  landing  at  Genoa  was  one  of  the  golden  days  of  his 
checkered  life.  He  was  received  with  a  wild  outburst  of 
enthusiasm.  Guns  roared  their  salute,  church  bells  pealed, 
shouting  crowds  lined  the  quays  and  crowded  the  decks 
and  rigging  of  the  ships,  and  flowers  were  strewn  on  the 
water  before  his  gilded  barge  as  he  was  rowed  ashore. 
With  his  arrival  came  news  that  the  Austrians,  after  three 
days  on  Piedmontese  soil,  were  retiring  into  Lombardy. 
Gyulai  had  learned  that  Victor  Emmanuel  had  already  been 
heavily  reinforced,  and  he  had  therefore  decided  to  abandon 
his  march  on  Turin  and  take  up  a  position  on  the  Ticino 
to  defend  Lombardy  and  the  approach  to  Milan. 

On  June  4  Napoleon  fought  the  great  battle  of  Magenta, 
drove  the  Austrians  from  the  Ticino,  and  then  entered  Milan 
in  triumph.  The  Austrian  army  retreated  across  the  Mincio, 
evacuating  Lombardy,  and  turning  to  bay  on  the  frontier 
river  of  Venetia,  with  the  fortresses  of  Mantua  and  Pes- 
chiera  on  its  left  and  right.  The  allied  armies  followed  up 
this  retirement  with  cautious  deliberation.  It  had  been  ex- 
pected that  the  Austrians  would  dispute  the  passage  of  the 
rivers  that  flow  from  the  Alps  to  the  Po;    but  the  line  of 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SOLFERINO  37 

the  Adda,  the  OgHo,  and  the  Chiese  were  in  turn  found  to 
be  abandoned.  Before  the  cavah-y  thrown  out  in  front  of 
the  French  advanced  guards,  a  screen  of  Austrian,  Croat, 
and  Hungarian  horsemen  retired  steadily.  At  the  crossing 
of  the  Chiese  all  touch  of  the  enemy  was  lost,  and  report 
said  the  Austrians  would  not  fight  till  the  crossing  of  the 
Mincio. 

On  June  23  the  French  crossed  the  Chiese  with  La  Mar- 
mora's Italians  on  their  left.  The  center  of  the  allied  ad- 
vance was  formed  of  the  Second  Corps,  veterans  of  Algeria, 
under  MacMahon,  now  bearing  the  title  of  Duke  of  Ma- 
genta ;  and  the  First  Corps,  under  Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  the 
son  of  a  marshal  of  the  First  Empire,  and  who  had  himself 
served  under  the  great  Napoleon  as  a  young  officer.  Behind 
these  came  the  regiments  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  forming  a 
picked  army  corps  under  St.  Jean  d'Angely. 

On  the  right  were  the  Third  Corps,  under  Canrobert,  and 
the  Fourth,  under  Niel.  The  total  fighting  strength  of  the 
Allies  was  151,200  men,  of  whom  15,500  were  cavalry.  The 
artillery  numbered  370  guns.^  It  was  the  largest  and  best 
equipped  army  that  had  marched  to  battle  since  the  great 
days  of  the  First  Empire. 

Amongst  its  auxiliary  arms  was  a  balloon  detachment, 
directed  by  Monsieur  Godard,  a  famous  aeronaut  of  the  day. 
Godard  joined  MacMahon  at  the  little  town  of  Castiglione 
in  the  forenoon  of  June  23,  and  was  ordered  to  make  an 
ascent  and  reconnoiter  the  country  in  front.  The  cavalry 
patrols  sent  into  the  hills  towards  the  Mincio  had  reported 
that  they  had  met  only  small  parties  of  the  enemy's  horse- 
men, who  had  everywhere  promptly  retired  before  them.  It 
was  a  hot  summer  day,  with  a  clear  sky  and  hardly  a  breath 
of  wind,  and  instead  of  going  up  at  the  end  of  an  anchored 

'  The  Picflinontese  contingent,  under  King  Victor  Emmanuel  and 
General  La  Marmora  (included  in  these  totals),  numbered  44,700 
men,  of  whom  6300  were  cavalry,  and  132  guns  (smooth-bores). 


38  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

cable,  Godard  risked  a  free  ascent,  inflating  his  balloon  just 
inside  the  outpost  line.  A  staff  officer  went  up  with  him, 
and  the  great  white  globe  drifted  slowly  high  in  air  over 
Castiglione,  while  the  occupants  of  the  car  searched  the 
country  with  their  telescopes. 

They  had  a  magnificent  view.  Northwards  the  landscape 
was  bounded  by  the  snowy  Alpine  range ;  closer  at  hand 
the  Lake  of  Garda  displayed  its  shining  expanse  of  sunlit 
waters.  The  Austrian  fortress  of  Peschiera  could  be  plainly 
seen  at  the  point  where  the  Mincio  runs  out  of  the  lake,  and 
the  course  of  the  river  could  be  traced  by  looking  away  to 
the  southeast,  where  far  off,  near  its  junction  with  the  Po, 
the  still  more  famous  fortress  of  Mantua  could  be  dimly 
seen  amid  the  hot  haze  that  hung  over  its  girdle  of  lakes 
and  marshes.  To  the  southward  extended  the  plain  of 
Medole,  cut  up  with  irrigation  canals,  and  with  its  gray- 
green  olive  groves,  darker  plantations  of  mulberries  and 
fields  of  maize  and  rice,  and  expanses  of  pasture-land,  amid 
which  here  and  there  were  to  be  seen  the  square  church 
towers  of  the  white  villages.  In  front  from  the  shores  of 
the  Lake  of  Garda,  between  the  northern  part  of  the  plain 
and  the  line  of  the  Mincio,  rose  a  labyrinth  of  rocky  hills, 
running  up  into  craggy  crests.  On  a  bold  summit  four 
miles  away  in  front  of  Castiglione  clustered  the  houses  of 
Solferino,  and  beside  them  was  the  lofty  tower,  on  the 
highest  point  of  the  hill,  known  as  the  Spia  d' Italia  ("the 
Spy  of  Italy"),  on  account  of  the  wide  prospect  com- 
manded from  its  battlements.  There  was  no  glimpse  of  an 
enemy  to  be  seen  on  hills  or  plain,  no  rising  dust-cloud  to 
mark  the  march  of  troops  on  the  sun-scorched  roads.  The 
balloon  descended  with  information  that  the  country  between 
the  French  outposts  and  the  Mincio  must  be  clear  of  the 
enemy.  No  serious  fighting  need  be  expected  till  the  cross- 
ing of  the  river. 

On  June  22  there  was  concentrated  along  the  eastern 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SOLFERINO  39 

bank  of  the  Mincio,  from  Pcschiera  to  the  bridge  of  Goito, 
an  Austrian  army  of  133,000  men,  inckiding-  6500  splendid 
cavalry  and  413  guns.  It  was  made  up  of  the  troops  that 
had  retired  from  Lombardy,  large  reinforcements  drawn 
from  the  Austrian  Empire,  and  smaller  contingents  from 
the  garrisons  of  Northern  Italy.  The  young  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph  was  in  personal  command,  with  Field- 
Marshal  Count  Hess  acting  as  his  chief  of  the  staff.  The 
corps  concentrated  on  the  Mincio  were  divided  into  two 
subordinate  armies.  The  First  Army,  on  the  left,  under 
Count  Wimpfenn,  included  the  following  corps : 


CORPS 

COMMANDERS 

MEN 

GUNS 

Second   .    . 

.    .    Prince  Liechtenstein   . 

17,700 

56 

Third      .    . 

.    .     Prince  Schwarzenberg 

17,900 

72 

Ninth      .    . 

.    .    General  Schaffgotsche 

18,700 

64 

Tenth      .    . 

.    .    General  Wernhardt     . 

20,700 

72 

Eleventh    . 

.    .    General  Weigl  .... 

12,500 

48 

In  the  Second  Army,  on  the  right,  under  Count  Schlick, 
were  the  following: 

CORPS  COMMANDERS  MEN         GUNS 

First Count  Clam  Gallas  .    .    .  15,200  56 

Fifth Count  Stadion 19,600  60 

Seventh      .    .    .     General  Zobel 15,700  48 

Eighth   ....  General  Benedek  ....  20,100  72 

Late  on  the  twenty-second  there  was  a  sudden  change 
of  plans.  It  was  supposed  the  French  were  not  yet  across 
the  Chiese,  and  it  was  decided  to  recross  the  Mincio  next 
day  and  attack  them,  while  they  were  passing  the  Chiese,  on 
the  twenty-f(nirth.  The  ])ontoon  bridges  on  the  Mincio 
were  still  in  position.  On  the  twenty-third,  while  Godard 
was  reporting  "  no  sign  of  the  enemy,"  the  heads  of  the 
Austrian  columns  were  crossing  the  twelve  bridges  of  the 
Mincio.  By  that  evening,  all  unknown  to  the  French,  sev- 
eral corps  of  the  Second  Army  were  in  the  hills  south  of 


40  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  Lake  of  Garda,  and  the  First  Army  had  pushed  well 
forward  in  the  plain.  The  Austrian  orders  for  next  day 
were  to  march  to  the  Chiese;  those  of  the  Allies  to  ad- 
vance to  the  Mincio.  Thus  the  two  armies  were  moving 
to  an  inevitable  collision. 

Long  before  sunrise  on  June  24,  the  Allies  had  resumed 
their  advance.  On  the  left,  near  the  Lake  of  Garda,  moved 
the  Piedmontese  in  three  columns,  preceded  by  cavalry 
patrols.  They  expected  to  be  before  Peschiera  in  the  after- 
noon, and  to  summon  the  place  and  make  the  first  prepara- 
tions for  besieging  it,  as  they  had  done  in  the  campaign  of 
1848.  In  the  center  Baraguay  d'Hilliers  was  marching  on 
Solferino.  His  corps  was  to  reach  the  Mincio  by  the  hill 
roads.  Behind  him  was  the  Imperial  Guard,  coming  up 
from  Monte  Chiaro ;  and  to  his  right  MacMahon's  Corps, 
moving  from  Castiglione  on  Guidizzolo  by  a  road  running 
below  the  margin  of  the  hill  country.  On  the  right  in  the 
plain  Niel  was  marching  on  Medole,  and  behind  him  came 
Canrobert,  part  of  whose  corps  was  still  passing  the  pon- 
toon bridges  on  the  Chiese. 

The  Emperor  Napoleon  had  spent  the  night  at  Monte 
Chiaro.  One  of  his  aides-de-camp,  General  Cotte,  had  died 
of  heat  apoplexy,  and  Napoleon  and  the  headquarters  stafif 
so  little  expected  a  great  battle  that  morning  that  they  re- 
mained at  Monte  Chiaro  to  assist  at  the  funeral  service  and 
requiem  mass  for  their  comrade  in  the  village  church.  The 
service  had  hardly  begun  when  there  was  a  sound  of  gallop- 
ing horses  in  the  village  street,  and  two  staff  officers  entered 
the  church  with  urgent  messages  for  the  emperor.  One 
came  from  Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  the  other  from  MacMahon. 
They  reported  that  the  Austrians  were  in  force  on  the  hills 
from  the  lake  to  Solferino  and  Cavriana,  and  strong  columns 
were  advancing  in  the  plain.  A  great  battle  was  imminent. 
The  emperor  left  the  church  and  drove  to  Castiglione  in 
hot  haste,   with  his  staff  and   escort  galloping  after  him. 


THE    BATTLE   OF    SOLFERINO  41 

Castiglione  stands  on  a  rising  ground,  and  the  square  bell- 
tower  of  its  church  commands  a  wide  view.  Napoleon  went 
up  to  the  belfry  with  some  of  the  staff  to  take  a  general 
survey  of  the  Austrian  positions. 

On  the  hills  in  front  the  enemy's  artillery  was  in  action 
from  Solferino  northwards  towards  San  Martino,  and  south- 
wards in  the  direction  of  Cavriana.  Masses  of  white- 
uniformed  infantry  were  seen  here  and  there  advancing 
over  the  ridges.  Between  Castiglione  and  Solferino  the 
three  divisions  of  the  First  Corps  were  being  directed  by 
Baraguay  d'Hilliers  to  the  attack  of  the  outlying  ridges  in 
front  of  Solferino,  L'Admirault  and  Forey's  divisions  lead- 
ing, Bazaine's  in  support.  To  the  right  MacMahon  was 
fighting  his  way  towards  Cavriana.  Further  away  in  the 
plain  there  was  a  separate  battle  in  progress  around  Me- 
dole,  where  Niel  was  in  action  with  Schaffgotsche's  Corps. 

The  fighting  had  begun  on  this  side  soon  after  sunrise. 
Niel  had  marched  on  Medolc  in  the  summer  twilight.  He 
had  no  expectation  of  a  fight,  and  the  closely-cultivated 
level  country  through  which  he  marched  allowed  only  a 
restricted  view.  So  when  a  crackle  of  fire  in  front,  lasting 
only  a  few  minutes,  was  followed  by  a  message  from  his 
advanced  guard  reporting  that  a  small  party  of  Austrian 
cavalry  had  been  met  with  and  driven  in,  he  counted  the 
affair  as  an  unimportant  skirmish  with  a  reconnoitering 
detachment  left  far  in  the  rear  of  the  enemy's  retreat.  But 
then  came  news  that  the  Austrians  held  Medole  with  in- 
fantry and  cannon,  and  as  Niel  deployed  his  leading  divi- 
sion for  the  attack  on  the  place,  there  came  the  booming 
of  artillery  from  the  left,  and  with  the  field-glass  smoke 
clouds  were  seen  on  the  outlying  ridges  of  the  hills  towards 
Solferino,  four  miles  away.  This  was  a  fairly  clear  indi- 
cation that  he  had  no  more  belated  rearguard  in  front  of 
him,  but  that  the  Austrians  were  in  force  on  a  wide  front. 
It  was  an  unpleasant   revelation  that  all  the  information 


42  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

supplied  from  headquarters  was  wrong.  The  enemy  had 
challenged  battle  on  ground  he  was  supposed  to  have  defi- 
nitely abandoned.  And  the  dead  level  of  the  plain  in  front, 
with  the  view  narrowed  in  every  direction  by  plantations, 
might  conceal  overwhelming  numbers  of  opponents. 

War  maps  and  battle  plans,  with  their  definite  present- 
ment of  the  positions  occupied  by  both  sides  over  leagues 
of  ground,  are  misleading,  unless  we  remember  that,  what- 
ever the  aeroplane  and  the  dirigible  may  do  for  generals 
of  coming  days,  those  of  the  past  had  to  judge  the  situa- 
tion and  make  their  decisions  in  the  midst  of  what  Colonel 
Lonsdale  Hale  has  happily  described  as  the  "  fog  of  war." 
Niel,  with  his  single  corps  thrown  forward  in  the  plain, 
was  for  a  while  utterly  in  the  dark  as  to  what  was  in  front 
of  him.  He  decided  to  clear  the  enemy  out  of  Medole  and 
find  out  what  was  behind  it,  sending  back  messengers  to 
ask  Canrobert,  ■  who  was  crossing  the  Chiese,  to  come  to 
his  support,  and  protect  his  right  from  a  possible  turning 
movement  on  that  side,  and  he  sent  a  stafif  officer  to  get 
in  touch  with  MacMahon  on  his  left. 

Medole,  held  only  by  an  Austrian  vanguard  of  two  bat- 
talions, two  guns,  and  a  few  hussars,  was  not  cleared  of 
the  enemy  for  some  time.  Colonel  Urs,  who  commanded 
there,  disputed  every  street  and  house,  and  was  only  driven 
out  after  enduring  and  inflicting  heavy  loss.  Niel  was  no 
sooner  in  possession  than  he  was  attacked  in  turn,  Schaff- 
gotsche  making  determined  efforts  to  recapture  the  place. 
Canrobert  seemed  to  be  hanging  back,  and  Niel  for  a  while 
thought  his  colleague  had  left  him  in  the  lurch.  But  Can- 
robert had  to  get  his  corps  across  the  Chiese,  and  then 
m>ove  forward  very  circumspectly  and  slowly,  because  he 
had,  whilst  on  the  march,  received  information  that  an 
Austrian  column,  25,000  strong,  was  on  his  right,  and  spent 
some  time  watching  for  and  preparing  to  meet  this  non- 
existent force.    Only  detachments  of  cavalry  showed  them- 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SOLFERINO  43 

selves  on  this  side.  The  misleading  information  appears  to 
have  come  to  the  imperial  staff  through  a  secret  service 
agent,  and  was  based  on  a  plan  actually  entertained,  but 
not  executed,  by  the  Austrians. 

On  the  left  of  Niel's  battle-ground,  about  Medole,  a  wide 
gap  separated  him  from  MacMahon  and  the  Second  Corps. 
The  Emperor  Napoleon,  immediately  after  his  survey  of  the 
field  from  Castiglione,  temporarily  closed  this  gap  by  send- 
ing the  cavalry  of  the  Canard  with  Desvaux  and  Parton- 
neaux's  cavalry  divisions  to  take  post  between  Niel  and 
MacMahon.  The  latter,  with  the  Second  Corps,  had  been 
stopped  on  his  march  towards  the  high  ground  of  Cavriana. 
The  enemy  in  his  front  was  making  a  determined  stand, 
and  the  emperor,  who  rode  over  to  MacMahon's  position, 
agreed  that  for  the  present  he  must  be  content  to  hold  his 
ground  and  protect  the  right  tlank  of  Baraguay  d'Hilliers's 
attack  on  Solferino.  The  Imperial  Guard  was  brought  up 
to  Castiglione  to  form  a  reserve  for  this  attack.  Baraguay 
had  won  the  outlying  ridges  in  front  of  the  main  plateau, 
and  brought  his  artillery  into  action  against  the  walled 
cemetery  of  Solferino  and  the  ground  near  the  "  S])ia " 
tower,  and  formed  up  L'Admirault  and  Forey's  divisions 
for  a  first  effort  to  carry  the  heights. 

To  King  Victor  Emmanuel  on  the  allied  left  a  request 
was  sent  to  detach  one  of  his  divisions  to  support  the  attack 
on  Solferino.  But  the  Picdmontese  king  and  his  chief  of 
the  staff.  La  Marmora,  had  already  discovered  that  they  had 
so  much  work  to  do  that  they  could  not  spare  even  a  single 
battalion.  The  Piedmontese  had  marched  at  sunrise  in  three 
columns  —  Cucchiari's  Division  away  to  the  extreme  left 
by  the  lake,  Mollard  in  the  center,  Fanti  on  the  right  nearest 
to  the  French.  The  country  in  front  was  supposed  to  be 
quite  clear  of  the  enemy.  Nevertheless  La  Marmora  sent 
strong  advanced  guards  well  to  the  front,  and  towards  seven 
o'clock  these  came  in  contact  with  Benedek's  troops  mov- 


44  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

ing  out  over  the  hills  that  look  down  on  the  lake  to  the 
westward  of  Pozzolengo.  The  Italian  detachments  were 
everywhere  driven  back.  Cucchiari  had  brought  up  his 
whole  division  to  their  support,  to  the  high  ground  west 
of  San  Martino.  After  some  severe  fighting  Benedek  drove 
him  from  the  heights,  and  he  fell  back  to  the  railway. 
Benedek  then  solidly  occupied  the  high  ground  from  San 
Martino,  by  the  hamlet  of  Rocco,  to  Madonna  del  Scoperta, 
just  north  of  Solferino,  and  there  was  a  lull  in  the  fighting 
while  the  Piedmontese  massed  for  a  new  attack. 

The  Austrian  emperor  and  Count  Hess,  who  acted  as 
his  military  adviser,  had  at  first  thought  that  they  were  in 
touch  only  with  French  advanced  guards  covering  the  cross- 
ing of  the  Chiese.  They  soon  realized  that  the  Allies  were 
further  forward  than  they  had  expected,  and  that  they  had 
to  deal  with  the  whole  of  the  French  and  Piedmontese 
armies.  Of  the  seven  Austrian  army  corps  that  had  crossed 
the  Mincio,  four  were  already  in  action,  three  more  close 
at  hand.  Two  corps  that,  if  they  had  been  available,  might 
have  secured  a  victory  for  Austria  were  still  near  Mantua. 
A  plan  for  the  battle  was  quickly  arranged.  On  the  right, 
along  the  margin  of  the  hill  country,  Schlick,  with  the  four 
corps  of  the  Second  Army  (First,  Fifth,  Seventh,  and 
Eighth),  was  to  hold  the  French  center  and  the  Piedmon- 
tese. On  the  Austrian  left,  in  the  plain,  Wimpfenn,  with 
the  First  Army  (Third,  Ninth,  and  Eleventh  corps),  was 
to  roll  up  the  French  right,  and  break  in  upon  the  flank  of 
their  central  attack  against  Solferino.  So  far  only  one  corps 
was  up  to  the  front  on  this  part  of  the  field  — the  Third, 
under  Schafifgotsche ;  but  the  two  other  corps  were  com- 
ing up,  and  there  was  a  fair  chance  of  overwhelming  Niel 
before  Canrobert  could  support  him.  Here  the  fate  of  the 
day  turned  on  Niel's  tenacity. 

The  French  plan  was  of  a  more  elementary  type.     Napo- 
leon had  had  his  attention  riveted  on  Solferino.     To  seize 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SOLFERINO  45 

that  commanding-  point  in  the  Austrian  center  appeared 
to  him  to  be  the  simplest  way  to  victory.  He  left  Niel  to 
take  care  of  himself  on  the  right,  and  staked  everything 
on  a  series  of  fierce  assaults  on  the  natural  fortress  of  which 
Solferino  and  Cavriana  were  like  two  towering  bastions, 
with  the  ridges  between  them  and  to  the  north  as  their 
ramparts.  The  Austrians  had  carried  out  more  than  one 
series  of  peace  manoeuvers  on  this  very  ground,  and  looked 
on  their  hill  fortress  as  impregnable.  It  says  much  for  the 
fighting  quality  of  the  French  that  they  were  able  to  force 
it  by  repeated  and  costly  attacks.  The  army  that  fought 
under  Napoleon's  command  at  Solferino  was  certainly  the 
best  that  the  Second  Empire  ever  possessed. 

There  was  a  long  struggle  for  Solferino,  and  the  fate  of 
the  hilltop  village  hung  in  the  balance  for  hours.  Before 
eight  o'clock,  when  the  Emperor  Napoleon  reached  Castig- 
lione,  the  Austrian  outposts  had  been  driven  from  the  foot- 
hills in  front,  and  the  French  rifled  artillery  had  come  into 
action  against  the  village  and  the  heights  at  a  range  of  2500 
yards.  Under  the  eyes  of  the  emperor  two  columns  of  as- 
sault, led  by  Generals  Forey  and  D'Alton,  moved  forward 
to  the  attack,  preceded  by  a  dense  line  of  skirmishers.  They 
worked  their  way  through  the  broken  ground  below  the 
main  ascent  to  the  village  under  a  rain  of  bullets  and  shells. 
Forey  was  slightly  wounded ;  two  of  his  staff  were  killed 
beside  him.  At  last  the  moment  came  when  further  prog- 
ress was  stopped  by  the  storm  of  hostile  fire.  D'Alton  fell 
back  before  a  column  of  Austrians  that  menaced  his  flank ; 
Forey  barely  held  his  own.  Then  six  battalions  of  the 
Guard,  under  General  Maneque,  were  thrown  into  the  fight, 
and  Bazaine's  Division  was  seen  climbing  the  slopes  towards 
the  vy^lled  cemetery. 

The  battle  for  the  heights  now  became  a  close  conflict 
between  great  masses  of  men.  The  battles  of  more  recent 
wars  were  decided  by  fire,  and  opposing  lines  faced  each 


46  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

other  at  long  rang^es,  each  makinj;-  such  good  use  of  cover 
that  for  hours  neither  saw  much  of  its  enemy.  But  the 
methods  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  were  still  in  honor  in  the 
days  of  Solferino.  Around  the  village  the  defenders  were 
arrayed  in  deep  masses  of  white-coated  infantry,  with  their 
batteries  in  the  intervals,  and  the  green-uniformed  Tyrolese 
riflemen  held  the  loopholed  houses  and  farmsteads  on  the 
crest.  From  the  foothills  to  the  westward  the  shells  of  the 
French  artillery  came  screaming  through  the  air,  bursting 
with  deadly  effect  over  the  close-formed  ranks,  battering  the 
walls  of  the  cemetery,  crashing  into  the  roofs  of  the  houses. 
Up  the  slopes  came  long  lines  of  skirmishers  wrapped  in 
eddying  clouds  of  powder  smoke,  and  through  this  screen 
would  burst,  now  here,  now  there,  the  head  of  a  massive 
storming  column,  blue-coated,  red-trousered  linesmen  or 
bearskinned  guardsmen,  a  forest  of  bristling  bayonets,  with 
the  tricolors  flying  over  them,  drums  beating,  bugles  sound- 
ing, and  the  swords  of  the  mounted  officers  waving  them 
onward.  For  every  man  in  that  moving  mass  the  one  idea 
would  be  to  cross  the  fire-swept  ground  in  front  as  soon  as 
might  be,  and  bring  the  bayonet  and  the  weight  of  mar- 
shaled ranks  to  bear  upon  the  enemy.  But  the  head  of  the 
column  would  be  at  once  the  target  of  a  concentrated  short- 
range  fire.  The  front  ranks  would  go  down,  those  behind 
would  press  forward  over  them,  till  the  moment  when  the 
strain  of  apparently  useless  loss,  the  fall  of  leaders,  the 
confusion  of  struggling  through  the  wreckage  of  the  fight, 
would  stop  the  advance,  and  men,  instead  of  pushing  on 
with  the  bayonet,  would  halt  to  fire,  spread  out  into  irregu- 
lar groups,  take  cover  in  broken  ground,  and  then  fall  back, 
rallying  to  the  colors,  each  of  which  had  probably  already 
passed  from  the  hands  of  its  original  bearer  to  those  of  an 
eager  substitute.  For  the  battle  flags  drew  fire,  and  many 
a  gallant  life  was  sacrificed  in  bearing  them  in  the  close 
fight. 


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WEIGU 


Pt'in 


No.  2  —  Battle  of  Solferino,  June  24,  1859 
(Pobitiou  about  S  A.  m.) 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SOLFERINO  47 

As  each  attack  was  repulsed  another  would  be  pushed 
on  with  fresh  troops  or  the  rallied  battalions  of  an  earlier 
onset.  Thus  it  was  that  twice  the  cemetery  was  attacked, 
and  twice  Bazaine's  men  were  beaten  back  with  loss,  only 
to  come  on  again  after  the  artillery  had  widened  the  breaches 
of  the  wall.  At  the  third  onset  the  column  poured  over  the 
barrier  like  a  flood,  and  swept  the  defenders  before  it  at  the 
bayonet  point.  Then  Forey's  Division  and  the  Imperial 
Guard  fought  their  way  over  the  crest  near  the  "  Spia  " 
tower,  and  the  tricolor  was  displayed  from  its  lofty  roof. 

Away  towards  the  Garda  Lake  the  Italians  had  again 
attacked  the  heights  of  San  Martino,  and  once  more  had 
been  hurled  back  by  Benedek's  white-coats.  On  the  right, 
below  the  ridges  towards  Cavriana,  MacMahon's  African 
Corps  was  in  hot  fight  with  the  Austrian  left  center.  Still 
farther  away  Niel  was  doggedly  holding  his  own  to  the 
eastward  of  Medole,  and  Canrobert  was  at  last  coming  into 
action  on  his  right.  Along  the  miles  of  opposing  front, 
nearly  800  guns  were  roaring  out  in  a  cannonade  that  was 
heard  like  far-off  thunder  in  distant  cities.  Mantua  and 
Verona  heard  it  plainly.  Far-off  Milan  caught  the  sound 
like  the  muttering  of  a  coming  thunderstorm. 

After  the  capture  of  the  cemetery  and  the  "  Spia  "  height 
there  was  still  a  hard  fight  for  Solferino.  The  place  was 
taken  by  the  Imperial  Guard,  but  every  house,  every  in- 
closure  had  to  be  stormed  with  the  bayonet.  Austrians 
and  Frenchmen  met  hand  to  hand,  and  when  at  two  o'clock 
it  was  at  last  in  the  possession  of  the  French,  streets,  houses, 
gardens,  and  vineyards  were  thickly  strewn  with  dead  and 
wounded,  which  in  many  places  lay  in  heaps.  Some  guns 
and  a  number  of  jirisoners  were  taken,  for  the  eastern  side 
of  the  Solferino  ridge  is  very  steep,  and  accessible  only  by 
narrow  paths  along  which  rapid  and  ordered  retirement 
was  impossible. 

When  Solferino  was  lost  the  Austrian  right  center  still 


48  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

held  the  ridges  of  the  plateau  east  of  it  from  Cavriana 
towards  San  Martino.  On  the  extreme  right,  round  this 
latter  position,  the  Italians,  reinforced  by  Fanti's  Division, 
were  again  attacking  Benedek  after  a  long  lull  in  the  fight. 
Once  more  the  dogged  Austrian  commander  of  the  Eighth 
Corps,  though  fighting  against  superior  numbers,  flung  back 
assault  after  assault.  Along  a  spur  that  connects  Solferino 
with  Cavriana  the  Imperial  Guard  was  advancing  to  a  re- 
newed attack  on  the  Austrian  center,  and  MacMahon  was 
pressing  forward  over  the  outlying  ridges  of  San  Cassiano 
and  Monte  Fontana,  on  the  left  of  the  Cavriana  position. 
The  village  of  San  Cassiano  was  stormed,  and  the  African 
regiments.  Zouaves  and  Turcos,  were  flung  against  Monte 
Fontana.^  The  Turcos  are  the  native  infantry  of  Algeria  — 
Arabs  and  Kabyles  under  French  officers.  They  were  first 
in  the  rush  for  the  ridge ;  but  fierce  as  was  their  onset, 
they  were  driven  back  by  the  Austrians  with  a  heavy  loss 
among  the  white  officers.  The  half-savage  Turcos  dipped 
their  hands  in  the  blood  of  their  fallen  leaders,  swore  to 
avenge  them,  and  came  on  again.  This  time  the  ridge  was 
stormed  with  the  bayonet,  and  scant  quarter  was  given  by 
the  dark-skinned  victors.  Guns  were  dragged  up  to  the 
crest  to  bombard  Cavriana  at  short  range.  The  wind  had 
fallen,  the  heat  had  become  almost  unbearable,  and  the  tired 
horses  could  hardly  move  the  guns  up  the  slope.  The 
officers  and  men  tugged  at  the  traces,  pushed  at  the  wheels 
and  axles,  and  at  last  the  guns  were  almost  carried  to  the 
top. 

In  the  plain  on  MacAIahon's  right  there  was  open  ground, 
pasture-land  with  a  few  patches  of  wheat  and  maize.  Here 
the  Austrian  cavalry  had  tried  to  break  through  the  French 

'  On  Monte  Fontana  the  Austrian  infantry  held  shelter  trenches, 
which  had  been  dug  a  couple  of  years  before  during  the  annual 
peace  manoeuvers.  The  battle  was  fought  on  ground  where  the  Aus- 
trians had  taken  part  in  many  such  rehearsals  of  war. 


THE    BATTLE   OF    SOLFERINO  49 

line,  and  had  been  repulsed  by  several  charges  of  Dcsvaux's 
squadrons.  To  the  northeast  of  Medole  Niel  had  42  guns 
in  line.  The  Austrians  had  been  bringing  their  inferior 
artillery  into  action  against  this  formidable  battery,  not  in 
a  mass,  but  piecemeal,  only  to  be  beaten  in  detail,  batteries 
being  sometimes  silenced  after  firing  only  a  few  shots. 
This  superiority  in  artillery  enabled  the  French  to  beat  off 
the  repeated  attacks  made  by  Wimpfenn's  infantry ;  and 
now  that  Canrobert's  Corps  was  engaged,  Niel  was  able  to 
use  part  of  his  force  to  close  the  gap  between  his  flank 
and  the  ground  held  by  MacMahon,  and  assuming  the  of- 
fensive, established  himself  in  the  farm  of  Casa  Nuova,  the 
hamlet  of  Baite,  and  the  village  of  Rebecco.  The  capture 
of  this  line  of  intrenched  positions  was  a  costly  business. 
There  was  plenty  of  hand-to-hand  fighting.  A  French  regi- 
ment saw  its  colors  disappear  in  one  of  these  melees,  and  it 
was  supposed  that  the  flag  had  been  captured,  but  after  the 
fight  it  was  found  under  a  heap  of  dead. 

Cavriana  was  now  attacked  by  the  Guards  from  the 
westward  and  by  MacMahon  from  the  south,  and  the  Aus- 
trian center  was  in  serious  peril.  The  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph  sent  word  to  Wimpfenn  to  make  one  more  effort  to 
force  back  the  French  right,  and  then  strike  at  MacMahon's 
flank  and  rear.  Wimpfenn  had  lost  his  opportunity  earlier 
in  the  day,  when  he  had  the  advantage  of  numbers  on  his 
side.  He  had  now  to  attack  a  line  of  strong  positions,  in 
which  Niel  had  been  reinforced  by  Canrobert's  fresher 
troops.  But  the  Austrians  did  their  best.  For  an  hour 
wave  after  wave  of  white-coated  infantry  broke  upon  .the 
line  of  loopholed  buildings  and  walled  inclosures  from  Casa 
Nuova  to  Rebecco,  and  surged  round  its  flank,  where  the 
French  cavalry  charged  furiously  on  the  advancing  enemy. 
This  cavalry  attack  stopped  the  movement  against  the  flank. 
Though  the  Austrians,  formed  in  squares  bristling  with 
bayonets,  held  their  own  against  the  horsemen,  the  mere 


50  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

fact  that  they  were  thus  forced  to  defend  themselves  brought 
the  flank  attack  to  a  standstill.  The  frontal  attack  was  a 
disastrous  failure. 

The  day  was  now  going  badly  for  Austria.  Into  the 
village  of  Cavriana  there  poured  the  converging  columns 
of  assault,  and  after  a  desperate  street  fight  the  Austrians 
were  driven  out.  The  center  was  now  pierced,  and  a  great 
wedge  of  victorious  Frenchmen  driven  in  between  Schlick's 
armv  on  the  right  and  Wimpfenn's  on  the  left.  On  the 
extreme  right  the  fighting  had  again  almost  ceased,  for 
once  more  Benedek  had  driven  the  Italians  from  the  heights 
of  San  Martino.  On  the  extreme  left  Wimpfenn  had  re- 
pulsed a  determined  attack  made  by  Niel  and  Canrobert 
on  Guidizzolo.  But  Count  Hess  and  the  Austrian  emperor 
now  realized  that,  with  tens  of  thousands  of  French  in- 
fantry and  their  terrible  artillery  crowning  the  central 
heights,  to  prolong  the  battle  might  be  to  invite  an  irrepa- 
rable disaster. 

They  were  actually  issuing  the  orders  for  a  retreat  across 
the  Mincio  when  a  startling  change  came  over  the  scene. 
Since  two  o'clock  the  sky  had  become  more  and  more  over- 
cast, though  the  gathering  clouds  in  no  way  diminished  the 
oppressive  heat.  On  the  contrary,  it  seemed  to  become  more 
intense.  Men  dropped  in  the  ranks  unwounded,  but  faint- 
ing or  halfdead  with  sudden  heat-stroke.  Then  in  a  few 
minutes  there  came  on  a  darkness  like  night,  and  a  tre- 
mendous thunderstorm  burst  over  the  battle-field.  The 
lightning  came  flash  after  flash  in  streaks  of  bluish  flame, 
the  rain  descended  in  a  deluge,  mingled  with  driving  gusts 
of  hailstones,  under  which  horses  broke  away  in  mad  fright, 
and  men  ceased  firing  and  huddled  together  for  shelter. 
Under  the  dark  sky  and  through  the  driving  rain  it  was 
impossible  to  see  for  more  than  fifty  yards.  For  twenty 
minutes  the  battle  ceased,  except  where  here  and  there  the 
drenched  gunners  still  fired  a  few  shots  at  random. 


THE    BATTLE    OF   SOLFERINO  51 

When  the  storm  ceased,  as  suddenly  as  it  had  begun,  it 
was  seen  that  all  along  the  center,  in  the  hills,  and  on  the 
left  in  the  plain  the  Austrians  had  abandoned  their  positions. 
Covered  by  strong  rearguards,  they  were  retiring  in  long 
columns  towards  the  bridges  of  the  Mincio.  There  was  no 
attempt  at  pursuit.  The  French  were  too  exhausted  for  any 
prolonged  forward  movement,  now  that  the  inspiring  ex- 
citement of  battle  was  gone.  The  men  had  had  coffee  and 
bread  as  they  broke  up  from  their  bivouacs  at  three  in  the 
morning.  For  fourteen  hours  they  had  been  marching  and 
fighting,  most  of  the  time  under  almost  tropical  heat.  They 
were  glad  enough  to  halt  and  begin  cooking  a  meal  of  soup 
on  the  ground  they  had  won. 

But  away  towards  the  Lake  of  Garda  the  battle  broke 
out  again.  The  Piedmontese  had  renewed  the  attack  on 
the  San  Martino  heights.  Benedek  had  received  the  order 
to  retreat,  but  for  the  present  he  disregarded  it.  The  French 
were  so  confident  that  he  would  soon  have  to  give  way  that, 
desiring  to  leave  the  Piedmontese  their  full  share  in  the 
glory  of  the  victory,  they  did  not  intervene.  And  until 
after  sundown  Benedek  held  his  own.  It  was  between  eight 
and  nine  o'clock  that  he  led  in  person  a  sudden  counter- 
attack, drove  the  enemy  down  the  slopes,  and  then  began 
his  orderly  and  unmolested  march  back  to  Peschiera.  As 
the  rearguard  evacuated  San  Martino  the  Piedmontese  col- 
umns once  more  went  up  the  heights,  and  their  artillery 
flashed  out  through  the  gathering  darkness  of  the  summer 
twilight.  An  Austrian  battery  put  in  a  few  parting  shots 
before  finally  liml)cring  up  and  retiring  from  the  eastern 
spur  of  the  plateau. 

San  Martino  is  counted  as  a  Piedmontese  victory,  and 
gives  its  name  to  a  battleship  of  the  Italian  navy ;  but  the 
plain  truth  is  that  this  isolated  battle  above  the  lake  was  a 
splendid  success  for  Benedek  and  the  Eighth  Corps,  who 
only  abandoned  their  ground  hours  after  the  fighting  to  the 


52  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

southward  had  ceased,  and  in  order  to  conform  to  the  gen- 
eral retirement  of  their  army.  To  his  success  that  day 
Benedek  owed  the  general  command  of  the  Austrian  Army 
of  the  North  in  the  war  of  1866. 

The  losses  on  both  sides  had  been  heavy,  though,  in 
proportion  to  the  large  ^numbers  engaged,  not  so  serious  as 
in  the  great  battles  of  the  First  Empire  and  of  the  American 
Civil  War.  The  Austrians  had  13,100  men  killed  or 
wounded,  and  left  in  the  hands  of  the  French  8600  prisoners 
and  13  guns.  The  heaviest  loss  fell  on  Stadion's  Corps, 
the  iMfth,  which  held  Solferino  village  and  the  heights 
around  it.  The  corps  lost  124  officers  and  2717  rank  and 
file  killed  and  wounded,  and  1597  taken  prisoners.  It  says 
much  for  the  fighting  spirit  of  Stadion's  officers  that  not 
one  of  them  was  among  the  prisoners. 

The  Allies  lost  14,420  in  killed  and  wounded.  The 
heaviest  proportional  loss  fell  on  the  Piedmontese  in  their 
repeated  unsuccessful  attacks  on  San  Martino.  They  lost 
216  officers  and  4047  men.  They  left  about  1200  prisoners 
in  the  hands  of  Benedek,  none  of  them  officers.  How  vic- 
tory hung  in  the  balance  on  the  southern  flank,  the  fighting 
in  the  plain,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  there  the  Austrians 
took  some  1500  French  prisoners.  The  sufferings  of  the 
thousands  on  thousands  of  wounded  were  terrible.  The 
Austrians  had  carried  ofT  very  few  of  their  wounded  in 
the  retreat,  and  the  Allies,  with  a  most  imperfect  organiza- 
tion for  the  purpose,  had  to  do  all  the  work  of  clearing 
the  battle-field.  It  was  two  days  before  the  last  of  the 
Avounded  received  even  first  aid.  The  horrors  of  the  field 
of  Solferino  so  impressed  a  civilian  spectator,  the  Switzer 
Henri  Dunant,  that  he  devoted  himself  to  the  organization 
of  the  Red  Cross  movement  for  the  help  of  the  wounded 
in  war,  and  as  a  result  of  his  agitation  on  the  subject  the 
Geneva  Convention  was  signed  in  1864. 

The  losses  among  French  officer?  of  r^nk  were  heavy. 


THE    BATTLE    OF    SOLFERINO  53 

Five  generals  were  wounded  —  L'Admirault,  Forey,  Auger, 
Dieu,  and  Douay.  vVuger,  who  commanded  Niel's  artillery, 
died  of  his  wounds.  Thirteen  colonels  were  killed  at  the 
head  of  their  regiments  or  while  serving  on  the  staff.  The 
death  of  one  of  these  put  an  end  to  a  famous  race.  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Junot,  Due  d'Abrantes,  killed  while  serving 
as  chief  of  the  staff  to  De  Failly's  Division  of  Niel's  Corps. 
was  the  second  and  only  surviving  son  of  Marshal  Junot 
of  the  First  Empire. 

Within  a  few  days  of  the  battle  of  Solferino  the  armistice 
of  Villafranca  prepared  the  way  for  peace  between  P^rance 
and  Austria.  A  few  weeks  later  the  army  of  Italy  marched 
in  triumph  into  Paris,  along  the  Boulevards,  and  through 
the  Place  Vendome,  where,  at  the  base  of  the  column  that 
commemorates  the  glories  of  the  first  Napoleon,  Napoleon 
III  sat  on  horseback  surrounded  by  his  staff,  with  a  little 
boy  dressed  as  a  chasseur  of  the  Guards  before  him  on  his 
saddle.  It  was  the  last  great  triumph  of  the  Second  Em- 
pire. The  army,  formed  in  the  campaigns  of  Algeria,  vic- 
torious in  the  Crimea  and  in  Lombardy,  was  about  to  enter 
on  a  period  of  decline,  when  efficiency  was  to  disappear  in 
routine,  and  a  fatal  confidence  in  the  glories  of  the  past 
was  made  to  cloak  a  hundred  abuses.  The  boy  Prince  Im- 
perial was  never  to  reign.  The  emperor  who  had  com- 
manded at  Solferino  and  ridden  victoriously  into  Cavriana, 
amid  the  acclamations  of  his  splendid  Guardsmen  and  his 
African  veterans,  was  to  be  remembered  in  a  few  years  as 
"  the  man  of  Sedan." 


CHAPTER   III 

CHANCELLORSVILLE 

May,  1863 

The  American  War  of  Secession  began  with  the  shots 
fired  against  Fort  Sumter  in  Charleston  Harbor  on  April 
12,  i86i,  and  ended  with  the  surrender  of  General  Lee's 
army  at  Appomattox  Courthouse  on  April  9,  1865,  having 
lasted  just  four  years.  This  prolonged  conflict  included 
some  of  the  hardest  fought  battles  in  military  history.  It 
was  in  many  ways  unlike  the  other  wars  of  the  half  century. 
At  the  outset  there  were  few  regular  soldiers  or  trained 
officers  in  the  United  States.  The  war  was  fought  with  im- 
provised armies  on  both  sides,  and  hundreds  of  thousands 
learned  the  soldier's  work,  not  on  the  parade-ground,  but 
in  the  harder  school  of  the  bivouac  and  the  battle-field. 
But  the  regular  armies  of  Europe  learned  much  from  the 
experience  of  these  volunteer  armies,  notably  the  new  value 
of  rapidly  constructed  intrenchments  in  fighting  carried  on 
with  modern  weapons. 

In  such  a  war  men  of  merit  win  their  way  to  high  com- 
mand more  speedily  than  in  regular  armies  of  long  stand- 
ing where  promotion  depends  as  much  on  seniority  as  upon 
talent.  So  it  was  that  upon  both  sides  a  considerable 
number  of  able  leaders  fought  their  way  to  high  command. 
The  bitterness  of  the  strife  is  now  forgotten,  and  the  names 
of  the  great  generals  of  both  Federal  and  Confederate 
armies  belong  to  the  roll  of  fame  of  which  all  Americans 
are  proud,  whether  they  are  men  of  north,  south,  or  west. 
It  was  the  good  fortune  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  to 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  55 

secure  the  devoted  service  of  two  soldiers  who  both  had 
professional  training  and  practical  experience  of  war,  and 
whose  talents  for  command  were  of  the  highest.  Robert 
Edward  Lee,  the  Confederate  commander-in-chief  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  war,  ranks  among  the  world's  great 
captains.  Thomas  "  Stonewall  "  Jackson,^  the  most  famous 
of  his  lieutenants,  stands  only  second  in  renown  to  his 
chief.  Chanccllorsville,  where  Jackson  met  his  death,  was 
one  of  Lee's  triumphs,  and  a  typical  battle  of  the  War  of 
Secession.  It  was  also  the  prelude  to  the  invasion  of  Penn- 
sylvania, and  the  hard-fought  battle  of  Gettysburg,  which 
may  be  regarded  as  the  decisive  battle  of  the  war. 

In  the  summer  of  1862  the  United  States  Government 
was  pressing  steadily  forward  the  policy  of  isolating  the 
Confederate  States  by  maintaining  a  blockade  of  their  ports 
on  the  Atlantic  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  gradually 
obtaining  possession  of  the  line  of  the  Mississippi.  But  at 
the  same  time  a  vigorous  eflfort  was  made  to  advance  upon 
and  capture  Richmond,  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy. 
Although  the  Federals  were  able  to  invade  northern  Vir- 
ginia with  superior  numbers,  Lee,  ably  seconded  by  Jack- 
son, and  with  the  aid  of  Stuart's  genius  as  a  cavalry  leader, 
won  a  succession  of  victories,  and  was  able  himself  to 
threaten  Washington  before  the  end  of  the  summer  cam- 
paign. The  tactics  of  the  Southern  leaders  were  a  splendid 
example  of  what  may  be  called  aggressive  defense.  They 
compelled  the  enemy  to  divide  his  forces,  and  successfully 
united  their  own  against  a  locally  inferior  opponent  at  the 
critical  point.     Both  sides  fought  well,  but  the  result  of  the 

'  Thomas  Jonathan  Jackson  was  the  general's  name.  At  the  first 
battle  of  Bull  Run,  before  the  tide  of  victory  had  turned  in  favor  of 
the  South,  and  when  the  Confederate  lines  were  breaking  before  the 
Federal  attack,  General  Bee  called  out  to  his  men :  "  Look  at  Jack- 
son's Brigade  standing  like  a  stone  wall !  "  After  this  the  brigade 
came  to  be  known  as  "  the  Stonewall  Brigade,"  and  its  general  as 
"  Stonewall  Jackson." 


56  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

battles  of  1862  was  to  give  the  Confederates  a  confidence 
in  themselves  and  their  leaders  that  immensely  added  to 
the  fighting  value  of  their  armies.  A  further  gain  was  that 
from  the  spoils  of  the  battle-field  they  were  able  to  im- 
prove their  own  armament  and  equipment.  In  the  spring 
of  1862  many  of  the  Confederate  soldiers  carried  shot-guns, 
or  old  smooth-bore  muskets;  by  the  end  of  the  year  all 
had  rifles. 

At  the  end  of  the  summer  Lee  had  fallen  back  to  the 
south  bank  of  the  Rapidan  and  the  Rappahannock,  and  his 
army  was  massed  along  the  latter  river  above  and  below 
the  little  town  of  Fredericksburg.  The  Federal  "  Army  of 
the  Potomac,"  now  commanded  by  Burnside,  held  the  op- 
posite bank.  In  the  middle  of  December,  Burnside,  after 
weeks  of  inaction,  crossed  the  river  at  Fredericksburg  under 
the  cover  of  heavy  batteries  established  on  the  heights  of 
the  left  bank.  But  his  attack  on  Lee's  fortified  lines  on 
the  high  ground  above  the  town  ended  in  disastrous  failure 
and  heavy  loss.  He  recrossed  the  river,  and  then,  through 
wintry  months  of  frosty  snow,  and  rain,  all  was  quiet  along 
the  Rappahannock.  It  was  not  till  the  end  of  April,  1862, 
that  General  Halleck,  who  was  directing  from  Washington 
the  operations  of  the  war  on  the  Federal  side,  decided  that 
the  armies  massed  along  the  river  should  once  more  cross  it 
to  overwhelm  Lee  and  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  and 
open  the  way  to  Richmond. 

At  the  end  of  April  the  forces  under  Lee's  command 
amounted  to  about  62,000  men  and  170  guns.  The  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  now  under  the  command  of  General 
Hooker,  had  been  raised  to  130,000  men,  with  428  guns. 
Thus  in  the  coming  struggle  on  the  Rappahannock  the  Con- 
federates would  be  outnumbered  in  the  proportion  of  more 
than  two  to  one.  It  was  a  position  that  might  well  have 
seemed  desperate  to  a  less  able  leader  than  Lee. 

His  army  was  organized  in  two  corps  of  unequal  strength 


CHANCELLORS  VI LLE 


57 


—  the  First  Corps,  about  18,000  strong-  under  Longstreet; 
the  Second,  about  38,000  strong,  under  Jackson.  These 
troops  were  watching  the  line  of  the  river  above  and  below 
Fredericksburg,  and  holding  the  intrenched  lines  from 
which  they  had  hurled  back  Burnside's  onset  in  December. 
Stuart  had  been  sent  off  with  1500  horsemen  across  the 
Rapidan  to  Culpeper  Station,  on  the  Orange  and  Alexandria 
Railroad,  to  keep  watch  on  a  concentration  of  Northern 
cavalry,  reported  by  spies  to  be  at  Warrenton  Junction,  on 
the  other  side  of  the  upper  Rappahannock. 

Burnside's  defeat  at  Fredericksburg  had  convinced  Hal- 
leck  and  Hooker  that  Lee's  lines  could  not  be  forced  by 
a  direct  attack  across  the  lower  Rappahannock.  The  ques- 
tion was,  as  the  American  attache  said  to  Buller  at  Colenso, 
"  how  to  find  a  way  round."  Hooker  felt  himself  strong 
enough  to  divide  his  forces,  in  order  to  make  a  flank  march, 
turn  to  Confederate  intrenchments,  and  make  Lee  come 
out  of  them  and  fight  in  the  open.  So  far,  in  these  earlier 
battles  of  the  war,  the  side  that  fought  a  defensive  battle 
had  usually  won  it,  and  Hooker  meant  to  force  Lee  to  at- 
tack him,  recombine  his  own  divided  army  on  the  actual 
battle-field,  and  catch  Lee  between  hammer  and  anvil.  H 
Lee  escaped,  it  would  only  be  by  retiring  towards  Rich- 
mond with  forces  twice  as  strong  as  his  own  at  his  heels. 

Hooker's  plan  was  to  leave  his  Heutenant,  General  Sedg- 
wick, with  58,000  men  on  the  lower  river  facing  Fred- 
ericksburg. Sedgwick  was  to  rivet  Lee's  attention  on  him- 
self by  a  false  attack  at  the  crossing  below  the  town,  to 
be  turned  into  a  real  attack  as  soon  as  the  Confederates 
were  forced  by  Hooker's  further  operations  to  relax  their 
hold  on  Fredericksburg.  Hooker  himself,  with  some  60,000 
men,  would  move  up  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  cross  at 
Kelly's  Ford,  and  by  a  forced  march  reach  the  Rapidan  at 
Germanna  Ford,  and  thence  push  on  towards  Chancellors- 
ville ;    while  Stoneman,  with  10,000  horsemen,  would  make 


58  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

a  dash  from  Warrenton  Junction,  cross  the  Rappahannock 
and  Rapidan  (the  latter  river  at  Raccoon  Ford)  and,  raid- 
ing to  the  southwards,  destroy  railways,  telegraphs,  and 
bridges,  and  cut  off  Lee's  supplies.  Hooker  believed  he 
was  strong  enough  to  fight  Lee  if  the  Confederate  general 
turned  upon  him ;  but  he  seems  to  have  expected  that  when 
his  opponent  found  that  60^000  men  were  in  rear  of  the 
Fredericksburg  lines,  and  nearly  as  many  more  crossing 
the  river  below  the  town,  while  10,000  cavalry  were  raiding 
his  communications,  he  would  make  a  prompt  retreat 
towards  Richmond. 

The  movement  had  been  planned  for  the  middle  of  April, 
but  heavy  rains,  that  made  the  roads  difficult  and  swelled 
the  rivers,  delayed  it  till  the  end  of  the  month.  On  April  28 
Stoneman  moved  from  Warrenton  Junction  with  the  Fed- 
eral cavalry,  slipped  past  Stuart's  position  at  Culpeper,  and 
then  pushed  on  across  the  Rapidan  at  Raccoon  Ford,  and, 
riding  due  south,  began  the  work  of  destroying  bridges  and 
railways  in  the  direction  of  Richmond.  Stuart,  with  his 
much  smaller  force,  might  have  been  sent  off  in  pursuit; 
but  there  was  other  work  for  him  to  do,  in  view  of  which 
Lee  disregarded  Stoneman's  cavalry  raid  for  the  moment. 
For  Stuart  had  discovered  that  a  large  force  of  all  arms 
was  moving  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Rappahannock  towards 
Kelly's  Ford,  and  reported  this  to  Lee's  headquarters  at 
Fredericksburg  on  the  evening  of  the  twenty-eighth. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  twenty-ninth  Fredericksburg 
woke  to  the  sound  of  firing  along  the  river  below  the  town, 
and  Jackson,  who  was  watching  this  part  of  the  line,  re- 
ported that,  under  cover  of  a  heavy  fog,  the  enemy  had 
thrown  pontoon  bridges  over  the  Rappahannock,  and  had 
sent  troops  across  which  were  engaged  with  his  outposts. 
Neither  Lee  nor  Jackson  was  anxious  about  this  attack. 
They  were  quite  confident  that  they  could  repel  an  assault 
on  the  Fredericksburg  lines  as  easily  as  they  had  done  in 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  59 

December.  The  question  was  what  the  flank  movement  on 
the  upper  river  meant.  Lee  rehed  on  Stuart  to  clear  this 
point  up. 

Hooker  had  made  a  mistake  in  sending  away  all  Stone- 
man's  mounted  division  on  a  distant  raid  and  retaining  only 
a  handful  of  cavalry.  Stuart  was  able  to  keep  in  close 
touch  with  his  movements.  On  the  evening  of  the  twenty- 
ninth  Lee  had  news  from  his  cavalry  that  all  the  afternoon 
strong  columns  of  the  enemy  had  been  passing  the  Rapidan 
by  the  Germanna  and  Ely's  Fords.  He  at  once  marched  off 
Anderson's  Division  towards  Chancellorsville.  Early  next 
day  Stuart  sent  in  word  that  he  had  taken  prisoners  be- 
longing to  three  Federal  army  corps  —  the  Fifth,  Eleventh, 
and  Twelfth.  Anderson  reported  that  he  had  not  been  able 
to  reach  Chancellorsville,  but  had  fallen  back  before  a  strong 
hostile  advanced  guard  and  taken  up  a  position  where  he 
was  intrenching  his  force. 

So  far  Hooker's  plan  had  worked  out  well.  Sedgwick 
had  bridged  the  river  below  Fredericksburg,  and  was  in- 
trenched on  the  right  bank  and  ready  to  attack.  Hooker 
himself,  by  a  forced  march,  had  crossed  the  Rappahannock 
and  the  Rapidan,  and  concentrated  60,000  men  in  the  rear 
of  the  Confederate  position. 

The  country  south  of  the  Rapidan,  where  he  was  now 
operating,  was  the  thickly-wooded  region  which,  in  a  later 
campaign,  became  famous  under  the  name  of  the  "  Wilder- 
ness." The  surface  was  undulating,  and  for  the  most  part 
covered  with  a  forest  of  fir,  cedar,  and  oak,  with  quanti- 
ties of  close-growing  underwood,  often  so  entangled  with 
creepers  that  it  was  difificult  even  for  a  man  on  foot  to  make 
his  way  through  it.  The  streams,  though  small,  flowed  in 
marshy  hollows  that  made  them  serious  obstacles.  There 
were  clearings  round  the  scattered  wood-built  houses,  and 
several  roads,  mostly  "  planked  "  or  "  corduroyed "  with 
felled  timber,  ran  through  the  woods.     Some  of  these  were 


6o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

highways  traversing  the  forest  from  end  to  end,  others  were 
cross-roads  leading  to  the  local  iron  mines  and  furnaces, 
which  the  war  had  put  out  of  work.  Towards  the  western 
edge  of  the  Wilderness  Forest,  near  a  junction  of  several 
roads  and  woodland  tracks^  stood  a  large  country  house 
belonging  to  the  Chancellor  family,  and  known  as  "  Chan- 
cellorsville."  Here  Hooker  established  his  headquarters  on 
April  30.  There  was  an  extensive  clearing  immediately  to 
the  west  of  it,  and  the  hollows  of  streams,  running  north 
to  the  Rapidan  and  southwest  to  the  Rappahannock,  marked 
out  a  line  that  could  be  quickly  strengthened  with  breast- 
works of  felled  timber  and  hasty  intrenchments.  From 
Chancellorsville  he  issued  a  somewhat  boastful  general 
order  to  his  army  congratulating  them  on  an  assured  suc- 
cess.    It  ran  thus : 

"  It  is  with  heartfelt  satisfaction  that  the  commanding  general  an- 
nomices  to  his  army  that  the  operations  of  the  last  three  days  have 
determined  that  our  enemy  must  either  ingloriously  fly  or  come  out 
from  behind  his  intrenchments  and  give  us  battle  on  our  own 
ground,  where  certain  destruction  awaits  him.  The  operations  of 
the  Fifth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  corps  have  been  a  succession  of 
splendid   achievements." 

Hooker  was  making  a  very  premature  announcement  of 
success.  In  the  light  of  his  subsequent  proceedings  it  would 
appear  that  he  counted  upon  Lee  retreating  from  a  danger- 
ous position  without  any  serious  fighting.  But  he  knew  his 
opponent  well  enough  to  anticipate  that  if  he  did  not  at 
once  retire  he  would  certainly  not  wait  to  be  surrounded  in 
the  lines  of  Fredericksburg,  but  would  come  out  and  attack 
him.  In  that  case  he  reckoned  upon  being  able  to  inilict 
defeat  upon  Lee  by  merely  holding  the  position  he  had  taken 
up  in  the  woods  about  Chancellorsville.  But  in  assuming 
this  passive  attitude  he  would  be  throwing  away  the  chief 
advantage  he  had  gained  by  the  forced  march.  In  the 
woods  his  great  superiority  in  artillery  was  neutralized,  for 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  6i 

there  were  not  many  positions  where  even  a  single  battery 
could  find  a  field  of  fire  of  more  than  a  few  hundred  yards. 
The  movements  of  his  infantry  were  restricted  by  being  for 
the  most  part  confined  to  the  tracks  cut  through  the  forest. 
There  were  only  four  openings  of  any  importance  leading 
out  of  it  towards  Fredericksburg  —  namely,  the  old  turnpike 
road  in  the  center,  the  so-called  "  River  Road  "  north  of 
it,  the  corduroyed  track  known  as  the  "  Plank  Road  "  to  the 
south  of  it,  and  still  farther  to  his  right  the  clearings, 
through  which  ran  an  unfinished  railway  line.  These  four 
ways  were  so  many  defiles,  the  western  outlets  from  which 
Lee  could  block  with  a  locally  superior  force,  bringing  the 
heads  of  the  Federal  columns  under  a  concentrated  and 
converging  fire  of  rifles  and  artillery  as  they  issued  from 
the  forest. 

For  a  short  time  on  the  morning  of  May  i  Hooker  seemed 
to  have  decided  on  a  more  resolute  policy  —  the  policy  of 
attack,  the  only  one  by  which  he  could  reap  decisive  re- 
sults from  his  earlier  operations.  His  best  chance  was  now 
to  take  the  initiative,  not  to  wait  till  Lee  chose  between 
retreating  and  attacking  the  lines  of  Chancellorsville,  but 
to  move  boldly  forward  and  bring  all  his  forces  to  bear 
on  the  enemy,  falling  on  rear  of  the  Fredericksburg  works 
with  his  right,  while  Sedgwick  attacked  with  the  left.  In 
order  to  secure  joint  action  with  Sedgwick,  he  had  estab- 
lished a  chain  of  signal  stations  from  Chancellorsville  to 
the  United  States  Ford  across  the  Rappahannock  on  his 
left.  Here  his  engineers  had  built  a  pontoon  bridge  for 
reinforcements  to  join  him,  and  had  run  a  field  telegraph 
line  from  the  ford  back  by  Falmouth  to  the  heights  oppo- 
site Fredericksburg.  But  the  line  of  telegraph  worked 
badly,  and  in  the  early  hours  of  the  May  day  the  hot  sum- 
mer haze  from  the  river  and  the  swampy  hollows  made  the 
signal  stations  nearly  useless. 

Nevertheless,    if    he    had    pushed    steadily    forward    the 


62  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

sound  of  his  guns  would  soon  have  been  sufficient  warning 
to  Sedgwick  to  cooperate.  Early  in  the  day  strong  columns 
were  moving  by  the  forest  roads  westward  from  the  Chan- 
cellorsville  lines.  Fredericksburg  was  only  twelve  miles 
away,  and  Hooker  spoke  of  being  in  possession  of  the  place 
by  noon,  or  soon  after.  But  his  energetic  mood  did  not  last 
long.  He  had  expected  to  find  in  front  of  him,  on  leaving 
the  woods,  only  Anderson's  Division,  and  to  drive  it  with 
very  little  effort  from  the  ground  where  it  had  halted  the 
day  before.  But  while  he  was  still  in  the  forest,  the  heads 
of  his  columns  met  with  such  serious  and  determined  op- 
position that  it  became  evident  that  instead  of  retiring,  or 
waiting  to  be  crushed  between  superior  forces,  Lee  had 
come  out  of  his  lines  to  attack  him. 

When  Sedgwick  crossed  the  river  and  intrenched  himself 
on  the  right  bank  below  Fredericksburg,  and  Stuart's  des- 
patches told  of  a  strong  flank  movement  across  the  upper 
Rappahannock  and  the  Rapidan,  Lee  had  at  once  decided  to 
fall  upon  one  or  other  of  the  divided  wings  of  the  Federal 
army  before  they  could  combine  to  attack  him.  A  sugges- 
tion that  Sedgwick  should  be  driven  back  across  the  river 
was  dismissed.  To  close  with  him  meant  to  bring  the 
assaulting  columns  under  the  fire  of  the  heavy  batteries 
established  on  the  commanding  heights  of  the  left  bank.  It 
was  better  to  wait  and  let  him  run  his  head  against  the 
Fredericksburg  intrenchments.  But  Sedgwick  was  also 
playing  a  waiting  game.  He  skirmished  with  the  Con- 
federate outposts,  and  his  guns  threw  a  few  shells  among 
them,  but  most  of  his  men  were  busy  digging  intrench- 
ments to  secure  his  hold  of  the  ground  on  which  he  lay. 
On  the  other  bank  of  the  river  three  captive  balloons  swayed 
at  the  ends  of  their  long  cables.  From  these  a  watchful 
eye  was  being  kept  on  the  Confederate  lines  to  give  warn- 
ing of  any  movement  against  Hooker,  and  to  catch  the  first 
signs  of  his  advance  from  the  westward. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  63 

When  Stuart's  later  messages  showed  that  the  enemy  was 
in  force  in  the  Wilderness  Woods,  Anderson's  Division  was 
sent  out  to  gain  touch  with  Hooker.  Then  on  the  evening 
of  April  30  Lee  resolved  on  a  bold  stroke.  He  would 
leave  only  10,000  men  in  the  Fredericksburg  lines.  They 
might  bluff  Sedgwick  into  waiting  still  longer;  but  even  if 
the  Federals  attacked,  the  lines  were  strong  enough  to  be 
held  for  a  while.  All  Lee  wanted  was  time  to  strike  a 
crushing  blow  at  Hooker  in  the  woods.  He  would  march 
against  him  with  the  whole  of  Jackson's  Corps  and  every 
man  he  could  spare  from  the  First  Corps.  Even  so  he 
would  not  bring  an  equal  force  against  the  Federals,  but  it 
would  be  nearly  equal,  and  he  relied  on  the  fighting  quality 
of  his  men  and  the  leadership  of  Jackson  to  make  up  the 
difference. 

The  march  began  in  the  night  between  April  30  and 
May  I.  The  darkness  and  then  the  mists  of  the  early  hours 
of  daylight  hid  the  first  movements  from  the  observers  in 
the  cars  of  the  Federal  balloons.  Further  to  impose  upon 
Sedgwick,  deserters  had  been  sent  out,  who  made  their  way 
into  his  picket  lines  in  the  early  morning,  and  told  that  Lee 
had  been  heavily  reinforced  from  Richmond.  The  garrison 
of  the  lines  made  such  a  good  show,  and  kept  up  such  a 
brisk  skirmishing  with  the  Federal  pickets,  that  Sedgwick 
believed  Fredericksburg  was  strongly  held  even  when  the 
mist  cleared  and  his  balloonists  reported  long  columns  mov- 
ing westward  by  the  roads  towards  the  forest. 

Before  dawn  Anderson's  intrenched  line  was  reinforced 
from  Fredericksburg.  But  Lee  had  no  intention  of  standing 
on  the  defensive.  The  Federal  advance  had  been  very  slow. 
Hooker  was  waiting  for  reinforcements  he  had  called  up 
from  Falmouth.  The  heads  of  his  columns  were  still  in  the 
forest,  when  on  every  road  they  came  upon  advancing 
enemies.  They  pushed  back  the  first  detachments  they  en- 
countered.    They  had  expected  to  have   to   deal   with  at 


64  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

most  a  weak  rearguard.  But  now  across  every  road  and  in 
every  clearing  they  came  upon  ordered  lines  of  the  men  in 
gray.  Batteries  opened  upon  them  at  the  short  ranges  im- 
posed by  the  close  country.  A  column  pushing  forward  on 
the  turnpike  was  held  in  front  and  suddenly  assailed  on  its 
right  flank  by  swarms  of  gray-clad  skirmishers  breaking 
through  the  woods  and  coming  up  from,  the  direction  of  the 
Plank  Road.     They  fell  back  before  this  double  attack. 

Forest  fighting  is  a  trying  business  to  all  but  the  most 
resolute  of  men.  To  press  forward  or  even  to  stand  fast 
while  one  faces  hard  fighting  in  front  and  hears  the  roar  of 
unseen  guns  and  the  crackle  of  rifle  fire  coming  from  right 
and  left,  with  only  the  vaguest  sense  of  its  actual  direction, 
and  a  harassing  suspicion  that  it  may  be  already  far  in  on 
flank  and  rear,  makes  even  brave  men  think  seriously  about 
the  safety  of  the  line  of  retreat.  The  Confederates,  fighting 
nearer  the  edge  of  the  forest,  with  their  supports  well  in 
hand  in  the  clearings  immediately  behind  them,  knew  how 
they  stood,  and  were  able  to  work  together.  Hooker's  men 
were  in  the  thick  of  a  "  fog  of  war,"  made  more  trying  by 
their  surroundings.  Just  as  the  defenders  of  the  turnpike 
Tiad  been  driven  in  by  a  flank  attack  from  the  Plank  Road, 
so  a  stand  on  the  Plank  Road  was  broken  by  a  flank  attack 
coming  through  the  tangle  of  wood  in  the  direction  of  the 
railway. 

In  the  presence  of  this  unexpected  opposition  Hooker 
decided  to  abandon  his  attempted  advance,  and  bethought 
him  of  his  promise  that  if  the  enemy  did  not  take  to  "  in- 
glorious flight  "  he  would  be  forced  "  to  give  us  battle  on 
our  own  ground,  where  certain  destruction  awaited  him." 
That  chosen  ground  was  the  line  of  intrenchments  farther 
back  in  the  woods  along  the  Chancellorsville  ridges.  He 
sent  orders  for  a  general  retirement  to  the  prepared  posi- 
tion. Remembering  how  the  wild  onset  of  the  Federals  had 
been  flung  back  from  the  line,  of  Fredericksburg,  he  counted 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  65 

on  inflicting  the  same  fate  on  the  Confederates  at  the  hnes 
of  Chancellorsville. 

Following  up  the  retreating  enemy,  Lee  and  Jackson's 
men  came  on  intrenchments  and  breastworks  bristling  with 
artillery,  and  closing  every  road  and  sweeping  every  clear- 
ing. There  was  a  lull  in  the  fighting.  Along  the  front 
there  was  a  desultory  exchange  of  rifle  fire.  Here  and 
there  a  battery  found  a  target  and  sent  its  shells  screaming 
and  crashing  through  the  woodlands.  Lee  and  his  staff 
reconnoitered  the  Federal  lines.  They  found  the  right  and 
center  so  formidable  that  an  assault  could  only  end  in  use- 
less loss  of  life.  Where  the  line  turned  to  the  eastward  the 
bare  plateau  of  Hazel  Grove  rose  out  of  the  woods  crowned 
with  batteries.  Beyond  the  works  were  not  so  strong. 
Stuart  was  sent  ofif  to  reconnoiter  this  part  of  the  line  more 
closely. 

Both  sides  had  learned  the  value  of  intrenchments.  All 
along  the  opposing  fronts  the  men  in  blue  and  the  men  in 
gray  were  working  hard.  The  Federals  were  strengthening 
their  lines.  The  Confederates  were  felling  trees,  making 
entanglements  of  branches,  piling  stones,  grubbing  up  earth 
to  improvise  defensive  cover.  So  the  day  wore  on  with  an 
occasional  spatter  of  fire,  and  at  times  a  sudden  alarm  when 
the  firing  would  swell  for  a  while  into  a  roar  of  musketry 
and  cannon.  A  message  sent  to  Sedgwick  by  Hooker, 
bidding  him  attack  Fredericksburg,  arrived  too  late  for  any 
action  till  the  morrow.  As  the  sun  went  down  the  firing 
ceased.  Camp-fires  glowed  in  every  clearing  of  the  forest, 
and  the  two  armies  slept  in  their  woodland  bivouacs. 

There  was  little  rest  for  the  two  chiefs  of  the  Confederate 
army.  Lee  and  Jackson  had  already  agreed  that  an  attempt 
must  be  made  against  the  extreme  right  of  the  enemy's 
works.  They  had  a  very  imperfect  map  of  the  Wilderness 
region ;  but  Stuart  was  out  with  Fitzhugh  Lee,  the  gen- 
eral's nephew,  and  would  bring  in  information  before  dawn 


66  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

that  would  decide  the  actual  plan  for  the  morrow's  battle. 
Lee  and  Jackson  had  snatched  a  brief  sleep  rolled  in  their 
cloaks  under  a  clump  of  pine  and  oak  in  the  woods  to  the 
west  of  Chancellorsville.  Before  three  o'clock  they  were 
up,  and  by  the  light  of  a  lantern  sat  on  a  couple  of  biscuit 
boxes  breakfasting-,  discussing  the  orders  for  the  day.  At 
three  Stuart  rode  up,  dismounted,  flung  his  bridle  to  an 
orderly,  and  joined  them.  He  put  another  box  between 
them,  spread  his  map  upon  it,  and  pencil  in  hand  made  his 
report. 

Along  the  Federal  right  all  the  intrenchments  looked 
southwards.  They  ended  abruptly  at  a  point  on  the  turn- 
pike two  and  a  half  miles  short  of  Wilderness  Run.  In 
military  phrase,  the  extreme  right  was  "  in  the  air."  It 
rested  on  no  obstacle.  It  was  not  protected  by  redoubts  or 
by  turning  back  to  the  northward.  Further,  Stuart  had 
found  a  friend  and  helper  in  a  Mr.  Welford,  who  owned  an 
iron  mine  near  the  enemy's  right,  and  had  lately  cut  through 
the  woods  a  road,  marked  as  yet  on  no  map,  which  gave  a 
concealed  access  to  the  ground  between  the  Federal  flank 
and  the  hollow  of  Wilderness  Run.  The  road  had  been 
made  for  hauling  ore  to  a  furnace  near  Welford's  house, 
and  the  iron-master  had  volunteered  to  act  as  a  guide  to 
troops  sent  by  this  way. 

The  plan  of  battle  was  soon  settled.  Jackson  had  often 
before  acted  as  the  leader  of  a  striking  force  detached  by 
Lee.  It  was  to  be  his  work  in  this,  his  last,  battle.  Lee 
would  retain  only  some  10,000  men  under  his  immediate 
command.  They  would  during  long  hours  of  the  coming 
day  keep  up  a  pretense  of  attacking  the  enemy's  works. 
The  forest  and  their  own  activity  would  mask  their  weak- 
ness. Stuart  would  send  patrols  to  watch  the  woods  fac- 
ing the  enemy's  works  on  the  right.  Jackson  would  mass  ■ 
45,000  men  in  a  single  column,  and,  guided  by  Welford, 
work  round  the  enemy's  right,  mass  his  army  near  the  fork 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  67 

of  the  roads  to  the  west  of  their  extreme  flank,  and  then 
come  sweeping  into  the  forest,  rolHng  up  their  line,  attack- 
ing behind  their  intrenchments,  driving  everything  before 
him  with  local  weight  of  numbers,  aided  by  surprise,  and 
cutting  them  off  from  the  fords  of  the  Rapidan.  The  plan 
offered  a  prospect  not  merely  of  defeating  but  of  destroying 
Hooker's  army.  It  would  not  matter  now  if  Sedgwick 
rushed  Fredericksburg.  After  destroying  Hooker  the  vic- 
torious Confederates  would  turn  on  him  and  crush  him  also. 

"How  soon  will  you  move?"  asked  Lee. 

"  At  once,"  replied  Jackson,  his  stern  features  aglow  with 
the  enthusiasm  of  expected  triumph.  The  men  were  quietly 
roused  from  their  bivouacs,  and  fell  in  silently  after  taking 
a  hasty  meal  from  their  haversacks.  Staff  officers  passed 
from  point  to  point  directing  regiments  and  brigades  how 
to  reach  their  places  in  the  column.  Twilight  was  begin- 
ning, but  it  was  dark  among  the  forest  trees,  and  it  says 
much  for  the  war-trained  discipline  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  that  the  long  column  formed  without  confusion 
or  delay.  At  four  o'clock  the  leading  division  marched  oft", 
with  a  squadron  of  Stuart's  horsemen  at  its  head.  Lee  sat 
on  horseback  in  one  of  the  forest  glades  watching  the  long 
line  tram])ing  past  him.  Jackson  was  beside  him  for  a 
while ;  then  with  a  few  parting  words  and  a  grasp  of  the 
hand  he  bade  Lee  good-by,  and  gradually  gained  the  head 
of  the  column. 

The  twilight  grew  to  day,  and  the  sun  rose  over  the 
woodlands  in  a  clear  blue  sky.  Still  Lee  watched  the  end- 
less march.  It  was  four  hours  before  the  last  of  Jackson's 
men  had  gone  by,  for  the  column  was  nearly  ten  mile«  from 
front  to  rear  —  sun-tanned,  weather-beaten  infantry  men  in 
ragged  gray  uniforms,  with  blankets  strapped  bandolier 
fashion  across  their  shoulders,  and  broken  boots  or  strips 
of  hide  twisted  round  their  bare  feet ;  guns  that  had  lost 
all  parade  polish  tugged  over  the  rough  forest  road  by  thin 


68  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

horses  all  bone  and  muscle  —  a  working  army  marching 
silently  to  victory,  saluting  their  chief  with  a  glance  and  a 
smile  instead  of  the  rolling  cheers  and  the  exultant  yell  that 
generally  greeted  him.  When  the  sun  rose  there  came 
sounds  of  battle  from  the  woods  to  the  northeastward,  deep 
booming  of  cannon,  dull  patter  of  distant  rifle  fire,  for  al- 
ready the  feigned  attack  had  begun  that  was  to  rivet 
Hooker's  attention  on  the  wrong  point.  When  the  last  of 
Jackson's  men  had  gone  by  Lee  turned  and  rode  towards 
the  firing. 

He  was  taking  very  serious  risks,  but  he  had  recognized 
and  accepted  them.  The  best  part  of  his  army  had  been 
sent  off  on  a  march  of  many  hours  by  a  narrow  track  in 
the  western  woods,  and  he  had  with  him  only  Anderson 
and  McLaws's  divisions  of  Longstreet's  Corps,  not  quite 
10,000  men,  to  hold  the  enemy  along  a  front  of  more  than 
four  miles.  If  Hooker  were  to  assume  the  offensive,  the 
situation  would  be  serious ;  but  Lee  knew  his  adversary, 
and  felt  quite  sure  that  a  persistent  show  of  attacking  him 
would  be  enough  to  keep  him  within  his  intrenched  lines 
through  the  long  summer  day.  Guns  were  crowded  up  to 
the  front,  trees  being  felled  by  the  score  to  make  way  for 
them,  and  a  heavy  cannonade  thundered  against  the  Chan- 
cellorsville  lines,  along  the  River  Road  by  the  Rappahan- 
nock on  the  right  and  in  the  clearings  of  the  Turnpike  and 
Plank  roads  in  the  center.  Lines  of  skirmishers  were 
pushed  well  forward,  covered  by  improvised  breastworks, 
the  firing  line  being  made  strong  to  give  the  impression 
that  supports  were  massing  behind  it  for  an  assault.  But 
there  were  no  supports  available.  It  was  a  splendid  game 
of  "  bluff,"  and  the  forest  effectually  screened  the  real 
weakness  of  the  Confederate  attack.  Hooker's  men  stood 
to  their  breastworks,  and  manned  their  rifle-pits  and 
trenches,  and  answered  back  the  hostile  fire  with  cannon 
and  rifle. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  69 

As  the  morning  hours  went  by  and  no  assault  was  made, 
the  Federal  commander  began  to  suspect  that  all  this 
"  sound  and  fury  "  was  meant  to  veil  the  preparations  for 
a  retirement.  He  was  confirmed  in  this  idea  when,  from 
the  high  ground  of  Hazel  Grove,  General  Sickles,  who  com- 
manded there,  reported  that,  looking  down  the  long  hollow 
which  runs  southwards  from  the  height,  he  could  see, 
through  gaps  in  the  trees,  men,  guns,  and  wagons  march- 
ing away  in  a  steady  stream  with  their  backs  to  him.  What 
Sickles  saw  was  the  rear  divisions  of  Jackson's  Corps 
marching  across  Lewis  Creek,  near  Welford's  house,  and 
moving  southwest  by  the  new  roadway.  It  looked  like  a 
retirement,  for  he  had  no  means  of  knowing  that,  three 
miles  farther  on,  the  long  column  was  turning  sharply  to 
the  northward.  Stuart's  men  in  the  woods  had  driven  back 
patrols  pushed  out  from  the  Federal  right,  and  further 
screened  Jackson's  movement  by  holding  every  path  and 
clearing  in  front  of  the  enemy's  works  on  this  side. 

Hooker  felt  so  sure  that  the  Confederate  retreat  had 
begun  that  he  agreed  to  a  proposal  of  Sickles  that  he  should 
advance  from  the  lines  at  Hazel  Grove,  attack  along  Lewis 
Creek,  and  "  capture  guns  and  baggage."  Sickles  came  on, 
covered  by  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery,  and  gradually  pushed 
some  thousands  into  action.  But  their  advance  was  delayed 
by  a  strong  rearguard  that  Jackson  had  left  facing  Hazel 
Grove.  Having  taken  this  precaution,  he  had  pushed  on, 
regardless  of  the  firing  in  the  woods  behind  him.  He  took 
the  chance  of  Sickles  breaking  through,  and  held  on  to  his 
original  purpose.  Whatever  happened  in  the  woods  round 
Lewis  Creek,  a  successful  stroke  against  the  Federal  flank 
would  be  decisive. 

The  march  of  Jackson's  column  on  the  rough  and  nar- 
row forest  track  was  terribly  slow.  It  was  late  in  the  after- 
noon when  the  leading  brigade  —  General  Rodes's  Alabama 
regiments  —  reached  the  open  ground  near  Old  Wilderness 


70  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Tavern.  Then  for  fully  two  hours,  as  mile  on  mile  of 
marching  men  came  into  position,  Jackson  was  forming 
his  divisions  for  battle  in  three  lines.  The  intrenchments 
on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Federals  were  held  by  the 
Eleventh  Corps,  under  General  Howard.  Most  of  his  regi- 
ments were  recruited  from  the  German  population  of  the 
Northern  States.  The  roll  of  his  brigade  and  regimental 
commanders  reads  like  an  extract  from  a  Prussian  army 
list.  Many  of  them  had  served  in  the  forces  of  various 
German  states.  Some  had  seen  war  service  in  1848  and 
1849.  Howard  himself  was  a  good  soldier.  He  recognized 
that,  though  his  line  was  strong  against  a  frontal  attack,  his 
flank  was  dangerously  exposed.  Hooker  seems  to  have  sent 
him  a  warning  message,  suggesting  that  an  attempt  might 
be  made  against  it,  and  Howard  himself  states  in  his  nar- 
rative of  the  day's  work  that  he  was  anxious  on  the  subject. 
Hooker  had  sent  away  nearly  all  his  mounted  troops  on 
Stoneman's  raid,  and  had  a  mere  handful  of  cavalry  with 
him  under  Pleasanton.  These  were  acting  with  Sickles 
near  Hazel  Grove.  The  firing  in  that  direction  was  drift- 
ing southwards  through  the  woods,  and  this  somewhat  re- 
assured Howard.  But  he  was  troubled  by  the  fact  that 
Stuart's  gray-coated  horsemen  appeared  from  time  to  time 
in  the  clearings  in  his  front,  pushed  close  up  to  the  works, 
and  retired  when  fired  upon,  only  to  reappear  again  soon 
after.  The  marvel  is  that  he  took  no  steps  to  secure  his 
flank.  How  little  even  a  veteran  general  of  the  day  some- 
times knew  of  the  mere  elements  of  war  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  it  did  not  occur  either  to  him  or  to  any  of  his 
American  or  German  officers  that  it  would  be  useful  to 
have  a  line  of  patrols  in  the  woods  on  his  flank  to  watch 
the  ground  between  his  extreme  right  and  Wilderness  Run. 
A  single  patrol  of  scouts  properly  worked  would  have  told 
him  that  an  army  was  forming  up  for  attack  on  his  flank, 
and  was  within  a  couple  of  miles  of  it. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  71 

Jackson  had  himself  gone  forward,  under  cover  of  the 
woods,  and  seen  with  his  own  eyes  the  state  of  afifairs  in 
Howard's  Hnes,  and  he  felt  so  secure  that  he  took  all  the 
time  needed  to  form  his  triple  line  of  battle,  and  did  not 
give  the  word  to  advance  till  he  had  more  than  30,000 
bayonets  in  array.  He  took  his  post  beside  Rodes  in  the 
front  of  the  Alabama  Brigade.  It  was  within  a  few  min- 
utes of  six  o'clock  when,  glancing  along  the  ordered  lines, 
he  turned  to  the  brigadier  and  asked,  "  Are  you  ready, 
General  Rodes  ?  "  "  Yes,  sir,"  "  You  can  go  forward,  sir." 
A  nod  from  Rodes  to  his  bugler,  and  the  call  for  the  ad- 
vance was  sounded,  and  the  gray  lines  began  to  tramp  for- 
ward into  the  forest,  the  red  rays  of  the  declining  sun  in 
their  faces. 

Along  the  front  of  Hooker's  lines  the  firing  had  died 
down  to  a  mere  desultory  exchange  of  shots,  except  south 
of  Hazel  Grove,  where  there  was  still  some  serious  fighting 
in  the  woods.  Behind  their  intrenchments  the  Federals 
were  cooking  their  evening  meal.  Arms  were  piled  in  long 
rows,  and  the  officers  of,  several  regiments  were  actually 
dining,  seated  at  improvised  tables  of  packing  cases.  The 
first  sign  that  something  was  happening  in  the  woods  on 
the  right  was  a  rush  of  startled  birds  and  beasts.  There 
was  a  flutter  of  wings  among  the  trees ;  scared  deer  and 
hares  and  rabbits  dashed  into  the  bivouacs.  Before 
Howard's  men  had  realized  what  it  meant,  there  were  a 
crackling  of  branches  in  the  underwood,  the  tramp  of  thou- 
sands, the  click  of  accoutcrmcnts,  the  murmur  of  a  great 
movement  of  men,  and  along  the  opening  of  the  road,  out 
of  clearings,  through  thickets  the  gray  regiments  appeared  ; 
and  as  they  sighted  the  blue-clad  Federals  rushing  to  their 
arms,  there  came  from  the  long  front  of  the  attack  a  blast 
of  rifle  fire,  and  then  by  the  road  a  battery  unlimbered  and 
sent  its  shells  tearing  through  the  woodland. 

The  surprise  was  complete.     Men  were  shot  as  they  rose 


72  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

from  the  ground  and  ran  to  their  arms ;  horses  fell  strug- 
gling at  their  picket  lines ;  officers  were  calling  to  their 
men  to  form,  and  while  some  tried  to  obey,  others  in  the 
confused  panic  of  the  moment  turned  and  fled  from  the 
advancing  wave  of  fire  and  steel.  General  Devens's  Bri- 
gade, on  the  extreme  right,  was  overwhelmed,  and  hurled 
back  in  a  mingled  mass  of  men,  horses,  guns,  and  wagons, 
leaving  hundreds  of  prisoners  and  two  cannon  in  the  hands 
of  the  Confederates. 

Howard  had  been  inspecting  the  left  of  his  line^  and 
had  dismounted  at  his  headquarters,  Dowdall's  Tavern,  a 
farm-house  near  the  turnpike,  about  800  yards  east  of  the 
Wilderness  Church,  and  close  to  a  line  of  trenches  and 
breastworks  that  ran  northwards  from  the  main  line  to 
bar  the  road.  Suddenly  a  sound  of  heavy  firing  came  from 
the  extreme  right,  and  he  mounted  and  galloped  along  the 
road  in  that  direction.  The  first  thing  that  told  him  there 
had  been  a  disaster  was  the  sight  of  fugitives  crowding 
into  the  opening  along  the  road  —  "  not  the  few  stragglers 
that  always  fly  like  chaff  at  the  first  breeze,  but  scores  of 
them,  some  with  arms,  some  without."  The  scores  soon 
became  a  moving  crowd,  throwing  into  confusion  McLean's 
Brigade  as  it  tried  to  swing  round  to  meet  the  attack. 
Guns  galloping  to  the  front  were  stopped  by  the  throng. 
Howard  sent  swift  orders  to  Steinwehr  and  Schurz's  bri- 
gades to  form  front  to  the  westward,  and  riding  into  the 
panic-stricken  mass  saw  the  enemy's  advance  coming  on 
through  a  clearing  of  the  woods.  "  As  they  emerged  from 
the  forest,"  he  says,  "  the  men  in  front  would  halt  and  fire, 
and  while  these  were  reloading  another  set  would  run  be- 
fore them,  halt  and  fire  in  no  regular  line,  but  in  such 
multitudes  that  our  men  went  down  before  them  like  trees 
before  a  hurricane." 

A   regiment   of   Federal   cavalry  — the   Eighth   Pennsyl- 
vania—came  riding   up,   and   charged   the    Confederates; 


Xwlv^.^^c?      '?°°°*  Federal.  eJvtrenAed  f)os't.  on. s 
^^^^^'''SvC)        CoafaiejTii-d  troops  *  c^ 


•■  No.  4  —  Battle  of  Chancellorsville,  May  1-2,  1863 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  73 

but  disordered  in  the  underwood,  and  fired  upon  from  rifles 
crowded  among  the  trees,  the  horsemen  were  driven  back 
with  loss  and  scattered,  to  rally  again  far  to  the  rear.  One 
of  the  troopers,  whose  horse  was  shot,  and  who  narrowly 
escaped  capture,  gives  a  vivid  glimpse  of  the  scene  he  saw 
when  he  struggled  back  to  the  road : 

"  The  road  and  the  woods  that  bordered  it  presented  a  scene  of 
terror  and  confusion  such  as  I  had  never  seen  before.  Men  and  ani- 
mals were  dashing  against  one  another  in  wild  dismay  before  the 
line  of  fire  that  came  crashing  and  crackling  after  them.  The  con- 
stantly approaching  rattle  of  musketry,  the  crash  of  the  shells  through 
the  trees,  seemed  to  come  from  three  sides  upon  the  broken  frag- 
ments of  the  Eleventh  Corps  that  crowded  each  other  on  the  road. 
The  horses  of  the  men  of  my  regiment  who  had  been  shot,  mingled 
with  the  pack-mules  that  carried  the  ammunition  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  tore  like  wild  beasts  through  the  woods.  I  tried  in  vain  to 
catch  one.  ...  I  now  gave  up  the  hope  of  a  mount,  and  seeing  the 
Confederate  lines  coming  near  me,  tried  to  save  myself  on  foot. 
More  than  half  of  the  runaways  had  thrown  their  arms  away,  and 
all  of  them  were  talking  a  language  I  did  not  understand.  I  doubt 
if  any  of  us  knew  where  we  were  going,  further  than  that  we  were 
fleeing  before  the  pursuing  lines  of  the  enemy." 

Presently  the  dismounted  trooper  came  upon  the  corps 
commander,  who  was  trying  to  rally  the  fugitives  under  fire. 

"  In  the  very  height  of  the  flight  we  came  upon  General  Howard, 
who  seemed  to  be  the  only  man  in  his  own  command  who  was  not 
running  at  that  moment.  He  was  in  the  middle  of  the  road  and 
mounted,  his  maimed  arm  embracing  a  stand  of  colors  that  some 
regiment  had  deserted,  while  with  his  sound  arm  he  was  gesticulat- 
ing to  the  men  to  stand  by  their  flag.  With  bared  head  he  was  plead- 
ing with  his  soldiers,  literally  weeping  as  he  entreated  the  unheeding 
horde.  Maimed  in  his  person  and  sublime  in  his  patriotism  he 
seemed  worthy  to  stand  by,  and  out  of  pure  compliment  to  his  ap- 
pearance I  hooked  up  my  saber  and  fell  into  the  little  line  that 
gathered  about  him.  As  the  front  became  clear  we  fired  a  few  shots 
at  the  advance  line  of  the  Confederates;  but  a  fresh  mass  of  fugi- 
tives in  blue  soon  filled  the  road,  and  we  had  to  stop  firing.  The 
general  now  ordered  us  to  cover  the  whole  line  of  retreat  so  as  to 
let  none  pass,  and  the  officers,  inspired  by  his  devotion,  ran  in  front 
of  their  men,  drew  their  swords,  and  attempted  to  stop  them.  As 
the  number  constantly  increased  the  pressure  became  greater  upon 


74  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  line  that  blocked  the  way;  but  this  line  was  constantly  reinforced 
by  ofificers  and  others,  and  offered  some  resistance  to  the  pressure. 
At  last  the  surging,  seething  sea  of  humanity  broke  over  the  feeble 
barrier,  and  General  Howard  and  his  officers  were  carried  away  by 
main  force  with  the  tide."  ' 

There  was  a  rally  and  a  brief  stand  at  the  line  of  in- 
trenchments  across  the  road ;  but  the  Confederates,  flushed 
with  their  first  success,  came  pouring  in  a  fierce  wave  of 
bayonets  over  the  works,  and  again  carried  all  before  them. 
The  onset  was  not  checked  till  the  advance  broke  into  a 
wide  clearing  northeast  of  Hazel  Grove.  Pleasanton  and 
Sickles  had  moved  back  towards  the  high  ground  when 
they  heard  the  storm  of  fire  behind  them.  Pleasanton  had 
hurriedly  got  some  fifty  guns  into  line  across  the  road  to 
sweep  the  clearings.  As  the  advancing  rush  of  the  attack 
came  in  sight  the  guns  opened  fire  at  a  hundred  yards,  tear- 
ing ghastly  lanes  of  dead  and  crippled  men  in  the  dense 
mass  and  effectually  checking  the  advance.  The  Confeder- 
ates fell  back  into  the  forest,  and  kept  up  a  dropping  fire 
of  rifles  from  the  edge  of  the  bush.  The  Federal  artillery 
ceased  firing,  and  masses  of  infantry  began  to  form  up 
behind  it. 

It  was  now  quite  dark,  except  where  the  rising  moon 
gave  a  doubtful  light  in  the  clearings  of  the  wood.  The 
Confederates  were  disorganized  by  their  own  swift  success. 
Regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions  were  mingled  together. 
Ofiicers  were  separated  from  their  men,  and  many  had  lost 
all  sense  of  direction  in  the  gathering  darkness,  the  broken 
ground,  and  the  tangled  thickets,  where  gray  uniforms  had 
been  torn  to  rags  as  the  men  burst  through  the  underwood. 
The  wide  track  of  the  advance  was  strewn  with  dead  and 
wounded.  Men  had  stopped  to  help  the  latter,  or  to  secure 
and  guard  prisoners,  or  catch  runaway  horses,  and  take 
possession  of  wagons  and  guns.     In  open  country  and  in 

*  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,"  vol.  iii,  p.  184. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  75 

broad  daylight  the  re-forming  after  the  first  burst  of  a  suc- 
cessful attack  is  no  easy  matter,  and  is  a  good  test  of  dis- 
cipline and  training.  It  was  a  serious  problem  in  the  dark- 
ness of  the  woods. 

Jackson  had  ridden  forward  with  the  attack.  He  had 
destroyed  a  whole  Federal  corps  and  completely  turned  the 
enemy's  works,  but  he  was  anxious  to  do  still  more  before 
they  could  recover  from  the  first  shock.  While  exerting 
himself,  with  the  help  of  his  staff,  to  get  the  leading  divi- 
sions of  his  own  army  into  order  and  formation,  he  sent 
off  a  messenger  to  A.  P.  Hill,  who  commanded  the  third 
line,  and  had  followed  up  the  advance  without  being  closely 
engaged.  Hill  was  ordered  to  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  re- 
treat by  seizing  the  road  to  United  States  Ford.  He  came 
up  to  Jackson  and  told  him  he  did  not  understand  the  lie 
of  the  country  on  that  side,  and  a  staff  officer  was  told  off 
to  direct  him. 

Jackson  was  now  somewhat  in  front  of  the  men,  who 
were  re-forming  in  the  woods,  and  was  on  the  main  road 
near  where  a  side  track  through  the  forest  ran  into  it.  A 
Confederate  battery  had  just  opened  fire  without  orders. 
Some  of  the  enemy's  guns  had  replied  at  close  range,  and 
in  the  excitement  of  the  moment  a  number  of  the  troops, 
who  were  re-forming,  were  seized  with  a  panic  as  the  shells 
burst  among  them.  Jackson  himself  rode  back  and  rallied 
them.  He  then  turned  and  went  to  the  front  again,  anxious 
to  see  for  himself  how  far  the  enemy  was  prepared  to  make 
a  stand.  His  staff  officers  formed  rather  a  numerous  group 
of  horsemen.  One  of  them  remonstrated  with  him  for  being 
so  far  to  the  front,  and  suggested  that  he  was  needlessly 
exposing  himself.  "  There  is  no  danger,"  he  replied  ;  "  the 
enemy  is  routed." 

But  there  was  a  terrible  danger  on  which  he  had  not 
counted.  To  use  a  familiar  phrase,  men's  nerves  were 
'■  jumpy  "  after  the  wild  excitement  of  the  last  hour,  and 


76  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

under  the  influence  of  the  darkness  and  mystery  of  the 
forest,  in  which  friend  and  foe  were  huddled  together  so 
near  each  other.  Jackson  turned  to  ride  back  to  his  men. 
Then  came  the  disastrous  chance  that  marred  the  well-worn 
victory. 

At  the  point  where  he  approached  the  Confederate  ranks 
a  Carolina  brigade  had  just  formed.  They  half  saw  in  the 
obscurity  a  body  of  horsemen  riding  towards  them,  and 
took  them  for  a  party  of  hostile  cavalry.  Two  volleys  were 
fired  without  a  word  of  challenge.  The  first  killed  an 
officer  and  a  signal  sergeant  of  Jackson's  staff ;  the  second 
severely  wounded  the  general  himself.  A  bullet  lodged  in 
his  right  hand,  another  in  his  left  wrist,  a  third  shattered 
his  left  arm.  His  horse  turned  and  bolted  towards  the 
Federal  lines,  the  wounded  man  still  keeping  his  seat.  A 
branch  struck  him  in  the  face,  knocked  off  his  cap,  and 
nearly  dismounted  him  ;  but  grasping  the  bridle  with  the 
wounded  right  hand  he  regained  control,  rode  back  to  his 
staff,  and  then  fell  into  the  arms  of  the  officer  who  helped 
him  to  dismount. 

Weak  from  shock  and  loss  of  blood,  and  suffering  severe 
pain,  he  was  still  self-possessed  and  full  of  mental  energy 
and  determination.  He  insisted  that  the  fact  that  he  had 
been  wounded  should  be  concealed  from  the  men,  and  re- 
peated to  Hill  his  order  to  bring  his  division  up  to  the 
front.  His  officers  realized  that  he  had  been  very  badly 
hurt,  and  that  his  position  in  front  of  the  line  was  danger- 
ous in  the  extreme.  The  two  volleys  had  been  taken  by  the 
Federals  as  a  prelude  of  a  renewed  attack,  and  they  were 
firing  at  random  through  the  woods.  Here  and  there  the 
Confederates  were  replying,  and  one  of  the  staff  came  up 
with  a  report  that  hostile  guns  were  unlimbering  in  the 
bush  just  in  front.  A  doctor  had  been  sent  for,  but  before 
he  arrived  the  general's  wounds  were  hastily  bandaged,  and 
leaning   on   two   of  his   officers  he  began   to   walk   slowly 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  77 

towards  his  own  lines.  They  had  hardly  started  when  some 
guns  opened  from  the  underwood  on  the  Federal  side,  and 
a  shower  of  grape-shot  swept  the  road.  The  general  was 
placed  on  the  ground,  and  the  officers  lay  down  heside  him 
to  shelter  him  with  their  bodies.  After  a  few  terrible 
moments  the  guns  happily  changed  the  direction  of  their 
fire,  a  doctor  arrived  with  a  stretcher,  and  the  wounded 
man  was  carried  to  the  rear.  The  first  stage  of  the  mourn- 
ful march  was  trying.  Bullets  were  whistling  through  the 
wood,  and  one  of  the  bearers  fell  wounded.  The  stretcher 
fell  with  him,  and  the  general  rolled  on  the  ground,  and  for 
the  first  time  a  groan  told  of  the  pain  he  was  enduring. 

It  was  near  nine  o'clock  when  Jackson  was  wounded 
and  carried  to  the  rear.  Hill  took  command,  and  gradually 
restored  order  along  the  front.  But  with  the  loss  of  the 
one  man  who  had  been  the  driving  force  of  the  whole  attack 
a  change  had  come  over  the  battle.  The  Confederates  were 
now  thinking  only  of  holding  the  ground  they  had  won, 
till  daylight  would  show  the  way  for  a  further  advance. 
Sickles's  Corps  had  come  up  from  Hazel  Grove  and  fronted 
them  closely  in  the  woods,  so  closely  that  Hill's  men  could 
hear  the  orders  being  passed  to  form  for  a  bayonet  attack. 
They  were  ready  for  it  when  it  came.  After  desperate 
fighting  in  the  moonlit  woods  Sickles's  charge  was  every- 
where driven  back.  Hill  was  wounded,  and  Stuart  took 
over  the  command. 

When  Jackson  fell  his  cavalry  leader  was  arranging  a 
dash  to  the  fords  of  the  Rapidan.  He  was  called  back  to 
the  flank  fight  by  a  messenger  from  Hill,  who  told  him  the 
general  was  badly  wounded,  and  the  whole  situation  in  the 
woods  was  an  anxious  one  on  account  of  the  disorder  and 
exhaustion  of  the  troops  and  the  renewed  activity  of  the 
enemy.  The  whole  position  affords  a  striking  example  of 
what  is  continually  occurring  in  war.  Both  sides  were 
under   a   severe   strain ;     the   prolonged    efifort   was   telling 


78  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

heavily  on  every  one,  from  generals  at  the  head  of  brigades 
and  divisions  down  to  regimental  and  company  officers 
and  soldiers  in  the  ranks.  The  tension  was  increased  by 
the  uncertainties  arising  from  the  difficulty  of  knowing 
what  was  passing  beyond  each  one's  extremely  limited  scope 
of  observation.  The  Federals  were  rallying  after  a  crush- 
ing blow ;  even  among  the  victors  the  nerve  strain  had  re- 
sulted in  local  panics. 

At  such  a  time  the  question  is  which  side  can  make  one 
more  effort,  and  it  is  in  producing  this  final  effort  that  the 
influence  of  an  energetic,  determined  leader  is  of  such  over- 
whelming importance.  It  was  thus  that  the  fall  of  Jackson 
had  for  a  while  tended  to  paralyze  the  fighting  force  of  the 
Confederates.  But  there  were  two  elements  in  the  situation 
that  tended  to  sway  the  balance  in  their  favor.  The  success 
of  their  great  stroke  had  given  them  a  sense  of  exultant 
confidence  in  themselves ;  and  then,  though  there  was  a 
pause  in  the  onward  tide  of  victory,  they  still  felt  they  were 
the  attacking  force,  theirs  was  the  forward  impulse  that 
gave  a  direction  to  each  one's  efforts,  while  their  opponents, 
still  staggering  under  the  first  crushing  blow,  were  bracing 
themselves  to  meet  the  next  without  being  clear  as  to  where 
it  might  fall. 

When  Stuart  took  over  the  command  in  the  woods,  he 
felt  so  anxious  as  to  the  immediate  outlook  that  he  sent 
back  one  of  his  aides,  Major  Pendleton,  to  consult  his 
wounded  general.  When  Pendleton  reached  the  field  hos- 
pital, about  2  A.  M.,  the  surgeons  at  first  refused  to  let  him 
see  the  general.  They  had  amputated  Jackson's  left  arm, 
and  he  was  very  weak ;  but  when,  after  some  hesitation, 
Pendleton  was  admitted  to  his  bedside,  the  general  ex- 
pressed pleasure  at  seeing  him.  "  I  thought  you  had  been 
killed,"  he  said,  and  then  he  asked  some  questions  as  to 
the  position  in  the  woods.  For  a  short  time  he  seemed 
quite  alert.    Then  after  some  silent  thought  he  told  Pendle- 


CHANCELLORSVIL*LE  79 

ton  he  could  not  work  things  out ;  Stuart  must  do  the  best 
he  could. 

Stuart,  full  of  the  restless  energy  of  youth,  passed  a 
sleepless  night  reorganizing  his  forces  and  preparing  to 
advance  at  dawn.  With  the  true  cavalry  spirit,  though  he 
was  now  commanding  an  army  of  gunners  and  infantry,  he 
meant  to  go  forward  at  all  hazards.  Divided  from  Lee  by 
Hooker's  main  position,  he  had  not  yet  been  able  to  com- 
municate with  his  commander-in-chief,  but  he  relied  im- 
plicitly on  his  support.  Lee  knew  that  the  attack  on  the 
right  had  been  victorious,  and  not  having  yet  heard  of  Jack- 
son's fall,  counted  on  his  following  up  his  success.  Thus 
on  the  Confederate  side  there  was  the  directing  impulse  of 
confident  leadership. 

The  Federals,  on  the  other  hand,  were  under  the  sway 
of  hesitating  counsels.  The  turning  of  his  intrenchments 
and  the  destruction  of  his  right,  at  a  moment  when  he  be- 
lieved he  had  won  the  game  and  had  only  to  follow  up  a 
retreating  army,  had  been  a  staggering  blow  to  Hooker. 
He  had  drawn  considerable  reinforcements  from  Sedgwick's 
army  by  way  of  Falmouth,  and  the  troops  now  under  his 
immediate  command  outnumbered  the  forces  of  Lee  and 
Stuart  united,  and  occupied  a  central  position,  from  which 
he  might  throw  an  overwhelming  weight  upon  either  of 
them.  But  while  attack  would  have  still  given  him  the 
fairest  chance  of  victory,  he  was  so  dominated  by  the  hope- 
less sense  of  failure  that  he  thought  only  of  defense,  and 
even  now,  when  he  should  have  united  his  efforts  against 
a  divided  enemy,  he  further  divided  his  own  forces.  Fear- 
ing to  be  cut  off  from  the  fords,  he  had  decided  to  fight 
only  a  rearguard  action  about  Chancellorsville,  and  fall  back 
on  the  Rapidan  and  intrench  a  new  position  with  its  flanks 
resting  on  the  river. 

Napoleon  never  said  a  truer  thing  than  that  in  war  the 
moral  is  to  the  material  as  three  to  one,  and  never  made 


8o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

a  greater  mistake  than  when  he  said  that  "  Providence  is 
always  on  the  side  of  the  big  battahons."  The  man  often 
counts  for  more  than  men,  the  leader  for  more  than  tens 
of  thousands  of  followers. 

So  it  was  in  the  last  phase  of  the  Chancellorsville  cam- 
paign. When  at  dawn  on  Sunday,  May  3,  Stuart's  cannon 
thundered  through  the  Wilderness  woods,  and  were  echoed 
by  Lee's  guns  opening  against  the  west  front  of  the  Chan- 
cellorsville lines.  Hooker  had  lost  heart,  and,  notwithstand- 
ing superior  numbers,  tacitly  accepted  a  position  of  inferi- 
ority. The  attack  had  hardly  developed  when  Stuart  saw 
that  the  commanding  ground  of  Hazel  Grove  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  enemy,  and  promptly  seized  it,  and 
thence  enfiladed  the  Federal  line  with  the  fire  of  thirty 
guns.  Then,  not  without  meeting  with  dogged  resistance, 
and  suffering  more  than  one  local  repulse,  Stuart's  men 
stormed  the  hastily  improvised  line  of  defense  held  by  the 
Federals. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  position  the  concentrated  fire 
of  Lee's  artillery  had  been  turned  on  Chancellorsville  and 
the  plantations  around  the  great  house.  Hooker  had  a 
narrow  escape.  A  pillar  of  the  portico  was  shattered  by 
a  bursting  shell,  and  he  was  stunned  by  the  falling  frag- 
ments. The  house  and  the  woods  near  it  were  set  on  fire, 
and  when  the  Federal  line  gave  way,  and  Lee  rode  into 
the  heart  of  the  conquered  position  amid  the  wild  cheering 
of  his  men,  he  dismounted  and  took  a  personal  part  in 
rescuing  the  enemy's  wounded  from  the  burning  buildings. 
It  was  in  this  moment  of  triumph  that  he  heard  for  the 
first  time  that  his  best  general  was  lying  dangerously 
wounded  at  the  other  end  of  the  conquered  lines. 

Only  about  half  of  Hooker's  force  had  fought;  the  rest 
were  already  at  work  intrenching  the  new  position  along 
the  Rapidan,  where  by  evening  the  whole  of  the  Federal 
right    was    concentrated.      But    meanwhile    Sedgwick    had 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  8i 

stormed  the  heights  above  Fredericksburg,  driving  back 
Early's  Division  towards  Chancellorsville.  Early  retired 
fighting,  and  Sedgwick  as  he  followed  him  waited  in  vain 
for  any  sign  of  the  expected  cooperation  of  Hooker.  Find- 
ing himself  isolated  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  who 
though  beaten  still  showed  a  determined  front,  and  obvi- 
ously had  strong  support  behind  him,  Sedgwick  marched 
to  Banks  Ford,  where  he  intrenched  himself  on  the  south 
side  of  the  Rappahannock. 

Next  day  Lee  was  upon  him.  Leaving  a  mere  skeleton 
force  to  observe  Hooker's  new  lines,  he  flung  almost  his 
entire  force  against  Sedgwick,  stormed  his  works,  drove 
him  across  the  river,  and  then  returned  to  confront  Hooker 
once  more.  Strange  to  say,  the  Federal  general  had  re- 
mained idle  in  his  lines  while  a  few  miles  away  his  lieutenant 
at  Banks  Ford  was  being  defeated  in  a  battle  of  which  he 
could  plainly  hear  the  cannonade. 

Lee  was  preparing  to  attack  the  lines  on  the  Rapidan, 
when  the  weather  broke,  and  a  deluge  of  almost  tropical 
rain  descended  on  the  woods  of  the  Wilderness,  making  the 
roads  difificidt  and  all  movement  off  them  impossible. 
Hooker  took  advantage  of  the  truce  imposed  by  the  storm 
to  evacuate  his  lines  and  transfer  his  army  to  the  north 
bank.  Thence  the  Federals  marched  back  to  their  old 
camps  on  the  heights  opposite  Fredericksburg,  and  Lee 
concentrated  his  army  in  its  former  positions  along  the 
river  above  and  below  the  town. 

In  the  six  days'  fighting  both  sides  had  lost  heavily. 
The  Federals'  losses  were  about  14,000  killed  and  wounded, 
and  some  6000  more  prisoners  or  missing.  The  Confeder- 
ates captured  13  guns  and  many  colors.  They  lost  about 
10,000  killed  and  wounded  and  some  2000  prisoners,  mostly 
taken  by  Sedgwick  in  his  attack  on  the  Fredericksburg 
lines.  These  losses  were  more  than  made  good  by  drafts 
of  recruits  from  Richmond.     But  Lee  had  suffered  another 


82  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

loss  that  nothing  could  replace:  Jackson,  who  had  so  long 
been  his  "  right  hand,"  died  on  May  lo. 

He  had  rallied  at  first,  and  there  were  hopes  that  his 
life  would  be  saved.  He  heard  the  news  of  Lee's  victorious 
operations,  and  discussed  with  his  friends  the  conduct  of 
the  campaign.  Asked  what  he  thought  of  Hooker's  plan, 
he  said :  "  It  was  in  the  main  a  good  conception,  an  excel- 
lent plan,  but  he  should  not  have  sent  away  his  cavalry. 
That  was  his  great  blunder.  It  was  that  which  enabled  me 
to  turn  him  and  to  take  him  in  the  rear.  Had  he  kept 
his  cavalry  with  him  his  plan  would  have  been  a  very  good 
one."  Speaking  of  his  own  part  in  the  battle,  he  said 
that  if  he  had  not  been  wounded  he  would  have  cut  ofif 
Hooker  from  the  Rapidan,  and  taken  up  a  position  where 
the  Federals  must  have  attacked  him.  "  My  men  sometimes 
fail  to  drive  the  enemy  from  a  position,  but  they  always 
fail  to  drive  us  out."  In  characteristic  words  he  gave  his 
judgment  of  his  own  masterly  action:  "  Our  movement  was 
a  great  success  —  I  think  the  most  successful  military  move- 
ment of  my  life ;  but  I  expect  to  receive  far  more  credit 
for  it  than  I  deserve.  Most  men  will  think  I  planned  it 
all  from  the  first ;  but  it  was  not  so.  I  simply  took  ad- 
vantage of  circumstances  as  they  were  presented  to  me 
in  the  providence  of  God.  I  feel  that  His  hand  led  me. 
Let  us  give  Him  the  glory." 

On  May  7  pneumonia  set  in.  Three  days  later  he  died. 
In  the  last  hour  he  lay  unconscious  and  silent,  but  suddenly 
he  seemed  to  rouse  himself.  He  was  dreaming  of  battle, 
perhaps  of  the  crisis  of  Chancellorsville.  "  Order  A.  P. 
Hill  to  prepare  for  action,"  he  said.  "  Pass  the  infantry 
to  the  front.  Tell  Major  Hawks  —  "  Then  he  was  silent 
for  a  few  minutes.  When  next  he  spoke  it  was  under  the 
influence  of  some  more  peaceful  thought.  "  Let  us  cross 
over  the  river,"  he  said,  "  and  rest  under  the  shade  of  the 
trees."     A  few  minutes  more  and  he  breathed  his  last. 


CHANCELLORSVILLE  83 

Lee  knew  what  he  had  lost.  "  Any  victory,"  he  wrote, 
"  would  be  dear  at  such  a  price.  I  know  not  how  to  replace 
him."  And  after  the  war  he  said  to  an  intimate  friend, 
"If  I  had  had  Jackson  at  Gettysburg  I  should  have  won 
the  battle,  and  a  complete  victory  there  would  have  resulted 
in  the  establishment  of  Southern  independence." 


CHAPTER   IV 

GETTYSBURG 
July  1,  2,  and  3,  1863 

Gettysburg  was  the  decisive  battle  of  the  War  of  Seces- 
sion, the  hard-fought  field  that  shattered  the  hopes  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  terrible  struggle  went  on  for  nearly  two 
years  more,  but  never  again  had  Lee  the  same  chance  of 
securing  a  victory  for  his  cause  that  could  do  more  than 
delay  its  final  downfall. 

For  nearly  a  month  after  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville 
he  faced  Hooker  on  the  Rappahannock,  about  Fredericks- 
burg. During  this  time  he  reorganized  his  army  of  70,000 
men  in  three  corps,  under  Generals  Longstreet,  Ewell,  and 
Hill.  Stuart  commanded  the  cavalry.  Hooker's  army,  dis- 
pirited by  its  recent  failure,  shrank  to  some  80,000  men, 
large  numbers  of  officers  and  men  whose  term  of  service  had 
expired  refusing  to  renew  their  engagements.  Hooker's 
mission  during  this  time  was  merely  to  watch  the  Confeder- 
ate army  and  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  act  against  it  if 
it  moved  northward  to  strike  at  Washington.  In  Govern- 
ment circles  strong  feeling  against  him  had  been  aroused 
by  his  failure  in  the  Chancellorsville  campaign,  and  there 
was  a  movement  in  progress  for  his  removal  from  the 
command. 

On  the  Mississippi,  Grant  was  besieging  Vicksburg.  Its 
capture  would  give  the  Federals  control  of  the  whole  line 
of  the  great  river  and  cut  the  Confederacy  off  completely 
from  the  Western  States.  Lee  decided  to  endeavor  to  re- 
lieve the  pressure  on  Vicksburg  indirectly  by  an  invasion 


GETTYSBURG  85 

of  the  Northern  territory.  He  hoped  thus  to  alarm  the 
P'ederal  Government  into  withdrawing  at  least  some  part 
of  Grant's  forces  from  the  Mississippi  and,  in  any  case, 
counted  on  making  his  own  capital  secure  by  compelling 
Hooker's  army  to  follow  him  northwards.  He  expected  to 
be  able  to  force  the  Federals  to  attack  him  on  a  prepared 
position,  and  to  win  a  great  victory  on  Northern  soil.  Such 
a  success  would  endanger  Washington,  and  would  bring  a 
victorious  ending  of  the  war  in  sight.  It  was  well  known 
that  more  than  one  foreign  power  was  ready  to  recognize 
the  Confederacy  on  the  morrow  of  such  a  triumph,  and  in 
the  Northern  States  there  were  many  advocates  of  a  com- 
promise with  the  South. 

On  June  3  Lee  began  his  movement  for  the  invasion  of 
the  Northern  States.  Hill's  Corps  was  left  at  Fredericks- 
burg to  watch  Hooker  and,  in  combination  with  Stuart's 
cavalry,  to  screen  the  northwestward  march  of  the  other  two 
corps  as  long  as  possible.  Ewell  and  Longstreet's  corps 
concentrated  at  Culpeper  Courthouse,  beyond  the  Rapidan ; 
then  Ewell  pushed  on  to  Winchester,  in  the  Shenandoah 
valley.  By  June  13  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was 
thus  divided  into  three  detachments,  covering  a  front  of 
about  100  miles  —  Ewell  with  the  left  at  Winchester,  Long- 
street  with  the  center  at  Culpeper,  Hill  with  the  right  still 
at  Fredericksburg. 

Lee  counted  on  being  able  to  concentrate  rapidly  when 
Flooker  moved.  lUit  it  was  not  till  the  ninth  that  the 
Federal  commander  learned  by  chance  that  considerable 
hostile  forces  were  north  of  the  Rapidan.  He  was  planning 
a  stroke  against  one  or  other  of  the  divided  Confederate 
corps,  when  the  Washington  Government  became  aware  of 
the  movements  in  the  Shenandoah  valley,  and  concluded 
that  Lee  was  marching  to  cross  the  Potomac  and  threaten 
the  capital.  On  this  Lincoln  and  Halleck  peremptorily 
ordered  Hooker  to  march  to  its  defense. 


86  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

As  soon  as  Hooker  began  his  movement,  Lee  withdrew 
Hill  from  Fredericksburg ;  and  the  three  corps  mached  on 
the  Potomac  by  the  Shenandoah  valley,  Ewell's  Corps  lead- 
ing the  way.  Lee  had  successfully  stolen  a  march  on 
Hooker,  and  the  Northern  States  were  open  to  a  Confed- 
erate invasion. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  third  week  of  June  Hooker's 
army  was  moving  towards  the  Potomac.  It  interposed 
between  the  mass  of  Lee's  forces  and  the  capital.  The  Con- 
fedrate  army  was  still  widely  dispersed.  Hill  was  marching 
up  from  Fredericksburg.  Longstreet  was  in  the  Shenan- 
doah valley,  holding  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Ridge  that  forms 
its  eastern  wall,  with  Stuart's  cavalry  thrown  out  in  his 
front  towards  Hooker's  army.  Ewell's  front  and  rear  were 
separated  by  more  than  sixty  miles  of  country.  His  rear 
division  was  at  Winchester ;  his  center  crossed  the  upper 
Potomac  into  the  Northern  States ;  his  leading  division, 
under  Rodes,  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  nearly  forty 
miles  north  at  Chambersburg.  Lee's  object,  so  far,  was  to 
keep  the  Federals  in  anxious  uncertainty,  and  so  perhaps 
lead  them  to  abandon  their  operations  in  the  Mississippi, 
in  order  to  strengthen  their  forces  in  the  Atlantic  States. 
Rodes's  advance  northward  was  a  threat  against  the  great 
cities  of  Pennsylvania,  where  local  levies  began  to  muster 
to  defend  the  crossings  of  the  Susquehanna. 

Ewell  had  cleared  the  Shenandoah  valley  of  all  the  Fed- 
eral garrisons  and  detachments,  losing  only  269  men,  and 
capturing  4000  prisoners,  28  guns,  and  300  loaded  wagons. 
In  the  last  week  of  June  Lee  pushed  forward  the  whole 
of  Ewell's  Corps  towards  the  Susquehanna,  while  Hill  and 
Longstreet's  concentrated  about  Chambersburg.  Hooker 
had  by  this  time  crossed  the  Potomac  above  Washington, 
and  was  marching  northwards  in  the  hope  of  forcing  the 
Confederates  to  attack  him  on  a  position  he  would  select 
for  defense.     Both  sides  were  anxious  to  begin  the  decisive 


GETTYSBURG  87 

battle  of  the  campaign  on  the  defensive,  for  the  memory  of 
Fredericksburg  was  still  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  leaders. 
Lee,  as  the  invader,  was  in  a  better  position  for  forcing 
on  such  a  battle;  but,  partly  through  his  own  fault,  he  was 
badly  served  by  his  cavalry  in  operations  where  early  in- 
formation of  the  enemy's  movements  was  all-important. 
So  long  as  Hooker  was  south  of  the  Potomac,  Stuart,  with 
part  of  the  cavalry,  had  held  the  passes  of  the  Blue  Moun- 
tains, screening  the  Confederate  movement  through  the 
Shenandoah  valley.  When  the  Federals  crossed  the  river, 
Stuart  was  directed  to  push  northwards  and  join  Ewell, 
and  his  suggestion  was  accepted  that  he  should  do  this  by 
a  rapid  march  to  the  eastward  of  the  Confederate  positions. 
But  he  found  the  whole  mass  of  the  enemy's  army  in  his 
way,  and  had  to  cross  the  Potomac  a  little  above  Washing- 
ton and  make  a  long  detour  through  the  enemy's  country. 
He  was  thus  separated  from  Lee  at  the  critical  moment. 
For  some  reason  that  is  hard  to  discover,  a  detachment  of 
Stuart's  cavalry  left  with  Lee,  under  General  Imboden,  in- 
stead of  being  used  to  get  in  touch  with  the  Federal  ad- 
vance, marched  on  the  left,  the  flank  farthest  from  the 
enemy.  Lee  was  quite  in  the  dark  as  to  the  Federal  move- 
ments until  in  the  last  days  of  June  he  obtained  from  spies 
information  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  in  full 
march  northwards.  He  then  issued  orders  for  his  three  corps 
to  concentrate  for  battle,  and  chose  as  the  point  of  concen- 
tration the  town  of  Gettysburg,  a  center  from  which  a 
number  of  turnpike  roads  radiated,  and  near  which  he  ex- 
pected to  find  a  position  on  which  to  stop  the  enemy's 
advance.  Ewell  was  ordered  to  move  on  Gettysburg  from 
the  northward,  while  the  other  two  corps  marched  on  it 
from  the  Cumberland  valley.  Hill  leading,  and  Longstreet 
following  him  up. 

As  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  marched  northwards,  Hooker 
was  deprived  of  the  command  and  Meade  put  in  his  place. 


88  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Meade  knew  that  his  advance  would  force  Lee  to  concen- 
trate, and  he  was  anxious  to  invite  an  attack  from  him. 
The  position  he  had  chosen  on  which  to  await  the  Confed- 
erate attack,  and  bar  the  roads  to  Washington  and  Balti- 
more, was  on  the  low  range  of  hills  that  runs  along  the 
left  bank  of  Pipe  Creek,  a  day's  march  southeast  of  Gettys- 
burg. But  reports  that  the  Confederates  were  still  widely 
dispersed  induced  him  to  push  forward  towards  the  great 
junction  of  roads  at  Gettysburg.  On  June  30,  while  three 
of  his  corps  (Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth)  were  still  south  of 
the  creek,  three  others  (Eleventh,  Third,  and  Twelfth)  were 
spread  out  on  a  broad  front  north  of  it,  and  the  First  Corps, 
with  Buford's  cavalry  brigade,  had  been  sent  forward 
towards  Gettysburg  to  gain  touch  of  the  enemy.^  Thus 
both  the  armies,  with  their  concentration  still  incomplete, 
were  converging  on  the  little  town.  Neither  Meade  nor 
Lee  had  any  very  precise  knowledge  of  the  situation,  and 
the  great  battle  thus  began  by  a  collision  between  the  ad- 
vanced troops,  and  the  chance  of  war  dominated  the  open- 
ing moves  of  the  decisive  struggle. 

Late  on  June  30  Buford's  cavalry  brigade  marched  into 
Gettysburg.  The  citizens  reported  that  some  Confederate 
horsemen  had  been  in  the  town  that  day,  to  collect  infor- 
mation and  requisition  a  supply  of  boots;  and  fugitives 
from  the  neighboring  country  toid  of  gray-coated  regiments 
near  at  hand  to  the  westward,  on  the  Chambersburg  turn- 
pike. Buford's  men  went  out  in  that  direction  and  formed 
an    outpost    line    across    the    road,    with    their    advanced 

^  Meade's  corps  commanders  were  : 
First  Corps,  General  Reynolds.  Sixth  Corps,  General  Sedgwick. 

Second  Corps,  General  Hancock.  Eleventh  Corps,  General  Howard. 
Third  Corps,  General  Sickles.  Twelfth  Corps,  General  Slocum. 

Fifth  Corps,  General  Sykes. 

A  Federal  army  corps  was  not  more  than  half  the  strength  of  a 
corps  on  the  Confederate  side,  and  there  was  abont  the  same  propor- 
tion between  Federal  and  Confederate  infantry  divisions. 


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FEDERAL  FositLOnS 

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Xo.  5  —  Sketch  ^Iap  of  the  Gettysburg  Campaign 


GETTYSBURG  89 

"  pickets "  —  or,  as  we  would  say,  sentries  and  sentry 
groups  —  in  the  woods  and  along  the  banks  of  Willoughby 
Run. 

The  Gettysburg  of  1863  was  a  small  country  town,  with 
streets  laid  out  at  right  angles,  dividing  it  into  regular 
"  blocks."  On  the  north  side  was  an  unfinished  line  of 
railway.  From  the  town  straight,  well-made  roads  ran  in 
various  directions,  so  that  it  was  a  center  for  all  the  chief 
lines  of  communication  between  the  Susquehanna  and  the 
Potomac.  West  of  the  town  a  low  range  of  hills  ran  south- 
wards from  a  prominent  knoll  known  as  Oak  Hill.  About 
a  mile  and  a  half  south  of  Oak  Hill  stood  a  massive  build- 
ing with  a  small  cupola  —  the  Lutheran  Seminary  —  from 
which  the  range  is  known  in  the  records  of  the  battle  as 
the  "  Seminary  Ridge."  It  was  covered  throughout  a  great 
part  of  its  length  with  patches  of  open  woods,  easily  tra- 
versed by  troops.  South  of  the  town,  opposite  the  Seminary 
Ridge,  was  a  stony  hill,  on  which  was  the  cemetery  of 
Gettysburg,  a  walled  inclosure  with  a  large  arched  gate- 
house. This  height  was  known  as  "  Cemetery  Hill."  It 
formed  the  northern  point  of  another  range  running  south- 
wards, and  roughly  parallel  to  the  Seminary  Ridge.  This 
second  range  is  the  "  Cemetery  Ridge  "  of  the  battle  records. 
At  its  southern  end  are  two  round  craggy  knolls  rising 
above  it,  known  as  "  Round  Top  "  and  "  Little  Round  Top." 
At  the  back  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  on  its  east  side,  runs  the 
turnpike  road  from  Gettysburg  to  Taneytown.  Just  south 
of  Cemetery  Hill  there  is  a  depression  in  the  ridge,  through 
which  comes  the  road  from  Emmetsburg  to  join  the  "  Taney- 
town 'pike."  The  Emmetsburg  road  runs  along  a  line  of 
rising  ground  branching  from  Cemetery  Ridge.  On  the 
east  side  of  Cemetery  Hill  is  Culp's  Hill,  beyond  which  the 
ground  falls  away  in  a  succession  of  lower  heights.  On 
all  the  hills  there  was  a  considerable  amount  of  wood,  and 
the  upper  heights  are  broken  and   rocky  in  many  places. 


90  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

The  valleys  were  pasture  and  agricultural  land,  with  here 
and  there  groups  of  farm  buildings,  mostly  constructed  of 
wood.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  help  to  make  clear  this 
general  description  of  the  battle-field. 

The  first  shots  were  fired  about  half  past  five  on  the 
morning  of  Wednesday,  July  i.  At  sunrise  Buford  had 
sent  patrols  forward  across  Willoughby  Run.  Presently 
they  fell  back  with  the  news  that  the  enemy  was  approach- 
ing by  the  Chambersburg  pike.  Then  over  the  rising 
ground  in  front  came  the  leading  files  of  the  First  Division 
of  Hill's  Corps.  They  were  received  wth  a  crackle  of  rifle 
fire  from  the  pickets  along  the  stream,  and  deployed  a 
skirmishing  line  which  briskly  replied. 

As  the  firing  line  of  the  attack  was  steadily  reinforced 
Buford  fell  back  to  the  slope  east  of  the  stream,  and  posted 
his  dismounted  cavalry  along  fences  and  walls  in  good 
cover,  bringing  a  battery  of  horse  artillery  into  action  to 
support  them.  He  showed  such  a  bold  front,  and  his  men 
shot  so  well,  that  he  was  able  to  hold  his  own  single-handed 
for  some  hours.  He  had  sent  messengers  back  in  hot  haste 
to  hurry  up  Reynolds  and  the  First  Corps.  They  came 
marching  at  their  best  towards  Gettysburg  town,  urged 
forward  by  the  ever-increasing  roar  and  rattle  of  the  fight 
away  to  their  front. 

It  was  nearly  ten  o'clock  when  Reynolds's  first  batteries 
galloped  up,  and  his  sturdy  infantry  soon  followed  them. 
By  this  time  the  enemy's  line  of  guns  was  firing  from  the 
ridge  west  of  the  stream ;  four  Confederate  brigades  were 
in  action  along  the  front,  and  four  more  were  close  at  hand. 
Reynolds  had  come  to  Buford's  help  in  the  nick  of  time. 

As  one  of  his  regiments,  the  Seventh  Wisconsin,  went 
forward  into  the  battle  it  was  joined  by  a  little  man  in  a 
blue  swallow-tail  coat  with  large  brass  buttons,  wearing 
a  wide-awake  hat,  and  with  a  long,  old-fashioned  rifle  over 
his  shoulder.    It  was  the  farmer  John  Burns  of  Gettysburg, 


GETTYSBURG  91 

come  to  "  be  even  with  the  rebs  because  they  had  driven 
off  his  cows."  The  soldiers  poked  fun  at  him,  thinking-  "  no 
civiHan  in  his  senses  would  show  himself  in  such  a  place." 
One  of  them  offered  him  a  cartridge  box ;  but  he  slapped 
his  pocket,  bulging  with  ammunition,  and  said  he  could  get 
on  better  without  "  those  new-fangled  things."  All  day  old 
IJurns,  despite  his  seventy  years,  kept  his  place  in  the  firing 
line,  and  limped  home  in  the  evening  with  a  bullet  through 
his  left  foot,  and  two  other  wounds.  His  pluck  deserves  to 
be  remembered  as  proof  that  even  a  civilian  who  can  shoot 
may  be  useful  in  the  day  of  battle. 

The  arrival  of  Reynolds's  Corps  did  more  than  save 
Buford.  For  a  while  it  gave  the  Federals  a  decided  ad- 
vantage. Reynolds  in  person  led  a  counter-attack  through 
the  fields  south  of  the  Chambersburg  road,  and  drove  in  the 
enemy's  right.  But  he  was  killed  by  a  rifle  bullet  in  the 
actual  firing  line.  His  fall  was  a  severe  loss  to  the  Federal 
cause. 

The  Confederates,  continually  reinforced,  began  to  gain 
ground.  Before  noon  General  Howard  arrived,  and  took 
command  of  the  hard-pressed  Federals.  The  first  troops  of 
the  Eleventh  Corps  were  now  coming  into  action  —  the  Ger- 
man regiments  eager  to  wipe  out  the  memory  of  their 
failure  at  Chancellorsville.  But  Howard  soon  became  aware 
that  the  enemy  advancing  from  the  westward  was  not  the 
only  force  with  which  he  would  have  to  deal.  Strong- 
columns  of  gray-clad  troops  were  reported  to  be  moving  on 
Gettysburg  from  the  northward.  It  was  the  First  Division 
of  Ewell's  Corps  that  was  about  to  come  into  action. 
Howard  placed  part  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  in  position  to 
meet  this  new  danger,  extending  his  line  to  the  right,  and 
turning  it  back  in  a  long  curve  rour.d  the  northwest  of  the 
town. 

Howard  was  now  fighting  a  battle  against  ever-increas- 
ing odds,  to  give  time  for  Meade's  army  to  close  up,  and  so 


92  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

prepare  the  way  for  a  fight  on  more  even  terms  next  day. 
For  three  hours  the  Federals  held  on  gallantly  to  the  high 
ground  at  the  end  of  Seminary  Ridge,  and  on  the  open 
ground  north  of  Gettysburg.  In  this  stubborn  contest,  as 
in  so  many  of  the  battles  of  the  War  of  Secession,  both 
sides  endured  losses  heavier  than  the  troops  of  any  Euro- 
pean army  have  stood  up  against  since  the  sanguinary 
battles  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  The  tactics  of  the  day  did 
not  as  yet  recognize  that  the  avoidance  of  loss  was  a  seri- 
ous part  of  the  soldier's  business.  The  fighting  was  not 
between  dispersed  lines  of  skirmishers  in  open  order,  but 
after  the  opening  phase  of  the  fight,  the  gray  and  blue  in- 
fantry standing  in  double  ranks,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  fired 
into  each  other  at  short  ranges  that  made  the  old  muzzle- 
loader  as  deadly  as  the  modern  repeating  rifle.  Nowadays 
field  artillery  is  protected  by  steel  shields,  and  quick  spade 
and  pick  work  half  buries  the  guns  in  improvised  intrench- 
ments.  But  in  those  days  batteries  took  position  in  the  open, 
in  full  view  of  their  antagonists.  If  dogged  determination 
and  reckless  disregard  of  loss  could  have  won  the  battle, 
Howard's  men  would  have  held  their  ground,  but  against 
the  numbers  opposed  to  them  after  three  in  the  afternoon 
the  position  became  hopeless.  The  Confederates  were  strong 
enough  to  work  round  both  the  flanks  of  the  Federal  posi- 
tion, and  at  last  the  word  was  given  to  retire,  and  the  line 
fell  back  fighting.  Unfortunately  for  Howard,  the  way 
for  a  considerable  part  of  his  force  lay  through  the  streets 
of  Gettysburg.  As  they  struggled  through  the  town  large 
numbers  of  prisoners  were  made  by  the  victorious  Con- 
federates pressing  upon  them  and  cutting  ofif  the  retreat  of 
those  who  failed  to  take  a  direct  way. 

But  the  Federals  were  not  yet  beaten.  In  good  order 
they  took  up  a  new  position  on  the  ground  which  was  to  be 
held  during  the  fierce  struggle  of  the  next  two  days  —  the 
heights  of  Cemetery  Hill,  Gulp's  Hill,  and  Cemetery  Ridge. 


No.  6  —  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  July  i,  1863,  First  Day 

(Situation  about  4  P.  M.,  Federal  retirement  through  the  town  beginning) 


GETTYSBURG  93 

While  Howard  was  re-forming  his  hue  on  the  new  position, 
with  Buford's  cavalry  guarding  his  left,  General  Hancock 
arrived.  He  had  ridden  forward  far  in  advance  of  his 
corps,  and  told  Howard  he  had  come  to  take  command.  "  I 
am  the  senior,"  replied  Howard.  "  I  know  that,"  said 
Hancock ;  "  but  I  have  written  orders  from  General  Meade. 
I  will  show  them  to  you  if  you  like."  There  was  a  moment 
of  dangerous  friction.  Howard,  angered  at  being  thus 
superseded  just  when  he  expected  to  put  a  better  complexion 
on  the  day's  fighting,  said  he  did  not  want  to  see  the  orders. 
"  I  don't  doubt  your  word,  general,"  he  said;  "  but  you  can 
give  no  orders  while  I  am  here."  Hancock  saved  the 
situation  by  replying,  "  Very  well.  General  Howard ;  I  will 
second  any  order  that  you  have  to  give,"  and  added  that 
Meade  had  also  directed  him  to  select  a  position  for  the 
coming  battle.  Then  he  went  on  to  say  that  he  thought 
the  ground  on  which  they  stood  was  the  strongest  position 
he  had  yet  seen  for  a  defensive  engagement.  Howard 
agreed,  and  Hancock  ended  the  discussion  with,  "  Very  well, 
sir ;  I  select  this  as  the  battle-field."  So  the  chance  of  war, 
the  accident  by  which  Howard's  troops  had  drifted  to  the 
Cemetery  Ridge,  fixed  the  ground  on  which  the  decisive 
action  was  to  be  fought  out. 

Lee  had  by  this  time  reached  Seminary  Hill,  and  could 
see  for  himself  the  position  of  afifairs.  He  was  reluctant  to 
bring  on  a  general  engagement  until  Longstreet's  Corps 
had  come  up,  and  this  force  —  one-third  of  his  army  — 
would  not  be  available  till  next  day.  He  therefore  ordered 
Ewell  and  Hill  not  to  press  their  advantage  any  further, 
and  though  there  was  desultory  fighting  till  near  sundown, 
all  the  serious  work  of  the  first  day's  battle  was  over. 

Opinion  is  divided  as  to  whether  Lee  judged  rightly  in 
thus  holding  back  his  victorious  corps  commanders.  It  is 
true  that  their  men  were  fatigued  with  a  long  march  and 
many  hours  of  fighting  under  a  blazing  sun,  and  they  had 


94  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

lost  heavily  in  the  actual  engagement.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Federals,  though  not  beaten,  had  been  very  roughly 
handled,  and  had  lost  5000  killed  and  wounded,  and  as 
many  prisoners,  and  two  guns.  The  Confederates  had  the 
feeling  of  success,  and  one  effort  more  might  have  given 
them  possession  of  Gulp's  and  Cemetery  hills,  and  so  made 
the  whole  Gettysburg  position  useless  to  the  enemy.  But  it 
is  difficult  to  discuss  satisfactorily  the  ''  might  have  beens  " 
of  war.  Howard  and  Hancock  thought  that  if  they  had 
been  attacked  seriously  they  could  have  held  their  ground, 
especially  as  Hancock's  Corps  was  coming  on  to  the  ridge, 
where  Meade  himself  arrived  soon  after  dark. 

Meade's  army,  according  to  the  roll-call  returns  of 
June  30,  was  over  90,000  strong.  But  at  sundown  on 
July  I,  allowing  for  the  heavy  losses  of  the  first  day's 
battle,  and  deducting  troops  still  on  their  way  to  the  field, 
he  cannot  have  had  much  more  than  30,000  effective  fight- 
ing men  on  or  close  to  the  Gettysburg  position.  Some  of 
the  expected  reinforcements  could  not  arrive  till  late  next 
day.  Sedgwick's  Corps,  nearly  15,000  strong,  and  the 
largest  unit  in  the  army,  was  thirty-four  miles  away.  It 
reached  the  position  only  at  4  p.  m.  on  the  second,  wearied 
with  a  march  which,  begun  in  the  darkness,  had  been  con- 
tinued through  the  long  hours  of  an  exceptionally  hot  sum- 
mer day.  Two  other  corps  had  their  first  troops  up  a  little 
after  7  a.  m.,  thanks  to  a  forced  march  during  the  night. 

Lee,  owing  to  the  unfortunate  separation  of  Stuart's 
cavalry  from  his  army,  had  only  very  incomplete  informa- 
tion as  to  the  general  position  of  the  Federals,  but  he  knew 
enough  to  feel  sure  that  Meade  was  still  concentrating. 
Taking  the  whole  fighting  strength  of  the  Confederates  — 
after  allowing  for  losses  and  Stuart's  absence  —  at  between 
60,000  and  70,000  men,  he  had  on  the  evening  of  July  i 
close  on  50,000  within  striking  distance.  Of  his  three 
corps,   the   Second    (Ewell)    and   the   Third    (Hill)    were 


GETTYSBURG  95 

practically  all  present.  Longstreet  had  ridden  forward  to 
confer  with  him  in  the  evening.  His  corps,  the  First,  had 
been  marching  towards  the  cannon  all  day.  One  division 
was  four  miles  from  Lee's  headquarters  at  sundown.  An- 
other came  up  to  the  same  point  shortly  before  midnight. 
The  reports  of  the  divisional  commanders  make  this  certain. 
Defending  himself  from  the  charge  of  being  late  in  coming 
into  action  next  day,  Longstreet  stated  in  a  subsequent 
discussion  that  on  the  evening  of  July  i  his  corps  was  nine- 
teen or  twenty  miles  from  the  field.  This  is  true  only  of 
its  rearmost  units.  More  than  half  the  corps  was  within 
two  hours'  march  of  the  battle-field  by  midnight. 

Longstreet,  at  the  conference  on  the  evening  of  the  first 
day,  proposed  to  Lee  that  next  day  the  Confederate  army 
should  march  round  the  enemy's  left,  passing  across  his 
front  without  attacking.  This  movement  would  threaten  to 
cut  Meade  off  from  Washington,  and  probably  force  him  to 
retreat  from  the  Gettysburg  ridges  without  firing  a  shot. 
This  is  true  enough.  Meade  was  so  anxious  about  his  left 
that,  early  on  the  second,  he  directed  his  chief  of  the  staff 
to  prepare  the  orders  for  a  retreat  in  the  event  of  its  being 
turned ;  and  Halleck  from  Washington  had  wired  to  him 
expressing  his  anxiety  about  the  left,  and  advising  a  prompt 
retirement  if  it  were  seriously  endangered.  Lee  saw  the 
force  of  Longstreet's  argument,  but  nevertheless  rejected 
his  plan.  He  saw  no  gain  in  merely  manoeuvering  Meade 
out  of  his  position.  Campaigns  are  not  decided  by  taking 
possession  of  this  or  that  bit  of  ground,  but  by  smashing 
up  the  opposing  army,  and  Lee  believed  he  had  a  fair  chance 
of  destroying  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  He  felt  himself 
strong  enough  to  act  against  both  wings  of  the  Federals, 
but  he  meant  the  decisive  attack  to  be  driven  home  against 
the  center  and  left  of  the  enemy  on  Cemetery  Ridge.  A 
success  on  this  side  would  break  in  upon  the  enemy's  line 
of   retreat,   and  interpose  the   victorious   Confederates  be- 


96  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

tween  the  beaten  army  and  its  capital.  The  orders,  there- 
fore, were  that  Ewell  on  the  left  was  to  demonstrate  against 
the  Federal  right,  about  Gulp's  Hill,  turning  the  demonstra- 
tion into  a  real  attack  if  the  enemy  weakened  that  flank 
to  reinforce  the  center  and  left.  Hill,  in  the  center,  was  to 
keep  the  enemy's  center  occupied.  Longstreet  was  to  drive 
home  the  decisive  attack  against  Cemetery  Ridge.  It  was 
important  to  act  early  on  July  2,  before  the  rearward  corps 
of  the  enemy  could  join  him. 

Nevertheless  the  attack  was  delayed  till  it  was  late  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  long  summer  day..  Hour  after  hour 
Meade's  position  was  growing  stronger.  Three  corps  of 
the  Federal  army  had  begun  their  march  during  the  night. 
They  plodded  steadily  forward  in  the  darkness,  and  when 
the  sun  rose  it  was  soon  striking  with  fierce  heat  upon  their 
backs  as  the  dense  columns  of  weary  men  tramped  onward 
mile  after  mile  in  clouds  of  stifling  dust,  listening  for  the 
sounds  of  a  far-off  cannonade.  Early  in  the  day  a  whole 
corps,  and  battery  after  battery  of  reserve  artillery,  reached 
the  front.  They  had  expected  to  arrive  in  the  midst  of  a 
hard- fought  battle ;  but  except  for  an  occasional  crackle 
of  rifle  fire  as  a  skirmish  broke  out  on  the  opposing  picket 
lines,  all  was  peaceful  among  the  ridges  and  valleys  south 
of  Gettysburg.  Along  the  Federal  position  staff  officers 
were  guiding  troops  to  their  ground,  and  working  parties 
were  busy  felling  trees,  digging  rifle-pits,  piling  up  rocks 
and  stones  into  rough  breastworks.  Along  the  north  end 
of  Seminary  Ridge,  and  on  the  ground  between  Gemetery 
Hill  and  the  town,  masses  of  gray-clad  infantry  could  be 
seen  among  the  trees,  and  rows  of  guns  stood  waiting  in 
silence  for  the  signal  to  open  fire.  The  attack  had  been 
expected  at  dawn.  Meade  and  his  generals  could  not  under- 
stand the  long  respite  allowed  them  to  strengthen  their 
hold  on  the  range  of  hills  they  had  chosen  for  their  battle- 
ground. 


GETTYSBURG  97 

The  occupation  of  the  position  had  not  been  carried  out 
precisely  on  the  Hues  which  Meade  had  planned.  Sickles, 
with  the  Third  Corps,  had  been  directed  to  take  post  along 
the  southern  part  of  Cemetery  Ridge,  with  his  extreme  flank 
on  the  Round  Tops.  But  he  did  not  like  the  position,  and 
took  it  upon  himself  to  alter  it.  In  front  of  the  ridge  the 
ground  fell  away  rapidly  to  the  undulating  valley,  from 
which  it  again  rose  to  the  long  spur  followed  by  the  Em- 
metsburg  road.  Sickles  saw  in  this  advanced  elevation  a 
position  that  might  soon  be  held  by  hostile  artillery,  and 
thought  that  it  would  be  better  to  have  his  own  guns  there, 
even  though  the  outlying  ridge  was  somewhat  lower  than 
the  ground  originally  assigned  to  him.  So  he  moved  his 
corps  forward,  its  right  being  placed  along  the  Emmets- 
burg  road,  its  left  thrown  back  towards,  but  not  reaching, 
the  Round  Tops.  There  was  a  gap  between  his  right  and 
the  rest  of  the  Federal  line,  and  his  left  was  dangerously 
exposed.  Meade  did  not  like  the  arrangement,  but  did  not 
insist  on  its  being  changed.  When  the  fighting  began  he 
had  seriously  to  weaken  his  center  and  right  in  order  to 
help  Sickles  to  defend  this  advanced  position,  and  to  pro- 
vide for  the  protection  of  its  exposed  flanks. 

Just  before  the  attack  opened  Sedgwick's  Corps  began  to 
arrive,  weary  with  a  forced  march  of  more  than  thirty 
miles,  but  fit  and  eager  for  battle.  Meade  had  now  all  his 
army  in  hand,  and  could  face  the  coming  struggle  with  an 
easy  mind. 

And  with  the  long  delay  Lee's  best  chance  of  victory 
had  vanished.  To  attack  such  a  position,  he  should  have 
had  superior  numbers.  He  was  now  not  quite  equal  in 
strength  to  the  defense.  There  should  have  been  ample 
time  to  have  everything  ready  for  the  attack  by  9  A.  m.  at 
latest,  but  it  was  not  till  3.30  p.  m.  that  Longstreet's  Corps 
was  at  last  in  position  on  the  Confederate  right.  It  had 
simply  crawled  to  the  ground  assigned  to  it.     Longstreet 


98  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

tried  afterwards  to  throw  the  hlame  for  the  delay  on  Lee's 
staff,  alleging,  amongst  other  reasons  for  it,  that  unneces- 
sarily elaborate  precautions  were  taken  to  keep  the  move- 
ment of  the  troops  out  of  sight  of  the  Federal  lines.  But 
the  fault  was  his  own.  He  showed  a  strange  lack  of  energy, 
an  incomprehensible  disregard  of  the  value  of  time.  He 
waited  needlessly  for  a  belated  brigade  to  join  him.  Can 
it  be  that  he  felt  chagrined  at  Lee's  having  rejected  his 
plan  of  operations,  and  so  acted  with  a  listless  lack  of 
interest  in  the  task  allotted  to  him? 

When  at  last  Lee  was  satisfied  that  Longstreet  was  on  or 
near  his  part  of  the  battle-ground,  the  Confederate  batteries 
on  the  left  and  center  opened  fire  against  Gulp's  and  Ceme- 
tery hills,  and  the  Federal  guns  replied.  Longstreet's 
artillery  carried  on  the  cannonade  to  the  right,  and  swarms 
of  gray-coated  skirmishers  began  moving  forward  towards 
the  Emmetsburg  road  ridge.  As  the  attack  developed 
rapidly  on  this  side,  Meade,  realizing  that  it  was  the  danger 
point,  sent  orders  to  General  Sykes,  who  was  in  reserve 
behind  his  right,  to  move  his  corps  (the  Fifth)  to  the  sup- 
port of  Sickles.  Meade  himself  rode  to  the  left  to  watch 
the  fight  there  more  closely,  and  while  personally  directing, 
the  movement  of  reinforcements  for  the  firing  line  had  his 
horse  shot  under  him. 

The  right  and  left  of  Sickles's  line  met  at  a  sharp  angle 
at  the  plantation  known  as  the  Peach  Orchard  on  the  out- 
lying ridge.  From  this  point  his  left  was  thrown  back 
towards  Round  Top.  Longstreet's  attack  was  hurled  against 
both  faces  of  the  salient  thus  formed  in  the  Federal  front. 
General  McLaws'  Division  against  the  right  along  the  ridge. 
General  Hood's  against  the  flank.  The  troops  holding  the 
Peach  Orchard  were  thus  brought  under  a  deadly  cross-fire. 
A  projecting  point  in  a  battle  line  is  always  liable  to  become, 
like  the  salient  of  a  fortress,  the  focus  of  the  assault. 
Longstreet  saw  that  to  win  the  orchard  was  to  clear  the 


GETTYSBURG  99 

Emmetsburg  road  and  break  through  Sickles's  defense,  shat- 
tering the  keystone  of  the  arch.  Regiment  after  regiment 
was  sent  against  it,  and  on  the  Federal  side  wave  after  wave 
of  reinforcements  pressed  forward  to  sustain  the  defense. 
The  ground  on  which  this  stubborn  fight  went  on  for  two 
hours  of  the  summer  evening  is  spoken  of  in  records  of 
the  battle  as  the  "  death  angle,"  so  terrible  was  the  loss  of 
life. 

At  the  outset  of  the  attack  Hood,  on  the  extreme  right 
of  the  advance,  had  been  informed  by  his  scouts  that  Round 
Top  was  occupied  only  by  a  post  of  Federal  signalers.  He 
sent  a  message  to  Longstreet  asking  for  permission  to  seize 
it,  and  urging  that  by  diverting  the  main  force  of  the  as- 
sault in  that  direction  the  Federal  position  might  be  turned, 
and  a  costly  frontal  attack  avoided.  Longstreet  replied  that 
he  had  Lee's  orders  to  make  the  frontal  attack,  and  there- 
fore could  not  entertain  the  suggestion.  But  the  attraction 
of  the  Round  Tops  was  too  much  for  the  Confederates,  and 
a  brigade  dashed  ofif  to  seize  the  hills.  Sykes's  Corps  was 
just  then  moving  to  reinforce  the  Federal  left,  and  a  brigade 
was  detached  to  secure  the  Round  Tops.  Federals  and  Con- 
federates, advancing  from  opposite  sides,  raced  each  other 
for  the  wooded  knolls.  The  Federals  won  the  race,  and  a 
couple  of  batteries  came  up  with  them.  The  drivers  trotted 
their  teams  over  the  rocky  ridges  and  through  roadless 
clumps  of  wood  in  a  way  that  suggested  disaster  at  each 
moment,  but  the  guns  were  got  into  position  without  acci- 
dent, four  of  them  well  down  the  slope  between  the  Round 
Tops  in  the  mass  of  rocks  and  boulders  locally  known  as 
the  "  Devil's  Den." 

The  Confederates  were  now  fighting  their  way  forward 
among  rocks  and  bushes,  eager  to  drive  the  Federals  from 
the  broken  ground  and  the  wooded  heights  of  the  Round 
Tops.  It  was  a  recklessly  daring  fight  at  close  quarters. 
Sometimes  the  bayonet  was  used,  but  mostly   men  shot  at 


loo  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

each  other  at  point-blank  distance.  Some  took  cover  among 
the  boulders ;  others,  with  mad  disregard  of  danger,  stood 
erect  upon  them  to  get  a  temporary  vantage-ground,  though, 
as  often  as  not,  these  daring  sharpshooters  dropped  at  once, 
riddled  with  bullets.  The  Devil's  Den  rocks  were  stormed, 
and  three  guns  were  captured ;  and  then  the  attack,  rein- 
forced by  Hood  with  fresh  troops,  began  to  fight  its  way 
upwards  through  the  woods  of  the  steep  hillsides. 

Meanwhile,  under  the  continual  pressure  of  fresh  assaults, 
the  defense  of  Peach  Orchard  gave  way,  and  Sickles  and 
Sykes's  Corps  began  to  fall  back  from  the  advanced  posi- 
tion, still  disputing  every  inch  of  ground.  Sickles  was 
badly  wounded,  and  there  was  heavy  loss  among  his  briga- 
diers, colonels,  and  field  officers  —  the  result  of  the  custom 
of  the  time,  when  mounted  officers  used  to  remain  on  horse- 
back even  with  a  firing  line.  The  mounted  officer  thus 
became  an  easy  target  for  aimed  hostile  fire.  It  was  only 
after  the  war  of  1870  that  it  was  recognized  that  for  field 
officers  of  infantry  to  remain  mounted  in  close  action  was 
uselessly  to  sacrifice  valuable  lives,  and  disorganize  the 
leadership  of  the  battle. 

Between  the  abandoned  position  along  the  Emmetsburg 
road  and  the  main  line  of  Cemetery  Ridge  a  swell  of  the 
ground  along  a  little  brook  afforded  a  position  where  the 
retiring  Federals  made  a  stubborn  stand  till  the  sun  went 
down  and  darkness  ended  the  day's  fighting.  In  this  last 
phase  of  the  struggle  the  Federal  artillery  played  a  splendid 
part,  batteries  being  pushed  boldly  forward  to  fire  in  the 
faces  of  the  advancing  Confederates.  At  one  dangerous 
point  a  rush  of  the  men  in  gray  was  stopped  by  a  Massa- 
chusetts battery  remaining  in  action  when  everything  else 
to  right  and  left  had  retired.  Nearly  half  the  gunners  and 
drivers,  and  65  out  of  80  horses,  were  shot  down.  The 
guns  had  to  be  temporarily  abandoned,  but  a  heavy  fire  of 
rifles  and  artillery  prevented  the  Confederates  from  carry- 


!^HR. 


No.  7  —  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  Second  Day 

(Position  about  4.30  p.  M.) 


GETTYSBURG  loi 

ing  them   off,   and  after  nightfall  they  were  rescued   and 
brought  back  to  Cemetery  Ridge. 

Longstreet  had  thus  driven  the  Federals  from  the  Em- 
metsburg  road  position,  and  his  right  attack  had  secured  a 
footing  on  the  Round  Tops.  After  dark  the  Federals  had 
withdrawn  to  the  high  ground  of  Cemetery  Ridge  from  the 
position  where  they  had  made  their  last  stand  in  the  valley. 
The  success  of  the  Confederate  right  would  doubtless  have 
been  more  complete  if  Ewell  and  the  left  had  been  more 
active  and  more  timely  in  their  operations.  Hill,  in  the 
center,  had  no  more  to  do  than  to  engage  the  opposing 
Federal  center  with  a  long-range  fire  of  guns  and  rifles. 
Late  in  the  day  he  ventured  on  an  infantry  attack.  Ewell 
was  to  have  made  a  false  attack  on  the  enemy's  right,  in 
order  to  prevent  Meade  from  withdrawing  his  reserves  from 
that  flank  to  oppose  Longstreet ;  and  the  demonstration 
was  intended  to  be  sufficiently  active  to  enable  Ewell  to  keep 
in  close  touch  with  the  enemy,  and  if  he  felt  that  the  de- 
fense was  weakening,  he  was  to  turn  the  false  attack  into 
a  real  assault  on  Culp's  and  Cemetery  hills.  Ewell's  action 
against  those  positions  was,  however,  so  obviously  unreal 
that  Meade  not  only  sent  away  Sykes's  Corps  to  the  right 
to  help  Sickles  and  secure  the  Round  Tops,  but  also  stripped 
Culp's  Hill  of  all  but  a  mere  handful  of  defenders.  It  was 
not  till  near  sunset  that  Ewell  realized  that  the  force  in  his 
front  had  been  greatly  reduced.  This  meant  that  he  had 
failed  to  do  his  work,  and  allowed  those  he  should  have 
kept  occupied  to  be  diverted  to  the  fight  against  Longstreet. 
But  it  gave  him  a  chance  of  still  doing  something,  so,  late 
as  it  was,  he  attacked  the  two  hills.  Early's  Division  made 
such  a  fierce  attempt  on  Cemetery  Hill  that  he  nearly  won 
it.  On  the  extreme  flank  Johnson's  Division  advanced  in 
the  twilight  against  the  eastern  slopes  of  Culp's  Hill.  The 
crest  was  held  by  a  mere  handful  of  defenders ;  but  though 
they  had  to  abandon  the  eastern  end  of  the  hill  top,  they  held 


UNIVEFPT'^Y  O'^  r- />  T  TTTORNIA 


I02  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

on  to  its  western  end,  thanks  to  solid  breastworks  of  felled 
trees,  which  they  had  been  piling  up  all  day. 

When  at  last  the  firing  ceased  the  situation  was  this : 
The  Federal  left  had  been  driven  in  upon  the  main  position, 
but  that  position,  from  Gulp's  Hill  on  the  north  to  the  Round 
Tops  on  the  south,  was  intact,  except  where  at  each  end  the 
Confederates  had  obtained  a  partial  possession  of  the  out- 
lying hills.  On  Gulp's  and  on  Round  Top  the  men  in  blue 
and  the  men  in  gray  were  close  to  each  other  in  the  dark- 
ness of  the  woods.  Both  sides  had  lost  heavily.  Thousands 
of  dead  and  wounded  strewed  the  hard-contested  ground 
in  front  of  the  Federal  left.  After  dark  on  both  sides  many 
prisoners  were  taken  —  men,  who  had  been  separated  from 
their  comrades  wandering  into  the  hostile  picket  lines.  Lee 
counted  the  day's  work  a  success,  though  an  incomplete  one. 
But  he  could  afford  less  than  his  opponent  the  heavy  toll 
of  life  by  which  this  success  —  such  as  it  was  —  had  been 
bought.  Meade,  though  anxious  about  his  left,  was  also 
well  satisfied.  At  a  council  of  war  held  late  that  evening  in 
the  farm-house  behind  the  Gemetery  Ridge,  which  he  had 
made  his  headquarters,  the  only  question  discussed  was 
whether  the  Federals  were  to  remain  on  the  defensive  next 
day,  or  to  attack  the  Gonfederate  positions  at  sunrise.  It 
was  decided  to  await  another  attack^  and  to  assume  the 
offensive  only  locally  on  the  right,  in  order  to  clear  the 
Gonfederates  off  from  Gulp's  Hill. 

Lee  received  some  important  reinforcements  in  the  early 
hours  of  the  third  day :  Stuart's  cavalry  had  regained  touch, 
and  Pickett's  splendid  division  of  Virginian  infantry  regi- 
ments, which  had  till  now  been  guarding  the  line  of  com- 
munication, marched  up  to  the  front.  The  Gonfederate 
commander  made  a  complete  change  in  his  plans  for  the 
day.  The  general  idea  of  the  attack  was  this.  Ewell  was 
to  press  the  advantage  he  had  won  at  Gulp's  Hill,  in  order 
to  compel  Meade  to  reinforce  his  right.     Meanwhile  the 


GETTYSBURG  103 

Confederate  artillery  would  be  massed  in  a  long  line  from 
Seminary  Hill  southwards  to  the  Peach  Orchard  and  the 
ridge  followed  by  the  Emmetsburg  road,  the  position  cap- 
tured by  Longstreet  the  day  before.  After  a  heavy  bom- 
bardment of  the  Federal  position  on  Cemetery  Ridge,  which 
it  was  hoped  would  silence  the  enemy's  batteries  and  severely 
shake  his  infantry,  a  strong  column  of  assault,  the  main 
body  of  which  would  be  formed  of  Pickett's  5000  fresh 
troops,  would  be  launched  against  the  Federal  center. 
Stuart  was  to  be  in  position  on  Ewell's  extreme  left,  and 
was  to  break  in  upon  the  rear  of  the  Federal  position,  and 
help  to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  enemy  after  Pickett's 
charge  had  forced  him  from  the  ridge. 

Long  before  even  the  artillery  preparations  for  the  pro- 
jected attack  could  begin,  there  was  hard  fighting  on  the 
right  of  the  Federal  position,  and  Meade  got  in  the  first 
blow.  Ewell  had  reinforced  Johnson  with  some  of  Early's 
infantry,  and  in  the  twilight  the  Confederates  were  form- 
ing on  Culp's  Hill  to  attack  the  works  at  its  western  end. 
As  the  sun  rose  a  storm  of  shells  burst  among  them.  Sev- 
eral Federal  batteries  had  been  already  placed  in  position 
to  take  the  attack  in  flank,  and  as  the  Confederates  moved 
forward  through  this  fire  two  Federal  brigades,  instead  of 
awaiting  the  assault,  dashed  out  to  make  a  counter-attack. 
For  four  hours  the  struggle  went  on  at  close  quarters, 
surging  backwards  and  forwards  in  the  woods  as  either 
side  threw  new  troops  into  the  fighting  line.  At  last  the 
Confederates  were  driven  from  the  hill,  all  the  ground  they 
had  rushed  the  night  before  being  recaptured. 

Fighting  continued  on  the  Federal  right  for  a  consider- 
able time  after  the  recapture  of  the  hill.  Ewell's  Corps 
being  in  action  on  a  prolonged  curve  that  encircled  the 
enemy's  flank.  Stuart's  efifort  to  break  in  behind  it  proved 
a  failure,  his  ride  round  the  Federal  lines  bringing  him  into 
conflict   with    Gregg's   cavalry   division   well   to   the   rear. 


104  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Many  of  the  cavalry  actions  of  the  War  of  Secession  were 
only  rifle  fights  between  lines  of  dismounted  men,  but  in 
the  action  of  July  3  the  opposing  cavalry  met  each  other 
in  more  than  one  charge,  resulting  in  a  hand-to-hand  melee 
with  saber  and  pistol. 

Meade  was  strong  enough  in  cavalry  to  guard  his  left 
with  Kilpatrick's  Division,  besides  diverting  Gregg  to  check 
Stuart.  Kilpatrick  used  his  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  to 
good  purpose,  threatening  the  Confederate  right,  and  forc- 
ing Hood  to  abandon  any  further  attacks  on  the  Round 
Tops,  and  form  a  strong  line  facing  south  to  protect  the 
flank  of  his  own  army. 

But  all  these  were  the  minor  incidents  of  the  day.  Its 
decisive  episode  was  the  battle  in  the  center.  General 
Hunt,  who  commanded  Meade's  artillery,  tells  how  during 
the  morning  hours,  while  the  battle  was  raging  round  Gulp's 
Hill,  he  saw  battery  after  battery  coming  into  position  along 
the  main  front  of  the  Confederates.  The  artillery  of  both 
armies  was  made  up  partly  of  rifled,  partly  of  smooth-bore 
guns,  and  the  distance  between  the  Federal  position  on 
Cemetery  Ridge  and  the  line  of  crests  on  which  the  hostile 
batteries  were  being  posted  was  not  more  than  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  —  a  close  and  deadly  range  for  the  rifled  guns ; 
but  artillery  tactics  were  still  influenced  by  the  traditions  of 
smooth-bore  days.  By  noon  the  Confederates  had  massed 
140  guns  in  a  long  line.  From  the  Federal  position  only 
the  guns  were  visible,  waiting  silently  for  the  order  to  open 
fire,  while  the  gray  infantry  were  kept  out  of  sight  in  the 
woods  and  behind  the  ridges.  Hunt  confesses  that  he  was 
in  doubt  as  to  what  these  preparations  meant,  and  his  first 
impression  was  that  Lee  intended  to  use  this  long  array  of 
cannon  to  play  upon  and  hold  in  check  the  Federal  center, 
while  he  concentrated  his  infantry  for  a  great  attack  on  the 
right,  where  fighting  was  already  going  on.  He  brought 
up  about  70  guns  to  oppose  the  hostile  artillery,  keeping 


GETTYSBURG  105 

some  batteries  in  reserve  behind  the  Cemetery  Ridge,  to  be 
sent  up  to  whatever  point  might  ultimately  be  attacked. 

Unseen  from  the  Federal  lines,  Lee  had  massed  behind 
his  guns  the  troops  chosen  for  the  infantry  attack.  That 
morning  there  had  again  been  a  marked  divergence  of 
opinion  between  the  commander-in-chief  and  General 
Longstreet.  The  latter  had  once  more  urged  that  an  at- 
tempt should  be  made  to  turn  the  enemy's  left.  But  Lee 
replied  that  he  had  decided  to  break  through  the  center, 
sending  forward  an  assaulting  force  against  the  low  crest 
of  Cemetery  Ridge,  near  its  junction  with  Cemetery  Hill. 
Pickett  would  lead  the  attack,  and  Longstreet  would  be 
given  two  divisions  of  Hill's  Corps  —  Pettigrew's  and 
Pender's  —  with  which  to  support  him. 

Longstreet  objected  to  the  plan.  "  The  three  divisions," 
he  said,  "  will  give  me  15,000  men.  I  have  been  a  soldier, 
I  may  say,  from  the  ranks  up  to  the  position  I  now  hold. 
I  have  been  in  pretty  much  all  kinds  of  skirmishes,  from 
those  of  two  or  three  soldiers  up  to  those  of  an  army  corps, 
and  I  think  I  may  safely  say  that  there  never  was  a  body 
of  15,000  men  who  could  make  that  attack  successfully." 

Lee  declined  to  discuss  the  matter  further,  and  Long- 
street,  discontented  at  this  summary  rejection  of  his  view, 
set  to  work  to  make  his  arrangements  for  carrying  out  a 
plan  which  he  expected  to  fail.  It  was  unfortunate  for  Lee 
that  he  had  no  longer  for  his  right-hand  man  a  soldier  like 
Jackson,  who  could  put  all  his  heart  into  any  enterprise 
assigned  to  him. 

Pickett,  unlike  his  immediate  chief,  was  delighted  at  the 
chance  offered  him,  eager  for  action,  confident  of  success. 
His  division  was  drawn  up  in  three  lines  on  the  reverse 
slope  of  the  ridge.  The  two  other  divisions  were  on  his 
left ;  they  were  to  advance  after  him,  in  echelon  —  that  is, 
the  right  flank  of  each  following  up  the  left  of  that  which 
preceded  it.     The  order  to  attack  would  be  given  as  soon 


io6  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

as  the  Confederate  guns  had  bombarded  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion and  silenced  or  produced  some  effect  on  his  batteries. 

To  Colonel  Alexander,  commanding  a  group  of  batteries 
of  the  First  Corps,  Longstreet  committed  the  general  direc- 
tion of  the  artillery  engagement.  Alexander  was  not  a  little 
anxious  about  his  task.  There  had  already  been  two  days 
of  fighting,  and  the  ammunition  supplies  for  the  guns  were 
running  low.  Unless  the  enemy  were  soon  silenced  the 
bombardment  could  not  be  continued.  But  so  far  as  he 
could  ascertain,  his  own  guns  outnumbered  those  opposed 
to  them  nearly  two  to  one,  and  this  was  a  hopeful  element 
in  the  situation.  The  signal  for  beginning  the  cannonade 
was  to  be  the  firing  of  two  guns  by  Longstreet's  orders,  as 
soon  as  the  infantry  were  ready. 

Though  there  had  been  firing  going  on  for  hours  to  right 
and  left,  as  yet  not  a  shot  had  been  fired  in  the  center. 
At  one  o'clock  the  two  signal  guns  rang  out,  and  immedi- 
ately the  Confederate  batteries  opened  fire.  Some  70  guns 
replied  from  the  opposite  ridge.  Dense  clouds  of  smoke 
soon  covered  the  ridges,  and  it  was  difficult  for  the  gunners 
to  see  their  targets.  General  Hunt,  the  Federal  artillery 
commander,  rode  down  the  back  of  Cemetery  Ridge  to 
bring  up  his  reserve  batteries  from  the  place  where  he  had 
posted  them  on  the  Taneytown  road.  When  he  arrived 
there  he  found  a  number  of  dead  horses  and  exploded  am- 
munition wagons.  He  had  some  difficulty  in  finding  the 
batteries,  for  almost  the  first  shells  fired  by  the  Confederates 
had  flown  over  the  ridge,  burst  among  them,  and  done  ter- 
rible damage,  and  they  had  shifted  their  position.  After 
ordering  them  up  to  the  ridge,  he  rode  towards  Meade's 
headquarters  at  the  farm,  hoping  to  find  there  a  staff  officer 
who  would  take  a  message  to  the  general.  The  farm  was 
deserted.  Dead  horses  lay  in  front  of  it,  and  the  house 
had  been  struck  by  shells,  some  of  which  burst  around  it 
while  Hunt  was  paying  hi?  hurried  visit.    He  then  realized 


GETTYSBURG  107 

to  his  satisfaction  that  the  fire  of  many  of  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries must  be  too  high.  The  Confederate  shells  were  flying 
in  scores  well  above  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  and  bursting 
harmlessly  far  behind  it. 

Returning  to  the  crest,  he  found  that  though  some  of  the 
batteries  were  suffering  considerable  loss,  the  infantry 
lying  down  on  the  reverse  slope  or  sheltered  behind  natural 
cover  or  improvised  breastworks  were  fairly  safe.  He 
knew  that  he  was  outnumbered  seriously  in  guns,  and  in 
the  dense  smoke  it  was  difficult  to  control  the  fire  of  those 
he  had.  There  was  no  sign  of  increased  activity  on  the 
enemy's  part  on  either  wing,  and  it  looked  as  if  the  can- 
nonade were  the  prelude  to  an  infantry  attack  on  the  center. 
He  decided  to  draw  the  attack,  economize  ammunition,  and 
be  ready  to  turn  his  guns  on  the  assaulting  columns  when 
they  advanced.  He  therefore  ordered  several  batteries  to 
withdraw  temporarily  over  the  ridge,  and  the  rest  to  slacken 
their  fire.  He  had  hardly  given  the  order  when  he  received 
directions  from  Meade  to  the  same  effect. 

As  to  what  was  passing  on  the  Confederate  side  there 
are  very  full  details  available.^  Some  of  these  are  of  special 
interest,  as  showing  the  difficulties  of  command  at  a  critical 
moment.  Longstreet  was  inclined  to  hesitate.  Before  giv- 
ing the  order  for  the  firing  of  the  signal  guns  he  had  sent 
a  note  to  Colonel  Alexander  in  which  he  said : 

"  If  the  artillery  fire  does  not  have  the  effect  to  drive  off  the 
enemy  or  greatly  demoralize  him,  so  as  to  make  our  efforts  pretty 
certain,  I  would  prefer  that  you  should  not  advise  General  Pickett 
to  make  the  charge.  I  shall  rely  a  great  deal  on  your  good  judg- 
ment to  determine  the  point,  and  shall  expect  you  to  let  General 
Pickett  know  when  the  moment  offers." 

This  note  rather  startled  the  artillery  commander.  To 
carry  out  the  attack  on  Lee  and  Longstreet's  responsibility 

*  See  the  numerous  narratives  in  "  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the 
Civil  War,"  vol.  iii. 


io8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

was  one  thing;  to  be  asked  to  decide  if  and  when  it  should 
be  made  was  a  more  serious  business.  So  he  wrote  to 
Lonestreet : 


"  General,  I  will  only  be  able  to  judge  of  the  effect  of  our  fire  on 
the  enemy  by  his  return  fire;  for  his  infantry  is  but  little  exposed 
to  view,  and  the  smoke  will  obscure  the  whole  field.  If,  as  I  infer 
from  your  note,  there  is  any  alternative  to  this  attack,  it  should  be 
carefully  considered  before  opening  our  fire;  for  it  will  take  all  the 
artillery  ammunition  we  have  left  to  test  this  one  thoroughly,  and 
if  the  result  is  unfavorable,  we  will  have  none  left  for  another  effort. 
And  even  if  this  is  entirely  successful,  it  can  only  be  so  at  a  bloody 
cost." 


The  reply  was  a  definite  order  to  open  fire  and  launch 
the  charge  as  soon  as  there  were  signs  that  the  cannonade 
was  effective.  General  Wright,  one  of  Hill's  brigadiers, 
was  beside  Alexander  when  the  order  came.  Pointing 
across  the  valley,  he  said  to  the  gunner  officer,  "  It  is  not 
so  hard  to  go  there  as  it  looks.  I  was  nearly  there  with 
my  brigade  yesterday.  The  trouble  is  to  stay  there;  the 
whole  Yankee  army  is  there  in  a  bunch." 

When  the  Confederate  artillery  opened,  all  the  enemy's 
line  from  Cemetery  Hill  down  to  Round  Top  blazed  out 
in  reply ;  and  the  reply  was  effective.  Men  fell  fast  around 
the  Confederate  guns.  Infantry  soldiers  had  to  be  requisi- 
tioned to  help  in  serving  them.  It  was  not  easy  to  make 
out  what  was  happening  on  the  other  side  of  the  valley  but 
there  was  the  natural  disposition  to  conclude  that  the  Fed- 
erals were  suffering  at  least  as  heavily.  Alexander  tells 
how  the  sudden  diminution  of  their  fire  led  him  to  give 
the  decisive  order: 


"  Before  the  cannonade  opened  I  had  made  up  my  mind  to  give 
Pickett  the  order  to  advance  within  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  after  it 
began.  But  when  I  looked  at  the  full  development  of  the  enemy's 
batteries,  and  knew  that  his  infantry  was  generally  protected  from 
our  fire  by  stone  walls  and  swells  of  the  ground,  I  could  not  bring 


GETTYSBURG  109 

myself  to  give  the  word.  It  seemed  madness  to  launch  infantry  into 
that  fire,  with  nearly  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  go  under  a  July 
sun.  I  let  the  fifteen  minutes  pass,  and  twenty  and  twenty-five,  hop- 
ing vainly  for  somethi'ng  to  turn  up.  Then  I  wrote  to  Pickett:  '  If 
you  are  coming  at  all,  you  must  come  at  once,  or  I  cannot  give  you 
proper  support ;  but  the  enemy's  fire  has  not  slackened  at  all,  at 
least  18  guns  are  still  firing  from  the  cemetery  itself.'  Five  minutes 
after  sending  that  message  the  enemy's  fire  suddenly  began  to 
slacken,  and  the  guns  in  the  cemetery  limbered  up  and  vacated  the 
position.  We  Confederates  often  did  such  things  as  that  to  save 
our  ammunition  for  use  against  infantry,  but  I  had  never  before 
seen  the  Federals  withdraw  their  guns  simply  to  save  them  up  for 
the  infantry  fight.  So  I  said,  'If  he  does  not  run  in  fresh  batteries 
there  for  five  minutes  this  is  our  fight.'  I  looked  anxiously  with  my 
glass,  and  the  five  minutes  passed  without  a  sign  of  life  on  the  de- 
serted position,  still  swept  by  our  fire  and  littered  with  dead  men 
and  horses  and  fragments  of  disabled  carriages.  Then  I  wrote 
Pickett  urgently :  '  For  God's  sake  come  quick.  The  18  guns  are 
gone.  Come  quick,  or  my  ammunition  won't  let  me  support  you 
properly.'  " 

Pickett  passed  the  word  to  prepare  to  advance,  rode  over 
to  Longstreet,  saluted,  and  told  him,  "  I  am  going  to  move 
forward,  sir,"  and  then  galloped  to  the  head  of  his  division. 
The  gray  lines  went  splendidly  onward  up  the  reverse  slope 
and  across  the  crest  of  the  Seminary  Ridge,  topped  with 
row  on  row  of  glittering  bayonets.  As  they  came  up 
through  the  scattered  wood  of  the  crest,  Longstreet  gal- 
loped to  Alexander's  position.  It  was  just  1.40  r.  m.,  forty 
minutes  since  the  signal  guns  were  fired. 

Alexander  told  the  general  he  thought  the  outlook  was 
now  more  hopeful,  but  he  was  anxious  about  the  shortness 
of  his  ammunition.  "  Then  stop  Pickett,"  said  Longstreet, 
"  and  replenish  your  ammunition."  Alexander  replied  that 
to  cease  fire  would  be  to  allow  the  enemy  to  recover,  and 
that  very  few  shells  could  be  got  from  the  reserve.  To 
hold  back  now  was  to  lose  the  battle.  "  I  don't  want  to 
make  this  attack,"  said  Longstreet.  "  I  would  stop  it  now 
but  that  General  Lee  ordered  it,  and  expects  it  to  go  on. 
I  don't  see  how  it  can  succeed."     Ominous  words  from  a 


no  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

general  in  command.  If  he  had  believed  in  success,  he 
might  perhaps  have  supported  the  attempt  more  vigorously. 

Pickett's  Virginians  were  now  marching  through  the 
intervals  of  the  batteries,  which  ceased  fire  just  there  to 
let  them  pass,  while  right  and  left  the  cannonade  continued. 
One  of  the  brigadiers.  General  Garnett,  saluted  Longstreet 
and  exchanged  a  friendly  word  with  Alexander  as  he 
passed.  Garnett  was  muffled  in  an  old  blue  overcoat,  though 
the  July  sun  was  blazing  at  its  hottest.  He  had  risen  from 
his  bed  in  a  fever  hospital  to  take  his  brigade  into  action, 
and  he  was  going  to  his  death. 

As  the  division  went  down  the  slope  of  the  ridge,  march- 
ing with  the  ordered  precision  of  a  state  review,  with  the 
supporting  troops  coming  over  the  crest  to  its  left  rear, 
every  gun  on  the  Federal  side  reopened  fire,  and  the  three 
batteries  which  had  left  the  cemetery  galloped  back  to  the 
front,  unlimbered,  and  joined  in.  A  storm  of  shell  burst 
over  and  amongst  the  gray  lines.  Horrible  gaps  were  blown 
in  them,  but  the  men  closed  up  and  went  on.  The  Con- 
federate batteries  were  now  firing  over  their  heads,  but 
the  Federals  fired  not  a  shot  at  the  hostile  artillery,  but 
devoted  all  their  energies  to  the  destruction  of  the  advanc- 
ing infantry. 

Alexander  selected  three  batteries  that  still  had  a  fair 
supply  of  ammunition  left,  limbered  them  up,  and  moved 
down  the  slope  to  Pickett's  right  rear,  intending  to  help 
him  by  coming  into  action  at  closer  quarters.  The  guns 
passed  over  ground  thickly  strewn  with  fallen  men.  Alex- 
ander noticed  among  them  one  poor  fellow,  who  raised  him- 
self on  his  elbow  and  looked  at  the  gunners  with  a  ghastly 
face,  from  which  a  shell  burst  had  swept  the  jaws  away. 

The  advance  had  now  crossed  half  the  intervening 
ground,  and  as  it  came  within  range  of  the  enemy's  in- 
fantry a  roar  of  rifle  fire  burst  out  all  along  the  opposite 
ridge.    A  brigade  of  Federals  swung  forward  to  take  Pickett 


GETTYSBURG  iii 

in  flank  with  a  fire  from  the  right.  Alexander  halted  his 
guns  and  opened  on  this  part  of  the  enemy's  line. 

Pickett's  men  were  now  going  up  the  front  of  Cemetery 
Ridge.  They  seemed  to  be  moving  with  an  impulse  that 
no  destruction  could  stop  or  even  delay.  To  their  left  the 
supporting  divisions  were  advancing  as  steadily,  regard- 
less of  loss,  though  they  were  not  so  severely  tried  as  the 
leading  division,  which  drew  the  heaviest  fire.  Crossing 
the  fences  of  the  Emmetsburg  road,  the  formation  of 
Pickett's  Division  became  somewhat  disordered.  The  three 
lines  seemed  to  close  into  one  great  mass,  a  sea  of  bayonets, 
above  which  rose  the  battle  flags.  Through  the  showers 
of  bullets  and  the  screaming  rush  of  shells  the  crowd  of 
men  surged  up  to  Cemetery  Ridge,  their  charging  yell  ring- 
ing out  above  the  din  of  the  fight.  To  those  who  watched 
eagerly  from  the  opposite  side  of  the  valley,  the  gray  mass 
seemed  to  be  suddenly  swallowed  up  in  the  dense  smoke 
clouds  that  hung  low  upon  the  ridge. 

They  were  in  amongst  the  Federal  guns.  Teams  and 
limbers  galloped  to  the  rear,  and  as  the  charge  burst  through 
the  line  of  artillery  it  seemed  for  a  moment  that  the  fight 
would  be  won  by  the  men  in  gray.  But  they  met  face  to 
face  unbroken  lines  of  infantry,  to  whom  fresh  supports 
were  coming  up  at  the  double.  An  enfilading  fire  of  guns 
and  rifles  tore  their  flank.  Volley  on  volley  flashed  in  their 
faces.  Some  fired  back  in  reply,  others  struggled  on  till 
bayonet  met  bayonet. 

To  their  left,  Pettigrew's  Division  had  pushed  up  to 
Cemetery  Hill,  protecting  them  effectually  on  that  flank. 
The  division  was  made  up  of  four  brigades  from  Vir- 
ginia, Tennessee,  Mississippi,  and  North  Carolina.  Unlike 
Pickett's  men,  they  had  been  in  action  all  the  day  before, 
and  had  lost  heavily.  Their  share  in  the  charge  is  some- 
times overlooked,  so  much  has  attention  been  riveted  on  the 
gallantry   of  the   leading   division.     But   Pettigrew's   men 


112  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

nearly  succeeded.  The  Tennessee  regiments  actually  forced 
their  way  over  the  low  wall  of  the  cemetery,  and  fought 
hand  to  hand  with  its  garrison.  The  Second  Mississippi 
also  crossed  bayonets  with  the  Federals,  and  lost  half  its 
force  in  the  fight. 

The  decisive  struggle  on  the  crest  of  the  ridge  did  not 
last  long.  Presently  out  of  the  smoke  the  fragments  of 
Pickett's  Brigade  were  seen  retiring.  The  young  general 
was  still  in  the  saddle,  rallying  the  broken,  confused  mass 
of  beaten  men,  but  his  three  brigadiers  were  all  down.  On 
his  flank  Pettigrew  was  forced  back.  Badly  wounded,  he 
still  rode  among  his  men.  The  retiring  Confederates  were 
fired  on  from  every  gun  and  rifle  within  range,  and  suffered 
heavily  as  they  recrossed  the  valley.  Some  hundreds,  who 
had  broken  into  the  Federal  lines  and  been  cut  off  from 
their  comrades,  were  made  prisoners. 

The  great  effort  had  failed.  General  Lee  left  his  staff 
and  rode  to  meet  Pickett's  men  as  they  came  back  into  the 
Confederate  lines.  It  is  likely  that  he  had  come  to  this  part 
of  the  position  expecting  that  the  Federals  would  at  once 
attack.  He  knew  the  battle  was  lost,  but  he  was  calm  and 
alert.  To  the  retiring  men  he  said :  "  It  is  not  your  fault. 
We  must  try  and  do  our  best  with  what  is  left."  His 
kindly  nature  and  his  complete  self-command  were  shown 
by  his  checking  a  staff  officer  who  spurred  a  tired  horse. 
A  British  officer  present  as  a  spectator.  Colonel  Fremantle 
of  the  Cold  Stream  Guards,  was  struck  by  the  bearing  of 
the  defeated  men.  "  There  was,"  he  wrote,  "  much  less 
noise,  fuss^  or  confusion  of  orders  than  at  any  ordinary 
field-day;  the  men  as  they  were  rallied  in  the  woods  were 
brought  up  in  detachments,  and  lay  down  quietly  and  coolly 
in  the  positions  assigned  to  them." 

After  the  repulse  of  the  great  charge  the  firing  gradually 
ceased  on  both  sides,  and  the  three  days'  battle  was  over. 
On  the  Confederate  side  there  was  a  general  expectation 


BM^ 


No.  8  —  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  Third  Day 
(The  crisis  of  the  day,  Pickett's  charge) 


GETTYSBURG  113 

that  Meade  would  follow  up  the  repulse  of  Pickett  by  an 
advance  against  Seminary  Ridge ;  but  the  victors  were 
themselves  exhausted,  and  not  knowing  how  short  of  am- 
munition their  opponents  were,  did  not  regard  an  attack 
in  the  face  of  the  140  guns  on  the  ridge  as  practicable. 
Longstreet  afterwards  said  that  he  could  certainly  have  re- 
pelled such  an  attack.  "  I  had  Hood  and  McLaws'  divi- 
sions, which  had  not  been  engaged ;  I  had  a  heavy  force 
of  artillery,  and  I  have  no  doubt  I  should  have  given  those 
who  tried  as  bad  a  reception  as  Pickett  received."  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  part  of  Hood's  Division  had  been  in  action 
against  Kilpatrick's  cavalry,  but  Longstreet  had  several 
brigades  that  did  not  fire  a  shot.  Had  he  thrown  these 
forward  on  Pickett's  right,  it  would  have  kept  the  Federal 
left  busy,  and  saved  Pickett  from  the  enfilading  fire  that 
tore  his  flank.  Many  who  watched  the  charge  believed  that 
but  for  this  it  would  have  succeeded.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  Lee  fully  expected  Longstreet  to  use  every  available 
man  to  support  the  attack,  on  which  everything  was  staked, 
but  with  his  chivalrous  generosity  he  never  blamed  his  sub- 
ordinate. On  the  contrary,  after  the  battle  he  told  him  that 
perhaps  if  he  had  accepted  his  plan  for  turning  the  enemy's 
left  all  might  have  been  well.  Yet  he  must  have  been 
thinking  of  Longstreet's  halting  support  when  he  said  years 
after  that  if  he  had  had  Jackson  at  Gettysburg  he  might 
have  marched  into  Washington. 

The  losses  of  the  three  days'  battle  amounted  to  19,000 
killed  and  wounded  on  the  Federal  side,  and  18,000  on  that 
of  the  Confederates,  or  24  per  cent  of  the  forces  engaged, 
nearly  one  man  in  every  four.  A  large  number  of  gen- 
erals and  field  officers  were  among  the  casualties. 

Meade  had  fought  a  strictly  defensive  battle  and  fought 
it  well  with  excellent  cooperation  among  his  corps  com- 
manders. But  even  after  it  was  plain  that  he  was  the 
victor  he  made  no  attempt  to  attack  the  Confederate  lines, 


114  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

though  Lee's  right  still  held  ground  it  had  won  on  the 
second  day.  All  through  July  4  the  Confederates  remained 
on  the  position,  busily  intrenching  every  yard  of  the  front, 
and  expecting  an  attack  from  hour  to  hour.  Meanwhile  the 
baggage  trains  and  long  convoys  of  wounded  had  been  sent 
to  the  rear.  Then  Lee  made  a  masterly  retreat  through  the 
passes  of  the  Cumberland  valley  and  across  the  Potomac, 
offering  battle  to  Meade  on  the  bank  of  the  river,  but  in 
such  a  strongly-prepared  position  that  he  did  not  venture 
to  attack. 

During  the  retreat  news  came  that  Vicksburg  had  fallen. 
It  was  a  dark  hour  for  the  Confederacy.  The  North  was 
exultant.  The  news  that  Victory  had  crowned  the  three 
days'  struggle  round  Gettysburg  reached  Washington,  New 
York,  and  the  other  great  centers  on  the  Fourth  of  July, 
and  made  the  national  festival  a  day  of  wild  rejoicing, 
dimmed  only  by  the  terrible  tidings  of  the  loss  by  which 
success  had  been  bought. 

Lee  had  displayed  all  his  old  mastery  of  war  in  the  re- 
treat. In  the  battle  he  had  been  badly  served  by  some  of 
his  subordinates,  and  his  staff  had  failed  to  secure  due 
cooperation  between  the  various  attacks.  The  final  effort 
had  failed  for  want  of  a  sufficient  artillery  preparation,  and 
for  the  lack  of  support.  It  had  for  a  moment  been  near 
success,  even  in  the  face  of  the  splendidly  organized  defense 
with  which  Meade  and  Hancock  met  it.  That  Pickett's 
charge  ever  reached  the  Federal  lines  is  a  marvel.  Seven 
years  later,  a  similar  effort  of  the  German  Guards  on  the 
field  of  Gravelotte  failed  even  more  disastrously,  and  only 
then  was  it  recognized  that  in  the  face  of  modern  weapons 
the  great  massed  infantry  charge  across  a  wide  stretch  of 
fire-swept  ground  had  become  an  impossibility. 

The  field  of  Gettysburg  is  now  a  national  possession  of 
the  great  American  Republic.  On  every  hard-contested  hill- 
side monuments  to  the  fallen  leaders  and  the  regiments  that 


GETTYSBURG  115 

played  a  foremost  part  in  the  strife  mark  out  the  stages  of 
the  battle.  The  graves  of  the  dead  are  lovingly  guarded, 
and  are  decked  with  flowers  as  the  anniversary  comes  round. 
North  and  South  alike  honor  the  men  who  fought  so  well 
and  died  so  fearlessly.  The  memory  of  their  valor  has 
become  part  of  the  common  heritage  of  a  happily  united 
people. 


CHAPTER   V 

SADOWA 

July  3,  1866 

For  seven  years  after  Solferino,  and  especially  during 
the  first  part  of  this  period,  there  was  a  general  disposition 
to  acknowledge  that  France  was  the  first  military  power  of 
the  European  Continent.  Napoleon  III  was  occupied  with 
schemes  of  colonial  expansion  in  Africa  and  Asia,  and  an 
unfortunate  attempt  at  empire-making  in  Mexico.  But  the 
Chauvinist  or  Jingo  school  of  French  politicians  dreamed 
of  further  military  exploits  in  Europe,  and  in  the  French 
schools  it  was  part  of  the  official  teaching  that  the  Rhine 
from  Basel  to  the  sea  was  the  "  natural  frontier  "  of  France. 
Sooner  or  later,  it  was  said,  the  emperor  would  try  to  re- 
duce this  theory  to  practice. 

Germany  was  a  confederation  of  more  than  fifty  states 
—  kingdoms,  grand-duchies,  duchies,  principalities,  free 
cities  —  with  Austria  and  Prussia  as  permanent  rivals  for 
the  control  of  the  Federal  Diet  that  met  at  Frankfort-on- 
the-Main.  Prussia  counted  among  the  second-rate  military 
powers,  and  no  one  in  the  early  sixties  foresaw  the  great 
changes  that  were  so  soon  to  make  the  Prussian  king  the 
most  formidable  rival  of  the  French  emperor. 

King  William  I  came  to  the  throne  in  i86i,  after  having 
for  a  few  years  governed  Prussia  as  regent  during  the  long 
illness  of  his  predecessor.  Born  in  1797,  he  had  entered 
the  Prussian  army  in  the  year  after  Jena,  and  served  as 
a  young  officer  in  the  campaign  of  France  against  Napo- 
leon I  in  1814.     When  he  came  to  the  throne,  he  began  at 


SADOWA  117 

once  to  prepare  for  the  double  task  of  making  Prussia 
supreme  in  Germany,  and  then  using  the  power  of  united 
Germany  to  put  an  end  to  the  French  menace  on  the 
Rhine. 

He  had  for  his  chief  helpers  in  this  twofold  task  three 
remarkable  men  —  his  Prime  Minister,  Von  Bismarck,  the 
Minister  of  War,  Von  Roon,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Staff, 
Von  Moltke.  A  reorganization  and  increase  of  the  army 
was  carried  into  effect  in  defiance  of  the  Prussian  Parlia- 
ment, which  refused  to  vote  the  necessary  supplies.  Then 
an  alliance  with  Austria  was  formed  to  enforce  the  historic 
claim  that  the  Danish  duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein 
belonged  to  the  German  Confederation.  The  Danish  War 
of  1864  ended  with  a  joint  occupation  of  the  duchies  by 
Austrian  and  Prussian  troops ;  but  from  the  first  there  was 
tension  between  the  Allies,  and  within  two  years  Bismarck 
had  formed  an  alliance  with  the  new  kingdom  of  Italy 
against  Austria,  and  at  the  same  time  put  forward  claims 
for  Prussia  in  the  Frankfort  Diet  and  in  the  negotiations 
as  to  the  settlement  of  the  duchies  that  challenged  the  old 
predominance  of  the  Hapsburgs  in  Germany. 

The  quarrel  came  to  a  head  in  the  early  summer  of  1866. 
Most  of  the  minor  states  of  Germany  ranged  themselves  on 
the  side  of  Austria  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  the 
general  impression  was  that  Bismarck  and  King  William 
were  risking  a  disaster  for  Prussia  that  might  prove  as  fatal 
as  that  of  Jena.  It  was  anticipated  that  in  any  case  there 
would  be  a  prolonged  struggle,  and  the  French  emperor, 
watching  the  conflict,  was  prepared  to  intervene  if  the  op- 
portunity offered,  and  claim  compensation  on  the  Rhine 
for  any  increase  of  territory  obtained  by  the  victor,  who- 
ever that  might  be. 

The  war  lasted  only  seven  weeks.  It  was  a  surprise  and 
a  revelation  to  all  Europe.  Its  lessons  led  to  radical  changes 
in  the  war  methods  and  the  peace  organization  of  every 


ii8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

army  on  the  Continent.     Sadowa,  the  crowning  victory  of 
the  Prussian  arms,  was  an  epoch-making  battle. 

After  Jena  the  first  Napoleon  had  tried  to  cripple  the 
military  power  of  Prussia  by  embodying  in  the  treaty  of 
peace  a  clause  limiting  the  Prussian  army  to  42,000  men. 
Hitherto,  long  service  had  been  the  rule  of  European  armies. 
But  Schnarnhorst  and  Gneisenau,  who  reorganized  the  Prus- 
sian army  after  Jena,  adopted  a  system  of  short  service  in 
order  to  pass  as  many  men  as  possible  through  the  ranks, 
and  form  a  reserve  of  trained  soldiers.  By  this  method, 
when  the  national  uprising  against  Napoleon  came  in  181 3; 
Prussia  was  able  at  once  to  put  more  than  100,000  men  in 
the  field.  This  system  of  using  the  peace  army  as  a  train- 
ing school  for  a  huge  reserve,  and  expanding  it  into  a  large 
war  army  on  the  approach  of  hostilities,  became  the  basis  of 
the  Prussian  military  organization.  To  this  was  added  the 
plan  of  permanently  localizing  every  regiment,  brigade, 
division,  and  army  corps,  so  that  the  men  of  a  town,  village, 
or  district  fought  side  by  side  in  war,  under  the  leaders  who 
had  trained  them  in  peace.  This  system  of  a  small  standing 
army  and  a  large  reserve  was  economical.  It  enabled  a 
comparatively  poor  state  like  Prussia  to  provide  an  excellent 
armament  and  equipment  for  a  large  war  army.  The  in- 
fantry was  armed  with  a  breech-loading  rifle  in  1855,  before 
any  other  government  had  ventured  on  such  a  change. 
Under  King  William  the  Krupp  factories  began  to  provide 
the  artillery  with  rifled  breech-loading  cannon.  But  most 
important  of  all  was  the  work  of  the  general  staff,  organized 
and  trained  by  Von  Moltke.  Its  business  was  not  only  to 
collect  intelligence  and  prepare  plans  of  operations  well  in 
advance  of  any  possible  conflict,  but  also  to  direct  the  train- 
ing of  the  troops  and  their  leaders,  and  to  inspire  the  whole 
army  with  a  common  ideal  as  to  the  methods  to  be  followed 
in  war.  Individual  initiative  was  encouraged.  Generals 
were  taught  that  they  must  take  the  responsibility  of  acting 


SADOWA  119 

for  themselves  without  waiting  for  detailed  orders,  and  the 
orders  issued  by  Von  Moltke  in  war  were  always  of  the 
briefest  —  a  short  note  on  the  situation,  an  indication  of  the 
object  in  view,  directions  to  the  corps  commanders  as  to 
their  line  of  advance ;  it  was  left  to  each  in  his  own  sphere 
to  work  out  the  details. 

The  tactical  methods  taught  to  the  troops  were  eminently 
practical.  The  infantry  fought  on  a  system  that  united 
some  of  the  advantages  of  line  and  column.  The  battalion 
was  divided  into  four  strong  companies,  each  of  about  240 
rifles,  and  the  company  was  again  divided  into  three  ::iigs 
or  sections.  The  normal  formation  was  the  line  of  company 
columns,  each  with  its  three  sections  formed  two  deep,  one 
behind  the  other,  and  spaced  out  so  that  there  was  room 
for  the  whole  to  deploy  into  line.  On  going  into  action  the 
leading  section  was  thrown  out  as  skirmishers.  But  until 
the  second  stage  of  the  war  of  1870  the  massed  column  of 
the  Napoleonic  wars  was  still  employed  to  drive  home  a 
decisive  attack. 

Few  had  marked  the  efficient  methods  of  the  Prussian 
army  in  the  short  war  of  1864,  which  saw  no  great  battles, 
and  was  chiefly  remarkable  for  the  prolonged  siege  and 
successful  assault  of  the  fortified  Danish  position  of  Diippel. 
The  war  of  1866  was  the  first  trial  of  the  reorganized  Prus- 
sian army  in  a  really  important  campaign. 

Hanover,  Saxony,  and  the  South  German  States  had 
thrown  in  their  lot  with  Austria.  Prussia  had  on  her  side 
some  of  the  minor  states  of  the  north,  and  they  added  some- 
thing to  her  fighting  strength,  but  the  350,000  men  detailed 
for  her  field  armies  were  nearly  all  her  own  people.  The 
Italian  alliance  would  force  Austria  to  keep  a  considerable 
army  in  the  south  for  the  defense  of  Venetia.  Moltke's 
estimates  of  the  forces  to  be  opposed  to  Prussia  proved  to 
be  very  correct.  He  calculated  that  after  allowing  150,000 
men  for  the  army  in  Italy  under  the  Archduke  Albert,  the 


120  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Austrian  Army  of  the  North,  which  would  immediately  be 
joined  by  the  Saxons,  would  (including  these)  number 
nearly  300,000  men.  Besides  these  the  Hanoverians  and 
South  Germans  would  have  to  be  reckoned  with.  They 
would  put  120,000  men  in  the  field.  The  odds  were  against 
Prussia  ;  but  her  enemies  were  divided.  Except  the  Saxons, 
the  allies  of  Austria  were  thinking  only  of  a  piecemeal  de- 
fense of  their  own  territories.  This  enabled  Moltke  to 
content  himself  with  detaching  an  army  of  50,000  men  under 
General  Vogel  von  Falkenstein  to  deal  with  them.  It  was 
obvious  that  the  whole  fortune  of  the  war  would  turn  on 
the  operations  against  the  main  Austrian  army.  Against 
this,  therefore,  he  directed  every  man  and  gun  he  could 
spare. 

Three  Prussian  armies  were  concentrated  along  the  fron- 
tiers of  Saxony  and  Austria  by  the  beginning  of  June.  In 
the  center,  about  Gorlitz,  was  the  First  Army,  120,000 
strong,  under  Prince  Frederick  Charles.  On  the  right  was 
the  Elbe  Army,  50,000  men,  under  General  Herwarth  von 
Bittenfeld.  These  threatened  Saxony,  and  interposed  be- 
tween the  Austrians  and  the  shortest  way  to  Berlin  from 
Bohemia.  On  the  left  was  the  Second  Army,  130,000  strong, 
under  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  (afterwards  the  Em- 
peror Frederick).  These  were  assembled  about  Neisse,  in 
Silesia,  ready  to  meet  a  move  across  the  frontier  from 
Moravia,  where  the  Austrian  Army  of  the  North  was  con- 
centrating. These  three  Prussian  armies  altogether  num- 
bered about  300,000  men. 

The  king  was  to  command  this  great  army,  with  Moltke 
as  his  chief  of  the  staff  and  the  real  inspirer  of  every  move- 
ment. Till  the  end  of  June,  though  many  battles  were 
fought,  the  headquarters  were  at  Berlin.  Moltke,  from  his 
room  in  the  War  Office,  sent  his  orders  by  telegraph,  and 
moved  the  colored  pins  on  his  large  scale  maps,  like  a  chess- 
player engaged  in  a  game  by  correspondence.     It  was  only 


SADOWA  121 

when  the  great  crisis  was  near  at  hand  that  he  went  to  the 
front  with  the  king. 

The  Austrian  emperor  had  given  the  command  of  the 
northern  army  to  Marshal  Benedek.  The  choice  was  due 
to  his  splendid  fight  at  San  Martino  on  the  day  of  Solferino. 
At  first  he  refused  the  position,  and  asked  for  a  mere  corps 
command.  "  I  am  no  tactician,"  he  said  to  the  emperor ; 
"  choose  some  one  else."  But  Francis  Joseph  insisted,  and 
Benedek  gave  way.  He  established  his  headquarters  at 
Olmutz,  in  Moravia,  where  an  army  of  more  than  a  quar- 
ter of  a  million  men  was  assembling.  Meanwhile  Bohemia 
was  held  by  the  First  Army  Corps  and  a  cavalry  division. 

The  Austrians  had  not  completed  their  preparations  when 
the  war  began  on  June  i6.  Moltke's  plan  was  to  unite  his 
three  armies  on  Austrian  territory  in  Bohemia,  after  over- 
running Saxony.  If  the  Austrians  had  been  ready  and 
enterprising,  it  would  have  meant  taking  the  risk  of  being 
beaten  in  detail,  but  he  knew  they  were  unready  and  slow. 
Dresden  was  occupied  by  the  Elbe  Army  without  resistance, 
the  Saxons  retiring  into  Bohemia.  As  the  Elbe  Army  and 
the  armies  of  Frederick  Charles  and  the  Crown  Prince  ad- 
vanced over  the  mountains  into  Bohemia,  they  fought  sev- 
eral battles  with  Austrian  and  Saxon  detachments,  which 
were  too  weak  to  offer  very  serious  opposition. 

On  June  30  King  William  and  Moltke  left  Berlin  for 
Bohemia.  Bismarck  went  with  them,  and  wrote  to  his  wife 
that  during  the  day'%  journey  to  the  front  he  saw  more 
Saxon  and  Austrian  prisoners  than  Prussian  soldiers.  The 
situation  on  June  30  was  briefly  this :  Benedek  had  brought 
up  his  army  from  Olmutz  to  the  crossings  of  the  Elbe 
between  the  fortresses  of  Josefstadt  and  Koniggratz,  and 
had  passed  the  rivef.  Immediately  to  the  west  of  him  lay 
the  First  Prussian  Army,  with  the  Army  of  the  Elbe  close 
behind  it.  To  the  northward,  on  the  upper  Elbe,  was  the 
Crown  Prince,  with  the  Second  Army.    There  was  a  critical 


122  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

moment  when  Benedek,  if  he  had  been  quicker  in  his  deci- 
sions and  movements,  might  have  thrown  all  his  force 
against  the  Crown  Prince ;  but  he  had  formed  a  bad  plan 
of  campaign,  and  his  advance  across  the  Elbe  had  been 
undertaken  with  a  view  to  holding  the  Crown  Prince  with 
his  right  wing,  and  throwing  the  rest  of  his  army  against 
Frederick  Charles.  He  was  choosing  to  strike  at  the  more 
distant  instead  of  the  nearer  enemy.  On  the  evening  of 
the  twenty-ninth  he  realized  his  mistake,  and  next  day  be- 
gan to  concentrate  to  the  rear,  drawing  in  his  most  ad- 
vanced troops  and  marching  back  towards  the  Elbe.  He 
had  given  up  the  idea  of  attack,  and  was  deliberating  as 
to  the  ground  on  which  he  would  fight  a  defensive  action. 

Moltke,  on  his  arrival  at  Gitschin  on  July  i,  brought  the 
Elbe  Army  up  into  line  on  the  right  of  the  First  Army,  and 
began  closing  up  the  united  force  towards  Miletin,  to  bring 
it  nearer  to  the  Crown  Prince,  who  was  crossing  the  upper 
Elbe  on  the  Austrian  right.  Wherever  touch  was  obtained 
with  the  enemy,  the  Austrians  were  seen  to  be  retiring  to 
the  eastward.  The  view  adopted  at  the  Prussian  head- 
quarters, and  under  the  impression  of  which  Moltke's  first 
orders  for  July  3  were  written,  was  that  Benedek  meant 
to  recross  the  Elbe  and  fight  a  battle  in  a  strong  position 
on  its  eastern  bank,  with  the  river  covering  his  front,  and 
the  fortresses  of  Josefstadt  and  Koniggratz  on  his  right 
and  left. 

King  William  had  gone  to  bed  in  his  hotel  at  Gitschin 
on  the  evening  of  July  i,  when  Moltke  came  to  his  room 
with  news  that  altered  all  the  plans  for  next  day.  A  mes- 
sage had  come  from  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  whose  head- 
quarters were  some  miles  to  the  eastward.  It  was  a  letter 
inclosing  the  report  of  a  daring  cavalry  officer  who,  late  in 
the  day,  had  managed  to  take  a  close  look  at  the  hills  that 
rose  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Bistritz  River,  and  across 
which    ran    the   main    road    from    Gitschin    by    Sadowa   to 


SADOWA  123 

Koniggratz.  It  was  known  earlier  in  the  day  that  there 
were  Austrian  troops  on  these  hills,  but  they  were  supposed 
to  be  only  a  weak  rearguard,  covering  Benedek's  retirement 
across  the  Elbe.  But  the  cavalry  scout  had  made  a  ride 
along  the  farther  bank  of  the  Bistritz.  He  had  been  more 
than  once  fired  on,  and  had  finally  been  chased  by  Austrian 
lancers,  and  escaped  by  a  hairbreadth.  But  he  had  seen 
enough  to  be  sure  that  it  was  no  mere  rearguard  that  held 
the  hills.  Along  miles  of  front  he  had  found  signs  of  the 
enemy's  presence  in  force,  and  in  several  places  intrench- 
ments  were  being  thrown  up  and  trees  felled.  Evidently 
Benedek  meant  to  fight  with  his  front  to  the  Bistritz,  and 
the  Elbe  and  its  twin  fortresses  behind  him.  The  next 
day's  march  of  the  Prussian  army  would  mean  a  colossal 
battle  in  its  first  hours. 

New  orders  were  hastily  written,  and  sent  ofif  to  the 
Crown  Prince  to  insure  his  early  cooperation  against  the 
Austrian  right.  Benedek,  with  his  Austrians  and  Saxons, 
was  between  the  two  Prussian  armies ;  but  there  was  no 
danger  in  this,  for  they  were  near  enough  to  insure  their 
junction  on  the  actual  battle-field.  It  was,  in  fact,  a  gain 
that  the  Crown  Prince's  army,  instead  of  being  in  line  with 
that  under  the  immediate  command  of  the  king,  was  already 
in  position  to  throw  all  its  weight  against  a  flank  of  the 
enemy. 

The  ground  on  which  Benedek  had  decided  to  risk  the 
ordeal  of  battle  was  well  chosen.  It  was  no  disadvantage 
that  he  had  a  broad  river  four  miles  in  his  rear,  for  it  was 
crossed  by  good  bridges,  and  protected  by  the  guns  of  two 
fortresses,  and  in  case  of  disaster  would  secure  his  retreat. 
The  line  of  hills  ran  generally  from  south  to  north,  sloping 
gently  to  the  valley  in  which  flows  the  little  river  Bistritz, 
a  sluggish  stream  with  stretches  of  marsh  along  its  course, 
so  that  in  many  places  troops  cannot  pass  it.  Along  the 
stream  are  a  number  of  villages  built  of  wood,  the  most  im- 


124  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

portant  of  which,  Sadowa,  gives  its  name  to  the  battle.* 
From  the  bridge  of  Sadowa  the  road  to  Koniggratz  runs 
over  the  hills,  passing  through  a  dip  below  their  highest 
point,  which  is  crowned  by  the  village  of  Chlum,  whose 
square  church  tower  looks  out  over  the  battle-field  as  the 
Spia  tower  looked  on  that  of  Solferino.  The  hills  rise  and 
fall  into  knolls  and  hollows,  and  there  are  numerous  villages, 
farmsteads,  and  fine  country  houses.  The  hedgerows  and 
inclosures  give  it  an  almost  English  look.  In  July  there 
are  wide  stretches  of  growing  corn  in  the  open  fields ;  but 
there  are  also  numerous  fir  and  pine  woods,  especially  at 
the  southern  end  of  the  position.  Shelter  trenches  and  gun- 
pits  had  been  dug,  and  trees  felled  to  form  barriers  across 
the  roads  and  on  the  slopes.  Some  of  the  lessons  of  the 
American  War  had  been  taken  to  heart  by  the  Austrians. 
Along  about  eight  miles  of  front  Benedek  had  set  in 
battle  array  an  army  of  215,000  men,  including  770  guns 
and  nearly  24,000  cavalry.  It  was  an  army  of  many  nations 
and  languages,  for  the  Emperor  of  Austria  rules  a  polyglot 
empire.  On  the  extreme  left  among  the  wooded  hills  were 
the  Saxon  allies,  23,000  strong,  under  their  Crown  Prince. 
Then  northwards  stretched  the  white-coated  Austrian  lines, 
with  here  and  there  a  dark  green  uniformed  detachment  of 
Tyrolese  rifles.  In  that  long  array  there  were  German- 
speaking  Austrians,  Czechs  of  Bohemia,  Poles,  Croats  and 
Slavs  of  the  south,  Italian-speaking  recruits  from  the 
Adriatic  shores,  Hungarians  and  Roumanians  from  Tran- 
sylvania. There  was  some  doubt  as  to  whether  the  Hun- 
garians and  Italians  had  their  hearts  in  the  struggle,  but 
most  of  Benedek's  men  were  in  excellent  fighting  form. 
They  were  not  discouraged  by  the  minor  defeats  during 
the  Prussian  advance,  and  news  had  come  from  Italy  of 
the  Archduke  Albert's  victory  of  Custozza,  won  on  the 
seventh  anniversary  of  Solferino. 

*  It  is  also  known  as  the  battle  of  Koniggratz. 


SADOWA  125 

On  the  Prussian  side  the  troops  actually  set  in  movement 
for  the  battle-field,  and  near  enough  to  be  engaged,  num- 
bered 221,000  men,  including  27,000  cavalry,  and  having 
with  them  780  guns.  The  total  of  the  forces  on  both  sides 
were  thus  436,000  men,  with  over  1500  guns.  Sadowa 
ranks,  in  point  of  numbers  engaged,  second  among  the 
great  battles  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Only  the  "  battle  of 
nations,"  at  Leipzig  in  1813,  ranks  before  it.^  The  Prussian 
armies  broke  up  from  their  bivouacs  in  the  darkness  hours 
before  the  dawn,  and  began  a  dreary  night-march  through 
cold  and  rain,  and  though  it  was  midsummer  the  weather 
was  miserably  depressing.  There  was  no  sight  of  the  sun- 
rise, for  the  sky  was  thick  with  gray  clouds  that  sent  down 
frequent  showers,  and  a  rainy  mist  hung  along  the  hollow 
of  the  Bistritz  till  long  after  dawn. 

The  first  troops  to  come  in  contact  with  the  enemy  were 
the  vanguard  of  the  First  Army.  As  the  twilight  grew  to 
day  the  Austrian  outposts  along  the  Bistritz  saw  through 
the  driving  rain  mounted  vedettes  of  the  enemy  crowning 
the  hilltops  that  looked  down  on  the  line  of  the  river.  For 
some  hours  this  was  all  they  saw.  But  behind  the  low  hills 
the  troops  of  the  First  Army  were  massing  for  the  attack. 
On  both  sides  of  the  roads  as  the  columns  approached  the 
hills  the  troops  were  moved  out  into  the  fields  —  masses  of 
greatcoated  infantry,  battery  after  battery,  with  the  guns 
and  the  teams  splashed  with  mud.  The  rain  had  soaked 
the  standing  corn,  and  the  troops  and  their  horses  trampled 

'  According  to  Otto  Berndt  ("  Die  Zahl  im  Kriege  ")  the  figures 
for  Leipzig  stand  thus  : 

Allies     301,500  men  (56,000  cavalry,  1384  guns). 

French  171,000  men  (22,000  cavalry,    700  guns). 

Totals    472,500  men  (78,000  cavalry,  2084  guns). 

Sadowa  ranks  second  in  point  of  numbers,  and  Gravelotte  (St. 
Privat),  1870,  third. 


126  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

it  down ;  but  the  tangled  mass  of  vegetation  was  a  drag 
on  the  gun  wheels  as  they  pulled  slowly  through  it.  By 
sunrise  Frederick  Charles  and  his  staff  were  waiting  just 
behind  the  fiat  summit  of  the  hills  near  the  village  of  Dub, 
a  point  that,  if  the  weather  cleared,  would  command  a  good 
view  of  the  Austrian  positions.  Here  he  was  soon  joined 
by  Von  Moltke  and  the  headquarters  staff,  and  the  two 
leaders  chatted  together.  The  plan  of  the  battle  had  been 
already  settled,  and  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  await 
reports  that  the  troops  were  up  to  the  front  and  ready  to 
advance.  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  with  the  First  Army, 
was  to  drive  in  the  enemy's  posts  on  the  Bistritz,  cross  the 
river,  and  keep  the  Austrian  center  occupied.  Meanwhile 
Herwarth,  with  the  Elbe  Army,  was  to  move  forward  on 
the  right  and  force  back  and  turn  Benedek's  left ;  while 
the  Crown  Prince,  with  the  Second  Army,  was  to  come 
down  from  the  northward,  strike  in  behind  the  enemy's 
right,  and  threaten  to  cut  the  Austrians  off  from  the  cross- 
ings of  the  Elbe.  This  attack  by  the  Crown  Prince  was  in- 
tended to  be  the  decisive  move  of  the  day. 

Strange  to  say,  Benedek  did  not  expect  any  serious  at- 
tempt to  be  made  against  him  on  that  side.  His  information 
was  very  misleading,  and  he  thought  that  the  bulk  of  the 
Crown  Prince's  army  had  already  moved  westward  and 
joined  the  First  Army,  and  that  he  had  all,  or  nearly  all, 
the  Prussian  army  in  his  front.  He  did  not  anticipate  that 
anything  more  than  a  relatively  small  detachment  had  been 
left  to  the  northward  on  his  right  flank.  This  error  was 
largely  the  result  of  his  keeping  his  splendid  cavalry  wait- 
ing for  use  in  charges  on  the  battle-field,  instead  of  using 
them  to  guard  his  flanks.  Had  he  sent  them  out  to  the 
northward,  he  would  not  only  have  discovered  the  presence 
of  a  great  army  in  that  direction,  but  would  also  have  been 
able  to  use  his  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  to  delay  very 
seriously  the  Crown  Prince's  advance. 


SADOWA  127 

About  seven  o'clock  a  carriage,  escorted  by  a  consider- 
able body  of  horsemen,  drove  along  the  road  from  Gitschin 
to  the  rendezvous  behind  the  hill  of  Dub.  King  William 
was  coming  to  assume  formal  command  of  the  battle.  He 
mounted  his  horse,  and  rode  up  to  Moltke  and  the  '*  Red 
Prince."  With  him  came  Bismarck,  wearing  for  the  occa- 
sion his  white  uniform  of  a  major  of  cuirassiers.  There 
were  a  crowd  of  staff  officers  and  gallopers,  and  a  group  of 
correspondents  of  various  newspapers,  for  the  "  war  corre- 
spondent "  had  by  this  time  won  a  recognized  place  with 
armies  in  the  field.  Russell  of  the  Times,  whom  we  have 
already  seen  at  the  Alma  as  a  barely  tolerated  spectator  of 
the  fight,  was  beside  Benedek  on  the  hill  of  Chlum,  an  hon- 
ored guest  of  the  Austrian  staff.^ 

The  king  and  his  generals  now  moved  up  to  the  top  of 
the  hill,  their  station  during  the  coming  battle.  A  cold  wind 
was  blowing  in  gusts,  and  the  rain  was  coming  down  in  a 
steady  drizzle.  Through  the  murky  atmosphere  the  hills 
held  by  the  enemy  loomed  up  like  gray  shadows.  There 
was  a  better  view  of  the  villages  clustering  here  and  there 
along  the  marshy  hollow  of  the  Bistritz.  The  scouts  had 
reported  that  the  enemy  held  all  these  villages  on  both  banks 
of  the  river,  and  held  them  in  force.  After  a  brief  survey 
of  the  ground  to  the  front,  gallopers  rode  off  to  right  and 
left  and  rear,  conveying  the  orders  for  the  first  advance, 

'  I  once  talked  over  the  Sadowa  campaign  with  the  late  Sir  Wil- 
liam Russell.  He  told  me  it  was  the  only  time  he  had  been  with  a 
beaten  army.  "  During  the  retreat,"  he  said,  "  I  was  hospitably  en- 
tertained by  some  good  people  in  a  Bohemian  village.  They  were  in 
quite  unnecessary  fear  of  being  plundered  by  the  Prussians  when 
they  arrived  in  pursuit,  and  asked  me  if  I  could  give  them  a  letter 
to  any  friend  in  the  invading  army,  asking  him  to  use  his  influence 
to  protect  them.  I  told  them  the  correspondent  of  my  paper  on  the 
other  side  was  a  British  officer,  Colonel  Hozier,  and  I  left  them  a 
letter  for  him,  which  ran  something  like  this :  '  Dear  Hozier,  these 
people  have  been  very  kind  to  me.  Don't  let  the  Prussians  steal  their 
spoons.'  " 


128  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

The  road  over  the  hill  of  Dub  runs  down  the  slope  and 
across  marshy  meadows  for  about  a  mile  and  a  half  to  the 
village  of  Sadowa,  where  it  crosses  the  Bistritz  by  a  bridge. 
The  village  of  wooden  houses  is  on  the  west  bank,  with 
orchards  along  the  river,  and  a  little  to  the  south  of  it  was 
a  brick-built  sugar  factory  with  a  tall  chimney.  The  first 
operation  of  the  day  was  to  be  the  seizure  of  the  village  and 
bridge.  Over  the  hilltop  came  some  batteries  of  artillery, 
escorted  by  a  regiment  of  Uhlans,  with  their  rain-soaked 
pennons  hanging  heavily  round  their  lances.  As  the  guns 
pulled  out  into  the  fields  and  wheeled  into  position,  the 
horses  were  slipping  and  almost  falling  on  the  sodden 
ground.  Before  they  had  unlimbered  there  came  the  open- 
ing shots  of  the  battle  from  the  other  side.  A  flash  through 
the  driving  rain,  a  cloud  of  smoke  in  a  field  beyond  the 
Bistritz  to  the  north  of  Sadowa,  and  a  shell  came  hurtling 
in  among  the  Uhlans,  burst  as  it  struck  the  ground,  sent 
up  a  geyser  of  mud,  smoke,  and  flame,  and  emptied  four 
saddles. 

Battery  after  battery  now  opened  along  the  river,  and 
from  the  hills  on  its  west  bank  the  Prussians  answered  back 
as  their  guns  came  into  position.  The  smoke  hung  heavy 
in  the  damp  air,  and  at  times  the  batteries  had  to  suspend 
their  fire  to  get  a  better  view  of  their  targets  before  re- 
opening. The  Prussian  guns  were  shelling  the  villages 
along  the  river,  and  soon  there  was  grim  proof  that  their 
fire  was  efifective.  Black  smoke  began  to  rise  from  the 
houses,  and  then  through  the  smoke  clouds  there  shot  up 
red  tongues  of  flame.  Sadowa  and  two  more  villages  to 
the  south  of  it  were  ablaze.  The  unfortunate  peasants  were 
witnessing  the  swift  destruction  of  their  homes. 

While  the  batteries  were  thus  doing  their  deadly  work, 
the  infantry  were  forming  for  the  attack  of  the  river  line. 

But  the  infantry  in  the  center  could  not  advance  till 
something  had  been  done  to  reduce  the  fire  effect  of  the 


SADOWA  129 

Austrian  batteries.  Benedek's  artillery  served  him  well,  and 
made  a  splendid  fight.  To  help  the  gunners,  ranges  had 
been  carefully  measured  off  by  the  Austrians,  and  trees 
felled  at  intervals  served  to  mark  the  distances  from  the 
artillery  positions ;  and  there  was  a  double  range  of  bat- 
teries in  action  —  some  along  the  low  ground  by  the  Bistritz, 
others  on  the  slopes  behind.  There  was  serious  loss  among 
the  Prussians.  At  one  time  several  shells  burst  on  the  Dub 
hilltop,  killing  and  wounding  some  of  the  king's  escort.  It 
was  more  than  two  hours  before  the  fire  of  the  Prussian 
guns  began  to  tell.  Then  it  was  seen  that  some  of  the 
Austrian  batteries  were  shifting  their  ground  and  with- 
drawing to  longer  ranges. 

Even  so,  the  infantry  would  not  have  advanced  until 
further  effect  had  been  obtained  and  the  enemy's  infantry 
shaken ;  but  the  attack  had  to  be  somewhat  anticipated,  for 
towards  the  left  Von  Fransecky's  Division  had  made  a 
premature  advance  against  the  village  of  Benatek.  The 
Austrians  abandoned  it  after  firing  a  few  shots,  and  Von 
Fransecky  occupied  it ;  but  his  division  was  now  in  action 
with  the  enemy,  who  held  the  wooded  slopes  beyond  the 
village,  and  this  isolated  division  was  across  the  Bistritz 
north  of  Sadowa  unsupported,  and  in  danger  of  being  per- 
haps overwhelmed  by  a  vigorous  counter-attack.  Prince 
Frederick  Charles  therefore,  about  ten  o'clock,  ordered 
Stulpnagel  to  force  the  crossings  of  the  Bistritz  at  Sadowa, 
Dohalicka,  and  Makrovous,  three  villages  that  had  been 
blazing  fiercely  for  the  last  hour. 

Lines  of  skirmishers  had  already  been  pushed  down  the 
slopes  towards  the  river.  They  now  advanced  and  opened 
fire,  and  the  company  columns  came  on  behind  them.  Over 
some  two  miles  of  front  a  hard-fought  infantry  battle  now 
began.  The  Austrians  held  the  orchards  and  inclosures 
along  the  river,  and  isolated  buildings  that  had  not  been 
set  on  fire,  and  their  artillery  was  in  action  on  the  farther 


I30  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

bank.  There  was  not  much  loss  till  the  attack  began  to  come 
to  close  quarters.  Then  the  Prussians  had  to  pay  heavily 
for  every  yard  of  progress ;  but  the  more  rapid  fire  of  the 
breechloader  gave  them  a  decided  advantage.  Still,  the 
Austrians  fought  so  stubbornly  around  the  burning  villages 
that  nearly  an  hour  went  by  before  they  were  forced  across 
the  bridges,  with  the  victors  following  them  up  closely. 

The  Prussian  infantry  and  artillery  now  came  pouring 
over  the  bridges,  regardless  of  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries from  the  hills.  All  the  higher  slopes  towards  Lipa 
and  Chlum  were  wrapped  in  the  smoke  of  a  long  line  of 
batteries.  In  the  woods  above  Sadowa  the  Austrians  made 
a  stand  to  cover  the  retirement  of  the  defenders  of  the 
Bistritz  to  the  main  position. 

On  the  right  the  army  of  the  Elbe  had  come  into  action. 
Herwarth's  advanced  guard  had  crossed  the  Bistritz  at 
Nechanitz  and  driven  the  Saxon  outposts  from  the  fir  and 
pine  woods  round  Hradek.  It  was  nearly  eleven  o'clock, 
but  so  far  all  that  had  been  done  was  to  force  an  advanced 
position  which  the  Austrians  had  never  intended  to  hold  for 
long.  The  main  position  had  now  to  be  assailed.  For  this 
the  cooperation  of  the  Crown  Prince  and  the  Second  Army 
would  be  of  vital  importance. 

In  a  campaign  of  the  present  day  two  armies  operating 
in  concert  within  a  few  miles  of  each  other  would  be  in 
constant  communication  by  telegraph.  If  in  any  enemy's 
country  there  was  any  difficulty  in  keeping  a  line  of  wires 
and  cables  intact,  some  form  of  wireless  telegraphy  would 
be  used.  But  at  Sadowa  there  was  no  telegraphic  link 
between  the  headquarters  of  the  First  and  Second  Army, 
and  the  king  and  Moltke  were  not  aware  that  the  Crown 
Prince's  troops  were  in  action  till  long  after  their  appear- 
ance on  the  field. 

The  sudden  change  in  the  orders  in  the  late  hours  of  the 
previous  evening  had  somewhat  delayed  the  start  of  the 


SADOWA  131 

Crown  Prince's  columns.  To  convey  new  orders  during 
the  night  to  troops  in  bivouacs  and  cantonments  extending 
over  many  miles  of  country  is  a  lengthy  process.  The 
method  followed  would  have  to  be  something  like  this :  On 
Moltke's  orders  reaching  the  Crown  Prince,  he  would,  with 
his  chief  of  the  staff,  draw  up  the  special  orders  for  each 
corps  or  division.  These  would  be  duplicated  and  sent  off 
by  mounted  officers  to  the  subordinate  generals.  They 
would  then  have  to  add  any  special  orders  for  their  own 
detachments ;  these  orders  would  be  dictated  to  the  staff 
clerks,  so  as  to  secure  a  sufficient  number  of  copies,  and 
then  staff  officers  and  orderlies  would  ride  with  them  to 
the  commanders  of  the  units  concerned.  Every  officer 
would  already  have  received  a  set  of  orders,  which  the  new 
orders  would  cancel,  and  with  each  detachment  fresh  ar- 
rangements would  have  to  be  hurriedly  made  for  the  morn- 
ing's work.  All  this  meant  delay.  Nevertheless,  the  col- 
umns of  the  Second  Army  were  in  movement  southwards 
before  sunrise,  a  division  on  their  left  being  entrusted  with 
the  task  of  masking  and  observing  the  fortress  of  Josefstadt. 
Benedek  received  early  in  the  day  a  message  from  Josef- 
stadt, warning  him  that  hostile  troops  had  been  seen  march- 
ing past  the  place  on  the  west  side  of  the  Elbe.  But  he 
still  clung  to  his  theory  that  the  Crown  Prince  was  with 
Frederick  Charles  in  his  front,  and  did  not  regard  the 
presence  of  what  he  took  to  be  a  minor  detachment  on  his 
right  to  be  a  serious  menace.  His  orders  for  the  day  show 
that  he  expected  the  flank  attack  to  be  made  against  his 
left,  where  he  had  stationed  the  Saxon  Army  Corps.  He 
contented  himself  with  placing  a  brigade  of  infantry  on  his 
right  rear  to  watch  the  crossings  of  the  lower  course  of  the 
little  river  Trotina  from  the  village  of  Racitz  to  its  con- 
fluence with  the  Elbe.  About  half  past  nine  the  weather 
had  somewhat  cleared,  and  the  Crown  Prince,  who  was 
with  his  advanced  guard,  saw  heavy  clouds  of  cannon  smoke 


132  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

on  the  hills  about  the  village  of  Horenowes  and  on  the  lower 
slopes  towards  Benatek.  The  wind  was  blowing  from  the 
northward,  and  though  there  was  evidently  a  serious  artillery 
fight  in  progress  a  few  miles  to  the  front,  not  a  sound  of 
it  could  be  heard.  The  march  of  the  right  column,  headed 
by  the  Prussian  Guards,  was  directed  towards  Horenowes ; 
the  left  column  moving  so  as  to  strike  in  between  the 
heights  and  the  Elbe.  The  word  was  passed  to  prepare  for 
action,  and  the  official  account  of  the  battle  tells  how  the 
colors  were  shaken  out,  and  the  chaplains,  Catholic  and 
Protestant,  rode  down  the  lines  exhorting  the  men  to  do 
their  duty.  Towards  eleven  o'clock  the  advanced  guard  of 
the  left  column  was  in  action  with  Austrian  outposts  along 
the  Trotina.  By  this  time  the  First  Army  was  beginning 
its  attack  on  the  Austrian  main  position  after  forcing  the 
line  of  the  Bistritz,  but  still  had  no  idea  that  the  Crown 
Prince's  army  was  already  coming  into  action. 

For  more  than  two  hours  the  First  Army  made  hardly 
any  progress.  On  the  right  and  in  the  center  Fransecky 
and  Stulpnagel's  men  were  fighting  hard  to  force  their 
way  through  the  Maslowed  and  Sadowa  woods.  From  the 
heights  in  the  Austrian  center  a  line  of  intrenched  guns 
fired  with  deadly  effect  on  the  Prussian  batteries  along  the 
Bistritz.  Some  of  the  batteries  on  the  side  of  the  attack 
barely  held  their  ground,  losing  heavily  in  men  and  horses. 
Even  some  guns  were  dismounted  by  bursting  shells  shat- 
tering the  gun  wheels.  On  the  right,  for  some  time  Her- 
warth's  batteries  could  only  support  the  attack  of  the  Elbe 
Army  at  long  range  from  the  west  bank  of  the  Bistritz. 
The  Austrians  had  partly  destroyed  the  bridge  at  Nechanitz, 
and  though  the  infantry  could  cross  it,  it  was  nearly  two 
hours  before  the  pioneers  could  repair  it  sufficiently  to 
make  it  passable  by  artillery.  Very  slowly,  and  at  the  cost 
of  some  hand-to-hand  fighting  with  the  bayonet,  the  Sadowa 
wood  was  won. 


I 


No.  lo  —  Battle  of  S^vdowa,  July  3,  1866 

(Position  about  ii  A.  m.) 


SADOWA  133 

So  far  Moltke  had  good  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the 
progress  obtained,  for  his  whole  plan  for  the  battle  de- 
pended on  keeping  the  enemy  occupied  until  the  Crown 
Prince  could  strike  in  on  his  right  rear.  But  there  was 
no  sign  to  be  seen  of  the  Second  Army  being  in  action,  and 
there  was  a  growing  danger  that  if  its  cooperation  failed 
Benedek  might  make  a  counter-attack,  and  drive  the  sorely- 
tried  First  Army  into  the  marshes  of  the  Bistritz.  The 
king  was  becoming  anxious  and  impatient,  and  towards  one 
o'clock  actually  gave  orders  for  a  massed  attack  of  infantry 
against  the  Austrian  intrenched  battery  in  front  of  Chlum 
and  Lipa.  Moltke  persuaded  him  to  withdraw  the  order, 
telling  him  frankly  that  the  attack  must  fail,  and  fail  with 
terrible  loss  of  life.  More  than  this,  its  failure  would  give 
an  opening  for  a  general  counter-attack  by  the  enemy.  He 
insisted  that  before  trying  any  desperate  measures  they  must 
wait  a  little  longer  for  the  promised  intervention  of  the 
Crown  Prince  and  his  100,000  fighting  men. 

Bismarck,  sitting  on  horseback  beside  the  king,  was  con- 
tinually scanning  the  hills  to  the  northeastward  with  his 
field-glass,  hoping  to  see  some  sign  that  the  Austrians  were 
being  attacked  in  that  direction.  At  one  time  it  was  no- 
ticed that  some  of  the  enemy's  guns  on  the  hillside  near 
Chlum  were  no  longer  firing  towards  the  Bistritz,  but  were 
pointing  northwards.  Could  they  be  in  action  with  the 
Crown  Prince's  batteries?  Moltke  looked  at  them  through 
his  field-glass,  and  explained  that  they  were  apparently 
firing  at  the  right  of  Fransecky's  attack  on  Maslowed. 
Smoking  is  a  way  to  calm  or  disguise  anxiety,  and  Bismarck 
took  out  his  cigar-case,  and  before  lighting  a  cigar  himself, 
ofifered  one  to  Von  Moltke.  Instead  of  taking  the  first  that 
offered,  Moltke  looked  carefully  at  the  cigars  and  picked  out 
the  best.  Bismarck  said  afterwards  that  the  trifling  incident 
reassured  him,  for  he  thought  that  if  the  veteran  chief  of 
the  staff  could  take  so  much  care  in  jiicking  out  a  good 


134  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

cigar,  he  could  not  be  very  anxious  about  more  serious 
matters. 

Anxious  as  the  headquarters  staff  undoubtedly  were,  there 
was  no  real  reason  for  their  anxiety;  for,  all  unknown  to 
them,  the  Crown  Prince's  army  had  been  already  in  action 
for  a  good  two  hours,  and  was  making  steady  progress.  As 
early  as  eleven  o'clock  he  had  actually  sent  two  staff  officers 
with  information  as  to  his  position  and  plans  to  Fransecky ; 
but,  strange  to  say,  that  general  was  so  fully  occupied  with 
his  own  operations  against  the  Austrian  right  about  Mas- 
lowed  and  Horenowes,  that  he  did  not  send  on  the  news 
to  the  king  and  Von  Moltke.  The  thunder  of  the  nearer 
cannonade  prevented  the  sound  of  the  Crown  Prince's  guns 
being  heard  in  the  Prussian  center.  The  thick  rainy  weather 
prevented  the  rising  smoke  being  seen,  and  the  whole  attack 
was  hidden  from  view  by  the  line  of  hills  held  by  Benedek's 
army. 

The  first  sign  of  the  Crown  Prince's  advance  telling  upon 
the  enemy  came  from  the  Prussian  left.  For  five  hours, 
from  shortly  after  9  till  after  2  p.  m.,  the  Austrians  had 
made  a  desperate  defense  of  the  Maslowed  woods  against 
Fransecky's  equally  determined  attack.  In  this  fight  the 
Prussian  infantry  lost  84  officers  and  some  2000  men.  It 
was  only  after  a  severe  struggle  that  the  margin  of  the 
wood  was  forced ;  then  there  was  a  long  series  of  sharp 
conflicts  in  its  interior,  the  fight  swaying  backwards  and 
forwards  in  the  dense  undergrowth,  and  all  order  being  lost. 
"  After  a  series  of  alternate  successes  and  reverses,"  says 
the  Prussian  official  narrative,  "  the  regiments,  battalions, 
and  companies  which  were  engaged  in  the  interior  of  the 
wood  had  in  the  end  become  completely  mixed  up ;  they 
could  barely  see  a  yard  in  front  of  them.  It  was  thus 
impossible  to  control  the  fight  as  a  whole,  and  the  leaders 
could  do  no  more  than  personally  set  an  example  to  their 
men.     Everywhere  officers  gathered  about  them  such  men 


SADOWA  135 

as  were  within  sight  and  hearing,  irrespective  of  what 
regiments  they  belonged  to,  and  led  them  again  into  the 
fight.  The  troops  which  were  driven  out  of  the  wood  were 
sent  into  it  again,  and  reserves  were  formed  out  of  those 
who  were  completely  disorganized.  In  the  rear  of  the  fight- 
ing line  Austrian  prisoners  were  continually  being  brought 
in,  but  there  was  also  an  ever-increasing  stream  of  wounded 
and  of  leaderless  men." 

But  towards  two  o'clock  the  resistance  of  the  Austrians 
became  less  stubborn,  and  then  it  was  found  that  they  were 
abandoning  the  wood.  More  than  this,  it  was  seen  that  the 
Austrian  right  was  falling  back  from  the  heights  above 
Horenowes  and  Maslowed.  Some  batteries  which  had  been 
in  action  on  a  bold  hill  near  Horenowes,  marked  by  a  pair 
of  tall  trees,  limbered  up  and  disappeared  down  its  eastern 
slope.  Evidently  something  serious  was  happening  beyond 
the  enemy's  right  flank.  It  must  be  that  the  Crown  Prince's 
attack  was  being  pushed  home.  Along  the  Prussian  center 
to  Herwarth  on  the  extreme  right  the  word  ran,  "  The 
Crown  Prince  is  coming !  "  and  anxiety  gave  way  to  ex- 
pectation of  a  speedy  triumph. 

The  Crown  Prince  was  not  merely  coming;  he  had 
come.  On  his  right,  nearest  to  Fransecky's  attack,  he  had 
pushed  the  Guards  forward  against  Horenowes.  A  single 
battery  was  in  action  on  the  tree-topped  hill  as  the  regiments 
of  the  Guards  advanced  across  the  marshy  valley  to  the 
north  of  it.  The  Austrians  hurried  up  several  batteries  to 
support  it,  and  the  artillery  of  the  Prussian  Guards  unlim- 
bered  and  replied  to  their  fire.  On  the  left,  the  Crown 
Prince's  advance  was  forcing  back  the  Austrian  detachments 
from  the  banks  of  the  Trotina  and  enveloping  the  village  of 
Racitz.  Just  as  these  attacks  developed,  Benedek  had  been 
preparing  to  make  a  fierce  counter-attack  on  the  Prussian 
center.  He  had  ridden  down  the  eastern  slope  of  Chlum 
Hill  to  bring  up  the  reserves  who  were  waiting  there.     As 


136  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

he  appeared  among  them  the  bands  struck  up  tlie  Austrian 
National  Anthem,  Haydn's  "  God  preserve  the  Emperor 
Francis,"  and  the  men  cheered  wildly.  "  Leave  the  cheering 
till  to-morrow,  my  boys,"  said  Benedek  as  he  rode  through 
the  ranks,  meaning  that  it  was  better  to  wait  till  victory 
was  won.  He  was  about  to  move  the  reserves  to  the  front, 
when  reports  reached  him  that  the  attack  to  the  northward 
was  that  of  a  great  army.  He  gave  up  for  the  present  all 
idea  of  assuming  the  offensive,  sent  some  reinforcements  to 
support  the  weak  line  that  held  the  Trotina  River,  and 
ordered  the  Fourth  Corps  on  the  right,  which  was  opposing 
Fransecky,  to  swing  back  and  face  northwards. 

It  was  this  retirement  that  gave  the  Prussian  headquarters 
staff  the  first  clear  proof  that  the  Crown  Prince  was  push- 
ing in  upon  the  Austrian  right.  Crushed  by  the  fire  of 
the  numerous  batteries  of  the  Guards,  the  Austrian  artillery 
abandoned  the  unequal  fight  for  the  Horenowes  Hill,  lim- 
bered up,  and  withdrew.  The  Guards  pushed  forward  and 
won  the  hill  with  trifling  loss.  The  Twenty-first  Brigade 
stormed  Racitz,  and  the  Austrians  fell  back  from  the  line 
of  the  little  river  that  runs  past  it. 

The  Crown  Prince's  100,000  men  had  now  at  most  one- 
fourth  of  their  numbers  directly  opposed  to  them,  and  had 
only  to  move  boldly  onward  to  push  the  enemy  back. 
Across  the  right  front  of  the  Prussian  advance  the  Austrian 
Fourth  Corps  was  retiring  in  column,  its  rearguard  pressed 
by  Fransecky's  exultant  troops.  The  whole  of  the  Austrian 
right  was  disorganized  and  moving  to  new  positions,  with  a 
sense  of  being  hustled  on  its  way  by  the  overwhelmingly 
superior  numbers  of  the  attack.  The  Guards  advanced  into 
Horenowes  village,  and  engaged  and  drove  in  some  Austrian 
battalions  who  rallied  on  the  hill  to  the  southeast  of  it. 
The  Crown  Prince's  left  columns  were  pouring  across  the 
Trotina,  threatening  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat.  Along  the 
front  towards  the  Bistritz  the  Prussian  fire  redoubled.    New 


SADOWA  137 

regiments  were  sent  into  the  fighting  line,  and  on  the  Aus- 
trian left  Herwarth  at  last  drove  out  the  defenders  of  the 
Hradek  woods,  and  began  to  develop  his  attack  against  the 
main  position  of  the  Saxons  on  the  hills  about  Problus 
and  Prim.  The  news  of  the  Crown  Prince's  victorious 
advance  had  sent  a  new  impulse  through  the  whole  of 
the  attack.  After  a  weary  and  doubtful  struggle  the  Prus- 
sians had  at  last  the  feeling  that  success  was  within  their 
grasp. 

The  Crown  Prince  now  drove  the  Guard  Corps  like  a 
wedge  into  the  center  of  the  Austrian  position.  While  the 
Second  Division  of  the  Guards  swept  the  enemy  out  of 
Maslowed  and  cleared  the  low  hills  to  the  east  of  it,  the 
First  Division  pushed  steadily  southwards.  In  front  of  it 
rose  the  hill  of  Chlum,  with  the  village  clustering  round  the 
square-towered  church  on  its  summit,  the  highest  point  in 
the  range  of  hills  held  by  the  enemy.  The  rapid,  almost 
unopposed  advance  of  the  Guards  had  come  as  a  surprise 
to  Benedek.  Chlum  was  very  weakly  held.  The  defenders 
of  the  hill  had  been  moved  down  to  its  western  slope,  where, 
with  the  line  of  intrenched  batteries  stretching  along  the 
hillside  towards  Lipa  village,  they  were  engaged  in  repelling 
the  attack  directed  against  them  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
from  the  Sadowa  woods.  Suddenly  a  storm  of  artillery  fire 
burst  out  upon  them  on  their  right  flank,  and  in  a  massive 
column  the  Prussian  Guards  came  charging  into  Chlum 
village.  It  was  taken  after  the  briefest  of  struggles.  At 
a  quarter  to  three  the  Prussian  colors  were  waving  from 
its  church  tower. 

General  Hiller  von  Gartringen,  the  commander  of  the 
First  Guards  Division,  had  won  a  splendid  success,  but  it 
had  placed  him  for  the  moment  in  a  position  of  considerable 
danger,  isolated  at  the  head  of  a  few  battalions  in  the  very 
heart  of  the  enemy's  position.  When  Benedek  heard  that 
the  Prussians  were  in  Chlum  he  was  west  of  the  village 


138  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

near  Lipa,  watching  his  line  of  intrenched  batteries  shelling 
the  Prussian  advance  from  the  edge  of  the  Sadowa  wood. 
He  absolutely  refused  to  believe  the  news,  and  rode  with 
his  staff  towards  Chlum,  only  to  be  met  by  a  heavy  rifle 
fire  as  he  approached  the  place.  He  turned  and  rode  by 
the  Koniggratz  road  towards  the  village  of  Rosberitz,  in- 
tending to  organize  a  counter-attack  from  that  side  and 
retake  Chlum.  But  as  Rosberitz  came  in  sight  over  the 
shoulder  of  the  hill,  helmeted  infantry  showed  themselves 
at  the  entrance  of  the  village,  and  sent  a  volley  at  the 
Austrian  staff.  Hiller,  with  splendid  dash  and  enterprise, 
had  decided  that  the  best  way  to  make  good  his  position  in 
the  Austrian  center  was  to  continue  attacking.  He  had 
hurried  up  some  batteries  into  Chlum,  and  at  the  head  of 
three  battalions  of  his  Guardsmen  rushed  Rosberitz.  While 
he  was  carrying  the  village  by  storm,  just  fifteen  minutes 
after  the  capture  of  Chlum,  the  latter  place  was  assailed  by 
Austrian  infantry  coming  up  from  the  Lipa  wood;  but 
the  Prussians  drove  them  back  with  the  rapid  fire  of  their 
breech-loading  rifles.  Wherever  infantry  met  infantry  at 
short  ranges,  the  superiority  of  the  needle-gun  to  the  old 
Austrian  muzzle-loader  soon  decided  the  contest,  and  always 
with  heavy  loss  to  the  white-coats. 

Benedek  now  made  strenuous  efforts  to  turn  the  adverse 
tide  of  battle.  On  the  western  slopes  of  the  hills  the  long 
lines  of  intrenched  batteries  for  a  while  successfully  checked 
the  advance  of  Frederick  Charles's  battalions  from  the  Bis- 
tritz.  Southwards  the  Saxons  fought  stubbornly,  and  de- 
layed for  a  considerable  time  the  dangerous  movement  of 
the  Elbe  Army  against  the  Austrian  left.  The  right  was 
falling  back  before  the  advance  of  the  Crown  Prince  between 
the  hills  and  the  Elbe.  Here  some  of  the  Austrian  regi- 
ments showed  very  little  inclination  to  continue  the  fight. 
A  great  column  of  the  Second  Corps  marched  towards  the 
Elbe  almost  without  firing  a  shot.     But  Benedek's  personal 


SADOWA  139 

efforts  were  directed  in  the  first  instance  to  expelling  Killer's 
Guardsmen  from  the  Chlum  heights.  He  hurried  100  gui^us 
into  position  in  a  mile-long  line  between  Langenhof  and 
Wsestar,  and  bombarded  Chlum  and  Rosberitz.  On  the 
left  of  the  guns  he  brought  up  his  reserve,  the  Sixth  Corps, 
and  three  divisions  of  cavalry.  Then  he  hurled  a  mass  of 
infantry  upon  Rosberitz.  The  fire  of  the  Prussian  needle- 
gun  mowed  them  down,  but  on  they  went,  and  by  sheer 
reckless  disregard  of  loss  forced  their  way  into  the  village, 
and  drove  the  Prussian  Guardsmen  out  at  the  bayonet's 
point.  But  they  could  not  advance  further.  Hiller  held  on 
to  Chlum,  where  he  was  steadily  reinforced.  A  storm  of 
shells  rained  upon  the  lofty  hilltop.  One  of  these  burst 
close  to  Hiller  and  struck  him  dead  shortly  after  the  recap- 
ture of  Rosberitz.  Von  Grossman,  his  second  in  command, 
took  over  the  direction  of  the  fight,  and  prepared  for  a 
fresh  advance. 

It  was  directed  against  Langenhof.  The  village  was 
stormed,  the  long  line  of  Austrian  guns  was  taken  in  flank, 
and  the  nearest  ten  of  them  captured  by  shooting  down  the 
'horses  and  drivers  as  they  tried  to  limber  up  and  retire. 
Then  Rosberitz  was  stormed  by  an  attack  of  a  strong  firing 
line  supported  by  massed  columns,  which  swept  down  on  the 
front  and  flanks  of  the  place,  and  almost  enveloped  it,  tak- 
ing 3000  prisoners.  To  the  southeast  of  Rosberitz,  almost  at 
the  same  moment,  a  Prussian  brigade  fought  its  way  into 
the  village  of  Sweti.  In  the  center,  towards  the  Bistritz, 
Frederick  Charles's  Infantry  was  storming  the  intrenched 
batteries.  They  took  scores  of  guns,  for  the  cannon  were 
left  in  the  earthworks  with  no  teams  available  to  remove 
them.  Indeed,  the  Austrian  artillery  officers  had  no  inten- 
tion of  withdrawing  them ;  they  had  decided  to  sacrifice 
their  guns  by  remaining  in  action  to  the  last  moment,  in 
order  to  hold  back  as  long  as  possible  the  advance  of  the 
Prussian  center  to  the  heights.     On  the  southern  flank  of 


I40  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  battle  the  Saxons  were  now  giving  way  before  Her- 
warth's  attack,  and  the  village  of  Problus  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  Prussians. 

It  was  about  five  o'clock.  The  heights  had  been  lost, 
and  the  Austrian  line  of  retreat  to  Koniggratz  was  in  seri- 
ous danger.  The  Crown  Prince  had  ridden  through  Chlum, 
and  as  he  left  the  village  saw  his  cousin  Prince  Frederick 
Charles  leading  an  infantry  column  up  the  road  from  Lipa. 
The  two  princes  saluted  each  other  with  a  wave  of  their 
caps,  but  both  were  too  busy  to  meet  and  exchange 
congratulations. 

Over  the  heights  beyond  Langenhof  came  a  body  of 
Prussian  cavalry.  At  its  head  rode  the  old  king,  with 
Moltke  and  Bismarck  beside  him.  They  saw  below  them 
on  the  slopes  towards  the  Elbe  a  great  multitude  of  white 
uniformed  infantry  rolling  back  like  an  ebbing  tide  towards 
the  bridges  of  the  Elbe.  Here  the  retiring  Austrians  were 
moving  in  a  confused  mass ;  there  they  kept  together  in 
ordered  columns.  But  the  retreat  was  covered  by  firing 
lines  of  infantry,  and  several  batteries  of  artillery  were  still 
in  action.  Masses  of  cavalry  were  moving  out  to  check  any 
attempt  at  pursuit  —  splendid  squadrons  of  tall  cuirassiers, 
brilliantly  uniformed  Hungarian  hussars,  and  the  forest  of 
pennoned  lances  of  the  Polish  Uhlans.  The  retiring  mass  of 
the  enemy  was  half  ringed  round  with  a  crescent  of  hostile 
fire  stretching  for  miles.  Battery  after  battery  rushed  to 
the  summit  of  the  conquered  ridges,  and  sent  its  shells 
screaming  into  the  huge  target  presented  by  the  defeated 
army.  Firing  lines  pressed  forward  to  pour  into  nearest 
Austrians  the  rapid  volleys  of  the  needle-gun. 

The  Austrian  shells  burst  among  the  king's  escort.  A 
score  of  men  and  horses  fell  killed  and  wounded.  The  king 
was  excited,  eager  to  lead  in  person  a  charge  upon  the 
enemy.  Bismarck  caught  his  bridle,  and  told  him  he  must 
not  expose  himself   uselessly.     It  was  with   difficulty  that 


SADOWA  141 

the  Chancellor  could  persuade  him  to  be  a  spectator  of  the 
closing  scenes  of  the  fight. 

Had  the  Prussian  cavalry  been  assembled  in  a  great 
mass  and  sent  round  the  right  of  the  Elbe  Army,  it  might 
have  cut  the  Austrians  off  from  Koniggratz  and  made 
Sadowa  a  Sedan.  But  the  cavalry  of  the  victors  was  used 
in  piecemeal  fashion,  charging  here  and  there  in  small  de- 
tachments, sometimes  a  single  regiment  being  thus  em- 
ployed. The  Austrian  cavalry  fought  splendidly,  and  more 
than  once  rode  over  the  Prussian  squadrons,  but  always 
failed  disastrously  when  it  charged  against  the  advancing 
lines  of  infantry,  men  and  horses  falling  in  heaps  under  the 
blasts  of  rifle  fire.  Two  men  of  British  race  distinguished 
themselves  in  these  desperate  charges  that  saved  the  Aus- 
trian army  from  utter  destruction.  One  was  an  English- 
man, Colonel  Beales  of  the  Cuirassiers,  who  was  badly 
wounded  at  the  head  of  his  regiment.  The  other  was  a 
Scot,  Count  Stuart  d'Albanie,  major  of  Austrian  Dragoons, 
who  won  his  colonel's  commission  at  Sadowa.  He  claimed 
to  be  a  descendant  of  the  royal  house  of  Stuart. 

The  Crown  Prince  had  pushed  forward  from  Chlum 
through  Rosberitz  at  the  head  of  the  victorious  Guards,  who 
were  now  to  help  in  completing  the  victory.  Good  soldier 
as  he  was,  he  was  painfully  impressed  by  the  horrors  he 
witnessed.    He  wrote  that  night  in  his  carefully-kept  diary : 

"  Around  us  lay  or  hobbled  about  many  of  the  well-known  figures 
of  the  Berlin  and  Potsdam  pjarrisons.'  A  shocking  appearance  was 
presented  by  those  who  were  using  their  rifles  as  crutches,  or  who 
were  being  led  up  the  heights  by  unwounded  comrades.  The  most 
horrid  spectacle  was  that  of  an  Austrian  battery,  of  which  all  the 
men  and  horses  had  been  shot  down.  It  is  an  awful  thing  to  ride 
over  a  battle-field,  and  it  is  impossible  to  describe  the  hideous  muti- 
lations that  present  themselves.  War  is  really  something  frightful, 
and  those  who,  sitting  at  a  green  baize  table,  bring  it  about  with  a 
stroke  of  a  pen,  little  dream  of  the  horrors  they  are  conjuring  up. 

'  These  are  the  peace  garrisons  of  the  Prussian  Guards. 


142  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

In  Rosberitz,  where,  judging  from  the  heaps  bi  dead  and  wounded, 
the  fighting  must  have  been  terribly  fierce,  I  found  my  kinsman 
Prince  Antony  of  HohenzoUern  mortally  wounded." 

As  he  rode  forward  the  Crown  Prince  met  the  king,  and 
father  and  son  embraced  each  other  amid  the  frantic  cheers 
of  the  Guardsmen.  The  king  told  him  how  deUghted  he 
was  that  he  had  proved  his  worth  as  a  leader  of  armies,  and 
took  from  his  own  coat  and  pinned  on  his  son's  breast  the 
Order  of  Merit,  the  most  prized  of  Prussian  decorations. 

The  slaughter  of  the  day  was  now  nearly  over.  The 
Austrians  were  crossing  the  bridges  tmder  the  protection  of 
the  guns  of  Koniggratz  and  of  the  strong  rearguards  of 
cavalry  and  artillery  that  Benedek  had  organized.  Old 
General  Steinmetz,  a  veteran  who  had  fought  against  the 
first  Napoleon,  was  just  on  the  point  of  launching  a  last 
attack  along  the  bank  of  the  Elbe,  in  the  hope  of  securing 
some  thousands  of  prisoners  and  some  scores  of  guns,  when 
he  received  an  order  from  Moltke  bidding  him  cease  fire 
and  halt  everywhere.  No  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  press 
the  beaten  enemy  further,  and  next  day  was  to  be  a  day 
of  rest  for  the  army. 

Thanks  to  the  new  Red  Cross  organization,  the  battle- 
field, extensive  as  it  was,  was  cleared  of  the  wounded  of 
both  sides  by  sunrise  next  day.  In  proportion  to  the  num- 
bers engaged  the  losses  of  the  victors  were  not  serious.  In 
the  great  battles  of  the  Napoleonic  period  the  loss  was 
rarely  less  than  ten  per  cent,  and  often  much  higher.  At 
Sadowa  the  Prussian  loss  was  only  about  four  per  cent,  but 
the  numbers  engaged  made  even  this  small  percentage  repre- 
sent a  terrible  total;  360  officers  and  more  than  8500  men 
were  killed  or  wounded.  The  heaviest  loss  fell  on  Fran- 
secky's  Corps,  which  lost  more  than  2000  men. 

The   Austrian   losses   were   fearful.^     This   was   largely 

'  Otto  Berndt  ("  Die  Zahl  im  Kriege  ")  gives  the  following  analy- 
sis of  the  losses  at  Sadow.a: 


SADOWA 


143 


the  result  of  the  execution  done  in  the  closely-formed  Aus- 
trian ranks  by  the  Prussian  breech-loader.  The  dead  and 
wounded  of  the  defeated  Allies  reached  the  awful  total 
of  23,598  men  (n  per  cent).  The  missing  and  the  un- 
wovmded  prisoners  numbered  more  than  20,000,  making- 
Benedek's  total  loss  more  than  44,000.  Eleven  generals 
and  more  than  1300  officers  were  included  in  these  losses. 
Some  of  the  cavalry  units  suffered  heavily  in  the  last  stage 
of  the  fight.  The  Third  Cavalry  Division  lost  more  than 
one-fifth  of  its  strength  (43  officers,  665  men,  and  901 
horses).  The  slaughter  of  artillery  teams  was  heavy  :  about 
6000  horses  were  killed  or  so  badly  wounded  as  to  make 
them  useless.  No  less  than  187  guns  were  captured  by  the 
victors. 

The  war  did  not  end  at  once,  but  this  overwhelming 
victory  decided  its  result.  Austria  ceded  Venetia  to  Italy, 
and  withdrew  from  the  Germanic  Confederation ;   and  Prus- 


Prussians 

AUSTRIANS 

Saxons 

AUSTRIANS 

AND  Saxons 

Officers 

Men 

Officers 

Men 

Officers 

■  Men 

Officers 

Men 

Killed  .  .  . 
Wounded  . 
Wounded 

prisoners  . 
Unwounded 

prisoners  . 
Missing   .   . 

100 
260 

1,835 
6,699 

278 

330 
431 

307 

202 
43 

5,328 
7,143 

8,984 

12,677 
7,367 

IS 
40 

120 
900 

426 

345 
471 

307 

202 
43 

5,448 
8,043 

8,984 

12,677 
7,793 

Totals  .  .  . 

360 

8,812 

1,313 

41,499 

55 

1,446 

1,368 

42,945 

9,172 

42,812 

1,501 

44,313 

The  "  missing  "  on  the  Prussian  side  were  chiefly  a  few  prisoners 
taken  by  the  Austrians.  The  "missing"  of  the  AlHes  were  a  large 
number  of  disbanded  nun  who  had  not  rejoined  when  the  lists  were 
made  up,  and  probably  a  number  of  men  killed  in  the  woods  and  not 
found  at  once,  and  a  few  drowned  at  the  crossing  of  the  Elbe  during 
the  night. 


144  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

sia  became  the  head  of  a  united  Germany  —  the  prelude  to 
the  foundation  of  the  new  German  Empire,  after  a  still 
greater  war,  in  which  Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  other  minor 
states  fought  side  by  side  with  the  Prussians,  whom  they 
had  met  in  battle  in  1866;  and  largely  helped  to  carry  the 
German  banners  to  victory  as  the  allies  of  their  former 
enemy. 


CHAPTER   VI 

REZONVILLE   AND   GRAVELOTTE 

August  16  and  18,  1870 

Paris  had  gone  half  mad  with  the  war  fever.  The  regi- 
ments marching  from  their  barracks  to  entrain  for  tlie 
frontier  were  cheered  by  excited  crowds  yelHng,  "  A  Berlin ! 
a  Berlin !  "  The  Prime  Minister  had  declared  that  he  went 
to  war  with  a  light  heart.  Marshal  Leboeuf  had  assured 
the  emperor  that  his  army  was  "  ready  down  to  the  last 
gaiter  button."  Those  Prussians  had  scored  in  i866  because 
they  had  a  breech-loading  rifle  against  slow-firing,  old- 
fashioned  muzzle-loaders.  But  now  the  French  had  the 
wonderful  chassepot,  with  a  longer  range  than  the  Prussian 
needle-gun.  And  there  was  the  mitrailleuse,  a  secret  weapon, 
sent  out  from  the  arsenals  covered  up  with  oil-cloths  lest 
some  spy  might  discover  its  mechanism.  Two  men  could 
work  it  and  spurt  out  rifle  bullets  in  death-dealing  showers. 
So  France  was  up-to-date,  more  than  up-to-date,  in  the 
weapons  of  its  army,  and,  better  still,  it  was  an  army  of 
veterans,  of  professional  soldiers,  the  victors  of  the  Crimea, 
Italy,  Algeria.  Compared  with  them  the  short-service  sol- 
diers of  Prussia,  with  their  crowds  of  reservists  hurried  up 
from  desk  and  counter,  were  only  a  militia.  They  would 
soon  be  hustled  across  the  Rhine  with  French  bayonets  at 
their  backs.  So  the  dei)arting  soldiers  chalked  "  To  Berlin  " 
on  the  doors  of  the  railway  carriages. 

South  Germany,  which  had  fought  Prussia  four  years 
ago,  would,  it  was  li(ii)e(l,  at  least  stand  neutral.  Austria 
would  seize  the  occasion  to  avenge  Sadowa.     Italy  would 


146  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

be  once  more  the  ally  of  Napoleon  III  in  gratitude  for 
Magenta  and  Solferino.  There  would  be  another  Jena. 
Bismarck  and  his  king  would  be  taught  a  lesson. 

Napoleon  III  was  to  command  in  person  the  armies 
gathering  to  win  back  the  old  Rhine  frontier.  His  son,  the 
boy  Prince  Imperial,  would  go  with  him  to  learn  the  sol- 
dier's business  in  the  field.  Marshal  MacMahon  with  the 
veterans  of  Algeria  .would  be  on  the  right,  Marshal  Bazaine 
on  the  left.  Marshal  Canrobert  of  Crimean  and  Italian 
fame  would  command  another  corps.  Then  there  were  the 
generals  who  would  soon  win  the  marshal's  baton  —  Fros- 
sard  the  engineer,  a  scientific  soldier,  it  was  said,  equal  to 
the  best ;  Ducrot  and  Bourbaki  of  the  Imperial  Guard,  good 
fighting  men,  with  all  the  dash  of  the  French  soldier  in 
them;  and  L'Admirault,  calm,  self-possessed,  a  man  to 
count  on  in  a  difficult  place.  Their  names  would  soon  be 
linked  with  new  victories. 

These  were  the  hopes  of  France  in  the  middle  of  July. 
1870.  It  was  disappointing  that  two  weeks  should  go  by 
with  no  news  except  of  insignificant  skirmishes  between 
cavalry  patrols.  "  We  ought  to  be  across  the  Rhine  by 
now,"  said  the  strategists  of  the  Paris  cafes.  It  was  not 
encouraging  to  hear  that  the  South  German  States  had  all 
declared  that  they  would  stand  by  Prussia.  Austria  was 
not  moving.  Italy  seemed  to  be  thinking  only  of  seizing 
Rome.  But  no  matter.  The  French  army  would  soon  move, 
and  did  not  need  allies.  Those  South  Germans  would  find 
they  had  made  a  mistake. 

But  at  Metz,  in  the  Hotel  de  I'Europe,  now  the  head- 
quarters of  Napoleon  III,  there  were  anxious  faces  at  the 
tables  in  the  long  mirror-decorated  dining-room  in  the  even- 
ings, and  anxious  discussions  in  the  emperor's  study  during 
the  last  days  of  July.  Not  half  the  expected  numbers  were 
as  yet  concentrated  in  the  border  departments.  The  regi- 
mental depots  were  sending  in  the  reservists  in  pitiful  hand- 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      147 

fills  of  men,  mostly  half  equipped.  The  supply  department 
was  in  hopeless  confusion.  Generals  were  telegraphing 
that  they  were  waiting  for  wheeled  transport,  horses, 
camp  equipment ;  that  they  were  short  of  men,  and  the 
men  they  had  could  not  be  moved.  The  projected  dash 
across  the  Rhine  had  to  be  put  off  from  day  to  day,  and 
it  was  almost  impossible  to  obtain  news  of  how  far  the 
enemy's  preparations  had  advanced,  and  where  he  was 
concentrating. 

All  the  while  the  mobilization  of  the  German  armies  was 
proceeding  with  the  smoothness  of  a  well-oiled  machine. 
Three  great  masses  of  armed  men  were  assembling  on  the 
Rhine.  Von  Moltke,  chief  of  the  Prussian  staff,  had  ar- 
ranged everything  for  an  advance  across  the  French  fron- 
tier in  the  first  days  of  August.  He  would  have  the  ad- 
vantage of  numbers,  and  the  still  greater  advantage  of  a 
definite  plan  opposed  to  the  daily  changing  counsels  of  the 
perplexed  imperial  headquarters. 

On  August  2,  in  order  to  do  something  to  allay  the 
impatience  of  the  French  people,  a  division  drove  in  the 
Prussian  detachment  at  Sarrebruck.  The  affair  was  repre- 
sented as  a  great  victory.  But  the  German  tide  of  invasion 
was  now  pouring  towards  the  frontier.  On  August  4  Abel 
Douay's  isolated  division  was  crushed  at  Weissemburg 
after  a  heroic  struggle  against  overwhelming  odds.  On  the 
fatal  Saturday,  August  6,  there  were  two  French  defeats  — 
Frossard  beaten  on  the  left  at  Forbach,  and  MacMahon 
and  his  splendid  Algerian  regiments  driven  from  the  hills 
of  Woerth  on  the  right.  "  All  may  yet  be  regained,"  said 
the  emperor  in  the  telegram  that  told  of  this  double  disaster. 
The  very  phrase  was  an  admission  that  much  had  been 
already  lost. 

MacMahon's  army  retreated  across  the  Vosges,  without 
attempting  to  hold  the  passes,  without  even  destroying 
bridges  and  tunnels.     The  German  left,  the  Third  Army, 


148  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

under  the  Crown  Prince,  afterwards  the  Emperor  Frederick, 
followed  it  up  towards  Chalons,  the  Aldershot  of  imperial 
France,  where  a  reserve  army  was  forming.  The  corps  on 
the  French  left  fell  back  towards  Metz,  followed,  at  first 
very  slowly,  by  the  two  other  German  armies.  These  were 
the  "  First  Army,"  ^  on  the  right,  under  the  veteran  Stein- 
metz,  who  as  a  young  officer  had  fought  against  the  great 
Napoleon  in  the  Leipzig  campaign  and  marched  into  France 
with  Bliicher  in  1814;  and  the  "  Second  Army,"  under  King 
William's  nephew.  Prince  Frederick  Charles  of  Hohenzol- 
lern,  whom  the  soldiers  called  the  *'  Red  Prince,"  from  his 
fondness  for  wearing  the  red  jacket  of  the  famous  Ziethen 
Hussars.  The  aged  King  William  was  in  personal  com- 
mand of  these  two  armies,  with  Von  Moltke  once  more  act- 
ing as  his  chief  of  the  staff. 

For  a  few  hours  the  French  thought  of  making  a  stand 
east  of  Metz,  along  the  banks  of  the  little  river  Nied.  The 
only  result  was  the  loss  of  valuable  time.  Then  a  new  plan 
was  adopted.  The  emperor,  disappointed,  harassed  with  the 
painful  malady  that  finally  ended  his  days,  decided  on  hand- 
ing over  the  command  of  the  "  Army  of  the  Rhine  "  to 
Marshal  Bazaine  and  proceeding  himself  to  Chalons.  Ba- 
zaine  was  to  lead  the  army  back  through  Metz,  leave  a  suffi- 
cient garrison  to  hold  the  fortress,  and  then  retreat  on 
Chalons  by  way  of  Verdun.  At  Chalons  he  would  join 
what  was  left  of  MacMahon's  army  and  the  reserve  army 
gathering  there,  and  these  united  forces  would  then  face 
the  advancing  Germans  and  fight  a  great  battle  to  bar  the 
way  to  Paris. 

Bazaine  blundered  from  the  first.  No  use  was  made  of 
the  French  cavalry  to  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy, 

^  The  First  Army  was  made  up  of  the  men  of  the  Rhineland  and 
Westphalia ;  the  Second  Army,  of  those  of  Central  and  North  Ger- 
many and  Saxony ;  the  Third  Army,  of  those  of  Silesia  and  the 
South  German  States. 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      149 

whose  daring  horsemen  were  able  to  report  to  Von  Moltke 
every  movement  of  the  French.  When  every  day  and  hour 
was  important  the  retirement  through  Metz  was  hopelessly 
slow.  On  August  14,  when  part  of  Bazaine's  army  was 
across  the  Moselle  at  Metz,  and  the  orders  were  for  the 
rest  of  it  to  pass  the  river  immediately,  the  eagerness  of 
a  German  divisional  general  and  the  lack  of  a  strong  com- 
mand on  the  French  side  brought  on  a  battle  which,  so  far 
as  the  development  of  Bazaine's  plan  went,  was  simply  a 
waste  of  life.  When  the  Germans  opened  fire  that  after- 
noon against  the  Third  French  Corps,  already  forming  to 
retire,  General  Decaen,  who  commanded,  should  have  merely 
left  a  rearguard  in  position  till  he  withdrew  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  outlying  forts  of  Metz.  Instead  of  this  he 
accepted  the  challenge,  L'Admirault,  when  he  heard  the 
firing,  came  back  from  the  bridges  with  the  Fourth  Corps 
and  joined  in  the  fight.  The  march  of  the  Imperial  Guard 
was  stopped.  Bazaine,  who  rode  up,  neither  put  an  end  to 
the  useless  fight  nor  took  advantage  of  the  superior  numbers 
at  his  command  to  crush  the  enemy's  vanguard.  When 
darkness  ended  the  fighting,  the  French  had  held  their 
ground,  and  at  one  point  driven  back  the  enemy.  They 
claim  the  action  of  the  fourteenth  as  a  victory,  the  ''  battle 
of  Borny."  The  Germans  call  it  the  "  battle  of  Colombey," 
and  also  claim  it  as  a  success,  because  they  attained  their 
object  in  delaying  the  French  retreat.  The  losses  were 
heavy  on  both  sides.  Decaen  was  mortally  wounded,  and 
Bazaine  himself  hit  in  the  shoulder  by  a  shell  splinter,  the 
sixth  wound  he  had  received  in  action  during  his  long 
career,  in  which  he  had  fought  his  way  upward  from  pri- 
vate to  field-marshal. 

The  whole  army  ought  to  have  been  across  the  Moselle 
by  midnight  on  the  fourteenth.  The  result  of  the  delay  was 
that  all  night  the  columns  were  moving  through  the  streets 
of  Metz  and  across  the  bridges.     By  a  hopeless  piece  of 


I50  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

blundering,  though  there  were  four  roads  leading  westwards 
across  the  chalk  downs  beyond  the  Moselle,  the  marshal  had 
ordered  every  man,  horse,  gun,  and  wagon  of  his  army, 
150,000  strong,  to  follow  a  single  road  until  the  village  of 
Gravelotte  was  reached.  This  meant  endless  confusion  and 
delay.  The  huge  column  was  so  long  that  it  took  more  than 
two  days  and  nights  to  pass  a  given  point.  As  they  came 
up  from  the  Moselle  bridges,  brigades  and  divisions,  long 
lines  of  guns  and  wagons,  and  regiments  of  mounted  men 
had  to  halt  for  hours  to  find  a  place  on  the  crowded  road 
that  led  up  to  the  hills.  All  through  the  fifteenth  and  part 
of  the  night  that  followed,  the  moving  multitude  was  plod- 
ding up  the  sloping  road  to  the  plateau  of  Gravelotte,  while 
beside  it  thousands  more  snatched  rest  in  improvised  camps 
under  the  little  shelter  tents  carried  by  the  men.  The  em- 
peror slept  in  a  roadside  inn  near  Gravelotte.  Late  in  the 
evening  Bazaine  came  to  see  him,  and  sat  by  his  bed  ex- 
pressing his  doubts  as  to  whether  he  could  direct  the  opera- 
tions any  longer  after  his  wound  at  Borny.  "  It  is  noth- 
ing," said  Napoleon.  "  You  have  won  a  victory.  You 
have  broken  the  spell.  Bring  the  army  to  Chalons,  and  all 
will  yet  be  well." 

On  the  fifteenth,  while  Steinmetz  with  the  First  German 
Army  closed  in  on  the  east  side  of  Metz  and  prepared  to 
cross  the  Moselle,  the  cavalry  of  the  Second  Army  (Fred- 
erick Charles)  was  across  the  river,  with  the  heads  of  the 
infantry  columns  behind  them  on  several  roads.  Bazaine 
had  sent  no  orders  to  destroy  the  bridges  above  Metz,  and 
subordinate  French  officers  had  not  yet  learned  to  act  on 
their  own  initiative.  The  Germans  were  pleasantly  sur- 
prised to  find  the  bridges  intact  and  even  unwatched.  Had 
they  been  destroyed  there  would  have  been  a  delay  that 
might  well  have  insured  the  unmolested  retreat  of  the 
French  army ;  for  the  Germans  had  as  yet  no  pontoon 
trains  up  to  the  front,  and  the  Moselle,  even  unguarded, 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      151 

still  more  if  watched  by  French  cavalry  and  horse  artillery, 
would  have  proved  a  serious  obstacle. 

Bazaine  was  already  blundering  badly.  No  one  doubts 
that  he  was  a  man  of  splendid  physical  courage.  He  had 
proved  it  during  more  than  thirty  years  of  service,  and  as  a 
brigadier,  a  divisional  general,  and  a  corps  commander  he 
had  shown  that  he  could  be  a  vigorous  leader.  But  it  is  a 
more  serious  matter  to  rise  to  the  exigencies  of  the  supreme 
command  of  a  great  army  matched  against  an  enterprising 
enemy  with  superior  numbers  on  his  side.  Bazaine  did  not 
rise  to  the  situation.  With  all  the  time  that  had  already 
been  lost,  he  was  beginning  to  doubt  whether  he  could  reach 
Verdun  and  Chalons  without  having  to  fight  a  pitched  battle 
against  the  united  armies  of  Steinmetz  and  the  Red  Prince. 
A  leader  like  the  first  Napoleon  would  have  beaten  them  in 
succession,  boldly  attacking  the  prince's  army  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Moselle  before  Steinmetz  could  come  to  its  help, 
and  then  dealing  with  the  First  Army.  But  Bazaine  was 
no  Napoleon,  and  he  even  failed  to  take  the  chances  the 
Germans  presently  gave  him.  The  fact  was  that,  although 
he  seemed  to  accept  the  emperor's  plan  of  a  retirement  on 
Chalons,  he  was  already  hesitating  about  facing  the  risks  he 
saw  in  it,  and  was  yielding  to  the  attraction  that  a  great 
fortress  so  often  exercises  on  weak  commanders.  He  had 
another  plan  in  his  mind  of  which  so  far  he  had  said 
nothing,  but  which  his  actions  presently  revealed.  He  would 
keep  the  Army  of  the  Rhine  near  Metz,  under  the  protec- 
tion of  its  outlying  forts  and  supplied  from  its  magazines, 
until  the  further  advance  of  the  invaders  into  France  would 
give  him  an  opportunity  of  resuming  active  operations. 
Military  history  shows  again  and  again  that  an  army  that 
will  not  risk  keeping  the  field,  but  trusts  to  the  shelter  of 
fortifications,  is  generally  starved  into  surrender. 

On  the  morning  of  Tuesday,  August  16,  the  French 
army  resumed  its  movement  of  retreat,  now  in  two  columns 


152  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

—  the  one  following  the  road  that  branches  from  Gravelotte 
by  Rezonville  and  Mars-Ia-Tour ;  the  other,  the  northern 
branch  of  the  road  that  goes  by  Doncourt  and  Conflans. 
The  ground  which  the  French  were  traversing  was  part 
of  the  cretaceous  plateau  that  extends  from  the  Moselle 
towards  the  Meuse.  The  streams  and  little  rivers  have  cut 
it  up»with  valleys  and  hollows,  some  of  them  so  narrow  as 
to  suggest  gorges  and  ravines.  In  places  the  crests  of  the 
plateau  form  bold  ranges  of  hills,  and  there  are  numerous 
stretches  of  wood.  The  country  would  be  like  that  of  the 
Surrey  downs,  only  that  there  is  less  pasture  and  more  cul- 
tivation. Fences  are  few ;  the  highroads,  bordered  on  each 
side  by  rows  of  poplars,  are  separated  from  the  fields  only 
by  a  small  open  ditch.  The  houses  of  the  villages  are 
compactly  grouped  together,  with  usually  a  walled  ceme- 
tery round  the  church.  Thus  each  village  becomes  easily 
a  tactical  point  in  the  defense  of  the  ground,  with  an  open 
field  of  fire  around  it,  and  the  walled  churchyard  for  its 
improvised  citadel.  Here  and  there  between  the  villages 
are  massively  built  farmsteads,  few,  however,  in  number. 
On  the  high  ground  in  hot  summer  weather  little  water  is 
to  be  found,  and  during  the  operations  round  Metz  not  only 
did  the  wounded  suffer  intensely  on  account  of  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  water,  but  the  troops  halted  on  the  heights 
had  to  send  parties  of  men  to  the  next  valley  to  bring  up 
water  in  buckets,  camp  kettles,  and  the  like  —  a  fatiguing 
operation  after  a  march,  and  especially  difficult  when  the 
column  halted  after  dark. 

The  morning  of  the  sixteenth  was  a  fine  summer  day, 
with  intense  heat  beginning  almost  as  soon  as  the  sun  rose. 
Some  of  the  corps  commanders  had  their  troops  early  on 
the  move.  The  men  had  snatched  an  apology  for  breakfast 
from  their  haversacks,  and  hoping  to  be  able  to  cook  at 
the  first  long  halt,  they  marched  along  the  poplar  avenues 
amidst  clouds  of  white  dust,  with  the  hot  sun  at  their  backs 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      153 

and  not  a  vestige  of  shade.  Bazaine  rode  over  to  the  inn 
on  the  Gravelotte  road  where  the  emperor  had  jDassed  the 
night  to  bid  him  farewell.  He  found  Napoleon  and  the 
Prince  Imperial  already  in  their  carriage,  surrounded  by 
an  escort  of  Chasseurs  d'Afrique,  the  dashing  cavalry  of 
the  Algerian  frontier.  The  emperor  looked  ill  and  de- 
pressed, but  as  he  grasped  the  marshal's  hand  he  told  him 
they  would  soon  meet  at  Chalons,  and  then  do  great  things. 
He  drove  off  by  the  northern  road.  Had  he  taken  the 
southern  he  would  probably  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of 
Rheinbaben's  cavalry  division,  which  was  prowling  beyond 
Mars-la-Tour  some  six  miles  away. 

Outside  the  inn,  country  folk  who  had  come  in  from  the 
wooded  and  ravine-scarred  hills  along  the  Moselle  by  Gorze 
told  the  marshal  that  they  had  fled  before  great  masses  of 
Prussian  troops,  who  had  been  pouring  across  the  river  for 
hours.  In  his  orders  issued  the  night  before  Bazaine  had 
warned  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps  (Frossard  and  Can- 
robert),  who  were  to  follow  the  Mars-la-Tour  road,  that 
they  had  probably  some  30,000  of  the  enemy  south  of  them, 
and  might  be  attacked.  But  he  did  not  take  the  precaution 
of  sending  his  cavalry  out  in  this  direction  to  gain  touch  with 
and  delay  the  enemy,  and  he  seemed  now  by  no  means 
anxious  to  hasten  the  march.  He  halted  the  troops  he 
found  near  Gravelotte,  and  even  told  them  they  might  set 
up  their  shelter  tents  and  cook.  From  far  away  to  the 
westward  came  the  dull  reports  of  a  few  cannon  shots. 
Stafif  officers  suggested  that  the  enemy  was  already  attack- 
ing. "  It 's  nothing,"  said  Bazaine,  as  he  turned  to  ride 
towards  Rezonville.     "  It  will  be  only  a  reconnaissance." 

The  shots  were  fired  by  a  horse  battery  with  Rheinbaben's 
cavaliers  to  the  west  of  Rezonville.  Their  target  was  the 
head  of  the  French  column  on  the  southern  road.  On  the 
appearance  of  a  mass  of  French  cavalry  the  daring  horse- 
men limbered  up  their  guns  and  rode  away  to  the  south- 


154  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

wards.  In  the  dust  and  haze  of  the  summer  morning  all 
they  had  made  out  was  that  a  strong  French  column  was 
approaching  Mars-la-Tour  from  Rezonville.  Though  Rhein- 
baben  had  been  in  Mars-la-Tour  since  the  day  before  he 
had  shown  a  strange  lack  of  enterprise  in  scouting.  With 
a  very  little  trouble  he  might  have  found  out  that  the  whole 
French  army  was  still  crowded  on  the  two  roads  of  the 
plateau,  and  its  retreat  only  begun.  But  he  went  away  with 
the  impression  that  what  he  had  come  upon  was  a  strong 
rearguard,  and  that  Bazaine's  army  was  well  on  its  way  to 
Verdun,  This,  too,  was  the  idea  of  General  Alvensleben, 
who  was  marching  up  the  forest-bordered  road  from  Gorze 
towards  Rezonville  at  the  head  of  the  Brandenburg  Corps, 
the  vanguard  of  Frederick  Charles's  army.  He  felt  sure 
the  French  troops  reported  near  Rezonville  must  be  a  last 
lagging  detachment  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  and  he 
decided  to  push  on  and  attack  them.  There  were  no  troops 
within  miles  to  support  him,  and  he  was  running  an  enor- 
mous risk. 

German  leadership  in  the  Franco-Prussian  war  was  by 
no  means  perfect.  It  seemed  to  be  so  admirable,  because  on 
the  whole  it  was  good,  and  because  that  of  the  generals  of 
the  French  army  was  abominably  bad,  except  sometimes  on 
the  actual  battle-field,  where  their  soldier  courage  and  the 
quality  of  their  men  enabled  them  to  make  a  good  fight. 
But  even  there  an  unfortunate  theory  of  the  best  tactics 
for  the  quick-firing  breech-loading  rifle  handicapped  them 
throughout.  The  sound  theory  of  Napoleon's  days,  which 
held  its  own  still  in  the  campaign  of  Magenta  and  Solferino, 
was  that  attack  is  the  best  form  of  defense,  and  the  im- 
petuous character  of  the  French  makes  their  attack  formid- 
able. Besides,  it  is  only  by  attacking  that  an  enemy  can  be 
really  beaten.  But  with  the  coming  of  the  breech-loading 
rifle  there  had  come  also  a  new  doctrine  that  the  way  to  win 
battles  was  to  "  sit  tight "  on  a  good  position,  preferably  a 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      155 

line  of  high  ground,  and  use  the  rapid  fire  to  destroy  the 
enemy  as  he  attacked.  "  The  defensive  is  now  superior," 
was  the  teaching  of  the  French  miHtary  schools.  The  Ger- 
mans held  by  the  sounder  doctrine,  "  Only  the  attack  can 
give  real  results.  It  may  be  more  costly  than  formerly,  but 
the  cost  must  be  paid.  To  attack  is  to  assert  from  the  out- 
set the  sense  of  power  and  the  determination  to  win." 

For  hours  on  this  day  of  Rezonville  the  French  had  in 
their  hands  the  opportunity  of  gaining  a  great  victory  —  if 
only  they  would  attack.  But  this  wretched  theory  of  the 
superiority  of  the  defense  made  it  the  ruling  idea  that  all 
they  had  to  do  was  to  cling  to  the  edge  of  the  high  ground 
near  the  Mars-la-Tour-Gravelotte  road  and  repel  the  Prus- 
sian attack.  A  single  German  corps  and  some  cavalry  were 
opposed  to  all  the  Army  of  the  Rhine.  But  the  French  did 
not  attack.  To  move  forward  would  have  been  to  over- 
whelm Alvensleben,  drive  him  back  upon  the  troops  strung 
out  along  the  Gorze  road,  hustle  them  back  upon  the  bridges 
of  the  Moselle,  and  (given  the  undoubted  fighting  quality 
of  the  French  regulars)  inflict  a  disaster  on  the  German 
Second  Army.  Regimental  officers,  even  soldiers  in  the 
French  ranks,  felt  this  instinctively ;  but  Bazaine  and  the 
staff  let  the  golden  opportunity  go  by,  and  the  rashness  and 
the  error  of  judgment  of  the  German  leaders  thus  became 
in  the  popular  mind  enterprise  and  clear-sighted  daring.  It 
is  a  true  saying  that  he  wins  in  war  who  makes  the  fewest 
mistakes  —  for  mistakes  there  always  are. 

Alvensleben  came  on  with  the  confidence  inspired  by  his 
false  view.  He  had  no  idea  he  was  running  into  a  hornet's 
nest,  no  foresight  of  the  terrible  price  to  be  paid  for  his  ven- 
ture. It  was  about  ten  in  the  morning  that  his  advanced 
guard,  issuing  from  the  Gorze  woods,  sighted  Frossard's 
Corps  marching  across  its  froiU.  Guns,  cavalry,  and  wagons 
were  on  the  Verdun  road.  The  infantry  was  marching  by 
field  tracks  and  across  open  ground  on  the  slopes  between 


156  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  poplar-bordered  highway  and  the  old  Roman  road  north 
of  it,  the  heads  of  the  columns  being  partly  hidden  by  the 
stretch  of  woods  and  copses  that  extends  northwards  from 
near  Tronville.  The  Germans  always  had  several  batteries 
well  to  the  front  with  their  advanced  guard,  and  these 
formed  up  and  opened  fire  on  the  French,  Frossard  at  once 
replied,  bringing  his  artillery  promptly  into  action,  while  he 
formed  his  line  of  battle  along  the  high  ground  of  the  plateau 
—  his  right  in  the  woods,  his  left  at  Rezonville,  throwing 
out  a  screen  of  skirmishers  in  the  Tronville  woods  and  along 
the  Verdun  road. 

The  positions  of  Bazaine's  army  corps  at  this  moment 
were  these:  The  Sixth  Corps  (Canrobert)  was  moving 
north  of  Frossard's  position,  its  leading  division  on  the 
Roman  road ;  the  Imperial  Guard  was  marching  up  through 
Gravelotte ;  two  corps  —  the  Third  (Lebceuf)  and  the 
Fourth  (L'Admirault) — were  marching  by  the  road  that 
branches  off  at  Gravelotte  and  goes  towards  Verdun  by 
Doncourt  and  Etain.  Bazaine  had  thus  his  whole  army  well 
placed  within  easy  reach  of  the  scene  of  the  opening  battle. 
He  might  have  rapidly  concentrated  to  attack  and  over- 
whelm the  enemy,  if  he  had  realized  that  only  part  of  the 
German  army  was  across  the  Moselle,  and  even  that  could 
only  issue  slowly  from  the  defiles  of  the  Gorze  woods.  Or 
he  might  have  used  Frossard's  Corps  and  his  cavalry  to  hold 
the  Germans  and  steadily  continued  his  movement  on  Ver- 
dun, with  his  flank  thus  protected.  He  chose  a  third  course, 
in  which  the  possible  gain  was  the  smallest.  He  fought  a 
purely  defensive  battle,  and  showed  throughout  a  continual 
anxiety  for  the  safety  of  his  left  —  massing  troops  there 
that  would  have  been  more  useful  elsewhere  —  under  the 
delusion  that  the  enemy  would  try  to  cut  him  off  from  Metz, 
while  their  whole  object  was  to  prevent  him  from  getting 
away  from  it. 

For  the  attack  of  the  French  positions  Von  Alvensleben 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      157 

had  at  hand  the  two  divisions  of  the  Third  Corps  —  Stulp- 
nagel's  Division  on  the  left  and  Buddenbrock's  on  tlie  right. 
Rheinbaben's  cavalry  division  was  already  on  the  ground.  A 
considerable  force  of  cavalry  was  within  call,  but  the  nearest 
infantry  was  still  miles  away,  the  army  corps  farthest  for- 
ward towards  the  field  being  the  Tenth,  under  Voights- 
Rhetz,  the  Hanoverian  Corps,  some  of  whose  regiments  still 
bear  on  their  colors  the  names  of  battles  they  helped  to  win 
under  British  generals.  Alvensleben  pressed  the  attack, 
sending  his  left  forward  to  clear  the  Tronville  woods,  and 
hurling  his  right  at  the  villages  of  Vionville  and  Flavigny. 
These  were  advanced  posts  of  the  French  position ;  but 
Frossard's  men  made  a  stubborn  fight  for  them,  and  in  this 
first  stage  of  the  battle  the  loss  was  severe  on  both  sides. 
It  was  only  after  more  than  one  repulse,  and  at  the  end 
of  two  hours  of  hard  fighting,  that  the  l)randenburgers  got 
into  Vionville  and  Flavigny  ;  and  the  left  attack  having  won 
the  south  end  of  the  woods,  Alvensleben's  line  went  forward 
to  the  line  of  the  Verdun  road. 

Fie  then  realized  that  he  had  an  overwhelmingly  superior 
force  in  his  front.  Bazaine  had  ridden  up  from  Gravclotte 
and  taken  the  direction  of  the  French  defense.  Canrobert's 
Corps  was  now  in  line  along  the  high  ground  south  of  the 
Roman  road.  To  its  left,  about  Rezonville,  the  Imperial 
Guard,  commanded  by  Bourbaki,  had  formed  up,  the  picked 
soldiers  of  France,  now  going  into  action  for  the  first  time 
since  Solferino.  The  Second  Corps  (Frossard's)  was  with- 
drawn into  the  second  line,  and  formed  a  reserve  behind  the 
Guard  on  the  French  right.  Leboeuf's  Corps  was  being 
brought  up  from  the  Doncourt  road  to  support  Canrobert. 

The  German  advance  came  to  a  standstill.  A  line  of 
skirmishers  pushed  out  towards  Rezonville  was  charged  and 
scattered  by  a  regiment  of  the  cuirassiers  of  the  Imperial 
Guard ;  but  while  they  were  disordered  with  their  success 
they  were  in  turn  charged  by  one  of  Rheinbaben's  brigades 


158  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

made  up  of  the  Black  Brunswickers  and  the  Seventeenth 
Hussars.  They  rode  through  the  cuirassiers,  and  then  the 
Brunswickers  found  themselves  in  front  of  one  of  the  bat- 
teries of  the  Imperial  Guard.  They  dashed  at  the  guns, 
cutting  down  several  of  the  gunners.  On  the  flank  of  the 
battery  was  a  group  of  mounted  officers,  among  them  one 
who  wore  the  gold-braided  kepi  of  a  general.  Some  of  the 
Brunswickers  rode  for  him,  and  he  defended  himself  sword 
in  hand,  showing  that  he  was  a  good  fighting  man.  But 
he  and  his  staff  officers  were  in  imminent  danger  of  death 
or  capture  when  the  Fifth  French  Hussars  came  to  the 
rescue  and  sent  the  Brunswickers  back  with  many  empty 
saddles.  The  general  who  had  had  such  a  narrow  escape 
was  no  other  than  Marshal  Bazaine  himself.  One  of  the 
best  of  the  French  critical  historians  of  the  war  notes  that 
it  might  have  been  a  piece  of  good  fortune  for  France  if 
the  Fifth  Hussars  had  not  come  so  promptly  to  the  rescue. 
If  Bazaine  had  been  killed  or  taken  by  the  Black  Bruns- 
wickers, Marshal  Canrobert  would  have  succeeded  by  right 
of  seniority  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine. 
This  might  well  have  meant  a  decided  victory  for  France 
at  Rezonville.  In  any  case,  it  would  have  meant  more 
vigorous  and  loyal  leadership,  and  France  would  have  per- 
haps been  spared  the  misery  of  the  blockade  and  capitulation 
of  Metz. 

Cavalry  now  began  to  play  a  great  part  in  the  battle. 
Alvensleben  could  not  yet  hope  for  infantry  reinforcements, 
but  the  mounted  troops  were  arriving.  The  Sixth  Cavalry 
Division,  commanded  by  the  Duke  of  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin,  had  just  arrived.  They  were  flung  into  the  fight, 
driving  back  the  French  Hussars,  only  to  be  charged  by 
a  mass  of  the  cavalry  of  the  Imperial  Guard.  In  front  of 
Rezonville  there  was'  a  fierce  melee  of  many  squadrons,  out 
of  which  emerged  the  red-coated  Ziethen  Hussars,  riding 
in  bold  onset  at  the  lines  of  bearskin-capped  Guardsmen  in 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      159 

front  of  the  village.  It  was  a  hopeless  piece  of  daring. 
With  a  storm  of  chassepot  bullets  bringing  down  riders  and 
horses,  and  the  shells  of  a  battery  bursting  in  their  midst, 
the  Red  tlussars  turned  when  they  were  still  500  yards  from 
the  French  line  and  rode  back,  leaving  the  ground  strewn 
with  dead  and  wounded.  Their  colonel  had  been  one  of  the 
first  to  be  shot  dead. 

Alvensleben  had  now  all  his  men  and  guns  in  action,  and 
no  reserves  to  draw  upon,  and  everywhere  his  advance  had 
failed  to  win  a  single  yard  beyond  the  ground  gained  in  the 
first  attack.  Leboeuf  was  reinforcing  Canrobert,  and  the 
German  general  thought  he  saw  a  disposition  of  the  enemy 
to  advance  and  turn  his  exposed  left.  He  must  keep  the 
French  right  occupied  for  a  while  longer,  to  give  Voights- 
Rhetz  time  to  arrive  with  his  sturdy  Hanoverians.  The  only 
fresh  troops  he  had  available  were  those  of  Von  Bredow's 
cavalry  brigade,  the  Sixteenth  Lancers,  and  the  Seventh 
Magdeburg  Cuirassiers.^  Alvensleben  ordered  Von  Bredow 
to  charge  the  French  batteries  on  the  right  and  their  infantry 
supports,  telling  him  that  the  fate  of  the  army  depended  on 
gaining  some  breathing  time  for  the  hard-pressed  infantry. 
The  two  regiments  together  numbered  only  a  little  more 
than  600  sabers,  and  Von  Bredow's  charge  is  remembered 
in  Germany  as  we  in  England  remember  the  charge  of  the 
"  Six  Hundred  "  at  Balaklava.  It  is  known  in  the  German 
army  as  the  Todtenritt  —  the  "Death-ride"  —  of  Von 
Bredow. 

The  cuirassiers  were  first  into  the  line  of  French  guns. 
They  came  charging  through  the  dense  smoke  of  a  battery, 
to  the  utter  surprise  of  its  gunners,  who  had  not  noticed 
its  advance.  Von  Schmettow,  the  colonel  of  the  regiment, 
cut  down  the  battery  commander.     Every  officer  and  man 

'  This  was  Bismarck's  regiment.  Tie  had  tlie  rank  of  major  in  it, 
and  generally  wore  its  uniform  when  with  the  royal  stafT  during  a 
campaign. 


i6o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

was  ridden  over  or  sabered,  except  one  of  the  privates,  who 
ran  towards  Von  Schmettow  calHng  out  that  he  surrendered. 
The  colonel  saved  his  life  and  let  him  go.  As  the  cuirassiers 
dashed  on  towards  the  French  infantry  this  solitary  gunner, 
crouching  beside  one  of  the  guns  of  the  battery,  watched  the 
charge  rolling  away  into  the  smoke  of  the  rifle  fight.  The 
lancers  had  dashed  through  another  battery,  and  were  fol- 
lowing up  the  cuirassiers,  and  together  they  went  through 
the  line  of  infantry,  which  broke  before  their  onset.  A 
French  general  who  was  directing  the  fire  of  the  batteries 
tells  how  he  got  away  by  riding  hard  before  the  charge,  and 
as  he  went  he  exclaimed  to  his  adjutant,  who  was  galloping 
beside  him,  "  What  a  magnificent  attack !  " 

In  the  rush  through  the  batteries  the  German  cavalry  had 
suffered  little,  but  in  charging  the  infantry  they  lost  heavily. 
Colonel  von  Schmettow  had  a  narrow  escape,  two  bullets 
going  through  his  steel  helmet.  But  now  the  cuirassiers 
and  lancers  were  charged  by  two  French  cavalry  brigades 
—  those  of  Prince  Murat,  a  grandson  of  the  famous  cavalry 
leader  of  Napoleon's  days,  and  General  Gramont.  There 
was  a  fierce  melee,  in  which  French  and  Germans  fought 
hand  to  hand.  Lieutenant  Campbell  of  Craignish,  a  young 
Scotch  officer  serving  with  the  cuirassiers,  cut  down  the 
standard-bearer  of  one  of  the  French  regiments  and  cap- 
tured the  eagle  he  carried,  but  he  did  not  keep  it  long.  The 
Frenchmen  closed  round  him  to  recapture  the  flag : ,  a  pistol 
fired  at  close  quarters  shattered  one  of  his  hands,  and  he 
had  to  let  his  trophy  go.  He  was  with  difficulty  rescued  by 
some  of  his  men.  Outnumbered  as  they  were,  the  German 
horsemen  kept  together  and  fought  their  way  out  of  the 
melee.  Then  they  rode  back  through  a  storm  of  fire  — 
rifles,  machine-guns,  cannon  opened  on  them  —  and  only 
a  handful  reached  the  German  lines.  "  They  rode  back  — 
not  the  Six  Hundred."  Two-thirds  of  the  officers  and  men 
strewed  the  3000  yards  of  ground  over  which  they  had 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      i6i 

charged.  Only  104  of  the  cuirassiers  and  90  of  the  lancers 
answered  the  roll-call. 

It  was  now  past  two  o'clock,  and  the  Hanoverian  Corps 
was  beginning  to  arrive.  Its  appearance  enabled  Alven- 
sleben  to  concentrate  his  hard-tried  Brandenburgers  on  the 
right,  and  prolong  his  line  to  the  left  with  the  fresh  troops. 
Then  Prince  Frederick  Charles  himself  came  on  to  the  field 
to  take  over  the  command.  He  had  ridden  hard  for  four- 
teen miles  from  Gorze,  and  Archibald  Forbes  tells  how  he 
saw  the  "  Red  Prince  "  spurring  towards  Flavigny,  keeping 
far  in  front  of  his  staff  and  escort,  and  not  even  turning 
his  head  as  a  French  shell  burst  beside  him. 

But  the  French  were  also  being  reinforced.  L'Admirault's 
Corps  was  marching  up  from  the  Doncourt  road  and  form- 
ing on  the  right.  The  Germans  were  still  heavily  outnum- 
bered. Two  things  saved  them  from  disaster:  First,  the 
vigor  of  Alvensleben's  attack  had  led  Bazaine  to  believe  that 
they  were  in  much  greater  force ;  and  secondly,  the  attitude 
of  passive  defense  adopted  by  the  French  army  made  its 
superiority  in  fighting  strength  useless,  except  to  hold  the 
ground  on  which  the  men  stood.  Frederick  Charles  recog- 
nized that  the  danger  point  was  on  his  exposed  left,  and  he 
sent  word  to  Voights-Rhetz  to  attack  the  French  right.  The 
attack  was  made  at  half  past  four,  and  was  badly  executed, 
with  disastrous  results  for  the  Germans.  It  was  directed 
against  L'Admirault's  Corps,  which  was  prolonging  the 
French  line  along  the  higher  ground  north  of  Mars-la-Tour, 
and  had  brought  60  guns  and  12  mitrailleuses  into  action 
against  the  36  guns  on  the  German  left.  Masses  of  French 
infantry  were  on  the  heights,  just  out  of  sight  behind  the 
crest  of  the  plateau,  and  a  strong  firing  line  had  advanced 
down  the  slope.  Probably  Voights-Rhetz  did  not  realize  that 
he  had  nearly  12,000  French  bayonets  in  his  immediate  front, 
for  he  sent  forward  a  single  brigade  —  five  battalions,  about 
4500  strong.     As  they  advanced  over  perfectly  oj^en  ground, 


i62  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

there  burst  upon  them  such  a  storm  of  fire  as  the  Germans 
had  never  yet  experienced.  It  came  from  a  double  tier  of 
infantry  in  Hne  —  the  skirmishers  on  the  lower  ground,  and 
the  battalions  formed  up  on  the  crest  of  the  plateau.  The 
advance  soon  came  to  a  dead  stop.  Most  of  the  officers 
were  down,  and  the  rank  and  file  had  lost  seriously.  For  a 
while  the  brigade  tried  to  hold  its  own  with  rifle  fire,  but 
from  the  crest  masses  of  French  infantry  came  rushing 
down,  and  deployed  into  swarms  of  skirmishers  in  the  firing 
line,  which  advanced,  firing  as  it  came.  The  Hanoverians 
fell  back,  with  the  victorious  French  in  close  pursuit.  The 
ground  was  heaped  with  fallen  men,  and  for  once  the  Ger- 
man soldiers  had  become  thoroughly  demoralized.  Some 
were  running,  others  threw  themselves  down  and  waited  to 
be  made  prisoners.  But  we  know  from  the  narrative  of 
a  German  officer,  who  was  afterwards  one  of  the  most 
famous  of  the  military  historians  of  the  day  (Captain  Fritz 
Hoenig),  that  the  French  were  also  in  a  state  of  disor- 
ganization, and  quite  out  of  the  hands  of  their  officers. 
Hoenig  had  been  wounded,  and  as  he  lay  on  the  ground 
the  advancing  French  line  passed  over  him.  He  tells  how 
they  were  shouting,  "  Courage!  En  avant! "  and  firing  hur- 
riedly from  the  hip,  without  bringing  the  rifle  to  the  shoulder 
to  aim.  Many  were  stopping  to  secure  and  carry  off 
wounded  and  unwounded  prisoners.  Some  were  even  plun- 
dering the  fallen  men.  It  was  the  intervention  of  a  French 
officer  that  saved  Hoenig  from  having  his  watch  taken.  He 
thought  that  if  there  had  been  better  discipline  among  the 
French  not  a  man  of  the  retiring  brigade  would  have  escaped. 
Even  as  it  was,  the  beaten  remnant  of  the  attack  was 
in  dire  danger.  Voights-Rhetz,  to  cover  the  retirement  and 
check  the  pursuit,  sent  the  First  Dragoons  of  the  Guard 
to  charge  the  French.  They  swept  round  the  east  side  of 
Mars-la-Tour,  formed  line  of  squadrons,  passed  through  the 
wreck  of  the  defeated  infantry,  and  rode  for  the  advancing 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      163 

skirmishers.  The  French  halted  and  fired  on  them  ;  but  the 
dragoons,  not  without  heavy  loss,  passed  through  them, 
doing,  however,  very  little  damage,  and  then  went  for  the 
formed  infantry  behind  them.  They  were  met  with  a  blast 
of  fire  from  the  front,  and  at  the  same  time  were  fired  on 
from  the  rear  by  the  unbroken  portions  of  the  skirmish 
line,  who  turned  to  fire  after  them.  Unable  to  close  with 
the  formed  infantry  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  the  dragoons 
turned,  charged  once  more  through  the  skirmishers,  and  re- 
gained Mars-la-Tour,  having  lost  in  a  few  minutes  15  offi- 
cers and  121  men  and  250  horses.  Most  of  the  dismounted 
men  were  made  prisoners.  Two  of  the  Chancellor  von 
Bismarck's  sons  were  serving  as  private  soldiers  in  the 
dragoons,  and  rode  in  the  charge.  The  elder,  Count  Her- 
bert, was  wounded ;  the  younger.  Count  William,  had  his 
horse  shot  under  him,  and  was  badly  hurt  in  the  fall,  but 
escaped  capture. 

The  charge  had  served  its  purpose  of  disengaging  the 
beaten  brigade.  The  losses  of  its  five  battalions  were  very 
serious.  Out  of  a  total  of  95  officers  and  about  4400  men 
who  went  into  the  fight,  74  officers  and  2415  men  did  not 
return.  Of  these,  two  officers  and  449  men  were  prisoners. 
The  rest  were  killed  or  wounded.  The  brigade  had  lost 
nearly  all  its  officers  and  more  than  half  its  men  in  less 
than  half  an  hour.  It  was  an  awful  revelation  of  the  power 
of  the  modern  rifle,  even  when  used  in  the  wild,  half- 
trained  way  in  which  the  French  employed  it.  "  I  am  not 
ashamed  of  owning,"  says  Captain  Hoenig,  "  that  the 
French  fire  at  Mars-la-Tour  affected  my  nerves  for  months 
after  the  battle.  Troops  that  have  survived  an  ordeal  of 
the  kind  are  for  a  considerable  time  demoralized  —  men  and 
officers  alike  —  and  T  am  not  the  only  man  who  says  this." 

Now  was  the  time  for  the  French  to  use  their  superior 
numbers  and  the  impulse  of  success  —  to  throw  L'Admi- 
rault's  Corps  upon  the  exposed  German  left.    Even  company 


i64  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

officers  and  men  in  the  ranks  felt  it.  As  the  dragoons  dis- 
appeared behind  Mars-la-Tour,  fire  was  reopened  on  the 
enemy's  infantry,  "  who  seemed  few  in  numbers  and  very 
disorganized,"  says  Colonel  Patry,  then  serving  as  lieutenant 
of  a  French  company.  And  he  goes  on  to  tell  of  the  dis- 
appointment of  the  French  at  the  want  of  enterprise  of  their 
leaders : 

"  We  asked  each  other  why  we  were  not  led  forward.  We  were 
strong  in  yumbers  and  in  the  best  of  spirits;  we  all  felt,  privates  as 
well  as  officers,  that  there  was  next  to  nothing  in  front  of  us.  Why 
not  go  forward?  Why  not  follow  up  the  success  already  obtained? 
Instead  of  this  we  were  actually  withdrawn  to  the  main  position. 
The  whole  thing  was  incomprehensible,  and  we  swore  at  the  generals 
who  had  no  idea  of  making  use  of  the  advantages  our  dash  had  ob- 
tained for  them." ' 

The  wretched  theory  of  purely  defensive  battles  was  the 
secret  of  this  slackness  of  the  French  commanders.  The 
Germans  fully  expected  a  fierce  counter-attack  on  their  left, 
and  massed  all  their  available  cavalry  to  protect  the  exposed 
flank.  The  French  cavalry  leaders,  more  enterprising  than 
their  colleagues,  saw  the  chance,  and  moved  brigade  after 
brigade  to  the  right,  and  then  boldly  attacked  the  German 
cavalry.  There  was  the  most  serious  cavalry  fighting  of 
the  whole  war  on  the  open  ground  near  Mars-la-Tour.  On 
both  sides  regiment  after  regiment  was  thrown  into  the 
melee,  till  at  last  some  80  squadrons  —  more  than  5000  men 
—  were  engaged.  Those  who  looked  on  saw  only  a  huge 
cloud  of  dust,  out  of  which  rose  a  wild  din  of  shouting, 
clash  of  steel,  and  reports  of  pistol  shots.  Out  of  the  melee 
riderless  horses  came  galloping  back  to  the  French  and 
German  lines,  and  wounded  men  struggled  to  reach  a  place 
of  safety.  Presently  it  was  seen  that  more  and  more  of 
the  French  cavaliers  were  riding  back  to  the  plateau,  and 
then  there  was  a  general  retirement,  and  the  German  horse- 
men were  left  in  victorious  possession  of  the  ground. 

^  Patry,  "  La  Guerre  telle  qu'elle  est,"  p.  87, 


No.  II — Battle  of  Rf.zonville,  August  i6,  1S70 
(Position  about  7  p.  m.) 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      165 

Evening  was  now  coming  on,  and  the  Germans  made 
one  more  effort  to  advance  against  the  French  center  and 
left.  The  attack  cost  them  much  loss  and  gave  no  results. 
The  men  were  too  exhausted  to  accomplish  anything  serious. 
For  some  time  after  sunset  there  was  desultory  firing  about 
Rezonville,  but  at  last  even  this  ended,  and  the  two  armies 
bivouacked  on  the  ground  on  which  they  had  fought  since 
morning,  with  their  outpost  lines  almost  in  touch  with  each 
other.  All  night  long  on  the  French  right  cavalry  soldiers, 
French  and  German,  came  into  the  picket  line,  all  of  them 
dismounted  and  leading  their  horses,  many  of  them  wounded. 
They  were  the  stragglers  from  the  great  cavalry  melee. 

At  the  close  of  the  battle  the  French  had  on  the  field 
113,000  men,  including  14,000  cavalry,  with  486  guns  and 
54  mitrailleuses.  The  Germans  had  brought  up  from  first 
to  last  63,000  men,  including  11,000  cavalry,  and  288  guns. 
At  the  outset  they  had  not  more  than  20,000  available. 
Careful  calculations  by  the  historical  section  of  the  German 
staff  show  that  the  forces  not  merely  present  but  actually 
engaged  were : 

FRENCH  GERMANS 

Infantry 83,680  47,530 

Cavalry      8,030  8,370 

Artillery  —  guns 432  222 

The  Germans  lost  14.830  killed  and  wounded  (including 
720  officers),  or  rather  more  than  22  per  cent  of  their  fight- 
ing  force.^     The   French   lost    11,460  killed  and   wounded 

*  Otto  Berndt  ("  Die  Zahl  im  Kriege  ")  gives  the  following  analy- 
sis of  the  German  losses  : 

Infantry  .  .  .  565  officers  13,084  men  =  25.2  per  cent. 
Cavalry  .  .  .  104  officers  1,303  men  =  12.0  per  cent. 
Artillery   .    .    .       39  officers  681  men  =  14.9  per  cent. 

The  heaviest  loss  fell  on  the  Third  (Brandenburg)  Army  Corps, 
namely : 

315  officers,  6438  men,  and  (>^2  horses  killed  and  wounded. 
203  men  and  6  horses  missing. 


i66  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

(9.4  per  cent).  Nine  hundred  and  seventy  Germans  were 
taken  prisoners,  but  the  prisoners  and  missing  on  the  French 
side  were  more  than  5000,  taken  in  the  cavalry  melee  and 
in  the  first  successful  advance  to  the  Verdun  road.  A 
French  gun  was  captured  when  Alvensleben  rushed  the  vil- 
lage of  Flavigny  in  the  first  stage  of  the  battle. 

Both  sides  claimed  the  victory.  "  The  enemy  left  us 
masters  of  the  battle-field,"  was  Bazaine's  telegraphic  report 
to  the  emperor.  It  was  a  perfectly  honest  report,  for  he 
had  held  the  position  he  had  taken  up,  and  repulsed  attack 
after  attack.  "  Our  troops,  worn  out  by  a  twelve  hours' 
struggle,  encamped  on  the  victorious  but  bloody  field  im- 
mediately opposite  the  French  lines,"  was  Moltke's  mes- 
sage. The  Germans  claimed  that  as  they  had  arrested  the 
French  retreat  they  had  scored  a  success.  But  there  has 
been  a  strange  amount  of  exaggeration  in  the  popular  Ger- 
man tradition  of  the  battle.^ 

On  the  morrow  of  the  battle  of  Rezonville  the  ofiicers 
and  men  of  the  French  army  received  with  puzzled  astonish- 
ment and  deep  disappointment  the  order  to  abandon  the 
ground  they  had  held  during  the  hard  fight  of  the  day  be- 
fore, and  march  back  to  the  bold  range  of  heights  that  rises 
to  the  west  of  Metz.  It  was  a  retirement  in  the  face  of 
an  enemy  whom  they  felt  they  had  beaten.  Were  all  the 
results   of   their   victory   to   be   thrown   away?     Even   the 

Thus  the  Emperor  William  II  said  in  one  of  his  speeches :  "  The 
battle  is  unparalleled  in  military  history,  for  a  single  army  corps 
about  20,000  strong  held  on  to  and  repulsed  a  well-equipped  enemy 
more  than  five  times  as  numerous.  Such  was  the  glorious  deed  of 
the  Brandenburgers,  and  the  Hohenzollerns  will  never  forget  the  debt 
they  owe  them." 

Now  the  plain  fact  is  that  the  P'rench  had  never  five  times  20,000 
men  in  acton ;  and  the  Brandenburgers,  though  they  fought  magnifi- 
cently, were  in  serious  danger  till  Voights-Rhetz  arrived.  The 
French  never  made  a  serious  attack,  but  remained  on  the  defensive. 
All  that  Alvensleben's  Corps  did  was  to  drive  in  the  French  first  line 
in  the  earlier  stage  of  the  fight.  After  that  its  attacks  on  the  French 
position  were  everywhere  repulsed. 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      167 

soldiers  in  the  ranks  knew  that  two  days  before  the  orders 
had  been  that  every  effort  must  be  made  to  move  west- 
ward, and  place  the  army  between  Paris  and  the  invaders. 
Now  they  were  turning  their  backs  on  Paris,  and  tramping 
back  under  the  blazing  sun  over  some  of  the  very  roads  they 
had  wearily  traversed  on  the  fifteenth. 

Bazaine  knew  that  now  the  German  army  was  massing 
on  the  ground  that  Frederick  Charles  had  held  at  the  end 
of  the  battle  of  August  16.  He  had  never  been  keen  on 
cutting  himself  off  from  Metz,  and  now  he  shrank  from 
the  responsibility  of  attempting  to  continue  his  march  to 
the  westward  across  the  front  of  the  German  armies.  He 
was  like  a  timid  navigator  —  afraid  to  go  far  from  a  shelter- 
ing port.  But  he  concealed  his  real  intention  by  telling  his 
colleagues  that  he  meant  to  take  up  a  position  on  the  hills 
west  of  Metz,  renew  his  supplies  of  ammunition,  give  the 
men  a  rest,  and  then  rejoin  MacMahon  by  a  march  to  the 
northwestward. 

Frossard,  on  the  left,  had  the  shortest  way  to  go  to 
reach  the  positions  assigned  to  him  on  the  heights  east  of 
Gravelotte  and  beyond  the  ravine-like  valley  by  which  the 
Mance  brook  flows  down  to  the  Moselle.  The  Imperial 
Guard  was  to  march  to  Plappeville,  where  Bazaine  had  de- 
cided to  establish  his  headquarters  under  the  guns  of  the 
outlying  forts  of  Metz.  Leboeuf's  Corps  was  to  take  up  its 
position  on  the  heights  north  of  Frossard.  L'Admirault's 
Corps  was  given  the  ground  about  the  village  of  Amanvil- 
liers.  Canrobert  was  to  be  posted  on  the  extreme  right, 
about  St.  Privat.  He  had  the  longest  way  to  go,  and  his 
troops  were  not  all  in  their  bivouacs  till  late  in  the  after- 
noon. The  retirement  was  encumbered  by  huge  trains  of 
baggage  and  long  convoys  of  wounded. 

The  Germans  were  concentrating  on  the  ground  aban- 
doned to  them  by  the  French,  and  Stcinmetz  was  bringing 
the  First  Army  across  the  Moselle  and  into  line.     No  at- 


i68  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

tempt  was  made  to  harass  or  even  to  observe  the  French 
retirement.  Towards  evening-  there  was  some  skirmishing 
between  detachments  pushed  forward  from  the  German  right 
and  the  outposts  of  Frossard's  Corps.  But  though  the  Ger- 
mans had  a  huge  force  of  cavalry  up  to  the  front,  no  effec- 
tive reconnoitering  work  was  done,  and  their  plans  and 
orders  for  next  day  (August  i8)  were  based  on  the  false 
idea  that  the  French  line  had  its  right  at  Amanvilliers, 
instead  of  extending  northwards  to  St.  Privat  and  beyond  it. 

The  night  was  fine  and  warm,  with  a  clear  starlit  sky. 
The  French  bivouacs,  extending  along  some  six  miles  of 
the  eastern  ridge  of  the  plateau,  presented  a  curious  spec- 
tacle. At  the  southern  end  of  the  line  the  outposts  looked 
southwestward,  towards  the  direction  from  which  an  enemy 
might  come.  But  in  the  center  they  were  thrown  out  in 
the  direction  in  which  the  columns  had  marched  during 
the  day,  and  were  therefore  looking  towards  Metz,  and 
watching  the  wooded  reverse  slope  of  the  ridge.  This  is 
almost  incredible,  but  there  is  positive  evidence  that  they 
not  only  looked  towards  their  own  fortress,  but  that  during 
the  night  they  imagined  impossible  enemies  in  their  actual 
front  and  opened  fire  at  trees  and  shadows.  On  the  west, 
the  side  of  the  enemy,  there  were  no  outposts  whatever 
along  the  greater  part  of  the  line,  and  the  baggage  wagons 
were  packed  together  in  rows  on  that  side.  The  whole 
arrangement  shows  how  utterly  incompetent  and  careless 
the  staff  of  the  army  must  have  been.  The  firing  of  the 
outposts  led  to  two  false  alarms  during  the  night  —  one 
about  2  A.  M.,  the  other  shortly  before  dawn  —  when  the 
men  sprang  to  arms,  and  regiments  formed  up,  and  bat- 
teries hooked  in  their  teams.  After  the  second  alarm  many 
of  the  men  did  not  lie  down  again,  but  sat  smoking  round 
the  camp-fires. 

When  the  sun  rose,  there  was  the  morning  roll-call. 
Then  coffee  was  made,  the  men  cleaned  up  their  rifles  and 


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REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      169 

accouterments,  and  there  were  formal  inspections.  The 
great  camp  had  the  air  of  an  assembly  for  peace  manoeuvers. 
During-  the  morning  hours  some  work  was  done  in  the  way 
of  intrenching  the  position,  but  not  many  tools  were  avail- 
able, and  very  little  was  accomplished,  except  on  the  left, 
where  Frossard,  an  engineer  officer,  did  some  serious  work 
towards  strengthening  the  front  of  his  line,  putting  the 
farmsteads  of  Moscou,  St.  Hubert,  and  Point  du  Jour  into 
a  state  of  defense,  and  digging  shelter  trenches  and  gun- 
pits.  The  men  had  been  living  from  hand  to  mouth,  chiefly 
on  biscuits,  during  the  last  few  days.  The  distribution  of 
a  liberal  meat  ration  made  the  cooking  of  an  early  midday 
meal  the  chief  subject  of  interest.  At  Plappeville,  Bazaine 
told  his  officers  that  he  expected  a  quiet  day,  and  set  his 
chief  of  the  staff,  General  Jarras,  to  work  at  preparing  a 
long  list  of  promotions  and  transfers  of  officers  to  fill  the 
gaps  made  by  the  losses  at  Borny  and  Rezonville.  A  more 
competent  commander  would  have  been  early  in  saddle, 
riding  along  the  position  to  insure  that  it  was  all  in  a  state 
of  readiness  for  defense,  and  would  have  sent  his  cavalry 
out  to  scour  the  country  towards  Mars-la-Tour  and  Rezon- 
ville and  keep  in  touch  with  the  Germans. 

By  noon  the  six-mile-long  camp  had  the  air  of  a  huge 
picnic  party.  The  men  were  regaling  themselves  with  a 
good  solid  meal  of  soup,  meat,  bread,  and  thin  wine.  The 
officers  were  having  their  dejeuner,  some  of  them  comfort- 
ably installed  at  folding  tables.  Colonel  Patry's  narrative  ^ 
gives  a  striking  picture  of  the  state  of  afifairs  in  L'Admir- 
ault's  Corps  in  the  right  center.  The  lieutenant,  as  he  then 
was,  had  enjoyed  a  good  dejeuner,  and  then  wrote  a  letter 
home,  and  set  off  to  post  it  at  the  field  post-office  wagon. 
On  the  way  he  saw  the  major  of  his  battalion  shaving  be- 
side his  tent,  and  jokingly  asked  him  if  he  was  preparing 
for  an  excursion  to  Metz.    "  If  I  am  killed  to-day  I  should 

*  "  La  Guerre  telle  qu'cUe  est." 


I70  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

like  to  look  a  bit  tidy,"  was  the  reply ;  and  Patry  told  him 
there  was  no  chance  of  that  — "  everything  was  a  dead 
calm."  Near  the  post-office  wagon,  which  was  standing 
among  rows  of  other  vehicles,  he  found  some  transport 
officers  still  sitting  round  a  table  with  wine  and  cigars.  He 
was  chatting  with  them  when  suddenly  there  was  a  sharp 
explosion  close  by.  A  shell  had  burst  among  the  wagons. 
The  men  rushed  to  arms  ;  he  ran  to  his  regiment,  and  found 
it  formed  up  facing  towards  Metz.  "  Crash,  bang,  crash !  " 
shell  after  shell.  Horses  were  running  wild,  after  breaking 
from  their  picket  ropes ;  drivers  tried  to  catch  them. 
Wagons  were  being  dragged  away.  Guns  were  galloping 
up  to  the  crest  of  the  ridge.  The  regiment  faced  about, 
and  marched  up  to  the  summit  north  of  Amanvilliers,  and 
he  saw  that  the  hostile  fire  was  coming  from  the  line  of 
crests  above  the  woods  at  the  other  side  of  the  valley,  west 
of  the  French  position.    The  battle  of  Gravelotte  had  begun. 

All  the  morning,  while  the  French  were  making  holiday 
in  careless  security,  the  Germans  had  been  marching.  Six 
army  corps,  forming  their  front  line,  had  been  making  a 
great  wheeling  movement,  pivoting  on  the  right  and  swing- 
ing round  towards  the  northeast,  across  miles  of  country. 
Behind  them  came  Alvensleben's  Corps  in  reserve,  after  its 
trying  day  on  the  sixteenth,  and  the  Second  (Pomeranian) 
Corps  tramping  up  from  Pont-a-Mousson  through  the  Gorze 
woods,  the  last  of  the  German  units  to  cross  the  Moselle. 
More  than  160,000  infantry,  20,000  cavalry,  and  700  guns 
were  marching  to  battle,  while  Bazaine  and  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine  were  enjoying  their  restful  holiday. 

On  the  German  side  there  was  no  holiday-making.  Some 
of  the  corps  marched  as  early  as  4  a.  m.  At  half  past  five 
the  "  Red  Prince "  was  in  the  saddle  at  Mars-la-Tour, 
directing  the  movements  on  the  left.  The  old  king  drove 
up  from  Pont-a-Mousson  in  the  early  morning,  passing 
the  columns  of  the  Second  Corps  already  tramping  through 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      171 

the  woods.  By  six  he  was  mounted  at  Flavigny,  and  rode 
towards  Gravelotte,  accompanied  by  Bismarck  and  Moltke. 
The  plan  of  the  battle  was  that  Steinmetz,  with  three  corps 
of  the  First  Army,  was  to  swing  round  and  engage  and 
occupy  the  French  in  front ;  while  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
with  the  Second  Army,  was  to  wheel  against  their  right, 
sending  the  Saxons  and  the  Guard  Corps  to  work  round  its 
exposed  flank,  envelop  and  drive  it  in,  rolling  up  the 
whole  of  the  enemy's  line.  As  already  noted,  it  was  sup- 
posed that  the  extreme  right  of  the  French  was  at  Aman- 
villiers,  or  just  north  of  it.  The  result  of  this  misinforma- 
tion was  that  when  the  contact  with  the  enemy  came  the 
Guards  found  themselves  in  front  of  Canrobert's  Corps  at 
St.  Privat,  and  the  Saxons  had  to  make  a  longer  detour  than 
they  expected  in  order  to  reach  the  flank  of  the  French  line. 
Steinmetz's  attack  on  the  French  left  and  center  was  not 
to  begin  till  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  in  position  for 
his  attack  on  the  right,  which  was  intended  to  be  the 
decisive  move  of  the  day.  But  the  beginning  of  the  battle 
was  precipitated  by  one  of  Steinmetz's  corps  commanders. 
Von  Mannstein.  Shortly  after  midday  he  had  led  his  corps, 
the  Ninth  (the  men  of  Schleswig-Holstein  and  Hesse),  to 
the  high  ground  east  of  Habonville,  and  in  front  of  Aman- 
villiers.  Looking  across  the  valley  that  separated  him  from 
the  heights  held  by  the  French,  he  saw  L'Admirault's  camp, 
the  picture  of  peaceful  security  —  wagons  parked  in  long 
lines,  horses  feeding  at  their  picket  lines,  tents  standing,  men 
strolling  about.  The  temptation  to  give  the  French  a 
startling  surprise  was  too  much  for  him.  He  unlimbered 
his  batteries  and  sent  shell  after  shell  across  the  valley. 
Moltke,  who  was  with  the  king  between  Flavigny  and 
Gravelotte,  heard  the  guns,  and  knew  that  they  had  opened 
too  soon.  He  sent  off  a  staff  officer  with  a  message  telling 
him  not  to  begin  his  attack  till  further  orders.  But  before 
the  galloper  reached  him,  Steinmetz  had  heard  the  reports  of 


172  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Mannstein's  guns  and  the  reply  of  the  French  artillery,  and 
had  not  only  broug-ht  his  batteries  into  action  all  along 
front,  but  sent  forward  his  infantry  into  the  woods  beyond 
Gravelotte  along  the  Mance  ravine.  So  by  Mannstein's 
precipitation  the  battle  began  some  two  hours  before  Moltke 
intended. 

In  twenty  minutes  Von  Goeben's  Corps,  on  the  German 
right,  had  loo  guns  in  action  against  Frossard's  position. 
They  sent  their  shells  high  over  the  wooded  hollow  of  the 
Mance  against  the  three  intrenched  farmsteads  on  the 
opposite  heights.  Frossard's  guns  replied,  but  the  marked 
superiority  of  the  German  artillery  was  soon  evident. 
They  were  breech-loaders  against  muzzle-loaders,  firing 
faster  and  with  less  exposure  for  the  men  serving  them. 
Their  shells  and  fuses  were  better.  Every  German  shell 
burst  as  it  fell.  Numbers  of  the  French  shells  simply  scored 
the  ground  or  buried  themselves  in  it  without  exploding. 
The  farm  of  St.  Hubert  was  gradually  reduced  to  a  mass 
of  ruins.  Early  in  the  fight  Moscou  and  Point  du  Jour  were 
set  on  fire.  Captain  Fritz  Hoenig,  in  his  study  of  the  fight 
on  the  French  right,  gives  a  terrible  description  of  the  de- 
struction of  these  two  farms  by  Von  Goeben's  artillery. 

"  At  these  points,"  he  says,  "  hardly  any  French  were  found  killed 
or  wounded  by  infantry  bullets.  Almost  all  had  been  destroyed  by 
the  fire  of  the  guns.  In  the  large  heaps  of  ruins,  especially  in 
Moscou,  the  defenders  lay  all  around,  fearfully  torn  and  mutilated 
by  the  German  shells;  limbs  and  bodies  were  blown  from  thirty  to 
fifty  paces  apart,  and  the  stones  and  the  sandy  ground  were  here  and 
there  covered  with  pools  of  blood.  In  Moscou  and  Point  du  Jour 
some  French  were  found  burnt  in  their  defensive  positions,  and  a 
large  number  of  wounded  showed  marks  of  the  flames,  which  had 
destroyed  both  uniforms  and  limbs.  All  around  lay  rifles  and  swords, 
knapsacks  and  cartridges,  the  remains  of  limbers  which  had  been 
blown  up,  broken  gun-carriages  and  wheels,  and  a  large  number  of 
hideously  torn  and  mangled  horses.  The  ground  was  changed  by  the 
German  artillery  fire  into  a  desert  covered  with  many  corpses.  The 
interiors  of  Moscou  and  Point  du  Jour  were  not  passable  after  the 
battle  until  they  had  been  cleared." 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      173 

The  infantry  advance  gradually  drove  the  French  out  of 
the  woods  in  the  Mance  valley ;  but  Frossard  had  no  in- 
tention of  persistently  holding  this  advanced  line.  By  this 
time,  too,  the  French  artillery  on  the  heights  was  suffering 
severely,  and  many  batteries  had  ceased  firing.  Only  the 
long-ranging  French  rifles  replied  to  the  German  infantry 
and  artillery  fire.  Along  the  eastern  side  of  the  hollow  of 
the  Mance  the  Germans  massed  for  a  further  advance,  and 
successfully  rushed  the  ruined  farm  of  St.  Hubert  and  the 
chalk-  and  gravel-pits  near  it.  But  all  efforts  to  press  on 
to  Moscou  and  Point  du  Jour  ended  in  costly  failure.  The 
flames  had  driven  the  French  from  the  farms,  but  between 
them,  and  on  the  slope  above  them,  they  held  on  doggedly, 
despite  the  German  bombardment,  and  drove  every  attack 
back  with  the  deadly  fire  of  their  chassepots.  The  German 
advance  on  the  right  was  thus  brought  to  a  standstill,  and 
Frossard's  main  position  was  intact. 

In  the  center,  things  had  not  gone  much  better  for  the 
invaders.  When  Von  Mannstein  opened  fire  on  Amanvil- 
liers,  he  believed  that  he  was  fronting  the  extreme  right  of 
the  French,  and  that  there  were  no  enemies  to  the  north  of 
his  position.  So  he  pushed  the  left  of  his  line  of  guns  well 
forward.  Then  from  the  heights  towards  St.  Privat  Can- 
robert's  batteries  opened,  and  brought  a  cross-fire  to  bear 
on  the  left  of  the  German  artillery.  Mannstein  was  about 
to  withdraw  the  exposed  guns  when  L'Admirault  sent  his 
infantry  down  the  heights  to  attack  them.  The  French 
came  on  in  a  dense  line  of  skirmishers,  backed  up  by  a 
formed  column  of  infantry.  They  drove  in  the  German 
troops  that  were  thrown  forward  to  protect  the  artillery, 
and  as  the  guns  limbered  up,  horses  and  drivers  were  shot 
down,  and  the  Frenchmen  dashed  in  among  them.  For  a 
few  minutes  they  were  in  possession  of  several  of  them.  A 
rush  of  German  infantry  saved  most  of  them,  but  when  the 
French  retired  again  on  Amanvilliers  they  dragged  back 


174  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

with  them  two  captured  cannon  as  trophies  of  their  suc- 
cessful counter-attack. 

The  fight  on  this  part  of  the  field  then  became  for  a 
while  an  artillery  duel,  in  which  the  French,  having  con- 
siderably more  guns  in  action  than  their  opponents,  more 
than  held  their  own.  The  balance  was  not  restored  till, 
towards  three  o'clock,  the  artillery  of  the  Prussian  Guard 
came  into  action  on  Von  Mannstein's  left. 

So  far,  after  three  hours  of  battle,  the  day  had  gone  well 
for  the  French.  They  might  have  done  better  still  if  there 
had  been  any  general  plan  for  the  action.  As  it  was,  each 
of  the  corps  commanders  had  to  make  an  isolated  defense 
of  his  own  part  of  the  position.  The  cavalry  divisions, 
which  could  have  done  useful  work  in  guarding  the  exposed 
right  flank,  were  standing  idly  by  their  horses  in  the  wooded 
valleys  to  the  rear  of  the  line.  Bourbaki's  splendid  regi- 
ments of  the  Imperial  Guard  were  waiting  near  Plappeville, 
listening  impatiently  to  the  roar  of  the  battle  in  which  they 
were  not  allowed  to  play  any  part.  Bazaine,  when  he  heard 
the  first  shots,  had  told  General  Jarras  that  the  affair  would 
not  be  serious,  and  he  had  better  remain  at  his  desk.  He 
himself  mounted,  and  with  only  two  of  his  officers  rode  up 
the  hill  of  Fort  St.  Quentin,  whence  he  watched  the  fight 
on  the  French  left.  The  fury  of  the  German  attack  on  this 
side  confirmed  him  in  the  delusion  that  haunted  him  through- 
out—  the  idea  that  the  enemy  was  anxious  to  cut  in  be- 
tween him  and  Metz.  This  was  why  he  kept  the  Imperial 
Guard  idle  for  hours  behind  his  left,  and  paid  no  attention 
whatever  to  his  right  flank,  where  the  real  danger  lay. 

On  that  side  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was  now  bringing 
the  Prussian  Guard  Corps  into  action.  Part  of  its  artillery 
had  been  hurried  forward  to  support  Von  Mannstein.  As 
the  rest  of  the  batteries  came  up  with  the  vanguard  of  the 
infantry,  they  were  formed  in  line  beyond  St.  Ail  to  pre- 
pare the  way  for  an  attack  on  the  village  of  Ste.  Marie  aiix 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      175 

Chenes.  It  is  a  large  village  of  solidly-built  stone  houses, 
about  a  mile  in  front  of  the  St.  Privat  position,  and  con- 
siderably below  it.  Canrobert  had  occupied  it  as  an  ad- 
vanced post,  sending  there  the  Ninety-fourth  Regiment, 
under  the  veteran  Colonel  Geslin  —  two  and  a  half  battalions, 
or  about  1500  men.  After  a  heavy  bombardment  the  Guards 
stormed  Ste.  Marie,  meeting  with  an  obstinate  resistance, 
for  the  soldiers  of  the  old  Imperial  Army  of  France,  long- 
service  men  whose  whole  active  life  belonged  to  the  regi- 
ment, were  splendid  fighters.^ 

When  Ste.  Marie  had  been  won,  the  line  of  guns  that 
had  been  in  action  against  it  swung  rovmd  and  took  position 
to  prepare  the  way  for  the  attack  on  the  heights  by  firing 
on  St.  Privat,  while  the  Guard  formed  up  right  and  left  of 
the  captured  village.  The  bombardment  of  St.  Privat  began 
about  half  past  three,  and  for  an  hour  and  a  half  200  guns 
rained  their  shells  on  the  place  and  the  ground  about  it. 

St.  Privat  stands  a  little  back  from  the  edge  of  the  flat- 
topped  ridge  held  by  the  French.  From  Ste.  Marie  only 
its  church  tower  and  some  outlying  houses  are  visible. 
From  the  crest  the  ground  slopes  towards  Ste.  Marie  for 
rather  more  than  a  mile.  The  gentle  declivity  is  perfectly 
unbroken  by  obstacles  or  cover  of  any  kind.  There  are 
no  walls  or  fences  to  the  open  fields.  From  Ste.  Marie 
a  road  runs  up  the  slope  to  St.  Privat.  It  is  a  French 
road  of  the  usual  kind,  with  a  ditch  on  each  side,  and  rows 
of  tall  poplars  by  the  ditches,  making  the  well-paved  high- 

*  Captain  Fritz  Hoenig,  a  most  competent  critic,  who  fought 
through  the  war  of  1870-1871,  and  afterwards  devoted  years  of  re- 
search to  the  study  of  it,  expresses  the  opinion  that  the  infantry  of 
the  French  Imperial  Army  was  "  undoubtedly  one  of  the  best  that 
ever  existed,  though  its  tactics  were  faulty."  And  he  goes  on  to  say  : 
"  It  remains  to  be  proved  whether  French  infantry  will  ever  again 
fight  as  it  did  at  Woerth  and  Gravelotte."  He  does  not  think  so. 
"  But  after  all,"  he  adds,  "  the  same  remark  applies  to  infantry  other 
than  the  French,  owing,  in  fact,  to  the  universal  introduction  of 
short  service." 


176  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

way  into  a  stately  avenue.  The  German  guns  simply 
crushed  out  the  fire  of  Canrobert's  artillery.  The  French 
infantry  lay  crouched  along  and  behind  the  crest  waiting 
for  the  infantry  attack,  to  which  they  knew  the  fierce  bom- 
bardment was  a  prelude.  In  front,  beyond  rifle  range,  and 
now  safe  even  from  shell  fire  (for  the  French  guns  were 
silenced),  the  Guards  waited  for  the  word  to  advance.  The 
Prince  of  Wurttemberg,  who  commanded  them,  had  formed 
them  up  as  men  formed  for  the  attack  in  the  days  before  the 
breech-loading  rifle  had  fully  proved  its  deadly  power.  They 
waited  in  two  solid  masses,  right  and  left  of  the  Ste.  Marie 
road.  Each  mass,  more  than  7000  strong,  was  formed  in 
a  huge  column,  a  forest  of  bayonets  half  a  battalion  in  line 
in  front,  and  the  other  half-battalions  'in  the  same  formation 
behind  it,  one  after  the  other. 

It  had  been  originally  intended  that  the  attack  of  the 
Guards  should  be  combined  with  that  of  the  Saxon  Corps, 
which  was  to  work  round  and  fall  on  the  flank  and  rear  of 
the  French  right.  But  there  was  as  yet  no  sign  of  the 
Saxons  coming  into  action ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  fire 
of  the  French  from  St.  Privat  had  almost  ceased,  and  Wurt- 
temberg believed  that  their  resisting  power  had  been  thor- 
oughly broken  by  the  bombardment.  So  a  few  minutes  after 
five  o'clock  he  gave  the  order  to  advance  against  the  heights. 
Out  marched  the  15,000  picked  Guardsmen  on  to  the 
gently  sloping  meadows.  At  first  the  two  great  columns 
moved  forward  as  if  they  were  at  some  ceremonial  review. 
Drums  beat  the  charge;  standards  waved  in  the  bright 
summer  sunlight,  over  the  long  rows  of  glittering  bayonets. 
The  mounted  officers  rode  proudly  in  front.  General  von 
Pape,  a  soldier  of  the  Rhineland,  at  the  head  of  the  column 
north  of  the  poplar-shaded  road ;  General  Budritzki,  a  Pole, 
leading  the  right  or  southern  column.  Over  their  heads  the 
200  guns  kept  up  their  fire  against  the  crest  of  the  ridge. 
But  Canrobert  and  his  officers  an4  soldiers  of  the  Sixth 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      177 

Corps  were  not  the  men  to  be  cowed  by  mere  bombardment, 
however  heavy  it  might  be.  As  the  German  columns  came 
on,  some  of  the  French  guns  were  run  up  again  to  the 
edge  of  the  plateau,  and,  disregarding  the  hostile  artillery 
fire,  opened  on  the  advancing  infantry.  But  they  still  moved 
onward  in  stately  march.  The  chassepot  rifle  had  a  long 
range.  When  the  heads  of  the  columns  were  still  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  down  the  slope,  a  roar  of  infantry  fire 
burst  out  along  the  crest.  Not  much  harm  was  done  to  the 
advancing  Guardsmen  at  first  by  this  long-range  fire;  but 
in  five  minutes  more,  when  the  distance  was  reduced  to  half 
a  mile,  the  Germans  began  to  fall  fast.  And  the  fire  became 
hotter  and  hotter,  for  more  and  more  rifles  were  rushed  up 
to  the  French  front,  and  Canrobert's  men  were  firing  as  fast 
as  they  could  pull  bolt,  slip  in  cartridge,  and  touch  off  trig- 
ger. They  had  a  huge  target  in  those  two  moving  masses  of 
dark  uniformed  men,  marching  up  a  green  slope  that  was 
smooth  as  table-top  and  gave  not  an  inch  of  cover.  The 
leading  battalions  of  the  Guard  broke  into  lines  of  skir- 
mishers, and  opened  fire  to  cover  the  advance ;  but,  shoot- 
ing uphill,  most  of  their  bullets  went  high  over  the  crest, 
now  wrapped  in  a  dense  bank  of  smoke,  torn  here  and  there 
by  the  red  flashes  of  cannon,  while  the  rifle  bullets  came 
down  the  hill  in  a  sweeping  leaden  hail.  Every  mounted 
ofificer  of  the  Guard  was  down,  mostly  shot,  for  only  a  few 
had  dismounted  to  lead  their  horses.  The  Rifles  of  the 
Guard,  who  led  the  left  attack,  lost  their  colonel  and  17 
officers  in  two  minutes.  Presently  every  officer  of  the 
battalion  had  fallen,  and  a  few  of  the  sergeants  were 
leading   it. 

For  about  200  yards  more  the  attack  struggled  forward 
through  the  death-dealing  storm  of  bullet  and  shell.  Then 
it  came  to  a  stop.  Even  the  bravest  could  do  no  more.  One 
man  in  every  four  had  fallen,  and  all  this  in  less  than  ten 
minutes.     The  dead  and  wounded  lay  in  heaps;    but  these 


178  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

splendid  soldiers,  if  they  could  not  advance  further,  would 
not  turn  and  retire.  They  lay  down  in  long,  huddled  lines 
where  they  stood,  and  waited  while  the  fire,  now  less  deadly, 
swept  over  them,  the  leading  ranks  answering  back.  The 
French  fusillade  slackened.  It  had  been  so  fast  and  furious 
that  most  of  the  men  had  used  up  their  sixty  rounds.  The 
pouches  of  the  dead  and  wounded  were  searched  for  cart- 
ridges. Canrobert  sent  off  frantic  messages  for  a  fresh 
supply,  and  later  on  a  small  quantity  reached  him;  but 
meanwhile  more  guns  galloped  up  to  the  ground  in  front 
of  him,  and  a  fiercer  bombardment  of  St.  Privat  began,  this 
time  from  300  cannon. 

The  battle  had  lasted  for  five  hours  and  a  half,  and  the 
French  were  still  everywhere  victorious.  When  he  saw 
the  Guards  advancing.  Von  Mannstein,  on  their  right,  had 
pressed  forward  towards  Amanvilliers ;  but  when  he  saw 
the  destruction  that  had  overtaken  the  Guards  Corps  he 
checked  his  advance,  and  continued  the  artillery  fight.  Von 
Zastrow  had  made  no  impression  on  Leboeuf  in  the  French 
left  center,  and  where  Frossard  fought  on  the  left  the  Ger- 
man attack  had  failed,  and  failed  disastrously. 

Here  the  veteran  Steinmetz  had  made  mistakes  that  cost 
him  his  command,  for  in  the  German  army  no  length  of 
service  is  allowed  even  to  palliate  a  bad  blunder.  He  saw 
the  farms  of  Moscou  and  Point  du  Jour  wrapped  in  smoke 
and  flame;  the  French  artillery  on  the  slopes  above  them 
absolutely  silenced,  even  their  rifle  fire  gradually  diminish- 
ing. He  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  French  resistance 
was  here  thoroughly  broken,  and  that  they  were  on  the 
point  of  abandoning  the  position.  He  had  with  him,  near 
Gravelotte,  the  Fourth  Uhlans  (lancers)  and  several  regi- 
ments of  cuirassiers.  He  sent  the  cavalry  commander  an 
order  in  writing,  telling  him  to  advance  by  the  ravine-like 
pass  by  which  the  Gravelotte  road  descended  into  the  Mance 
ravine,  cross  the  wooded  hollow,  push  on  to  the  captured 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      179 

farm  of  St.  Hubert,  and  there  wheel  to  the  left,  form  line, 
and  charge  the  enemy,  "  who  was  inclined  to  give  way." 
He  added  that  the  charge  was  to  be  continued  "  right  up 
to  the  glacis  of  Metz."  It  was  a  mad  order.  Even  sup- 
posing Frossard's  men  were  thoroughly  beaten,  which  was 
not  the  case,  and  though  Steinmetz  did  not  know  the  Im- 
perial Guard  was  in  reserve  behind  them,  his  map  must 
have  shown  him  that  a  pursuit,  even  of  broken  men,  towards 
Metz  would  soon  come  under  the  heavy  artillery  of  Forts 
St.  Ouentin  and  Plappeville. 

At  the  same  time  he  ordered  nearly  a  third  of  his  artil- 
lery to  cease  fire,  limber  up,  and  cross  the  Mance  valley 
with  the  cavalry.  They  were  to  open  on  the  French  at 
close  range  from  near  St.  Hubert  and,  covered  by  their  fire, 
the  infantry  was  to  advance  after  the  charging  squadrons. 
It  was  to  be  a  beautifully  combined  attack  of  all  three  arms. 
The  drawback  was  that  it  was  based  on  the  false  assumption 
that  Frossard  was  already  half  beaten. 

Lancers,  cuirassiers,  and  artillery  streamed  down  through 
the  woods  of  the  Mance  ravine,  crowded  together  on  the 
narrow  road ;  but  as  they  went  up  the  opposite  slope  and 
tried  to  form  line,  a  tornado  of  shells  and  bullets  swept 
down  on  them  from  the  hilltops  and  from  the  ground  about 
the  burning  farmsteads.  The  temporary  silence  of  so  many 
of  Steinmetz's  guns  had  allowed  Frossard  once  more  to 
bring  his  batteries  into  action,  and  his  infantry,  sheltered 
in  its  trenches,  was  not  in  the  least  inclined  to  give  way. 
On  the  contrary,  it  was  full  of  fight. 

This  terrible  burst  of  fire  came  as  a  surprise  to  the 
Germans.  At  the  head  of  the  dense  column  men  and  horses 
fell  in  heaps.  Horses  broke  away,  and  a  crowd  of  wounded 
and  unwounded  fugitives  struggled  to  reach  the  shelter  of 
the  woods  in  the  hollow.  The  teams  of  a  couple  of  artillery 
wagons  bolted  back  down  the  slope.  Bullets  and  shells 
rained  steadily  on  the  disordered  mass.     Out  of  the  crowd 


i8o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  Fourth  Uhlans  and  four  batteries  pushed  up  to  St.  Hu- 
bert. The  colonel  of  the  lancers  saw  at  once  that  it  was 
hopeless  to  charge  uphill  into  the  volcano  of  fire  along  the 
crest.  But  to  retire  was  impossible,  for  the  roadway  was 
blocked  by  the  broken  column ;  so  his  men  halted,  and  with 
splendid  courage  endured  a  heavy  loss.  The  horses  of  the 
first  gun  fell  in  a  heap,  and  it  stopped  on  the  slope.  The 
five  other  guns  of  the  battery  got  up  to  St.  Hubert,  and 
unlimbered  amid  a  hurricane  of  bursting  shells ;  but  as  the 
drivers  took  the  teams  and  limbers  away  they  could  not 
stop  them.  All  the  horses  bolted  madly  down  the  hill, 
some  of  them  wounded ;  others  were  dragged  along  dead 
in  the  traces.  The  three  other  batteries  came  into  action, 
only  to  lose  half  their  men  in  a  few  minutes. 

The  cuirassiers  and  the  rest  of  the  artillery  had  now 
been  recalled.  To  cover  their  retirement  the  Prussian  in- 
fantry pushed  up  from  the  woods  of  the  ravine;  but  now 
Frossard's  men  dashed  down  the  slope  with  the  bayonet. 
Everything  went  back  in  a  confused  panic  before  their 
charge.  The  guns  were  saved  by  running  them  down  into 
the  woods,  which  were  now  full  of  demoralized  fugitives, 
some  of  whom  had  even  thrown  away  their  arms.  Fros- 
sard's counter-attack  was  made  by  only  a  few  battalions, 
and  was  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  Germans  gave  way. 
The  purely  defensive  ideas  of  the  French  stafif  had  lost  a 
great  chance.  It  was  the  moment  for  an  attack  in  force, 
backed  up  by  the  reserves  of  the  Imperial  Giiard. 

Frossard  made  a  second  counter-attack  with  a  brigade  of 
infantry  a  little  later,  when  the  Germans  made  one  more 
attempt  to  push  forward  from  the  Mance  woods.  Again 
everything  gave  way  before  the  rush  of  the  French  bayo- 
nets, and  the  ruined  farm  of  St.  Hubert  was  retaken.  From 
the  heights  on  the  opposite  side  the  German  artillery  stopped 
the  advance  with  a  heavy  and  well-aimed  fire;  but  up  out 
of   the   valley   towards   Gravelotte  there   came  a  mass  of 


j  Aides 

Cavalri,    \^ 


Rezonvilld 


No.  13  —  Battle  of  Gravelotte,  August  18,  1870 

(Position  about  6  p.  m.) 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      i8i 

broken  troops  —  several  regiments  mixed  together  and  re- 
duced to  a  mere  mob.  The  crowd  came  running  towards 
their  own  guns,  which  they  silenced  for  a  while,  officers 
trying  in  vain  to  stop  them  with  sword  and  pistol  drawn 
to  frighten  them  into  obedience  to  orders.  Through  the 
line  of  guns  they  rushed  and  into  the  street  of  Gravelotte, 
hustling  and  nearly  dismounting  the  old  king  as  they  surged 
past  the  staff  in  disorderly  flight.  There  was  another  panic 
a  few  minutes  later  as  a  stampede  of  frightened  horses  came 
rushing  through  the  village.  On  the  German  right  there 
was  the  menace  of  disaster. 

It  has  been  truly  said  that  in  war  a  man  counts  for  more 
than  men.  On  that  July  evening,  if  the  French  army  had 
had  a  better  chief  than  Bazaine,  a  great  victory  was  within 
their  grasp.  While  the  German  right  attack  was  dissolv- 
ing into  demoralized  mobs  of  beaten  men  against  Frossard's 
defense,  Bourbaki's  magnificent  regiments  of  the  Im])crial 
Guard  were  waiting  idly  in  front  of  Fort  Pla])peville,  less 
than  five  miles  from  the  fighting  line.  Tliere  were  nine 
battalions  of  Grenadiers,  twelve  of  Voltigeurs  (light  in- 
fantry), three  of  Zouaves,  and  a  battalion  of  Chasseurs, 
with  several  batteries  of  artillery  and  machine-guns.  Had 
they  been  flung  against  the  German  right,  under  a  leader 
like  Bourbaki,  the  chances  were  that  they  would  have 
broken  it  up,  and  opened  the  way  to  a  disastrous  defeat  of 
the  whole  invading  army.  But  Bazaine  had  only  the  feeble 
idea  of  "  preventing  the  Germans  cutting  h.im  ofl^  from 
Metz  "  and  fighting  purely  defensive  battles.  He  left  the 
Guards  idle  for  more  than  four  hours,  and  then  used  them 
in  mere  driblets.  From  his  position  on  the  hill  of  St.  Ouen- 
tin  he  saw,  about  six  o'clock,  the  western  sun  shining  on 
moving  columns  of  flashing  helmets  behind  Gravelotte. 
Tlie  German  right  was  being  reinforced  in  ilir  nick  of  time. 
It  was  Fransecky's  Corps  of  Pomeranians  arriving  from 
Gorze  and  at  last  coming  into  action.     Bazaine  then  sent 


i82  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

some  of  the  Voltigeurs  of  the  Imperial  Guard  to  reinforce 
Frossard. 

By  this  time  serious  danger  was  again  threatening  the 
French  right,  about  which  Bazaine  never  seemed  to  trouble 
himself.  The  Saxons  had  at  last  reached  the  valley  of  the 
Orne,  a  little  river  that  runs  down  to  the  Moselle  below 
Metz,  cutting  a  hollow  through  the  plateau  north  of  St. 
Privat  and  Roncourt.  The  valley  should  have  been  held  by 
one  of  the  French  cavalry  divisions.  As  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Saxony  marched  into  it  he  found  nothing  to  oppose  him, 
and  sent  his  cavalry  on  in  advance  to  cut  the  railway 
and  telegraph  lines  between  Metz  and  Thionville.  Then 
he  turned  to  his  right  to  move  from  the  northward  on 
St.  Privat,  driving  a  French  detachment  out  of  Roncourt 
and  bringing  his  artillery  into  action  against  Canrobert's 
flank. 

St.  Privat  was  now  subjected  to  a  cross-fire  from  the 
Saxon  guns  to  the  northward  and  the  artillery  of  the  Guard 
to  the  westward.  Canrobert  sent  off  messages  begging  for 
ammunition,  which  only  reached  him  in  scanty  amounts, 
and  asking  for  reinforcements.  Bazaine  ordered  Bourbaki 
to  move  northwards  with  a  brigade  of  the  Guard ;  but  they 
had  started  too  late,  and  were  still  moving  up  the  forest- 
bordered  roads  towards  St.  Privat  when  its  fate  was 
decided. 

At  seven  o'clock  the  Crown  Prince  of  Saxony  ordered  his 
infantry  to  advance.  At  the  same  time  the  Guard  again 
moved  against  the  west  front  of  the  position.  In  front  and 
flank  more  than  40,000  men  had  been  launched  on  a  con- 
verging attack  upon  the  village  and  the  heights  around  it. 
It  was  only  a  comparatively  feeble  fire  that  now  met  the 
advancing  Germans,  for  the  French  were  short  of  cart- 
ridges. But  they  had  their  bayonets,  and  in  and  around 
St.  Privat  they  held  on  stubbornly  with  cold  steel,  even  after 
the  sun  went  down,  fighting  desperately  to  the  last  by  the 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      183 

light  of  the  burning  houses.  One  gallant  battalion,  the 
Ninth  Chasseurs,  held  the  walled  churchyard  with  the  bayo- 
net against  overwhelming  numbers  long  after  the  rest  of 
the  place  had  been  taken.  At  last  St.  Privat  was  won,  and 
in  the  gathering  darkness  the  French  fell  back  down  the 
forest  roads  fighting  to  the  last,  the  Grenadiers  of  the 
Guard  arriving  only  in  time  to  check  the  pursuit. 

As  the  attack  closed  on  St.  Privat,  Von  Mannstein,  with 
Voights-Rhetz's  Corps  in  support,  had  moved  upon  Aman- 
villiers.  But  here  L'Admirault  held  him  back  till  the  col- 
lapse of  Canrobert's  defense  on  his  right  exposed  his  flank, 
and  he  too  had  to  fall  back,  leaving  Amanvilliers  a  mass 
of  smoking  ruins.  On  the  northern  heights  there  was  firing 
along  the  margin  of  the  woods  long  after  dark.  But  the 
French  right  had  been  driven  in,  and  50,000  Germans  were 
established  on  the  plateau. 

On  the  other  end  of  the  position  the  French  were  still 
victorious.  Lebceuf's  position  was  intact,  and  Frossard  had 
again  beaten  ofif  a  German  attack  made  by  Fransecky's 
fresh  troops.  When  at  last  the  firing  ceased  on  the  German 
right,  though  they  had  again  taken  St.  Hubert  they  had 
failed  to  make  the  least  impression  on  the  main  position  of 
the  defense,  and  the  woods  of  the  Mance  valley  behind  the 
fighting  line  were  crowded  with  disbanded  men.  Moltke, 
Bismarck,  and  the  king  had  an  anxious  time,  until  towards 
eleven  o'clock  the  news  reached  Gravelotte  of  the  victory 
on  the  left,  which  would  make  the  whole  French  position 
untenable  next  day. 

Before  morning  the  whole  French  army  was  retiring  to 
the  protection  of  the  forts  of  Metz.  Rczonville  had  stopped 
Bazaine's  retreat ;  the  victory  of  Gravelotte  drove  the  feeble 
French  generalissimo  back  to  the  intrenched  camp,  where 
he  waited  in  almost  unbroken  inactivity  till  famine  and 
fever  ruined  his  army,  and  after  ten  weeks  the  capitulation 
of  October  27  handed  over  to  the  conquerors  a  great  for- 


i84  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

tress,  170,000  prisoners  —  including  three  marshals  of 
France  —  56  eagles,  and  more  than  1500  guns.  The  three 
days  of  August  16,  17,  and  18  were  the  critical  days  of  the 
war.     Gravelotte  was  its  decisive  victory. 

The  French  losses  in  the  battle  were  7850  killed  and 
wounded,  and  4000  prisoners  —  mostly  those  cut  off  when 
the  right  was  outflanked  and  driven  in.  The  German  losses 
were  much  heavier:  19,640  men  were  killed  or  wounded, 
including  900  officers.  The  heaviest  loss  fell  on  the  Guard 
Corps,  which  in  its  two  attacks  lost  309  officers  and  7923 
men.^ 

The  battle-field  in  front  of  and  around  St.  Privat  and 
Amanvilliers,  the  scene  of  the  fiercest  fighting  and  most 
fearful  loss  in  the  great  war,  still  bears  a  visible  record  of 
the  strife.  There  is  no  need  for  the  traveler  to  ask  for  a 
guide  to  point  out  the  line  of  the  heights  which  the  Ger- 
mans stormed  and  the  French  held  so  persistently.  It  is 
marked  by  a  scattered  line  of  monuments,  and  by  a  denser 
line  of  large,  flat-topped  mounds,  each  crowned  by  a  simple 
cross.  These  are  the  graves  of  the  German  dead.  Under 
each  of  the  mounds  some  hundreds  lie  buried.  They  rise 
like  green  islands  out  of  the  growing  corn  or  the  ridges 
of  the  cultivated  ground. 

A  gigantic  bronze  statue  of  St.  Michael,  a  stern-looking 
warrior-angel  leaning  on  a  long  sword,  looks  from  the 
summit  of  a  rock-hewn  pedestal  on  this  mile-long  cemetery. 
On  the  day  this  monument  was  unveiled  by  the  Kaiser 
William  II,  he  said  he  wished  it  to  be  a  memorial,  not  only 
of  those  who  had  fought  for  the  German  Fatherland,  but 
also  of  those  equally  brave  men  who  had  fought  there  a 
lost  battle   for   France.     The   bronze  angel   looks  towards 

^  The  Rifle  Battalion  of  the  Guard  lost  all  its  officers  and  431  men 
(44  per  cent).  The  Second  Grenadier  Regiment  lost  no  less  than  38 
officers  and  1020  men;  and  the  Fourth  Grenadiers,  27  officers  and 
902  men. 


REZONVILLE    AND    GRAVELOTTE      185 

France.  The  new  frontier  is  here  only  a  few  hundred  yards 
away.  It  crosses  the  slope  of  the  plateau  in  an  irregular 
line  marked  by  posts  at  intervals.  As  one  walks  over  the 
battle-field  one  is  now  in  France,  now  in  Germany,  and  one 
meets  carbine-armed  customs  guards  patrolling  the  roads 
and  field  paths. 

The  great  mounds  are  kept  in  perfect  order,  and  on  the 
crosses  are  wreaths  of  immortelles,  renewed  each  year  by 
German  patriotic  societies.  The  inscriptions  on  the  crosses 
give  not  the  names  of  the  dead  but  the  numbers  and  names 
of  the  regiments  to  which  they  belonged.  So  many  of  such 
a  regiment  "  here  rest  in  God  "  —  this  is  the  formula. 
Round  St.  Privat  the  graves  cluster  thickly,  and  there  are 
walled  cemeteries  with  many  monuments,  each  cemetery 
containing  the  graves  of  the  officers  and  men  of  a  regiment 
of  the  German  Guards. 

The  French  dead  lie  on  the  other  side  of  the  frontier. 
More  than  ten  years  ago  their  bones  were  disinterred  and 
transferred  to  a  stately  mortuary  chapel,  where  each  year,  a 
requiem  mass  is  celebrated  on  August  18,  in  the  presence 
of  a  congregation  of  veterans  of  the  day.  It  was  on  the 
occasion  of  the  transfer  that,  for  the  first  and  last  time  since 
1870,  a  French  general  marched  into  German  territory.  It 
was  General  Jamont,  sent  at  the  head  of  a  picked  force  of 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  to  act  as  a  guard  of  honor 
to  the  funeral  cars.  He  had  halted  his  column  on  the 
border-line  near  Ste.  Marie  aux  Chenes,  when  the  German 
commander  invited  him  to  march  across ;  and  then  French 
and  German  troops  formed  one  procession,  uniting  to  honor 
the  heroic  dead. 

The  grave-mound  cemetery  on  the  ridge  of  St.  Privat  is 
not  the  only  field  of  the  dead  round  Metz.  The  graves 
cluster  along  the  whole  battle  front  to  Gravelotte,  and  there 
are  more  of  them  southwards  by  Rezonville  and  Mars-la- 
Tour,   and   eastwards   about   Borny,   and   northeastward   in 


i86  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

front  of  Noisseville/  One  realizes  the  awful  cost  of  war 
as  one  visits  this  group  of  famous  battle-fields,  and  then 
one  must  reflect  that,  besides  the  young  lives  cut  short  by 
shell  and  bullet  and  blade,  there  were  the  crowded  hospitals, 
and  the  desolation  carried  to  tens  of  thousands  of  French 
and  German  homes,  as  women  and  children  heard  the  news 
of  the  fate  of  husband,  father,  brother,  and  son.  This  is 
the  dark  shadow  cast  far  and  wide  by  the  glory  of  the 
battle-field. 

*  The  August  battles  round  Metz  are  variously  named  by  French 
and  German  writers.  The  battle  of  the  fourteenth  is  known  to  the 
French  as  the  battle  of  Borny;  to  the  Germans  as  the  battle  of 
Colombey.  The  battle  of  the  sixteenth  is  variously  known  as  the 
battle  of  Rezonville,  Mars-la-Tour,  or  Vionville,  and  in  some  French 
histories  of  the  war  it  is  called  the  battle  of  Gravelotte.  This  name 
is  usually  given  by  German  writers  to  the  battle  of  August  i8,  which 
is  known  to  the  French  as  the  battle  of  St.  Privat. 


CHAPTER   VII 

SEDAN 
September  1,  1870 

France  had  plunged  into  the  war  with  Prussia  in  full 
confidence  of  winning  an  easy  victory.  But  in  the  very 
first  month  of  the  confiict  there  had  been  a  terrible  awaken- 
ing to  the  hard  realities  of  the  situation.  The  Army  of 
the  Rhine  had  been  beaten  and  its  collapse  in  the  field  had 
shown  that  the  military  forces  of  the  Empire,  instead  of 
being  prepared  for  war,  were  hopelessly  unready  for  it. 
There  was  shortness  of  numbers,  deficiency  in  equipment, 
utter  lack  of  information,  complete  absence  of  anything  like 
intelligent   leadership  or  efficient  staff  work. 

War  had  been  declared  on  July  19,  1870.  On  August  19 
Marshal  Bazaine  was  shut  u]^  in  Metz  with  the  main  body 
of  the  Army  of  the  Rhine,  having  lost  the  great  battle  of 
Gravelotte  the  day  before.  Marshal  MacMahon,  defeated 
at  Woerth  on  August  6,  was  retreating  on  Chalons,  followed 
up  by  the  German  Third  Army  under  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia.^  Paris  was  preparing  for  a  siege.  The  Em- 
peror Napoleon  was  at  Chalons  where  a  reserve  army  was 
being  hastily  assembled. 

Chalons  had  been  the  training  center  of  the  French  army 
since  Napoleon  III  established  a  permanent  caiup  there  at 
the  close  of  the  Crimean  War.  In  July,  1870,  every  avail- 
able man  had  been  hurried  to  the  front,  and  the  great 
camp  with  its  endless  streets  of  barrack  huts  had  been  for 
a  while  nearly  deserted,     A  few  depot  battalions  of  regi- 

*  Afterwards  the  Emperor  Frederick  of  Germany. 


i88  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

ments  remained  there,  and  to  these  were  soon  added  de- 
tachments that  had  failed  to  reach  the  front  before  the 
German  advance  cut  Metz  off  from  the  rest  of  France. 
Then,  when  it  was  reahzed  that  a  new  army  must  be  im- 
provised to  interpose  between  Paris  and  the  onward  march 
of  the  invaders,  the  numbers  rose  rapidly.  New  regiments 
of  half-trained  recruits  and  belated  reservists  were  formed 
by  drawing  on  the  depots  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry 
throughout  France.  Battalions  of  the  National  Guard  were 
called  out  for  service.  Marines  were  landed  from  the  fleet. 
A  new  army  corps,  the  Twelfth,  was  formed  under  the 
command  of  General  Lebrun.  The  First  Corps  (Ducrot), 
the  Fifth  (De  Failly),  and  the  Seventh  (Douay),  all  lately 
under  MacMahon's  command  in  Alsace,  were  ordered  to 
concentrate  on  Chalons.  It  was  hoped  that  by  the  third 
week  of  August  100,000  men  would  be  assembled,  and  it 
was  expected  that  the  French  would  offer  battle  in  the 
wide  plains  round  the  camp  —  historic  ground,  where  four- 
teen centuries  earlier  Aetius  and  Theodoric,  with  an  allied 
army  of  Romans  and  Visigoths,  had  defeated  the  barbarian 
hordes  of  Attila. 

It  was  generally  supposed  that  Bazaine  could  not  make 
a  prolonged  resistance  at  Metz.  The  supplies  there,  origi- 
nally intended  for  the  garrison  and  the  citizens,  would  be 
rapidly  consumed  now  that  the  place  had  also  to  feed  an 
army  of  170,000  men,  which  had  brought  no  considerable 
reserve  of  provisions  with  it.  Prince  Frederick  Charles 
had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  blockading  forces,  made 
up  of  the  First  Army  and  four  corps  of  the  Second  with 
two  cavalry  divisions  -^  180,000  men,  soon  raised  to  200,- 
000  by  reinforcements  from  Germany.  These  were  in- 
trenching themselves  in  commanding  positions  round  the 
place,  and  Bazaine  showed  no  disposition  to  make  a  serious 
attempt  to  break  out. 

For  the  advance  on  Chalons  and  Paris  the  Germans  had 


SEDAN  189 

the  Third  Army  under  the  Crown  Prince  Frederick  of 
Prussia,  already  following  up  MacMahon,  and  a  new  Fourth 
Army,  officially  known  as  the  Maas  Armee  or  "  Army  of 
the  Meuse,"  formed  under  the  command  of  the  Crown 
Prince  (now  the  king)  of  Saxony.  This  was  made  up  of 
troops  detached  from  the  Second  Army  and  included  the 
Guards,  and  the  Fourth  and  Twelfth  (Saxon)  Corps.  The 
Army  of  the  Meuse  and  the  Third  Army  were  to  move 
westwards  under  the  general  command  of  the  king  of  Prus- 
sia and  his  chief  of  the  staflf  Von  Moltke.  Their  combined 
force  would  be  over  200,000  men  (including  20,000  cavalry) 
with  some  700  guns. 

The  invaders  moved  westwards  in  several  parallel  columns, 
with  the  cavalry  pushed  well  out  in  advance  to  a  distance 
of  forty  or  fifty  miles.  But  these  daring  horsemen  found 
no  enemy  in  their  front,  no  detachments  of  French  cavalry 
watching  and  delaying  their  march.  When  the  leading 
squadrons  approached  Chalons  the  great  camp  was  found 
to  be  deserted,  with  several  of  its  storehouses  on  fire.  The 
French  army  had  simply  disappeared.  For  a  few  hours 
there  was  anxious  perplexity  at  the  German  headquarters. 
Had  the  French  fallen  back  on  Paris,  or  were  they  moving 
in  some  other  direction  ?  The  mystery  was  solved  by  in- 
formation gleaned  by  the  Prussian  embassies  at  London 
and  Brussels  from  unguarded  statements  telegraphed  to 
French  and  Belgian  newspapers  by  war  correspondents  with 
the  French  army  —  for  these  were  the  days  when  the  press 
censorship  had  not  yet  been  invented.  These  items  of 
news  telegraphed  to  Berlin,  and  thence  to  the  head- 
quarters in  the  field,  told  of  masses  of  French  troops 
moving  through  and  round  Rlicims  and  out  to  the  north- 
ward and  northeastward.  Promptly  Von  Moltke  issued 
orders  to  stop  the  westward  advance  and  swing  the  columns 
round  to  the  northward,  while  the  cavalry  rode  hard  in  the 
same  direction  seeking  to  gain  touch  with  the  enemy. 


I90  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

What  had  the  French  been  doing,  and  what  was  their 
present  object?  On  August  i6,  the  morning  of  the  battle 
of  Rezonville,  the  emperor  had  left  Bazaine's  army  and 
hurried  to  Chalons.  In  the  great  days  of  the  Second  Em- 
pire his  arrival  there  had  always  been  the  occasion  of 
imposing  military  display,  reviews,  field-days,  thunder  of 
saluting  cannon,  and  the  rest.  Now  he  almost  slunk  into 
his  splendidly  equipped  residence  in  the  camp,  and  when, 
next  day,  he  rode  round  it  and  saw  some  of  the  miscellane- 
ous bodies  of  troops  assembled  there  his  impressions  were 
disappointing.  The  official  gazette  declared  that  he  was 
received  with  enthusiasm.  But  the  truth  was  that  the  men 
were  mostly  sullen  and  silent.  When  cheers  were  called 
for  they  were  mingled  with  insulting  outcries.  Worst  of 
all  was  the  reception  he  had  from  the  Paris  National  Guard, 
twelve  battalions  (of  which  only  two  were  yet  armed). 
They  showed  such  a  hopeless  lack  of  discipline  and  such 
a  disaffected  spirit  that  at  a  council  of  war  next  day  it  was 
decided  that  they  would  be  not  only  useless  but  dangerous 
with  the  field  army,  and  they  were  sent  back  by  train  to 
Paris,  the  official  order  disguising  the  ugly  facts  of  the 
situation  by  declaring  that  these  citizen  soldiers  were  to 
have  the  privilege  of  being  employed  in  the  defense  of  their 
homes  and  their  native  city. 

At  this  same  council  of  war  important  decisions  were 
taken.  Marshal  MacMahon  was  appointed  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  "  Army  of  Chalons."  General  Trochu,  who  had 
been  till  now  in  command  of  the  camp,  was  named  military 
governor  of  Paris.  He  was  to  return  there,  take  charge  of 
the  defense  preparations,  and  announce  that  the  emperor 
would  shortly  arrive  in  the  capital  to  share  its  perils. 
MacMahon  with  the  Army  of  Chalons  was  to  retire  on 
Paris  and  ofifer  battle  to  the  invaders  before  its  fortifications. 
Trochu  went  to  Paris  the  same  day,  and  explained  to  the 
Empress  and  the  ministry  the  plans  adopted  by  the  council 


SEDAN 


191 


of  war.  But  now  political  considerations  came  into  play 
and  were  allowed  to  dictate  a  new  plan  of  campaign.  Wars 
are  waged  for  political  ends,  and  politics  have  therefore  to 
be  considered  in  the  general  direction  of  a  campaign,  but 
almost  without  exception  when  political  reasons  are  allowed 
completely  to  sway  the  course  of  a  campaign  the  results 
are  disastrous.  In  this  case  the  Ministers  declared  that  if 
the  Emperor  returned  to  Paris  under  the  shadow  of  defeat 
there  would  be  an  immediate  revolution ;  that  for  the  pres- 
ent he  must  stay  with  the  army,  and  that,  moreover,  the 
Army  of  Chalons  must  not  fall  back  upon  Paris;  it  must 
at  all  hazards  endeavor  to  hold  out  a  hand  to  Bazaine. 
Further,  the  Minister  of  War,  General  de  Montauban, 
Comte  de  Palikao  ^  had  a  new  plan  of  campaign  ready.  The 
Army  of  Chalons  was  to  make  a  rapid  march  on  Verdun, 
overwhelming  the  northern  columns  of  the  German  advance 
before  the  southern  contingents  could  come  to  'their  help, 
and  at  the  same  time  Bazaine  was  to  break  out  of  Metz  and 
join  hands  with  MacMahon  at  Verdun.  Unfortunately 
for  the  plan,  however,  Bazaine  was  not  at  all  ready  to  risk 
anything,  and  the  Army  of  Chalons  was  still  incomplete 
and  in  any  case  could  hardly  have  made  the  rapid  dash  to 
the  eastward  that  the  plan  required.  Palikao  was  thinking 
of  the  wonderful  strokes,  now  here,  now  there,  by  which 
the  great  Napoleon  in  1814  had  beaten  the  allies  in  detail 
and  paralyzed  their  whole  movement  on  Paris.  But  Napo- 
leon III  could  not  inspire  the  men  of  1870  as  his  uncle  had 
electrified  those  of  1814,  and  the  improvised  Army  of 
Chalons  could  not  be  compared  with  the  splendid  veterans 
of  the  First  Empire. 

Paris  and   Chalons  debated  possibilities  in  hurried   tcle- 

'  De  Montauban  was  a  good  soldier.  He  had  commanded,  in  i860, 
the  French  troops  who,  as  the  allies  of  the  English,  helped  to  capture 
Pekin.  His  title  of  Count  was  given  him  for  the  victory  won  over 
the  Chinese  at  the  bridge  of  Pa-li-kao  during  the  advance. 


192  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

graph  messages.  News  came  from  Bazaine  —  passed 
through  the  German  Unes  by  trusty  agents  and  wired  from 
Thionville.  These  brief  despatches  told  how  his  army  was 
reorganizing  after  the  battle  of  Gravelotte  and  added  that 
Bazaine  was  hoping  soon  to  attempt  a  movement  northwards 
from  Metz  that  would  enable  him  to  reach  the  line  of  forti- 
fied towns  along  the  Belgian  frontier. 

And  now  —  perhaps  on  this  suggestion  —  Palikao  and 
the  Paris  Government  proposed  a  new  plan,  which  Mac- 
Mahon  very  reluctantly  accepted.  His  own  wish  was  to 
withdraw  towards  Lille,  further  reinforce  his  army  in 
northern  France,  allow  the  Germans  to  advance  on  Paris, 
and  then  fall  upon  them.  But  Palikao  told  him  that  to 
retire  to  the  northwestward  would  be  to  abandon  Bazaine. 
At  all  costs  he  must  try  to  rescue  Metz  and  the  Army  of 
the  Rhine.  He  was  therefore  directed  to  march  from 
Chalons  arid  Rheims  northeastwards  to  Montmedy  on  the 
Belgian  frontier,  then  eastwards  by  the  line  of  old  frontier 
fortresses  towards  Thionville  north  of  Metz.  He  would 
have  to  make  forced  marches  in  order  to  gain  at  the  outset 
so  much  of  a  start  that  the  Germans,  when  they  discovered 
the  movement,  would  not  be  able  to  interpose  between  him 
and  Metz.  Bazaine  would  be  ready  to  cooperate  with  him. 
The  besieging  army  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  would  be 
caught  between  hammer  and  anvil,  then  the  combined  armies 
of  Bazaine  and  MacMahon  would  be  on  the  line  of  com- 
munications of  the  main  German  field  army  between  it  and 
the  Rhine  and  outnumbering  it  by   50  per  cent. 

The  plan  supposed  that  the  Army  of  Chalons  could  make 
a  rapid  march,  combine  its  operations  perfectly  with  those 
of  Bazaine,  and  completely  destroy  the  force  besieging  Metz 
before  the  main  German  army  could  intervene  in  any  way. 
There  was  just  a  chance  of  success,  but  failure  would  mean 
disaster  and  the  loss  of  the  only  army  France  now  had  in 
the  field.     MacMahon  thought  the  chance  of  success  small. 


SEDAN  193 

the  danger  of  disaster  enormous,  but  he  accepted  the  plan 
and  tried  to  execute  it,  hoping  that,  if  things  did  not  de- 
velop as  the  Paris  Government  anticipated,  he  might,  before 
he  had  gone  too  far,  still  save  the  Army  of  Chalons  by  a 
retreat  to  the  northwestward. 

The  Army  of  Chalons  began  its  adventurous  march  from 
Rheims  on  August  23.  The  total  force  was  about  130,000 
men,  organized  in  four  army  corps  (First,  Ducrot;  Fifth, 
De  Failly;  Seventh,  Felix  Douay ;  Twelfth,  Lebrun)  and 
two  cavalry  divisions  (heavy  cavalry,  De  Bonnemains ; 
light  cavalry,  De  Margueritte).  The  whole  of  the  First 
and  part  of  the  Fifth  Corps  had  already  suffered  severely 
in  action.  The  losses  in  men  had  been  partly  repaired  by 
drafts  of  recruits  and  reservists  from  the  depots.  The  loss 
of  material  and  equipment  had  been  less  fully  made  good. 
Some  of  the  batteries  had  not  all  their  guns ;  there  was  a 
deficiency  of  transport ;  in  several  regiments  only  half  the 
men  had  knapsacks.  All  the  three  corps  that  had  made  the 
long  retreat  from  Alsace  had  suffered  from  fatigue,  irregular 
rations,  and  exposure  to  weather.  The  men  were  physically 
run  down  and  depressed  with  the  sense  of  failure.  Lcbrun's 
Corps  (the  Twelfth)  was  made  up  of  a  division  of  regulars 
that  at  the  outset  of  the  war  had  been  posted  on  the  Pyre- 
nean  frontier  (while  there  was  still  some  fear  that  Spain 
might  act  as  the  ally  of  Germany)  ;  a  division  of  marines, 
good  solid  troops ;  and  a  division  of  improvised  regiments 
of  depot  troops  and  recruits.  These  last,  like  the  new  levies 
drafted  into  the  other  corps,  were  rather  an  element  of 
weakness.  The  recruits  were  untrained,  and  many  of  the 
reservists  had  never  handled  the  new  rifle.  At  Chalons  they 
were  taken  to  the  ranges  and  each  man  fired  five  shots. 
This  was  all  the  musketry  training  they  received. 

In  the  first  two  marches  good  progress  was  made.  Then 
began  the  difficulties  that  might  have  been  expected  with 
troops  who  were  wearied  and  dispirited  at  the  very  outset. 


194  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

It  was  found  that  after  the  first  spurt  the  men  could  not 
march  far  or  fast  and  matters  were  made  worse  by  the 
blunders  of  the  staff.  Columns  of  troops  blocked  each 
other's  way.  Trains  of  wagons  made  the  roads  impassable 
for  hours.  Corps  and  divisions  reached  their  bivouacs  late, 
or  halted  where  they  ought  not  have  been,  so  that  next  day's 
orders  reached  them  late.  The  march  of  the  army  was 
dragging  and  falling  into  disarray  when  everything  de- 
pended on  a  swift  and  ordered  advance  to  the  northeast- 
ward. On  account  of  difficulties  of  transport  MacMahon 
lengthened  the  distance  to  be  covered  by  bringing  the  gen- 
eral line  of  advance  nearer  to  that  of  the  Mezieres  railway. 
Worst  of  all  he  kept  his  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  not  on  his 
right  where  they  might  have  been  used  to  screen  the  move- 
ment by  driving  in  the  German  patrols,  but  on  his  left, 
where  they  were  useless.  Throughout  the  war  the  Imperial 
generals  seemed  to  think  cavalry  was  a  thing  to  be  kept 
for  charging  on  the  battle-field  but  not  to  be  used  on  the 
line  of  march.* 

The  German  war  leaders  knew  better.  As  their  armies 
turned  northwards  the  cavalry  were  flung  out  along  every 
road  to  feel  for  MacMahon,  and  soon  parties  of  daring 
horsemen  showed  themselves  on  the  flank  of  Douay's  corps. 
Driven  off  by  rifle  fire  they  rode  away  only  to  reappear 
again  and  again,  hanging  upon  the  flank  of  the  line  of 
march  in  ever-increasing  numbers.  Now  was  the  time 
when  the  French  cavalry  should  have  been  sent  to  drive 

*  In  a  memorandum  written  after  the  war  Marshal  MacMahon 
himself  attributed  the  neglect  of  a  proper  use  of  the  cavalry  in  the 
war  of  1870  for  securing  the  safety  of  the  army  and  keeping  watch 
on  the  enemy,  to  habits  acquired  in  Algerian  frontier  warfare.  In 
Algeria  the  cavalry  used  to  make  a  short  ride  out  to  the  front  before 
the  march  started  to  see  that  the  near  ground  was  clear,  and  then 
it  remained  with  the  infantry  ready  to  charge  in  action.  The  actual 
scouting  was  left  to  native  auxiliaries  who  were  relied  upon  to  keep 
in  touch  with  the  enemv. 


SEDAN  195 

• 
them  back  and  find  out  what  was  behind  them,  but  instead 
of  this  Douay  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  he  was  about 
to  be  attacked  in  force  and  for  a  whole  day  halted  his 
corps  in  order  of  battle,  this  too  at  a  time  when  every  hour 
of  steady  marching  was  of  value.  All  the  while  he  had 
in  his  front  only  a  few  squadrons  of  German  cavalry. 

MacMahon  now  thought  that  he  was  too  late  and  began 
a  retirement  to  the  northwestward.  But  he  had  no  sooner 
reported  this  to  Paris  than  he  received  positive  orders  to 
resume  the  original  direction.     So  another  day  was  lost. 

The  heads  of  his  columns  were  now  nearing  the  crossings 
of  the  Meuse.  He  had  intended  to  pass  the  river  at  Stenay 
and  Dun,  but  he  found  that  those  places  were  already  oc- 
cupied by  the  enemy.  He  changed  the  direction  of  his 
march,  bringing  it  still  nearer  the  Belgian  frontier,  and  his 
vanguard  secured  the  river  crossing  at  Mouzon.  He  now 
knew  that  the  Germans  must  be  close  on  his  right  flank 
and  nearly  heading  him  off.  But  he  had  only  the  vaguest 
information  as  to  their  numbers  and  positions,  and  sup- 
posed he  had  only  to  do  with  the  Crown  Prince's  Army. 
Of  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  he  seems  not  even  to  have  sus- 
pected  even  the  existence. 

On  August  30  there  was  a  disaster.  The  French  army 
was  partly  across  the  Meuse.  The  Seventh  Corps  (De 
Failly)  was  lagging  behind  and  farthest  to  the  south  of  the 
troops  who  had  not  yet  crossed.  On  the  twenty-ninth  it 
had  made  a  long  march  and  had  halted  for  the  night  at 
Beaumont,  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  margin  of 
a  wide  forest  tract,  one  of  the  southern  outlying  woods  of 
the  forest  country  of  the  Ardennes.  Next  morning  De 
Failly  decided  to  make  a  late  start  and  give  his  men  a  rest. 
No  patrols  were  sent  into  the  woods,  the  only  outposts  were 
close  in  to  the  camp,  and  the  general  treated  as  idle  gossip 
the  reports  of  peasants  who  told  him  that  masses  of  the 
,  enemy's  troops  had  entered  the  woods  from  the  southward. 


196  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

• 

Suddenly  from  the  margin  of  the  forest  hostile  artillery- 
opened  fire  on  the  camp.  Men  were  shot  down  as  they 
rushed  to  arms.  Horses  of  the  artillery  teams  were  killed 
as  the  gunners  were  harnessing  them.  The  surprise  was 
complete  and  the  battle  that  followed  was  a  series  of  at- 
tempts to  form  something  like  a  fighting  line  and  stem  for 
a  while  the  victorious  rush  of  the  Germans.  The  Seventh 
Corps  was  hustled  back  towards  Mouzon  with  the  loss  of 
thousands  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  leaving  42  guns 
and  much  of  its  transport  behind  it.  The  survivors  were 
for  a  while  little  better  than  a  disorganized,  dispirited  mob, 
and  as  they  crossed  the  river  they  brought  confusion  and 
disorganization  into  the  ranks  of  other  corps. 

Next  day  MacMahon  found  that  he  was  definitely  headed 
ofif  by  the  enemy's  advance,  and  he  began  to  retire  west- 
wards. On  the  afternoon  of  August  31  he  halted  at  Sedan. 
He  told  the  Emperor  and  the  generals  that  he  would  give 
his  troops  a  day's  rest  on  September  i  and  on  the  second 
continue  his  retreat  by  Mezieres. 

MacMahon  had  a  brilliant  record  of  service  in  Algeria, 
the  Crimea,  and  Italy,  and  the  reputation  of  being  a  skilled 
as  well  as  a  daring  leader  of  men.  This  makes  it  all  the 
more  difficult  to  understand  his  conduct  of  the  brief  cam- 
paign of  the  Chalons  Army.  He  seemed  to  be  no  longer 
the  same  man.  It  was  strange  that  from  first  to  last  he 
appeared  possessed  by  the  idea  that  if  he  was  to  succeed 
it  must  be  by  eluding  and  outmarching  the  Germans  with- 
out fighting  them.  This  was  all  the  more  remarkable  be- 
cause until  the  final  battle  he  had  no  idea  that  they  so 
largely  outnumbered  his  own  forces.  One  would  have 
thought  that  he  would  have  driven  in  the  German  cavalry 
screen  and  rejoiced  in  the  opportunity  of  making  a  dash  at 
the  heads  of  the  enemy's  columns,  or  that  when  he  found 
himself  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse  with  the  enemy 
partly  in  his  front,  partly  far  away  on  the  other  bank,  he 


SEDAN  197 

would  have  tried  to  fight  his  way  through  bv  beating  off 
those  who  barred  his  advance.  But  at  this  moment  he 
seemed  paralyzed  by  the  disaster  of  Beaumont,  and  even 
when  he  drew  back  on  the  road  to  Mezieres,  instead  of 
making  every  effort  to  eft'ect  his  retreat  as  rapidly  as  might 
be,  he  halted  in  what  was  a  hopeless  position. 

Sedan  is  a  small  manufacturing  town.  Within  its  walls 
and  in  the  villages  along  the  Meuse  there  are  a  number  of 
cloth  factories.  The  town  is  traversed  by  the  river  and 
surrounded  by  old  fortifications  planned  by  the  celebrated 
Vauban  in  the  days  of  Louis  XIV.  With  the  longer  range 
of  modern  cannon  the  old  citadel  and  the  ramparts  had 
long  been  useless  for  war,  for  from  the  surrounding  heights 
the  place  could  be  commanded  on  all  sides  by  hostile 
fire. 

The  heights  north  of  the  town  form  a  kind  of  plateau, 
roughly  V-shaped  in  general  outline,  with  the  opening  of 
the  V  towards  the  town,  and  the  point  at  the  hill  above  the 
village  of  Bly,  crowned  with  a  wayside  cross  and  known 
in  the  narratives  of  the  battle  as  the  Calvary  of  Illy.  The 
plateau  is  furrowed  by  streams  and  has  in  places  detached 
clumps  of  wood.  On  its  western  side  the  Givonne  brook 
runs  through  a  deep  valley.  On  the  other  side  the  plateau 
is  bounded  by  the  Floing  valley.  The  Mezieres  road  crosses 
this  hollow,  and  at  the  hamlet  of  St.  Albert  passes  through 
a  narrow  defile  between  the  steep  hills  and  a  sharp  bend 
of  the  Meuse.  Northwards  the  ground  rises  to  the  great 
forest  of  the  Ardennes,  through  which  runs  the  Belgian 
frontier  line. 

MacMahon,  with  his  army  halted  on  the  Sedan  plateau, 
was  thus  on  a  narrow  stretch  of  ground  between  the  Meuse 
and  the  frontier.  Eastward  the  way  was  already  barred 
by  the  German  army.  Westward  his  road  to  safety  lay  by 
the  defile  of  St.  Albert.  Strange  to  say  he  never  seems 
even  to  have  thought  of  the  necessity  of  securing  this  pass. 


198  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Orders  were,  however,  given  to  blow  up  the  bridge  over 
the  Metise  at  Donchery,  beyond  the  defile.  A  party  of 
engineers  with  tools  and  explosives  left  Sedan  by  the  last 
train  that  got  through  to  Mezieres.  At  Donchery  the  party 
left  the  train,  but  it  started  again  before  they  had  taken 
out  the  tools  and  the  gunpowder.  Even  then  it  does  not 
seem  to  have  occurred  to  any  one  that  the  train  might  be 
recalled.  The  bridge  was  left  standing.  No  attempt  was 
made  to  destroy  the  other  bridge  above  Sedan  near  Bazeilles 
till  it  was  too  late.  The  French  staff  seem  to  have  done 
all  that  was  possible  to  facilitate  the  coming  operations  of 
the  Germans. 

When  the  invaders  temporarily  abandoned  the  advance 
on  Paris  and  wheeled  to  the  northward,  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse,  moving  on  the  right  and  slightly  in  advance  of  the 
Third  Army,  had  got  across  the  Meuse  before  MacMahon. 
The  Third  Army  had  pressed  upon  the  flank  of  the  French, 
and  on  the  eve  of  Sedan  was  to  the  southward  of  the  for- 
tress on  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse.  As  MacMahon  re- 
tired upon  Sedan  on  August  31,  the  Saxon  Prince  with  the 
Meuse  Army  followed  him  up,  and  in  the  afternoon  received 
orders  from  Von  Moltke  to  march  at  daybreak  next  morn- 
ing from  the  eastward  against  the  positions  held  by  the 
French  north  of  Sedan,  sending  his  cavalry  out  on  the  right 
to  prevent  the  enemy  retiring  by  the  woods  into  the  neutral 
territory  of  Belgium. 

At  the  same  time  the  Prussian  Crown  Prince  was  directed 
to  cross  the  Meuse  below  Sedan  next  day  with  the  greater 
part  of  his  force  and  occupy  the  high  ground  about  Vrigne 
aux  Bois.  He  was  to  prevent  the  French  army  escaping 
westwards  towards  Mezieres  —  no  very  serious  task,  for 
MacMahon's  Army  would  be  moving  by  difficult  roads  in 
hilly  country  with  the  Meuse  Army  pressing  on  their  rear. 
The  two  Bavarian  corps  of  the  Crown  Prince's  Army  were 
to  seize  the  crossing  of  the  river  above  Sedan  and  cooperate 


SEDAN  199 

on  this  side  with  the  attack  of  the  Meuse  Army.  A  large 
number  of  batteries  were  to  be  placed  in  position  on  the 
hills  overlooking  Sedan  on  the  left  bank.  From  this  point 
their  fire  could  search  the  French  positions  north  of  the 
place. 

The  First  Bavarian  Corps  had  moved  down  to  the  river 
opposite  the  village  of  Bazeilles  in  the  afternoon,  found  the 
railway  bridge  still  standing,  seized  it  after  a  brief  skirmish, 
and  advanced  against  the  southern  side  of  Bazeilles.  Here 
their  advance  was  stopped  by  the  Marines  of  Lebrun's  corps. 
But  the  Bavarian  batteries  shelled  the  village  and  set  several 
houses  on  fire. 

At  9  p.  M.  Von  Moltke  sent  another  order  to  the  Crown 
Prince.  He  feared  that  the  French  might  begin  their  re- 
treat under  the  cover  of  darkness,  and  he  therefore  directed 
the  Prince  to  cross  at  Donchery  in  the  night  and  be  ready 
to  move  forward  or  to  the  high  ground  beyond  the  river 
at  daybreak.  The  German  cavalry  had  already  seized  the 
bridge,  which  they  found  intact  and  undefended.  A  pon- 
toon bridge  was  thrown  across  the  river  below  it,  and  mov- 
ing off  before  midnight  the  Crown  Prince  had  a  considerable 
force  massed  on  the  further  bank  by  daybreak. 

When  Von  Moltke  wrote  this  final  order  he  turned  to 
the  staff  officer  who  was  to  ride  off  with  it  and  said  to  him, 
"  Now  the  trap  is  closed  and  the  mouse  is  in  it." 

During  the  day  MacMahon  had  told  one  of  his  generals 
that  the  enemy  could  not  be  more  than  70,000  or  80,000 
strong,  that  they  were  all  to  the  eastward,  that  is,  to  the 
rearward  of  his  intended  movement,  and  that  there  was  no 
doubt  about  the  army  easily  reaching  Mezieres  on  Septem- 
ber 2.  The  most  he  expected  in  the  way  of  fighting  was 
a  rearguard  action.  As  the  troops  reached  the  ground 
north  of  Sedan,  two  corps  took  up  positions  on  the  west 
side  of  Givonne  valley  so  as  to  be  ready  to  bar  the  pursuit 
of   the   Germans  —  Ducrot   with   the   First   Corps   on   the 


200  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

heights  above  Daigny;  Lebrun  with  the  Twelfth  Corps  on 
his  left  holding  the  heights  south  of  Daigny  and  the  large 
village  of  Bazeilles  in  the  low  ground  near  the  Meuse. 
Douay  with  the  Seventh  Corps  had  pushed  on  to  the  west- 
ward and  halted  on  the  flat-topped  hills  above  Floing.  The 
cavalry  divisions  were  behind  Douay's  Corps,  and  close  to 
Sedan  lay  the  Fifth  Corps,  hardly  yet  recovered  from  its 
rout  of  two  days  before.  During  the  day  General  Wimp- 
fenn,  who  had  joined  the  army  on  the  thirtieth,  produced 
an  order  from  Palikao  appointing  him  to  the  command  of 
the  Fifth  Corps  and  superseding  the  unlucky  De  Failly. 

At  half  past  three  in  the  afternoon  the  Bavarian  attack 
on  Bazeilles  had  warned  the  marshal  that  he  was  not  to 
be  allowed  by  the  enemy  to  have  a  day  of  rest  for  the  army 
under  the  walls  of  Sedan.  A  little  later  an  old  soldier, 
who  lived  near  Donchery,  came  in  with  news  that  masses 
of  the  enemy  were  moving  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river. 
MacMahon  held  an  informal  council  of  war.  He  appears 
still  to  have  failed  to  realize  his  danger,  and  instead  of 
taking  prompt  measures  for  securing  the  hne  of  retreat 
westwards  by  St.  Albert  and  Vrigne  aux  Bois  and  barring 
the  river  crossing  below  the  town,  all  that  was  done  was 
to  make  arrangements  for  defending  the  ground  on  which 
the  army  had  halted.  Douay  pointed  out  that  he  was  not 
strong  enough  to  hold  the  west  side  of  the  position  from 
Floing  to  Illy,  and  Wimpfenn  was  directed  to  reinforce 
his  line  with  a  division  of  the  Fifth  Corps.  Probably  be- 
cause he  still  persisted  in  his  belief  that  the  enemy  was 
not  in  force  the  marshal  awaited  the  coming  battle  in  the 
blind  confidence  of  optimistic  ignorance.  He  had  no  idea 
that  he  was  outnumbered  two  to  one,  and  that  while  he 
slept  that  night  the  Germans  were  already  closing  his  one 
doubtful  way  to  safety. 

The  night  was  fine  and  warm,  with  hardly  a  breath  of 
wind,  and  as  the  dawn  came  a  dense  haze  covered  all  the 


SEDAN  20I 

lower  ground.  Before  sunrise  the  old  king  of  Prussia  was 
in  the  saddle.  He  rode  from  his  headquarters  at  Vendresse 
to  the  heights  between  the  villages  of  Fresnois  and  Wadelin- 
court.  He  had  with  him  a  mounted  escort,  a  numerous 
staff,  and  several  foreign  officers  and  war  correspondents. 
Among  these  privileged  spectators  were  the  American  gen- 
eral, Sheridan,  and  his  aide-de-camp,  Colonel  Forsyth.  Be- 
side the  king  rode  -the  three  men  who  were  the  makers  of 
the  German  Empire,  the  Chancellor  Von  Bismarck  in  his 
white  cuirassier  uniform,  the  war  minister,  Von  Roon,  and 
the  "  organizer  of  victory,"  Von  Moltke.  Battery  after 
battery  of  the  Bavarian  Second  Corps  came  clattering  up  the 
hill  and  unlimbered  with  the  muzzles  pointing  northwards, 
but  the  haze  still  hid  their  destined  targets.  But  out  of  the 
mist  on  the  right  towards  Bazeilles  came  the  sharp  crackle 
of  musketry  and  the  jarring  blast  of  the  French  machine- 
guns.  Von  der  Tann,  with  the  First  Bavarian  Corps,  was 
hard  at  it  with  Lebrun's  Marines. 

As  the  sun  rose  higher  the  mists  cleared,  and  from  the 
king's  position  on  the  hillto]i  the  battle-field  was  spread  out 
like  a  panorama.  Below  the  steep  slope  in  front  ran  the 
Meuse  with  the  railway  line  and  road  beside  it.  To  the  left 
Sedan  lay,  a  huddle  of  white  houses  and  big  factories,  with 
the  high  church  tower  rising  above  them,  the  old  ramparts 
and  ditches  girdling  it  round,  and  the  tricolor  flying  from 
its  citadel.  Beyond,  the  hills  rose  in  a  long  slope  to  the 
dark  woods  of  the  Ardennes,  hills  furrowed  with  deep  val- 
leys, dotted  with  clumps  of  wood,  with  the  village  church 
towers  marking  out  the  chief  points.  Telescope  and  field- 
glass  showed  plainly  where  the  iMcnch  were  i)osted. 

So  far  the  only  fighting  was  at  Bazeilles,  where  the 
dense  fog  of  white  powder  smoke  and  the  darker  smoke  of 
burning  houses  showed  the  fight  was  hot.  y\way  to  the 
westward  the  Crown  Prince's  Corps  were  pouring  north- 
wards from  Donchery.    They  had  marched  in  the  night  and 


202  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

already  would  soon  close  the  way  on  that  side  and  then 
come  into  action  with  Douay's  Corps.  Eastwards,  still  hid- 
den by  the  woods  beyond  the  Givonne  valley,  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Saxony  was  advancing-  with  the  Army  of  the 
Meuse  to  attack  the  east  front  of  MacMahon's  positions. 
The  Saxon  Prince  had  massed  his  horsemen  on  the  right. 
Then  came  the  Prussian  Guards,  then  his  own  Saxons  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  and  next  the  Fourth,  men  of  the  cen- 
tral German  lands  of  the  middle  Elbe,  Thuringia,  and  the 
Saxon  borders. 

The  first  shot  had  been  fired  at  4.30  A.  m.,  near  Bazeilles, 
and  for  some  hours  the  only  fighting  was  round  the  vil- 
lage. The  Germans  had  brought  several  batteries  into 
action  against  it  on  both  sides  of  the  river,  and  along  the 
south  front  of  the  place  there-  was  a  fierce  struggle.  The 
fight  swayed  backwards  and  forwards,  as  the  Bavarians, 
pressed  into  the  streets  and  gardens,  were  driven  out  and 
renewed  their  attack.  The  villagers,  encouraged  by  their 
cure,  joined  in  the  defense  with  a  variety  of  weapons,  from 
rifles  to  shot-guns.  It  was  only  with  heavy  loss  that  the 
invaders  at  last  gained  a  footing  in  the  south  part  of  the 
place.  Their  attempts  to  work  round  it  to  the  eastward 
were  checked  by  Lebrun's  men  aided  by  some  of  Ducrot's 
batteries  thrown  forward  to  the  high  ground  east  of  Daigny. 
In  this  local  engagement  the  French  were  at  first  un- 
doubtedly successful. 

But  while  this  struggle  for  the  village  was  in  progress, 
important  events  had  occurred.  MacMahon  had  ridden  out 
of  Sedan  just  before  5  a.  m.  He  rode  towards  the  fight  by 
the  high  ground  above  the  Balan-Bazeilles  road.  Accord- 
ing to  his  own  account  he  meant  to  see  for  himself  what  was 
happening  and  then  decide  whether  to  continue  the  re- 
sistance or  order  a  retreat.  But  he  also  admits  in  the 
same  note  on  the  day  of  vSedan  that  he  had  still  no  idea 
that  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  was  moving  against  his  posi- 


SEDAN  203 

tions  from  the  eastward.  On  the  heights  above  La  Moncelle 
he  came  under  the  fire  of  the  German  batteries  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Givonne.  A  shell  exploded  close  to  him.  One 
fragment  of  it  lodged  in  his  thigh,  another  broke  the  fore- 
leg of  his  horse,  which  fell  with  him.  At  first  he  thought 
he  was  only  slightly  wounded,  but  as  he  tried  to  rise  he 
fainted.  When  he  revived  he  felt  that  he  could  do  no 
more,  and  he  told  his  chief  of  the  staff  to  send  word  to 
Ducrot  that  he  was  badly  wounded  and  had  transferred 
the  command  to  him.  The  first  officer  who  rode  off  to  look 
for  Ducrot  was  himself  put  out  of  action  by  a  wound  of 
which  he  died.  A  second  message  despatched  later  reached 
Ducrot  shortly  before  7  a.  m. 

General  Ducrot  says  in  his  narrative  of  the  day  that  he 
had  not  seen  the  marshal  since  August  30  and  had  received 
no  information  or  orders  from  him.  But  he  had  made  up 
his  mind  that  the  only  hope  for  the  army  lay  in  a  prompt 
retreat  to  Mezieres,  and  the  halt  before  Sedan  had  made 
him  all  the  more  anxious  because  he  had  already  marked  as 
the  danger-point,  that  must  be  passed  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  the  narrow  gap  between  the  bend  of  the  Meuse 
at  Iges  and  the  Belgian  frontier,  a  space  of  less  than  three 
miles,  which  he  felt  sure  the  Germans  would  try  to  close. 
He  knew  the  enemy  was  in  force  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river,  and  messages  from  the  iiiaircs  of  villages  to  the  cast- 
ward  had  warned  him  of  another  army  moving  towards 
Sedan  from  that  direction  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse. 

As  soon  as  he  was  informed  that  he  had  become  com- 
mander-in-chief he  acted  on  the  idea  that  he  had  been 
thinking  out  for  the  last  two  days.  He  at  once  issued  orders 
for  a  general  retirement,  the  first  stage  in  which  was  to  be 
the  massing  of  the  army  on  the  heights  above  Illy.  He  then 
hoped  to  march  by  the  hill-tracks  along  the  eds:;c  of  the 
forest  of  the  Ardennes  and  gain  the  Mezieres  road  beyond 
Vrigne  aux  Bois.     Lebrun's  Corps  was  to  act  as  a  rear- 


204  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

guard  and  keep  off  the  pursuit  of  the  Bavarians.  The  dan- 
gerous gap  north  of  the  bend  of  the  Meuse  at  Iges  was  not 
yet  closed ;  the  Army  of  the  Meuse  had  not  yet  come  into 
action  to  the  eastward.  He  beheved  that,  although  there 
would  still  be  some  hard  fighting,  he  could  get  through, 
crossing  the  front  of  the  Crown  Prince's  advance  and  hold- 
ing back  the  pursuit. 

The  weak  point  of  the  scheme  was  that  there  were  no 
good  roads  in  the  direction  by  which  he  would  have  to 
move,  and  the  tracks  of  the  forest  mostly  led,  not  east  and 
west,  but  northwards  into  Belgium.  But  Ducrot  always 
maintained  that  if  he  had  been  allowed  to  carry  out  his 
movement  there  might  have  been  heavy  loss,  convoys  and 
batteries  might  have  had  to  be  abandoned,  but  the  catas- 
trophe of  Sedan  would  have  been  avoided  and  some  60,000 
saved  from  the  wreck  would  have  reached  Mezieres  and 
then  retired  on  Paris.  At  the  very  worst  the  army  would 
have  taken  refuge  in  Belgium. 

He  communicated  his  orders  personally  to  Lebrun.  The 
commander  of  the  Twelfth  Corps,  feeling  he  was  holding 
his  own  against  the  Bavarians,  was  reluctant  to  obey  and 
argued  the  point,  but  Ducrot  insisted  and  the  retirement 
from  Bazeilles  began,  and  simultaneously  the  troops  of  the 
First  Corps,  thrown  out  in  front  of  Daigny,  began  to  fall 
back.  The  withdrawal  from  the  village  was  delayed  by  the 
necessity  of  maintaining  what  was  now  a  rearguard  action 
with  its  assailants.  The  French  marines  were  very  re- 
luctant to  let  go  the  houses  and  barricades  they  held,  and 
the  villagers  had  no  idea  of  giving  up  the  fight.  It  was, 
therefore,  very  slowly  that  the  Bavarians  pressed  forward. 
On  the  left  of  the  village  the  retirement  was  more  rapid, 
alid  the  Germans  were  soon  in  possession  of  the  ground 
up  to  the  Givonne  and  "the  hamlet  of  La  Moncelle. 

During  these  slow  beginnings  of  the  retirement  the  right 
and  center  of  the  Meuse  Army  began  tO  reach  the  heights 


SEDAN  205 

east  of  the  Givonne.  Some  of  the  Twelfth  (Saxon)  Corps 
were  already  in  action.  The  (juard  arrived  at  Villers,  Cer- 
nay,  and  sent  its  batteries  galloping  forward  to  the  crest  of 
the  slopes  in  front.  The  Saxon  artillery  began  to  come  into 
line  on  their  left,  opposite  Daigny.  On  the  other  side  of 
the  battle-field  the  head  of  the  long  column  formed  by  the 
main  body  of  the  Crown  Prince's  Army  was  coming  through 
the  defile  of  St.  Albert  and  detachments  of  his  troops  were 
securing  the  high  ground  north  of  it. 

If  the  French  were  to  effect  their  retreat  not  a  moment 
was  to  be  lost.  Ducrot  was  watching  the  movement  from 
the  high  ground  above  Daigny  when  a  staff  officer  brought 
him  a  note,  hurriedly  written  in  pencil  and  signed  by  Gen- 
eral de  Wimpfenn.     It  ran  thus : 

"  The  enemy  is  falling  back  on  our  right.  I  am  sending  Grand- 
champ's  Division  to  Lebrun.  I  think  there  ought  to  be  no  question 
of  our  retiring  at  this  moment.  I  hold  a  letter  from  the  minister  of 
war  giving  me  the  command  of  the  army,  but  we  will  talk  of  this 
after  the  battle.  You  are  nearer  the  enemy  than  I  am.  Use  all 
your  energy  and  knowledge  to  gain  a  victory  over  an  enemy  who  is 
in  a  disadvantageous  position.  Therefore  while  taking  care  of  the 
line  intrusted  to  you  support  Lebrun  vigorously." 

Ducrot  was  thunderstruck.  De  Wimpfenn  was  taking  the 
command  out  of  his  hands  and  at  the  same  time  sending 
him  orders  that  showed  the  most  absolute  delusion  as  to 
the  real  position  of  affairs.  Presently  De  Wimpfenn  rode 
up,  and  Ducrot  tried  to  persuade  him  to  withdraw  his  order. 
It  was  evident  that  the  new  commander  had  the  strange  idea 
that  only  the  Bavarian  attack  on  Bazeilles  need  be  con- 
sidered. To  Ducrot's  suggestion  that  the  Germans  were 
moving  to  cut  the  line  of  retreat  he  replied.  "  You  are  ex- 
aggerating the  difficulty.  There  are  only  some  small  detach- 
ments of  the  enemy  on  that  side."  I'ut  Ducrot  asked  him 
if  he  was  not  aware  that  masses  of  Germans  were  also 
moving  through  the  country  to  the  eastwaril.  marching  on 
Illy.    "  If  they  once  seize  Illy  the  position  is  hopeless,"  said 


2o6  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Ducrot.  "  Illy  —  where  or  what  is  Illy  ?  "  asked  Wimpfenn. 
Ducrot,  one  of  the  few  officers  who  had  a  map,  opened  it  and 
pointed  to  the  height  where,  a  few  hours  later,  the  two  arms 
of  the  enveloping  German  movement  united  and  closed  the 
ring  of  fire  and  steel  round  the  doomed  Army  of  Chalons. 
Wimpfenn  refused  to  argue.  He  told  Ducrot  what  they  had 
to  do  was  "  to  throw  the  Bavarians  into  the  Meuse."  "  I 
shall  go  to  Carignan,  not  to  Mezieres,"  he  said.  "  We  don't 
want  a  retreat,  we  need  a  victory."  "  We  shall  be  lucky  if 
we  manage  a  retreat,"  replied  Ducrot  and  rode  away  to  obey 
what  he  rightly  regarded  as  a  fatal  order. 

So  in  less  than  three  hours  the  unfortunate  army  had 
three  commanders  in  succession.  Ducrot  certainly  showed 
no  lack  of  zeal  in  obeying.  He  stopped  the  retreat  and  per- 
sonally directed  a  counter-attack  which  for  a  while  recovered 
some  of  the  lost  ground.  Lebrun  recaptured  most  of  Ra- 
zeilles.  Ducrot  flung  a  division  across  the  Givonne  near 
Daigny,  and  his  Zouaves  and  linesmen  came  on  with  such 
a  dash  that  the  Germans  gave  way,  and  several  of  their  bat- 
teries went  galloping  back  to  the  shelter  of  the  woods.  But 
the  Guards  and  the  Saxons  were  now  coming  rapidly 
into  action,  and  before  the  steady  fire  of  their  guns  and 
the  advance  of  their  dense  firing  lines  the  French  were 
gradually  driven  back  again  over  the  Givonne. 

In  and  around  the  burning  village  of  Bazeilles  there  was 
desperate  fighting  at  close  quarters,  but  along  the  heights 
east  of  the  Givonne  valley  the  Germans  for  a  while  were 
chiefly  busy  bringing  battery  after  battery  into  line  and 
shelling  not  only  the  positions  immediately  in  their  front, 
but  also  the  interior  of  the  plateau  held  by  the  French. 
Some  of  their  shells  fell  in  the  rear  of  Douay's  Corps  on 
the  western  side  of  the  position  and  blew  up  artillery 
wagons  behind  the  French  batteries.  Some  of  the  gunners 
of  the  Prussian  guard  took  for  their  target  a  mass  of  horse- 
men on  the  height  by  the  Calvary  of  Illy  —  Margueritte's 


SEDAN  207 

splendid  brigade  of  the  Chasseurs  d'Afrique.  These  suffered 
such  loss  that  they  had  to  seek  shelter  behind  the  wood  of 
La  Garenne. 

Douay's  Corps,  with  the  German  shells  bursting  in  its  rear 
and  others  coming  on  its  flank  from  the  opposite  side  of  the 
river,  now  came  under  an  ever-increasing  artillery  fire  from 
the  front.  The  Crown  Prince's  Army  was  issuing  from  the 
undefended  defile  of  St.  Albert  and  streaming  out  upon  the 
heights  north  of  Iges.  The  first  comers  were  fired  on  by 
a  horse  battery  pushed  out  in  front  of  Floing,  but  it  was 
soon  driven  in  by  several  batteries  on  the  heights  near 
Menges  and  firing  lines  of  infantry  came  running  forward 
towards  Floing  village.  To  Douay's  message  that  he  was 
attacked  in  force,  Wimpfenn  replied  with  a  written  note  in 
which  he  said :  "  I  think  it  is  a  mere  demonstration  against 
your  corps  intended  to  prevent  you  sending  help  to  the 
First  and  Twelfth  corps,"  and  he  ordered  him  to  reinforce 
Lebrun  with  any  troops  he  could  spare. 

Ignorance  of  the  reality  could  hardly  go  further.  Douay 
sent  a  galloper  to  the  new  commander-in-chief  asking  him 
to  "  come  and  see  for  hiipself."  Wimpfenn  rode  over  to 
the  plateau  above  Floing.  Fie  saw  a  sight  that  at  last  some- 
what shook  his  optimism.  "  I  saw,"  he  says.  "  a  hostile 
army  extending  afar,  and  a  formidable  artillery  firing  with 
a  precision  that  under  other  circumstances  I  should  have 
been  the  first  to  admire."  From  the  slopes  behind  Menges 
northwards  the  hills  bristled  with  artillery  and  fresh  bat- 
teries were  coming  into  action.  Their  fire  was  already 
mastering  that  of  Douay's  artillery.  The  I-Vcnch  gunners 
were  working  under  a  storm  of  bursting  .'^hells.  ikoken 
wheels,  men  and  horses  struck  down.  Umber  boxes  and 
wagons  blowing  up,  showed  how  true  and  deadly  was  the 
enemy's  aim.  In  front  of  Floing  an  infantry  attack  was 
developing.  After  calling  up  some  reinforcements  from 
the  Seventh  Corps,  Wimpfenn  rode  back  to  the  right. 


2o8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Bazeilles  had  been  taken.  At  eleven  o'clock  the  brave 
garrison  gave  w^ay,  not  before  the  direct  attack,  but  under 
the  pressure  of  the  German  advance  from  the  left  across 
the  Givonne.  Even  after  the  marines  let  go  their  hold  of 
the  burning  village,  handfuls  of  men  still  fought  on  in 
isolated  houses.  A  chateau  on  its  northwestern  edge  was 
only  taken  after  artillery  had  shattered  it  at  close  range. 
In  a  wine  shop,  a  cottage  near  the  Balan  road,  a  few  offi- 
cers and  men  fought  on  till  they  had  literally  fired  the  last 
cartridge.  The  house,  riddled  by  bullet  and  shell,  is  still 
kept  as  it  was  at  the  close  of  the  day  as  a  memorial  of  the 
fight,  and  De  Neuville's  famous  picture  of  the  men  search- 
ing for  the  "  last  cartridges  "  among  the  dead  and  dying 
has  immortalized  the  incident. 

By  noon  nearly  500  guns  were  sending  a  converging  fire 
into  the  French  positions  from  east,  west,  and  south.  Along 
the  Givonne  there  was  a  fierce  infantry  fight  in  progress  and, 
working  round  the  blazing  wreck  of  Bazeilles  by  openings 
hurriedly  made  in  fence  and  wall  by  the  pioneers,  the  Bava- 
rian attack  was  pressing  on  towards  Balan.  The  German 
lines  to  east  and  west  were  gradually  extending  northwards, 
but  there  was  still  a  gap  open  north  of  Illy.  Through  this 
a  few  guns,  some  hundreds  of  horse,  and  some  thousands 
of  linesmen  and  Zouaves  streamed  northwards  in  driblets. 
Some  were  in  flight,  others  drifted  away  in  this  direction 
from  sheer  ignorance  of  the  ground,  as  they  shifted  their 
positions  under  the  searching  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery. 
Some  formed  bodies  were  deliberately  led  northwards  by 
officers  who  had  decided  that  to  remain  longer  was  to  be 
made  prisoners  and  who  hoped  still  to  fight  for  France. 
That  they  were  in  earnest  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  a  con- 
siderable number  reached  Mezieres  and  other  northern  fort- 
resses by  the  forest  tracks  and  afterwards  joined  the  Paris 
garrison.  Some  of  these  fugitives  escaped  by  making  a 
short  cut  through  Belgian  territory,  but  most  of  those  who 


SEDAN  209 

crossed  the  border  were  disarmed  by  the  frontier  guard  of 
the  Belgian  army. 

As  the  jaws  of  the  converging  attack  were  thus  closing  on 
the  French  position,  Wimpfenn  once  more  met  Ducrot,  who 
could  not  forbear  saying  to  him,  '*  What  I  foretold  is  hap- 
pening even  sooner  than  I  expected.  Douay  is  badly  shaken. 
The  enemy  is  moving  against  the  Calvary  of  Illy.  Moments 
are  precious.  You  must  hurry  up  reinforcements  if  we  are 
to  keep  that  position."  "  Look  after  it  yourself,"  said 
Wimpfenn,  "  I  must  help  Lebrun." 

Ducrot,  moving  up  some  of  the  First  Corps  and  a  regi- 
ment of  De  Margueritte's  Chasseurs  d'Afrique  towards  the 
northern  angle  of  the  plateau,  organized  the  defense.  By 
this  time  there  were  signs  that  the  end  was  coming.  Large 
numbers  of  wounded  were  straggling  back  from  both  fronts 
seeking  shelter  in  the  hollows  of  the  ground  and  in  the 
woods,  and  with  them  were  crowds  of  unwounded  fugitives. 
The  Bois  de  la  Garenne  was  filled  with  a  disorganized 
mob.  Ducrot  himself  steadied  and  moved  up  to  the  front  a 
regiment  he  found  retiring  in  confusion.  It  was  nearly  two 
o'clock.  One  of  the  Crown  Prince's  regiments,  advancing 
through  the  wooded  ground  north  of  Illy,  had  met  the 
Hussars  of  the  Prussian  Guard  coming  from  the  eastward. 
The  circle  was  closed. 

The  first  line  of  German  skirmishers  that  crowned  the 
height  above  Illy  was  driven  back  by  a  charge  of  the 
Chasseurs  d'Afrique,  but  they  in  turn  were  sent  back  with 
many  empty  saddles  by  formed  bodies  of  troops  advancing 
in  support.  Round  the  Calvary  the  French  infantry  held  on 
for  awhile,  but  a  storm  of  shells  from  front  and  both  flanks 
shook  them  terribly,  and  before  a  rush  of  the  attack  they 
gave  way.  Margueritte  had  already  moved  his  brigade  of 
cavalry  from  its  position  behind  the  Bois  de  la  Garenne 
towards  Douay's  left.  Ducrot,  seeing  Illy  lost  and  the  in- 
fantry attack  now  developing  rapidly  against  Douay,  most 


210  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

of  whose  batteries  were  silenced,  sent  word  to  Margueritte 
that  he  had  better  charge  the  attacking  infantry  to  give 
some  respite  during  which  the  defense  might  be  reorganized. 

Then  came  an  incident  that  did  something  to  save  the 
honor  of  the  French  arms.  De  Margueritte  moved  his 
splendid  squadrons  to  the  crest  of  the  slopes  above  Floing, 
and  as  they  formed  for  the  charge  himself  rode  forward  to 
reconnoiter  the  ground.  Suddenly  he  dropped  on  the  neck 
of  his  horse,  clinging  to  the  mane.  He  had  been  shot 
through  the  head.  Two  troopers  dashed  out  and  supported 
him  as  he  rode  back,  just  able  to  tell  his  second  in  com- 
mand, De  Gallifet,  to  take  his  place.  De  Margueritte,  the 
hero  of  many  a  desert  raid,  was  beloved  by  his  men,  and 
as  the  trumpets  sounded  the  charge  they  rode  forward  in 
a  fury  of  vengeful  rage. 

Archibald  Forbes,  who  watched  the  charge,  tells  how  the 
thousand  horsemen  wheeled  into  lines  of  squadrons  under 
a  terrible  fire  as  accurately  as  if  they  were  at  some  great 
review.  Then  down  the  slope  they  thundered,  scattering 
the  first  firing  line  of  German  Jagers  and  sabering  many  of 
them.  But  volleys  fired  at  close  quarters  by  the  supports 
broke  the  rush  and  strewed  the  ground  with  men  and 
horses.  Some  of  the  squadrons  turned  back.  But  others 
pressed  on,  raged  round  the  bristling  bayonets  of  rallying 
groups,  dashed  into  an  advanced  battery,  and  only  gave  up 
the  attempt  when  their  ranks  were  fairly  torn  to  fragments 
by  the  deadly  cross-fire  that  swept  down  upon   them. 

As  the  remnant  of  the  charge  rode  back  most  of  Douay's 
Corps  was  retiring  in  confusion.  One  division  kept  together 
and  prolonged  the  fight  for  a  while  among  the  quarries  and 
ridges  between  the  Floing  crest  and  Sedan. 

Northwards  the  German  guns  were  being  dragged  up  the 
slopes  of  Illy.  The  line  of  the  Givonne  had  been  lost,  and 
there  was  a  confused  fight  in  the  wood  of  La  Garenne  and 
the  valley  by  its  southern  margin.    The  Bavarians  had  taken 


SEDAN.  211 

Balan,  but  there  was  still  a  fight  on  the  slopes  above  it. 
A  confused  mass  of  men,  horses,  guns,  and  wagons  crowded 
the  ground  north  of  the  town  and  streamed  into  its  streets 
and  into  the  wide  ditches  of  the  old  fortress.  In  the  broken 
mob  Bonnemain's  Cuirassier  Division  had  been  swept  away, 
only  a  few  squadrons  breaking  off  and  charging  out  towards 
the  Floing  valley  in  the  desperate  hope  of  cutting  their  way 
through. 

On  the  remnant  of  the  fighting  lines,  on  the  mass  of  fugi- 
tives, and  on  the  town  itself,  the  grim  circle  of  German 
guns  rained  destruction. 

The  emperor  had  ridden  out  with  some  staff  ofificers  in 
the  morning  to  share  the  dangers  of  the  fight,  which  he 
could  not  venture  to  direct.  He  was  no  longer  the  man  of 
Solferino,  but  broken  by  the  painful  malady  that  made  it 
agony  for  him  to  ride,  and  utterly  dispirited,  he  was  little 
more  than  a  spectator  of  the  downfall  of  his  lifework.  He 
had  met  the  party  that  was  carrying  back  the  wounded 
Marshal  in  the  early  morning,  and  then  for  some  hours  he 
watched  the  fight  from  the  hill  above  Balan  under  a  fire  that 
killed  and  wounded  some  of  his  escort.  When  he  saw  the 
circle  of  hostile  fire  close  all  around  his  doomed  army,  he 
rode  back  to  Sedan,  and  about  three  o'clock,  telling  his  offi- 
cers that  something  must  be  done  to  stop  "  this  useless 
slaughter,"  he  ordered  the  white  flag  to  be  displayed  from 
the  citadel.  It  seems  to  have  flown  for  some  time  unnoticed 
by  any  one.  Then  Lcbrun  arrived  at  the  Prefecture  to  tell 
him  that  everywhere  the  defense  was  collapsing. 

The  emperor  said  to  the  general  he  had  already  decided 
that  the  time  had  come  for  surrender.  Lebrun  explained 
that  it  would  be  necessary  to  send  out  an  officer  with  a 
flag  of  truce  and  a  document  authorizing  him  to  ask  for  an 
armistice.  A  note  was  hastily  written,  and  Loljrun  with  a 
trumpeter  and  a  white  flag  rode  towards  Balan.  As  he 
cleared  the  broken  mob  outside  the  town  he  met  Wimpfenn, 


212  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

who  tore  the  white  flag  from  the  orderly's  hands  and  ex- 
claimed, "  I  will  have  no  surrender.  We  must  break  out." 
Lebrun  asked  for  orders.  Wimpfenn  said  he  had  sent  a 
message  to  the  emperor,  asking  him  to  join  in  the  last 
effort.  He  asked  Lebrun  to  help  him  to  get  some  men  to- 
gether and  make  a  dash  towards  Balan.  It  was  a  hopeless 
attempt  from  the  first.  A  couple  of  thousand  men  followed 
the  two  generals,  but  only  a  few  hundred  yards.  Then  they 
broke  away  under  a  sudden  storm  of  hostile  fire  from  Balan 
and  from  beyond  the  river.  Wimpfenn  and  Lebrun  found 
themselves  alone,  and  turning  rode  back  towards  Sedan. 

Before  they  reached  it  the  German  fire  died  down  rapidly 
and  then  utterly  ceased.  The  white  flag  on  the  citadel  had 
at  last  been  seen  through  the  smoke  clouds,  and  one  of  the 
Prussian  king's  stafif.  Colonel  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf 
(afterwards  Chancellor  of  the  German  Empire),  was  riding 
down  towards  the  Torcy  gate  of  Sedan  with  a  flag  of  truce 
to  summon  the  place.  To  his  utter  surprise,  on  arrival  he 
was  brought  into  the  presence  of  the  emperor.  The  Ger- 
mans had  no  idea  that  Napoleon  was  with  the  beaten  army. 
Shortly  before,  General  Sheridan  had  remarked  to  Bismarck 
that  probably  the  emperor  would  be  taken  with  his  army. 
"  No,  no,"  said  the  Chancellor,  "  the  old  fox  is  too  wary 
for  that.     He  has  slipped  away  to  Paris  long  since." 

But  now  after  an  hour  of  waiting,  the  king  and  his  com- 
panions on  the  hilltop  saw  Von  Schellendorf  spurring  wildly 
up  towards  them.  As  he  drew  near  he  shouted,  "  Der 
Kaiser  ist  da!  (The  emperor  is  there !)"  It  was  great  news. 
It  might  mean  the  end  of  the  war.  The  colonel  brought 
back  a  letter  from  Napoleon  personally  surrendering  himself 
to  the  king,  and  proposals  that  French  commissioners  should 
meet  the  German  chiefs  to  discuss  the  terms  of  a  capitulation. 

There  is  no  need  to  tell  the  story  of  the  efTorts  made 
by  the  French  generals  to  secure  some  better  terms  than 
absolute  surrender.     To  their  protests  that  they  could  still 


SEDAN  213 

make  the  Germans  pay  dearly  for  their  success  Von  Moltke 
grimly  replied  that  they  were  helpless.  Five  hundred  guns 
already  pointed  their  muzzles  on  the  narrow  space  where 
was  the  wreck  of  the  last  army  of  France.  Two  hundred 
more  would  soon  be  in  position,  for  at  the  close  of  the  fight 
the  Germans  had  hundreds  of  guns  and  tens  of  thousands  of 
men  that  had  not  yet  fired  a  shot.  At  dawn,  if  the  French 
had  not  surrendered  at  discretion,  those  700  guns  would 
open  fire.  It  would  be  a  mere  slaughter.  The  Frenchmen 
had  to  bow  to  the  inevitable. 

Early  on  September  2  the  capitulation  was  signed,  and 
the  emperor  and  his  army  became  prisoners.  Eighty-two 
thousand  men  laid  down  their  arms,  and  among  the  trophies 
of  the  victory  were  419  guns,  besides  the  139  cannon 
of  the  old  fortress.  About  8000  men  had  escaped  to  the 
northern  fortresses  or  surrendered  to  the  Belgians.  German 
accounts  placed  the  French  losses  in  the  actual  fighting  at 
17,000  killed  and  wounded.  But  the  figure  appears  to  be 
an  exaggeration.  The  French  stafif  history  of  the  war, 
which  enumerates  the  loss  of  every  unit  engaged,  states  that 
799  officers  were  killed  or  wounded  and  9035  men.  But  it 
includes  in  the  losses  of  the  fight  8347  men  missing  (dis- 
parus),  which  would  make  up  a  total  of  17,000  if  added  to 
the  killed  and  wounded.  Now  this  last  figure  (8347)  is 
very  nearly  what  appears  also  to  be  the  total  of  those  who 
escaped  to  the  northern  fortresses  or  surrendered  to  the  Bel- 
gians. Some  of  those,  who  thus  made  their  way  northwards 
before  the  iron  circle  closed,  had  already  been  wounded 
or  were  shot  down  by  German  patrols  in  the  forest.  But 
these  would  at  most  add  a  few  hundreds  to  the  day's  cas- 
ualties. The  French  loss  was  probably  a  little  over  10,000 
killed  and  wounded.  It  was  less  than  one  would  have  ex- 
pected, but  one  must  remember  that  the  circumstances  under 
which  loss  is  sufifered  can  increase  its  effect,  and  a  large 
nart  of  this  loss  was  inflicted  in  less  than  three  hours,  when 


214  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  German  artillery  had  mastered  the  fire  of  the  French 
batteries,  and  the  infantry,  already  dispirited  and  convinced 
that  victory  was  hopeless,  found  themselves  penned  in  a  cir- 
cle of  deadly  fire  to  which  they  could  make  no  effective  reply. 
The  Germans,  except  at  Bazeilles,  made  the  fight  an  artillery 
attack.  Their  fire  was  fearfully  effective.  The  French 
found  themselves  exposed  to  a  fierce  bombardment  from 
many  sides  at  once.  Archibald  Forbes  tells  how,  as  he  rode 
up  to  Douay's  position  after  the  battle,  he  saw  the  ground 
strewn  with  headless,  dismembered,  and  disemboweled 
corpses,  a  sight  to  make  him  sick.  It  was  when  they  found 
themselves  helpless  under  this  fire  that  so  many  of  the 
French  regiments  gave  way  and  became  disorganized  mobs. 
In  the  last  stage  of  the  fight  some  of  the  German  batteries 
on  the  northern  side  were  able  to  gallop  forward  in  front 
of  their  infantry  and  shell  the  flying  French  at  close  quar- 
ters, so  complete  was  the  breakdown  of  all  resistance. 

Fighting  under  such  conditions  the  Germans  had  won  a 
fairly  easy  victory.  Of  their  army  of  over  150,000  men, 
they  had  brought  into  action  not  quite  one  half.  Of  their 
20,000  cavalry  not  a  thousand  drew  swords  during  the 
fight.  Seventy  thousand  of  the  infantry  were  brought  up  to 
the  front,  but  even  of  these  many  thousands  never  fired  a 
shot.  But  of  their  700  guns  nearly  600  were  in  action  by 
the  end  of  the  day  or  actually  ready  to  open  fire  if  the 
fight  had  continued.  At  least  500  had  been  engaged  in  the 
bombardment  of  the  French  positions. 

The  loss  of  the  victors  was  8202  killed  and  wounded. 
The  heaviest  part  of  it  was  incurred  in  the  hard  fighting  at 
close  quarters  in  and  around  Bazeilles.  The  Bavarians,  who 
bore  the  brunt  of  the  fight  here,  lost  3876  officers  and  men, 
nearly  half  the  total  loss  of  the  Germans  in  the  whole  battle. 
The  Guard  Corps,  which  fought  chiefly  with  its  batteries, 
lost  only  434  men. 

But  as  our  narrative  has  shown,  the  battle  was  lost  by 


SEDAN  215 

the  French  before  the  first  shot  was  fired.  The  only  ques- 
tion was  what  would  be  the  extent  of  the  disaster.  The 
last  chance  of  evading  a  wholesale  surrender  disappeared 
when  Wimpfenn  took  the  command  out  of  Ducrot's  hands. 
"  Ordre,  contrcordrc,  dcsordre  "  —  runs  the  French  proverb, 
and  "  Orders,  counter-orders,  and  the  consequent  disorder  " 
marked  the  French  conduct  of  the  hopeless  fight.  With  the 
first  army  of  Imperial  France  shut  up  in  Mctz  and  the 
second  taken  in  Von  Moltke's  trap  at  Sedan,  all  that  was 
left  for  Frenchmen  was  to  disavow  the  empire  that  had 
gone  down  in  disaster  and  fight  for  a  while  with  improvised 
armies  in  the  brave  hope  of  saving  the  honor  of  the  French 
arms,  even  in  the  midst  of  such  widespread  ruin. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

THE   GREAT   ASSAULT    ON    PLEVNA 

September  11  and  12,  1877 

The  costly  failure  of  the  first  attack  of  the  Prussian 
Guards  on  St.  Privat  made  the  day  of  Gravelotte  an  epoch 
in  military  history.  It  was  that  terrible  experience  which 
at  last  brought  home  to  scientific  soldiers  the  fact  that  such 
attacks  in  mass  were  murderous  and  useless,  and  led  to 
the  adoption  of  the  modern  forms  of  attack  in  extended 
firing  lines,  backed  up  by  supports  also  advancing  in  line 
once  the  region  of  effective  fire  is  reached. 

The  war  of  1 877-1 878,  between  Russia  and  Turkey, 
enforced  another  lesson.  Osman  Pasha's  defense  of  Plevna 
showed  in  the  most  striking  way  the  value  of  improvised 
earthworks  held  by  determined  men  armed  with  the  new 
rifle.  The  experiences  of  Plevna  further  confirmed  the 
growing  belief  in  the  high  value  of  intrenchments  thrown 
up  so  as  to  correspond  with  the  tactical  needs  of  the  mo- 
ment, as  compared  with  permanent  and  more  costly  forti- 
fications. 

Plevna  was  an  open  town  in  Bulgaria  among  the  hills  on 
the  northern  slope  of  the  Balkans,  and  about  nineteen  miles 
south  of  the  Danube.  It  became  world  famous  almost  by  an 
accident.  The  first  operations  of  the  Russians  in  the  cam- 
paign of  Bulgaria  had  been  uniformly  successful.  They 
forced  the  crossing  of  the  Danube  at  Sistova.  Abdul  Kerim, 
the  old  pasha  who  commanded  the  Turkish  army  about 
Shumla,  gave  them  very  little  trouble,  and  they  were  able  to 
send   a   flying   column   under    General   Gourko   across   the 


GREAT   ASSAULT   ON    PLEVNA  217 

Balkans  by  the  Shipka  Pass  into  Roumclia.  Every  one  was 
talking  of  an  immediate  march  on  Adrianople.  In  the 
middle  of  July  General  Krudener,  after  reducing  Nicopolis 
on  the  Danube  by  a  two  days'  bombardment,  sent  forward 
General  Schildner-Schuldner  with  one  of  his  divisions  to 
occupy  Plevna,  as  a  prelude  to  opening  another  pass  over 
the  Balkans  west  of  the  Shipka. 

All  unknown  to  the  Russians,  Osman  Pasha,  the  military 
governor  of  Widdin,  had  marched  eastwards  with  about 
14,000  men  and  58  guns.  He  reached  Plevna  on  July  19. 
He  intended  to  use  the  place  as  a  starting-point  for  opera- 
tions against  the  flank  of  the  Russian  advance,  keeping  a 
line  of  retreat  over  the  Balkans  open  behind  him.  The  very 
next  day,  July  20,  Schildner-Schuldner,  with  9  battalions, 
46  guns,  and  some  Cossack  cavalry,  approached  Plevna, 
without  even  sending  a  handful  of  Cossack  scouts  in  ad- 
vance. To  his  utter  surprise  he  was  fired  upon  by  rifles 
and  artillery,  and  after  an  ill-directed  attempt  to  fight  his 
way  into  the  town,  was  beaten  off  with  serious  loss,  and  re- 
tired on  Nicopolis.  This  was  the  first  battle  of  Plevna.  It 
now  became  a  point  of  honor  with  the  Russians  to  avenge 
the  defeat  and  turn  Osman  out  of  the  place.  The  pasha 
brought  up  reinforcements,  and  began  to  throw  up  in- 
trenchments. 

Krudener  was  ordered  to  capture  Plevna,  and  on  July 
30  attacked  it  with  32,500  men  and  170  guns.  Osman  had 
been  working  night  and  day  throwing  up  earthworks  on  the 
hills  east  of  the  town.  They  were  of  the  simplest  construc- 
tion —  lines  of  shelter  trenches  and  square  redoubts,  the 
latter  having  a  low  rampart  and  shallow  ditch,  like  the  bank 
and  ditch  of  an  English  field.  The  largest,  near  the  village 
of  Grivitza,  was  about  200  yards  square.  But  these  simple 
and  apparently  feeble  works  were  well  placed.  Each  of 
them  had  a  good  clear  field  of  fire  to  a  considerable  distance 
down  the  slopes.    They  were  armed  with  cannon,  but  their 


2i8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

best  defense  proved  to  be  the  long-ranging,  quick-firing 
rifles  of  the  men  who  held  them.  The  rifle  was  a  good  one 
—  the  American  Peabody,  very  like  the  Martini.  There  was 
abundance  of  ammunition,  and  recesses  for  handy  reserves 
of  cartridges  had  been  made  by  placing  boxes,  opening  out- 
wards, in  holes  dug  inside  the  earthwork  parapets  of  trench 
and  redoubt. 

Krudener  made  two  disconnected  attacks  from  the  east 
and  southeast.  He  actually  took  two  of  the  redoubts,  but 
he  W'as  driven  out  again,  and  retreated  with  heavy  loss.  No 
less  than  169  officers  and  7136  men  (or  nearly  25  per  cent 
of  his  force)  were  killed  or  wounded.  He  reported  that 
he  had  been  opposed  by  50,000  men.  Osman  really  had 
only  20,000,  a  large  proportion  of  them  irregulars,  and  only 
58  cannon,  some  of  them  small  mountain  guns,  to  oppose  to 
Krudener's  170  field-pieces.  This  was  the  second  battle  of 
Plevna.  Osman  was  now  famous,  and  the  Russians  were 
more  determined  than  ever  that,  cost  what  it  might,  the  little 
Bulgarian  town  that  had  suddenly  grown  into  a  fortress 
must  be  taken.  All  the  plans  of  the  campaign  were  thrown 
to  the  winds.  The  Czar,  the  grand  dukes,  and  the  generals 
thought  only  of  Plevna. 

In  the  first  days  of  August  Osman  received  reinforce- 
ments that  raised  his  strength  to  35.000  men,  with  70  guns. 
He  pushed  out  a  division  under  Adil  Pasha  to  Loftcha,  to 
the  southeast  of  Plevna,  near  the  opening  of  the  Troian 
Pass  over  the  Balkans,  to  keep  open  his  communications  with 
the  capital.  For  their  next  attack  the  Russians  concentrated 
an  army  of  95,000  men  (including  10,500  cavalry),  with 
452  guns,  many  of  them  siege  pieces  of  heavy  caliber.  The 
nominal  command  was  given  to  the  ally  of  Russia,  Prince 
(afterwards  King)  Charles  of  Roumania,  30,000  of  whose 
army  helped  to  make  up  the  attacking  force.  The  real 
director  of  the  operations  was  his  chief  of  the  staff,  the  Rus- 
sian general  Zotofif.    The  large  force  of  cavalry  was  intended 


GREAT   ASSAULT    ON    PLEVNA  219 

to  assist  in  investing  the  place  completely  on  all  sides. 
The  hundreds  of  guns  were  to  prepare  the  way  for  the 
assault  by  a  bombardment  of  several  days'  duration.  As 
a  prelude  to  the  attack,  Prince  Imeritinski's  corps,  with 
which  the  famous  young  General  Skobeleff  was  acting  as 
second  in  command,  attacked  and  captured  Loftcha  on 
September  3,  thus  cutting  Osman  off  from  his  line  of 
supply  over  the  Balkans.  Adil  Pasha  then  retired  into 
Plevna. 

The  Russo-Roumanian  army  had  now  closed  in  upon 
Plevna  on  all  sides.  On  September  6  the  batteries  were 
ready  to  open  fire  against  the  place,  and  the  bombardment 
of  the  defense  works  began.  The  Russian  staff  had  ar- 
ranged that,  as  soon  as  the  bombardment  had  produced  some 
effect,  there  should  be  three  simultaneous  attacks  on  the 
works.  On  the  west,  the  Roumanians  were  to  advance 
against  the  Grivitza  redoubts;  on  the  southeast  front,  Gen- 
eral Kryloff  was  to  attack  the  line  of  intrenchments  about 
Omar  Tabia  with  the  Fourth  and  Ninth  Army  Corps ;  on 
the  southwest,  Skobeleff  was  to  advance  by  the  Green  Hills 
and  the  village  of  Brestovetz,  and  assault  the  four  redoubts 
grouped  about  Yunuz  Tabia.  The  Czar  himself  was  to  be 
present  to  witness  the  great  assault  and  capture  of  Plevna, 
and  with  him  came  a  crowd  of  grand  dukes,  foreign  military 
attaches,  and  journalists  of  all  nations. 

For  four  days  the  hundreds  of  Russian  guns  thundered 
against  Osman's  intrenchments.  The  tempest  of  fire  and 
steel  looked  very  terrible  to  those  who  watched  it,  and  it 
was  thought  that  the  Turks  must  be  suffering  fearful  losses, 
and  that  they  would  be  soon  reduced  to  a  condition  of  de- 
moralized panic.  It  is  strange  how  this  confidence  of  sol- 
diers in  the  efficacy  of  bombardment  lives  on  after  a  century 
of  failures.  The  tons  of  shells  thrown  into  Plevna  caused 
comparatively  small  losses.  The  Turks  kept  close  to  the 
protecting    parapets    of    their    intrenchments,    and    waited 


220  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

quietly  for  the  time  when  the  infantry  would  come  on  and 
they  would  have  something  to  do.  They  were  more  incom- 
moded by  the  steady  downpour  of  cold  rain  that  began  on 
September  6  and  continued  for  a  week.  It  soaked  them 
to  the  skin,  sent  many  into  hospital,  and  turned  the  interior 
of  the  works  into  miserable  quagmires.  The  few  shells  that 
made  fair  hits  on  the  parapets  did  not  damage  them  seri- 
ously. The  explosion  only  shifted  a  quantity  of  earth,  and 
an  hour  of  spade  work  after  dark  set  it  right  again.  The 
Turks  even  succeeded  in  keeping  a  good  many  guns  in 
action.  The  Omar  Tabia  redoubt  and  the  batteries  near 
it  steadily  answered  back  the  24  huge  siege-guns  which 
Kryloff  had  in  position  on  the  Radischevo  ridge.  On  the 
tenth  the  Turkish  shells  set  Radischevo  village  on  fire,  and 
it  blazed  for  twelve  hours,  lighting  up  the  country  around 
with  its  red  glare  all  through  the  night. 

Skobeleflf,  to  whom  Imeritinski  had  given  the  command 
of  the  Second  Division  and  the  Third  Rifle  Brigade,  had 
driven  the  Turks  from  Brestovetz,  and  the  wooded  heights 
near  it,  known  to  the  Russians  as  the  "  Green  Hills."  From 
the  ground  thus  won  the  Yunuz  Tabia  group  of  redoubts 
was  bombarded  at  short  range.  Skobeleflf  believed  the 
Turks  were  badly  shaken,  and  spoke  confidently  of  being 
able  to  rush  them  and  fight  his  way  into  Plevna.  Imeritinski 
left  him  the  leadership  of  the  attack.  Skobeleflf  was  the  idol 
of  the  Russian  soldiers.  He  had  won  his  rank  of  general 
four  years  before  in  Central  Asia,  when  he  was  only  thirty- 
two.  Recklessly  brave,  he  was  one  of  those  men  who  have 
the  power  of  inspiring  thousands  with  their  own  enthusiasm. 
He  had  some  of  the  love  of  theatrical  display  that  distin- 
guished Napoleon's  famous  cavalry  leader,  Joachim  Murat. 
In  the  fight  for  the  Green  Hills,  Skobeleflf  rode  forward 
with  the  assaulting  column,  mounted  on  a  white  horse,  and 
dressed  in  a  brilliant  uniform,  with  a  diamond  brooch  hold- 
ing the  aigrette  in  his  white  sheepskin  cap.     Such  a  figure 


GREAT   ASSAULT   ON    PLEVNA  221 

must  have  been  the  mark  of  many  rifles,  but  he  was  never 
wounded  in  battle.  His  right-hand  man  in  all  the  operations 
at  Loftcha  and  Plevna  was  a  young  staff  officer  for  whom 
a  brilliant  career  was  predicted  —  Captain  Kuropatkin,  the 
future  commander-in-chief  of  the  Russian  armies  in  the  war 
with  Japan. 

On  September  10  the  reports  of  the  engineer  and  artillery 
commanders  assured  the  staff  that  all  was  ready  for  the 
great  assault,  and  the  capture  of  Plevna  was  fixed  for  the 
afternoon  of  next, day.  The  batteries  were  to  redouble  their 
efforts  from  sunrise  till  3  p.  m.  Then  the  storming  columns 
were  to  rush  the  Turkish  redoubts  and  trenches.  The  fact 
that  the  time  of  the  advance  was  fixed  so  late  in  the  autumn 
day  as  to  leave  only  a  few  short  hours  of  daylight,  is  proof 
enough  that  the  Russian  staff  counted  on  a  rapid  and  easy 
victory. 

As  the  sun  rose  the  batteries  of  the  attack  opened  fire, 
and  for  hours  the  shells  fell  in  showers  along  the  north, 
east,  and  south  fronts.  On  the  west,  beyond  the  river  Vid, 
10,000  horsemen  were  posted  to  watch  that  side  of  the  in- 
trenched camp  of  Osman.  On  the  north  the  Roumanians 
were  to  make  a  mere  demonstration,  to  keep  the  garrison 
employed  on  that  side.  East  and  south  the  troops  for  the 
attack  were  formed  up  in  lines  of  company  columns.  The 
day  was  dark  and  gloomy ;  from  cloudy  skies  there  came 
down  a  deluge  of  cold  rain,  and  as  there  was  no  wind, 
masses  of  damp  fog  and  mist  mingled  with  the  clouds  of 
powder  smoke,  and  limited  the  view. 

The  orders  were  to  attack  at  3,  but  at  i  p.  xM.  there  was 
a  lull  in  the  bombardment.  It  was  apparently  the  result 
partly  of  a  delay  in  bringing  up  fresh  supplies  of  powder 
and  shell  to  the  batteries,  partly  of  the  difficulty  the  gunners 
experienced  in  finding  their  targets  in  the  thick  atmosphere. 
Two  regiments  of  the  Fourth  Corps  on  the  Radischevo 
ridge,   the  Ugla  and  Yaroslav   regiments,   three  battalions 


222  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

each  —  in  all  about  5000  men  —  took  the  sudden  halting 
of  the  fire  as  an  indication  that  the  moment  had  come  for 
the  assault,  and  dashed  forward  against  the  Omar  Tabia 
works.  Once  a  premature  attack  was  made  it  would  have 
been  sounder  policy  for  Kr}doff  to  support  it,  but  he  stuck 
to  the  letter  of  his  orders.  Not  another  man  was  to  move 
forward  till  three  o'clock.  So  the  six  unfortunate  battalions 
of  Ugla  and  Yaroslav  fought  single-handed,  while  their 
comrades  looked  on.  Again  and  again  they  flung  them- 
selves against  the  redoubt.  Its  Turkish  garrison,  three  bat- 
talions in  Omar  Tabia  and  the  trenches  right  and  left  of 
it,  crouched  low  against  the  parapets,  and  firing  as  rapidly 
as  deft  fingers  could  handle  bolt  and  trigger,  swept  the 
slope  in  front  with  a  hail  of  bullets.  As  they  came  into  the 
fire-swept  zone  the  Russians  went  down  like  grass  under 
a  scythe.  They  fell  back  more  than  once,  only  to  rally  and 
come  on  again.  When  at  last  they  gave  up  the  attempt,  and 
the  broken  battalions  straggled  back  to  the  Radischevo  ridge, 
they  had  left  nearly  half  their  numbers  on  the  ground  — 
2300  men  killed  and  wounded  out  of  5000. 

At  3  p.  M.  the  general  assault  began,  and  Kryloff  moved 
forward  over  the  death-strewn  ground.  For  two  hours 
regiment  after  regiment  was  hurled  against  Omar  Tabia, 
but  not  a  man  ever  got  within  a  hundred  yards  of  it. 
Twenty-one  battalions  were  engaged  from  first  to  last,  but 
the  rifle  fire  of  the  three  battalions  opposed  to  them  held 
them  at  bay.  Six  thousand  dead  and  wounded  were  heaped 
on  the  ground  in  front  of  the  works  at  5  p.  m.  Kryloff  de- 
cided that  further  attempts  were  useless.  The  Turks  had 
lost  a  few  hundreds  only,  chiefly  by  shell  fire  from  the  bat- 
teries that  covered  the  assault,  the  garrison  being  unable 
to  take  cover  so  effectually  while  repelling  the  attack. 

While  the  Russian  center  was  failing  thus  disastrously, 
the  right  attack  near  Grivitza  village  had  scored  a  partial 
success.     Here  the  assault  was  made  by  the  Roumanians, 


f  Miles. 


No.  i6  —  The  Great  Assault  on  Plevna,  September  ii,  1877 


GREAT   ASSAULT   ON    PLEVNA  223 

supported  by  a  division  of  Krudener's  Corps  (the  Ninth). 
The  objective  of  this  attack  was  the  projecting  angle  of  the 
works,  formed  by  the  two  inclosures  of  low  green  mounds 
that  stood,  about  three  hundred  yards  apart,  at  the  top  of 
the  slope  of  meadowland  west  of  Grivitza  village.  Three 
simultaneous  attacks  were  directed  against  the  nearest  of 
the  works,  the  "  Grivitza  Redoubt  No.  i  "  of  the  histories 
of  the  siege,  known  in  Turkish  narratives  as  "  Kanli  Tabia  " 
(that  is,  the  Bloody  Fort),  an  appropriate  name  consider- 
ing how  much  blood  was  shed  around  it.  The  Roumanian 
prince  formed  up  three  storming  columns  —  on  the  left, 
against  the  south  side  of  the  works,  Krudener's  Russians ; 
in  front,  and  on  the  right  his  own  Roumanians.  At  three 
o'clock  these  converging  attacks  were  pushed  forward,  but 
only  to  fall  back  before  the  leaden  hail  that  swept  the  slopes, 
the  right  attack  suffering  most  under  the  cross-fire  from  No. 
2  Redoubt.  The  attack  was  reformed  and  went  on  again, 
and  again  it  was  hurled  back  from  the  insignificant-looking 
mounds  that  topped  the  slope. 

At  five  o'clock,  when  the  firing  was  dying  away  on  the 
Russian  center,  Prince  Charles  tried  once  more.  He  had 
drawn  reinforcements  of  fresh  troops  from  the  Roumanian 
divisions  facing  the  north  front  of  Plevna.  This  time  the 
stormers  reached  the  redoubt,  surged  over  its  shallow  ditch 
and  low  rampart,  and  fought  with  crossed  bayonets  for 
possession.  The  Turks  made  a  desperate  struggle  to  hold 
on,  but  the  masses  of  stormers  that  poured  up  the  slope 
simply  hustled  them  out  of  the  redoubt.  Attempts  were 
then  made  to  charge  across  the  300  yards  of  ground  that 
separated  the  captured  work  from  Redoubt  No.  2.  But 
these  all  failed.  Still  something  had  been  done.  When  the 
sun  went  down  the  Roumanian  colors  were  flying  victori- 
ously over  the  "  Bloody  Fort,"  and  the  engineers  and  gun- 
ners were  bringing  up  artillery  and  digging  trenches  to 
insure  the  security  of  this  hard-won  concfucst.     Tts  capture 


224  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

had  cost  the  loss  of  nearly  4000  men  —  two-thirds  Rou- 
manians, the  rest  Russians. 

On  the  extreme  left,  north  of  the  Green  Hills,  Skobeleff 
had  been  fighting  in  fierce  battle  against  a  young  Turkish 
general  whose  energy  and  magical  power  of  command  was 
like  his  own  —  Yunuz  Pasha,  who  gave  his  name  to  one  of 
the  southwestern  redoubts,  where  he  had  his  headquarters. 

Before  three  o'clock  Skobeleff  had  formed  up  his  assault- 
ing column  among  the  woods  and  vineyards  near  Brestovetz, 
ready  to  move  forward  at  the  signal.  It  was  composed  of 
eight  battalions,  the  famous  regiments  of  Vladimir  and 
Suzdal,  and  the  Ninth  and  Tenth  Rifles.  The  Regiments 
had  their  bands  of  drums  and  bugles  at  their  head,  and  their 
colors  displayed.  Skobeleff,  in  all  his  parade  finery,  was 
mounted  on  his  white  horse,  with  a  standard-bearer  riding 
beside  him.  It  looked  like  a  peace  review.  At  three  the 
regiments  swung  out  of  the  woods  to  the  strains  of  martial 
music,  deployed  into  lines  of  company  columns,  and  moved 
upon  Yunuz  Tabia,  which,  with  the  three  other  redoubts 
forming  the  group,  looked  down  from  the  crest  of  a  slope 
on  the  other  side  of  a  grassy  hollow  traversed  by  a  stream. 

Just  beyond  this  stream  the  advance  was  stopped  by  the 
deadly  fire  of  the  Turkish  rifles.  In  vain  the  batteries  tried 
to  keep  down  the  enemy's  rapid  fusillade.  Lines  of  skir- 
mishers thrown  forward  to  answer  it  crumbled  away  under 
the  leaden  hail.  Wounded  and  unwounded  men  began  to 
straggle  to  the  rear.     It  looked  like  a  miserable  failure. 

In  the  thick  of  the  fire  Skobeleff  rode,  seeming  to  have 
a  charmed  life.  Suddenly  he  saw  a  new  possibility.  Kuro- 
patkin  was  sent  off  at  full  gallop  to  bring  up  the  reserves 
—  five  battalions,  the  Libau  regiment  of  the  line  and  the 
Eleventh  and  Twelfth  Rifles.  As  these  came  up  Skobeleff 
put  himself  at  their  head,  and  inclining  to  the  right  dashed 
round  the  flank  of  the  half-broken  line  of  the  first  attack,  and 
up  the  slope,  not  for  Yunuz  Tabia,  but  for  the  two  redoubts 


GREAT    ASSAULT    ON    PLEVNA  225 

to  its  left  rear,  and  between  it  and  Plevna.  These  works 
of  the  second  line  were  not  so  strongly  held.  Skobeleff 
fought  his  way  into  first  one  and  then  the  other  of  them. 
He  was  between  Yunuz  and  the  town. 

There  were  signs  that  he  had  friends  there.  The  Bul- 
garians in  Plevna  had  risen  on  the  Turks.  There  was  fight- 
ing in  the  streets,  and  great  columns  of  smoke  and  flame 
rose  up  as  the  rioters  fired  some  of  the  Turkish  magazines 
of  corn  and  forage.  Osman  had  to  use  some  of  his  force 
to  suppress  this  outbreak,  and  at  the  same  time  hurried 
reinforcements  from  the  north  front,  which  concentrated 
under  the  command  of  his  lieutenant,  Rifaat  Pasha,  among 
the  vineyards  near  the  two  inner  redoubts  at  the  south- 
western end  of  the  town. 

It  was  well  for  the  Turks  that  the  Russian  stafif  had  an 
exaggerated  idea  of  the  numerical  strength  of  Osman's 
army ;  otherwise  at  this  moment  the  Roumanians  might 
have  rushed  the  north  front  of  Plevna.  The  whole  long 
line  on  that  side  was  held  by  only  four  battalions.  For 
Osman  had  made  up  his  mind  that  the  enemy  did  not 
mean  to  attack  in  that  direction,  and  had  stripped  the 
works  of  men  in  order  to  meet  the  pressing  danger  from 
the  southwest. 

Rifaat  made  a  desperate  assault  on  the  captured  redoubts; 
but  Skobeleff  held  his  own,  and  as  the  sun  went  down  the 
Turks  fell  back  on  the  town  with  considerable  losses  and 
with  their  commander  badly  wounded.  During  the  night 
Skobeleff's  men  had  no  rest.  They  were  fired  upon  from 
three  sides,  and  were  kept  busy  repairing  the  works  and 
digging  trenches  on  their  flanks.  Some  reinforcements  and 
supplies  of  ammunition  reached  them  during  the  anxious 
hours  of  darkness.  They  knew  that  in  the  morning  they 
would  have  to  face  a  furious  assault,  for  at  any  cost  Osman 
would  have  to  try  to  turn  Skobeleff  out  of  the  ground  he 
had  won  in  the  very  heart  of  the  position,  and  reestablish 


226  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

communication  with  Yuniiz  in  the  two  outlying  redoubts, 
now  cut  off  from  the  town. 

Skobeleff's  best  chance  was  that  the  Russians  and  Rou- 
manians would  renew  a  general  assault  on  Plevna  on  the 
morning  of  the  twelfth,  and  thus  make  it  impossible  for 
Osman  to  concentrate  any  considerable  force  against  him. 
But  after  their  defeat  before  the  Omar  Tabia  lines  Kryloff's 
men  were  in  a  thoroughly  beaten  condition,  and  Zotoff,  the 
chief  of  the  Russian  staff,  declared  that  it  was  no  use  send- 
ing them  forward.  On  the  right  Prince  Charles  concen- 
trated fresh  troops  from  his  Roumanian  divisions,  and  made 
more  than  one  desperate  and  unavailing  effort  to  capture 
the  second  of  the  Grivitza  redoubts.  On  the  left  Imeritinski 
should  have  supported  Skobeleff  directly  with  fresh  troops, 
indirectly  by  vigorously  attacking  Yunuz.  But  he  showed 
very  little  energy,  and  his  lieutenants  had  mostly  to  depend 
on  what  he  could  do  for  himself. 

The  sun  had  hardly  risen  when  Osman  launched  his  first 
attack  upon  the  two  captured  redoubts.  It  was  driven  back, 
only  to  come  on  again.  All  day  long  the  Turks  moved 
regiment  after  regiment  and  crowds  of  irregulars  to  their 
right,  and  flung  them  against  Skobeleff's  hard-tried  bat- 
talions. In  the  interval  between  each  attack  a  storm  of  fire 
poured  on  the  redoubts  from  three  sides.  But  though  their 
losses  were  terrible,  it  was  not  until  late  in  the  day  that 
Skobeleff  decided  that  he  could  not  hold  on  for  another 
night.  The  men  were  by  this  time  breaking  down.  "  Offi- 
cers and  men,"  says  Skobeleff,  "  were  becoming  demoral- 
ized by  the  terrible  fire."  xA.bout  four  o'clock,  when  the 
Turks  were  massing  for  a  final  assault,  which  he  foresaw 
would  probably  be  successful,  he  gave  the  order  to  evacuate 
the  redoubts.  The  retirement  was  made  in  good  order,  but 
under  a  heavy  fire  that  inflicted  considerable  loss. 

Just  before  sundown  Adil  Pasha  made  an  attempt  to  cap- 
ture the  lost  Grivitz  redoubt;   but  the,  Rorim,ania,n  garrison 


GREAT   ASSAULT   ON    PLEVNA  227 

beat  him  back,  and  so  the  two  days'  battle  at  last  came  to 
an  end. 

The  Turks  had  lost  about  4000  men,  chiefly  in  their 
abortive  attempts  to  storm  the  two  redoubts  which  Skobeleff 
held  so  long,  and  in  Adil  Pasha's  final  assault  on  the  Grivitza 
redoubt.  The  allied  losses  reached  the  terrible  total  of 
i6,cxDO  killed  and  wounded.  Of  these  less  than  3000  were 
Roumanians.  In  his  fight  on  the  left  Skobeleff  lost  160 
officers  and  5600  men,  or  48  per  cent  of  the  force  engaged. 
In  the  Vladimir  Regiment,  out  of  15  company  commanders 
14  were  killed  or  wounded.  In  the  premature  assault  on 
Omar  Tabia  the  Ugla  Regiment  lost  1220  men,  or  42  per 
cent,  and  the  Yaroslav  Regiment  1025  men,  or  49  per  cent 
of  its  strength. 

But  the  mere  losses,  heavy  as  they  were,  were  less  serious 
than  the  sense  of  failure,  the  depression  that  for  a  while 
paralyzed  the  Russian  army.  The  troops  were  concentrated 
east  of  Plevna.  Only  the  Grivitza  Redoubt  No.  i  was  held, 
though  at  first  there  was  talk  of  abandoning  it.  Before  a 
relieving  column,  advancing  with  a  convoy  from  Sofia  over 
the  Balkans,  the  Russian  cavalry  were  drawn  in  from  the 
west  side  of  the  Vid,  and  till  after  the  middle  of  October 
supplies  came  in  freely  to  Osman.  He  was  also  able  to  send 
away  some  of  his  sick  and  wounded,  and  to  replace  them 
with  fresh  troops. 

It  was  during  this  time  that  he  informed  the  War  Office 
at  Constantinople  that  if  there  was  any  doubt  about  the 
west  front  of  Plevna  being  kept  open,  he  would  evacuate  the 
place  and  take  up  another  position  nearer  the  Balkan  passes. 
The  reply  was  that  sufficient  troops  were  available  to  prevent 
the  enemy  again  closing  the  Sofia  road.    So  Osman  held  on. 

But  on  October  24  Gourko  with  30,000  men  drove  the 
Turks  from  Gorni-Dubniak,  and  closed  the  Sofia  road,  while 
an  army  of  125,000  Russians  and  Roumanians  closely  sur- 
rounded Plevna,  and  the  famous  engineer  General  Todleben, 


228  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  defender  of  Sebastopol,  came  from  Russia  to  direct 
a  regular  siege  by  trench  and  sap  on  the  northeastern  front. 
Plevna  was  now  doomed,  unless  relief  could  come  from 
outside.  But  the  Turkish  plan  of  campaign  was  badly  con- 
ceived and  feebly  executed.  Osman,  left  to  his  own  re- 
sources, held  out  till  the  first  days  of  December.  Provisions 
had  become  scarce  in  the  besieged  town,  and  fuel  scanty, 
though  the  weather  was  bitterly  cold,  with  snowy  days  and 
freezing  nights.  Fever  and  dysentery  crowdfed  the  hospitals 
with  thousands  of  dying  men.  At  last,  on  December  lo,  he 
made  a  gallant  attempt  to  break  out  to  the  westward  across 
the  Vid ;  but  his  half -starved  army  had  to  succumb  to  the 
attack  of  superior  numbers.  Thirty  thousand  men  could  not 
hope  to  fight  their  way  through  120,000  enemies.  After 
two  hours'  fighting  and  the  loss  of  5000  the  white  flag  of 
surrender  was  displayed.  Osman  had  held  the  improvised 
earthworks  of  Plevna  for  nearly  five  months,  and  at  last 
succumbed  only  to  famine. 


CHAPTER    IX 

TEL-EL-KEBIR 

September  13,  1882 

Ismail  Pasha,  Khedive  of  Egypt,  was  a  man  of  large 
ideas  and  extravagant  tastes.  He  had  made  himself  practi- 
cally independent  of  the  Sultan  of  Turkey,  and  tried  to 
realize  a  dream  of  an  Egyptian  empire  stretching  from  the 
Mediterranean  to  the  great  lakes  of  Central  Africa.  He 
completed  the  Suez  Canal,  and  thus  hrought  back  to  Egypt 
the  main  highway  of  the  Far  Eastern  trade.  He  anticipated 
the  most  famous  of  the  projects  of  Cecil  Rhodes,  for  when 
the  first  section  of  the  Soudan  railway  was  constructed 
from  Wadi  Haifa  southwards,  he  insisted  that  the  gage 
should  be  that  of  the  Cape  Government  railways,  so  that 
the  tracks  might  join  up  some  day,  and  trains  run  through 
from  Cairo  to  Cape  Town. 

The  unfortunate  element  in  his  large  ideas  was  a  reckless- 
ness about  expenditure,  and  a  spendthrift's  carelessness 
about  the  terms  on  which  successive  loans  were  contracted. 
At  last  came  the  day  when  one  of  his  Arab  colonels  organ- 
ized a  military  protest  against  a  situation  in  which  the  offi- 
cers of  the  army  were  left  unpaid  in  order  that  money  might 
be  found  to  give  the  foreign  bondholders  their  interest. 
Arabi  Pasha's  successful  demonstration  was  the  first  step 
in  a  revolution.  Disorders  at  Alexandria,  in  which  Euro- 
pean lives  were  lost  and  foreign  property  plundered,  led  to  a 
joint  British  and  French  intervention.  At  the  last  moment 
France  withdrew  from  the  adventure,  and  after  a  I'ritish 
fleet  had  silenced  the  batteries  of  Alexandria  and  landed  men 


230  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

to  occupy  the  city,  an  army  was  sent  under  Wolseley  to 
restore  order  in  Egypt  —  with  the  unforeseen  result  of 
many  years  of  war  in  the  Nile  valley,  and  the  addition  of 
a  new  protectorate  to  the  British  Empire. 

The  victory  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  which  decided  the  first  cam- 
paign and  made  Britain  mistress  of  the  destinies  of  Egypt 
and  of  the  lands  of  the  Nile,  is  notable  not  only  as  one  of 
those  decisive  battles  which  have  changed  the  course  of 
history,  but  also  as  an  instance  of  tactics  which  are  destined 
to  play  a  considerable  part  in  modern  war  —  a  night  march 
followed  by  an  attack  at  dawn. 

The  British  army  had  been  concentrated  in  the  first  in- 
stance at  Alexandria.  The  Egyptian  army,  organized  on 
European  lines  and  partly  trained  by  French,  British,  and 
American  officers  who  had  taken  service  with  Ismail,  occu- 
pied an  intrenched  position  at  Kafr-dowar,  barring  the  neck 
of  land  between  two  marshy  lagoons,  along  which  lines  the 
direct  road  from  Alexandria  into  the  delta.  Lord  Wolseley 's 
plan  of  campaign,  concealed  up  to  the  last  moment  even 
from  some  of  his  immediate  colleagues,  was  to  use  the  fleet 
for  the  purpose  of  suddenly  transferring  his  army  from 
Alexandria  to  a  new  starting  point  at  Ismailia  on  the  Suez 
Canal.  This  would  give  a  shorter  road  to  Cairo,  along  the 
line  of  the  "  Sweet-water  Canal,"  constructed  to  supply  fresh 
water  from  the  Nile  to  the  ports  of  the  Suez  Canal.  The 
move  to  Ismailia  was  not  a  complete  surprise  for  Arabi  and 
the  Egyptians.  They  had  foreseen  the  possibility  of  an  ad- 
vance from  the  canal,  and  had  laid  out  a  line  of  intrench- 
ments  to  bar  this  route,  the  point  selected  being  a  rise  of  the 
general  level  of  the  desert  near  the  station  of  Tel-el-Kebir 
(that  is,  the  Big  Mound),  on  the  Ismailia-Cairo  Railway. 

The  troops  had  been  embarked  on  the  transports  at  Alex- 
andria with  an  ostentatious  announcement  that  they  were 
destined  to  attack  Damietta,  and  to  advance  from  that  point, 
turning  the  lines  of  Kafr-dowar.     In  the  night  of  August 


TEL-EL-KEBIR  231 

20  landing  parties  from  warships  that  had  entered  the  canal 
seized  Port  Said,  Ismailia,  and  Suez.  At  dawn  the  trans- 
ports were  steaming-  along  the  canal  towards  the  wide  lake 
on  which  Ismailia  stands,  and  for  days  the  landing  of  men 
and  stores  went  on.  The  vanguard  of  the  expedition  pushed 
on  by  the  line  of  the  Sweet-water  Canal  to  El-Magfar,  be- 
tween which  point  and  Tel-el-Mahuta  there  was  a  first 
action  with  the  enemy  on  August  24.  Next  day  the  Egyp- 
tians abandoned  a  partly  intrenched  position  at  Tel-el- 
Mahuta  ;  this  was  occupied,  and  there  was  some  skirmishing 
with  them  as  they  retired.  An  advanced  party  then  pushed 
on  to  Kassassin.  On  the  twenty-eighth  there  was  a  hard- 
fought  action  at  this  point,  the  enemy  attacking  in  force 
to  overwhelm  the  advanced  guard  of  the  expedition,  but 
being  everywhere  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 

Wolseley  had  selected  Kassassin  as  the  place  where  he 
would  concentrate  for  the  decisive  dash  at  Arabi's  fortified 
position,  and  he  now  proceeded  to  bring  up  every  available 
man,  and  to  accumulate  supplies  for  the  advance.  People  in 
England  who  did  not  realize  the  difficulties  of  the  work  to 
be  done  waited  impatiently  for  news,  chafed  at  the  apparent 
inaction  of  the  expedition,  and  even  talked  of  failure,  as 
days  and  weeks  went  by  without  news  of  the  hoped-for 
victory.  For  those  who  have  not  seen  war  in  a  desert 
region  it  is  almost  impossible  to  realize  the  time  and  labor 
required  to  keep  an  army  supplied,  and  to  accumulate  a  re- 
serve that  will  enable  an  advance,  once  begun,  to  be  carried 
on  continuously  for  even  a  few  days.  Wolseley  could  not 
bring  up  his  entire  force  from  Ismailia  till  he  could  feed 
them,  and  it  was  no  use  storming  the  lines  of  Tel-el-Kebir 
unless  the  victory  could  be  followed  up  by  a  swift  advance 
on  Cairo.  So  he  bided  his  time,  and  spared  no  effort  to 
insure  that  when  the  blow  was  struck  it  should  be  decisive. 

On  September  9,  Arabi  made  one  more  attack  on  Kas- 
sassin, and  was  again  badly  beaten,  but  his  troops  showed 


232  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

such  good  fighting  quahties  that  every  one  felt  they  would 
be  formidable  adversaries  behind  the  works  of  an  intrenched 
position.  And  the  strength  of  the  Tel-el-Kebir  lines  was 
growing  daily  under  the  efforts  of  thousands  of  impressed 
fellahin  laborers,  and  of  the  soldiers  themselves. 

Before  dawn  on  September  ii,  and  again  on  the  twelfth, 
Wolseley  rode  out  with  his  staff  and  a  small  mounted  escort 
to  take  as  close  a  look  as  possible  at  the  intrenchments  when 
the  sun  rose.  It  was  seen  that  the  improvised  fortifications 
had  a  front  of  about  four  miles. ^  There  was  a  short  line  of 
intrenchments  south  of  the  canal.  The  main  line,  starting 
from  its  north  bank,  ran  in  a  direction  a  little  east  of  north. 
It  followed  the  crest  of  a  rise  in  the  general  level  of  the 
district,  a  stretch  of  hard  sand  and  gravel,  and  the  dull, 
monotonous  brown  color  of  everything  made  it  no  easy 
matter  to  make  out  details.  The  rampart  was  low,  five  or 
six  feet  high,  with  a  ditch  of  the  same  depth  in  front.  It 
was  afterwards  found  that  a  shallower  ditch  had  been  dug 
behind  to  supply  additional  material  for  the  rampart,  which 
was  ten  or  twelve  feet  thick  at  its  base.  At  more  than  one 
point  in  the  long  line  batteries  of  guns  had  been  placed  in 
position.  Several  were  mounted  in  a  closed  redoubt  in  the 
center,  at  the  highest  point  of  the  ground.  From  this  fort 
a  second  line  ran  back  along  the  desert  plateau,  and  with 
the  help  of  a  cross  trench  inclosed  a  large  space  of  ground. 
On  the  extreme  left  or  north  end  of  the  main  line  there  was 
an  artillery-armed  redoubt,  but  for  this  part  of  the  line  there 
was  no  sign  of  defenses  in  the  rear,  and  Wolseley  decided 
that,  while  the  infantry  rushed  the  works  in  front,  the  cav- 
alry could  charge  round  to  the  back  of  the  intrenchments 
in  this  direction.  Reports  of  spies  said  that  the  works  were 
held  by  19,000  regular  infantry,  including  several  battalions 
of  black  Soudanese  troops,  likely  to  be  good  fighters,  and 
some  7000  Arab  irregulars. 

*  3ee  plan, 


TEL-EL-KEBIR  233 

The  force  concentrated  at  Kassassin  for  the  attack 
amounted  to  11,000  infantry,  2000  cavalry,  and  60  guns, 
exchisive  of  a  detachment  that  was  to  be  left  to  guard  the 
camp.  The  infantry  was  organized  in  two  divisions.  The 
First  Division,  under  General  Willis,  was  made  up  of  the 
First  or  Guards  Brigade,  under  the  Duke  of  Connaught 
(Second  Grenadiers,  Second  Coldstreams,  and  First  Scots)  ; 
and  the  Second  Brigade,  under  Sir  Gerald  Graham,  com- 
posed of  four  line  battalions,  two  of  them  Irish  (Royal 
Irish  Regiment  and  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers).  The  Second 
Division,  under  General  Hamley,  included  the  Third  or 
Highland  Brigade,  commanded  by  Sir  Archibald  Alison 
(Black  Watch,  Gordon,  and  Cameron  Highlanders,  and 
Highland  Light  Infantry)  ;  and  the  Fourth  Brigade,  under 
General  Ashburnham,  which  had  only  two  battalions  in  line 
(Duke  of  Cornwall's  and  King's  Royal  Rifles)  — its  other 
battalion,  the  West  Kent,  being  left  to  guard  the  camp,  with 
the  exception  of  a  single  company  that  escorted  the  reserve 
ammunition  on  the  advance.  A  battalion  of  Royal  Marines 
accompanied  the  headquarters.  The  contingent  sent  from 
India,  under  Sir  Herbert  Macpherson,  included  the  Seaforth 
Highlanders,  a  native  infantry  regiment,  a  battery  of  moun- 
tain artillery,  and  a  splendid  regiment  of  native  cavalry,  the 
Thirteenth  Bengal  Lancers.  The  British  cavalry  brigade, 
under  Sir  Drury  Lowe,  was  made  up  of  a  composite  regi- 
ment of  Household  Cavalry  (a  squadron  from  each  of  the 
three  regiments),  the  Fourth  Dragoon  Guards,  the  Nine- 
teenth Hussars,  and  two  batteries  of  the  Royal  Horse  Artil- 
lery. The  navy  supplied  a  contingent  of  250  bluejackets 
with  Gatling  guns,  and  a  40-pounder  mounted  on  a  truck 
on  the  railway. 

The  plan  of  attack  was  explained  to  all  the  superior  offi- 
cers, and  a  sketch-map  sui)plied  to  them  for  their  guidance. 
The  whole  force  was  to  march  during  the  night  in  battle 
array,  and  be  in  position  to  attack  at  dawn,  so  that  the  dan- 


234  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

gerous  space  in  front  of  the  works  might  be  crossed  without 
the  troops  being  long  under  fire.  The  Indian  contingent, 
under  Macpherson,  was  to  follow  the  south  bank  of  the 
canal,  rush  the  extreme  right  of  the  works,  and  turn  the 
whole  line  on  that  flank,  crossing  the  canal,  if  need  be,  with 
the  help  of  the  Royal  Engineer  pontoon  company  that  fol- 
lowed it.  The  naval  brigade,  with  its  machine-guns  and 
the  40-pounder,  was  to  march  along  the  railway.  The  main 
body  was  to  advance  with  its  left  on  the  railway,  and  its 
right  covered  by  the  cavalry  brigade.  On  the  left  was  to 
be  Hamley's  Second  Division,  the  Highland  Brigade  in 
front;  each  battalion  in  quarter  column,^  and  the  four 
columns  marching  abreast  of  each  other.  Ashbumham's 
little  brigade  of  two  battalions  was  to  be  in  support  in  the 
same  formation.  Behind  it  would  be  the  staff,  the  Royal 
Marines,  and  the  reserve  ammunition  column.  The  Nine- 
teenth Hussars,  detached  from  the  cavalry  brigade,  were 
to  be  within  call  of  the  headquarters  position.  Willis's  First 
Division  was  to  form  the  right  of  the  attack,  Graham's  Bri- 
gade in  the  same  formation  as  the  Highlanders  in  front,  the 
Duke  of  Connaught's  brigade  of  Guards  in  support  —  a 
disappointing  position  for  these  fine  battalions.  Between 
the  two  infantry  divisions  were  the  Royal  Field  Artillery 
batteries,  under  Brigadier-General  Goodenough. 

The  fighting  was  to  be  with  the  bayonet  in  the  first 
attack,  but  every  man  had  100  rounds  of  ammunition. 
There  were  just  five  days'  provisions  at  Kassassin  camp. 
Each  man  was  to  carry  two  days'  rations.  Two  more  were 
to  be  conveyed  by  the  regimental  transport.  It  was  ex- 
pected that  further  supplies  would  be  captured  in  Arabi's 
camp ;  and  it  was  known  that  as  Tel-el-Kebir  marked  the 
edge  of  the  fertile  delta,  abundant  supplies  could  be  collected 
from  the  country  beyond. 

Kassassin    camp    was    apparently    all    quiet    during    the 

*  That  is,  with  the  companies  in  hne,  six  paces  behind  each  other. 


TEL-EL-KEBIR  235 

twelfth.  Really,  the  preparations  for  the  advance  were  be- 
ing unostentatiously  completed,  the  outposts  being  pushed 
farther  out  to  keep  the  enemy's  Arab  scouts  at  a  good  dis- 
tance. It  was  not  till  late  in  the  day  that  the  word  went 
round  that  the  force  was  to  march  that  night  and  fight  a 
battle  as  the  sun  rose  over  the  desert  next  day. 

After  dark  the  various  units  fell  in,  and  were  moved  to 
their  positions,  the  line  of  battle  being  formed  at  the 
starting-point  in  front  of  the  desert  camp.  There  were  busy 
hours  before  this  could  be  done  —  striking  tents,  piling  bag- 
gage near  the  railway  line,  issuing  and  inspecting  ammuni- 
tion and  rations.  No  bugles  or  trumpets  sounded.  All 
words  of  command  were  given  in  a  low  voice.  Strict  orders 
had  been  issued  that  no  lights  were  to  be  shown,  not  a 
match  struck,  no  pipes  or  cigars  lighted.  It  was  not  till 
half  past  one  that  all  was  ready  and  the  word  was  given 
for  the  march  to  begin.  The  night  was  intensely  dark,  with 
a  clear  starlit  sky.  There  were  no  landmarks  or  tracks  by 
which  to  direct  the  march ;  but  in  front  of  the  Highland 
Brigade  a  naval  officer,  Commander  Rawson,  was  posted 
to  direct  the  advance  across  the  desert  by  the  compass  and 
the  stars  as  he  would  lay  the  course  of  a  ship  on  the  sea. 
Picked  men  were  placed  on  the  flanks  of  each  regiment,  and 
between  the  brigades  and  along  the  flanks  of  the  battalion 
columns  ropes  were  passed  from  front  to  rear,  and  held  by 
the  guide  of  each  company  at  a  point  marked  by  a  knot, 
so  that  connection  and  distance  could  be  more  easily  kept. 

At  half  past  one  the  word  was  passed  to  advance,  and 
the  men  began  to  move  forward.  A  desert  night  march 
that  is  to  end  in  a  battle  produces  a  strange  impression  on 
those  who  take  part  in  it.  At  times  everything  seems  more 
like  dreamland  than  reality.  Those  in  the  front  rank  see 
before  them  the  mysterious  darkness  into  which  they  go 
ever  onward,  with  nothing  to  mark  their  progress ;  those 
behind  are  moving  among  shadowy  masses  of  men.     To 


236  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

keep  order  and  direction  is  impossible  if  movement  is  at  all 
rapid,  so  the  pace  is  necessarily  slow,  with  frequent  checks 
and  halts.  The  excitement  of  the  start  soon  gives  way  to 
a  weary  sense  of  monotonous,  objectless  plodding,  without 
any  sense  of  progress.  The  hours  seem  endless.  Tired  men 
half  doze,  and  stumble  with  a  sudden  start  into  wakefulness. 
Excitable  men  are  liable  to  strange  fits  of  nerves  that  make 
them  liable  to  panic  on  the  slightest  provocation. 

Though  the  strictest  orders  had  been  issued  that  there 
should  be  absolute  silence  and  no  lights  should  be  shown, 
there  was  at  the  outset  some  difficulty  in  preventing  talking 
in  the  ranks,  and  here  and  there  surreptitious  attempts  at 
smoking  were  made.  But  before  the  first  mile  had  been 
traversed  all  the  moving  masses  of  men  had  settled  down 
into  silence,  and  at  fifty  yards  away  from  front  and  flanks 
there  was  nothing  to  be  seen  or  heard.  In  the  midst  of  the 
array  there  was  the  dull  sound  of  footsteps  on  the  hard  sand, 
and  the  creaking  of  leathern  accouterments.  Once  there 
was  an  alarm.  Wild  screams  like  the  outcry  of  a  madman 
rang  out.  A  young  soldier  had  fallen  down  in  a  fit,  and 
lay  on  the  ground  writhing  and  yelling.  A  stafT  officer 
galloped  up  and  gave  the  grim  order  for  the  man  to  be 
bayoneted,  as  the  continued  noise  might  give  the  alarm  to 
Arabs  prowling  in  the  darkness.  A  doctor  intervened,  and 
saved  his  life  by  offering  to  silence  him  temporarily  with  a 
strong  injection  of  morphia.  The  poor  fellow  was  thus 
treated  and  carried  to  the  rear  on  a  stretcher,  and  the 
march  was  resumed. 

The  scouts  in  front  and  the  cavalry  on  the  right  fiank 
again  and  again  reported  parties  of  the  enemy  prowling 
near  at  hand  in  the  darkness,  but  all  these  proved  to  be 
false  alarms.  Not  a  scout,  not  an  outpost  was  in  front  of 
the  lines  of  Tel-el-Kebir.  The  march  had  been  well  timed. 
As  the  eastern  stars  became  dim,  and  a  sudden  whiteness 
along  the  desert  horizon  told  of  the  short  twilight  and  the 


TEL-EL-KEBIR  237 

coming  day,  the  whispered  word  went  along  the  hnes, 
"  Halt,  halt!  "  and  the  ranks  were  dressed;  and  the  second 
order  came,  "  Fix  bayonets !  "  The  light  v/as  rapidly  in- 
creasing, and  along  the  rising  ground  of  the  desert,  only 
half  a  mile  in  front,  the  gray  lines  of  Arabi's  intrenchments 
loomed  up  dimly  against  the  sky. 

Forward  again  went  the  silent  army,  the  infantry  moving 
with  swift  swinging  strides,  all  now  alert  with  the  sense  of 
impending  battle.  The  kilted  Highland  regiments  on  the 
left  were  a  little  nearer  the  works  than  the  right  of  the  line. 
Only  some  300  yards  separated  them  from  the  works  in 
front,  when  the  long  silence  was  broken  by  the  sharp  crack- 
crack  of  a  few  rifles,  and  a  Highlander  staggered  forward 
and  dropped  dead.  A  bugle  note  rang  out  from  the  enemy's 
lines,  and  then  in  a  moment  rampart  and  redoubt  flashed  into 
fire.  From  right  to  left  a  sheet  of  flame  seemed  to  run 
along  the  two  miles  of  front,  and  here  and  there  the  long 
red  flashes  of  the  Egyptian  artillery  sprang  out  into  the 
twilight.  Silence  and  semi-darkness  had  suddenly  given 
way  to  an  uproar  of  sound  and  a  volcano  of  flame.  The 
enemy's  fire  was  mostly  too  high.  Overhead  there  was  a 
whistle  and  roar  of  flying  metal  that  sounded  like  a  hurri- 
cane. All  along  the  front  men  went  down  as  the  bugles 
sounded  the  charge,  and  the  voices  of  the  officers  were  heard 
calling  on  their  men. 

The  regiments  of  the  first  line  raced  for  the  ramparts, 
behind  them  the  supports  doubled  forward,  and  the  artillery 
teams  broke  into  a  sharp  trot.  Away  to  the  right  the  cavalry 
were  galloping  for  the  flank  of  the  works.  Beyond  the  canal 
the  Indian  Brigade  and  the  Seaforths  and  the  sailors  were 
rushing  to  the  attack. 

The  first  to  reach  the  enemy's  lines  were  the  Highland 
Brigade.  The  rampart  was  wrapped  in  dense  smoke,  torn 
by  the  fire  flashes,  as  the  kilted  Scotsmen  jumped  down 
into  the  ditch  and  began  to  climb  the  mound  on  the  other 


238  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

side.  It  was  steep  enough  to  give  them  momentary  sheher. 
Men  and  officers  helped  each  other  np.  The  pipers,  stand- 
ing on  the  edge  amid  the  flying  bullets,  played  the  wild 
battle  music  of  the  clans. 

The  first  man  to  mount  the  parapet  was  Donald  Cameron, 
a  private  of  the  Cameron  Highlanders.  For  a  moment  he 
stood  among  the  drifting  smoke,  stabbing  with  his  bayonet 
at  the  nearest  of  the  enemy ;  then  he  fell  back  into  the 
ditch  riddled  with  bullets.  But  his  momentary  stand  had 
allowed  others  to  climb  up  behind  him ;  and  once  a  foot- 
ing was  won  on  the  crest  more  and  more  were  up  and 
over  it,  and  the  Highlanders  came  pouring  into  the  works, 
Camerons  and  Gordons  mingling  together  in  the  mass 
of  men  that  bore  everything  down  before  its  bristling 
bayonets. 

There  had  been  severe  loss  as  the  Highlanders  forced 
their  way  over  the  crest  amid  the  showers  of  bullets  that 
met  them  at  point-blank  range.  They  had  not  fired  a  shot 
in  return.  They  trusted  to  claymore  and  bayonets  till  the 
Egyptians,  driven  from  the  first  line  of  works,  rallied  in 
their  retirement  to  the  inner  line.  On  the  right  the  first 
regiment  to  get  into  the  intrenchments  was  the  Eighteenth 
Royal  Irish.  They  surged  over  ditch  and  rampart  with  a 
wild  "  Hurroo !  "  that  was  heard  amid  the  din  of  the  battle 
and  the  cheers  of  their  English  comrades  of  the  Second 
Brigade.  They  cleared  the  rampart  of  its  defenders  with 
bayonet  and  butt,  and  then  wheeling  to  their  left  rolled  up 
the  line  of  Egyptians  in  action  with  the  next  regiment  of  the 
brigade.  The  cavalry,  sweeping  round  the  flank,  rode  in 
among  the  flying  enemy.  Some  of  the  batteries  had  unlim- 
bered  close  to  the  works,  and  were  sending  a  shower  of 
shells  into  the  high  redoubt  in  the  center.  Away  to  the 
extreme  left  of  the  attack  the  Seaforths  and  the  Indian 
troops  had  rushed  the  works  beyond  the  canal.  Through 
the  twilight  a  mass  of  Arab  horsemen  came  riding  towards 


TEL-EL-KEBIR  239 

the  flank  of  attack ;  but  before  they  could  charge  the  blue- 
jackets had  swung  round  their  Catling  guns  and  poured  a 
shower  of  bullets  into  them,  sending  them  off  in  wild  flight, 
hotly  pursued  by  the  Bengal  Lancers.  The  40-pounder  was 
in  action  on  the  railway.  The  Royal  Engineers  had  launched 
their  pontoons  on  the  canal,  and  in  a  few  minutes  they  had 
thrown  a  bridge  over  it,  across  which  Macpherson  rode  at 
the  head  of  the  Seaforths,  to  turn  Arabi's  right  and  com- 
bine with  Alison's  Highlanders  in  completing  the  victory 
on  that  side. 

In  the  center  Wolseley  and  the  staff  had  ridden  close  up 
to  the  ditch.  As  he  arrived  there  a  stretcher  party  was 
carrying  off  Wyatt  Rawson  mortally  wounded.  Aiter  guid- 
ing the  advance  through  the  night,  he  had  fallen  in  the 
first  rush  towards  the  works.  Wolseley  had  brought  up 
the  second  line ;  but  the  rampart  was  already  won.  and 
there  was  no  need  to  send  them  into  the  fight.  The  fire  of 
the  Egyptians  passing  over  the  heads  of  the  attack  had  killed 
and  wounded  some  of  the  Guardsmen,  who  were  disap- 
pointed at  being  mere  spectators  of  the  battle.  Two  killed 
and  14  wounded  was  the  total  loss  of  the  Duke  of  Con- 
naught's  splendid  brigade.  Among  the  wounded  were 
Colonel  Sterling  of  the  Coldstreams,  and  Father  Bcllord, 
the  Catholic  chaplain  of  the  Guards  (afterwards  Bishop  of 
Gibraltar). 

The  fighting  did  not  last  quite  half  an  hour,  but  it  is 
a  mistake  to  say  that  it  was  an  easily  won  victory.  The 
Egyptian  army,  and  above  all  its  black  Soudanese  battalions, 
made  a  hard  fight.  On  the  right  especially  they  rallied  and 
turned  to  bay  again  and  again.  Sir  Archibald  Alison,  who 
commanded  the  Highlanders  on  this  i^art  of  the  field,  says 
of  the  defeated  enemy : 

"  I  must  do  justice  to  those  much-maligned  EgA-ptian  soldiers.  I 
never  saw  men  fight  more  steadily.  They  were  falling  back  upon 
311   inner  line   of   works,   which   we   had   taken   in   flank.     At   every 


240  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

reentering  angle,  at  every  battery  and  redoubt,  they  rallied  and  re- 
newed the  fight.  Five  or  six  times  we  had  to  close  on  them  with 
the  bayonet,  and  I  saw  these  poor  men  fighting  hard  when  their 
officers  were  flying  before  us." 

The  inner  line  was  turned  by  the  attack  of  the  Seaforths, 
the  Indian  troops,  and  the  naval  brigade.  In  the  center, 
caught  between  the  converging  attacks  from  right  and  left, 
hundreds  threw  down  their  arms.  Thousands  were  stream- 
ing to  the  rear.  At  Tel-el-Kebir  station  there  were  several 
trains  with  steam  up.  Two  of  these  got  away,  crowded  with 
fugitives.  A  third  was  just  starting  when  a  shell  burst  in 
the  boiler  of  the  engine  and  blew  it  up,  blocking  the  line. 
The  shot  came  from  the  captured  works  on  the  right  center. 
There  a  battery  of  Horse  Artillery,  whose  drivers  boast  that 
they  can  take  guns  over  anything,  had  dashed  over  ditch  and 
rampart.  One  gun  came  to  grief  with  a  broken  wheel,  but 
five  got  in.  The  first  that  got  over  unlimbered,  and  was 
laid  on  the  engine  as  its  target  by  young  Lieutenant 
Fielding  (now  the  Earl  of  Denbigh  and  Colonel  of  the 
Honorable  Artillery  Company).  That  well-aimed  shot,  by 
stopping  the  railway  transport,  secured  some  thousands  of 
prisoners. 

The  cavalry  had  dashed  in  among  the  fugitives,  but  now 
rallied,  and  soon  Drury  Lowe  had  started  with  his  horsemen 
and  light  artillery  on  the  wonderful  forced  march  that  pre- 
vented any  rally  of  the  beaten  army,  and  by  one  bold  stroke 
secured  possession  of  Cairo.  Arabi  had  ridden  away,  but 
his  camp,  his  artillery,  and  a  crowd  of  prisoners  were  the 
trophies  of  the  victors.  Wolseley,  accompanied  by  his  staff 
and  Admiral  Beauchamp  Seymour,  rode  over  the  conquered 
works  amid  the  enthusiastic  cheers  of  his  men.  General 
Macpherson,  with  his  Highlanders,  the  Indian  troops,  and 
the  sailors,  was  already  in  full  march  for  the  junction  of 
Zagazig,  the  occupation  of  which  secured  a  large  quantity 
of  rolling  stock  and  huge  magazines  of  stores. 


TEL-EL-KEBIR  241 

The  victory  had  been  swift  and  complete.  Considering 
how  short  a  time  the  fight  had  lasted,  the  losses  were  serious. 
Killed  and  wounded  amounted  to  459  officers  and  men. 
The  regiment  that  lost  most  was  the  Highland  Light  In- 
fantry. It  had  three  officers  and  14  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers and  men  killed,  and  52  non-commissioned  officers  and 
men  wounded,  besides  11  missing,  most  of  whom  must  be 
counted  as  dead  and  not  identified. 

In  the  fight  for  the  works  and  the  immediate  pursuit  the 
Egyptian  army  lost  over  2500  killed  and  wounded.  But  in 
a  military  sense  the  army  of  Arabi  was  destroyed.  Most  of 
the  mounted  troops  got  away  and  held  together,  but  thou- 
sands of  the  infantry  were  prisoners,  and  thousands  more 
disbanded  and  returned  to  their  villages.  Sixty-six  guns 
were  taken  —  field-pieces  and  fortress  guns  mounted  in  the 
works. 

The  victory  was  followed  by  the  seizure  of  Cairo  and 
the  surrender  of  the  troops  holding  the  lines  in  front  of 
Alexandria  at  Kafr-dowar.  The  battle  decided  the  cam- 
paign. Compared  with  the  giant  conflicts  of  European  war 
it  was  a  small  affair,  but  it  was  in  a  double  sense  "  epoch- 
making."  First,  it  was  a  perfect  example  of  the  new  tactics 
that  were  to  play  a  great  part  in  the  wars  of  coming  years. 
The  deadly  effect  of  modern  rifle  fire  had  made  it  a  costly 
business  to  fight  one's  way  up  to  within  charging  distance 
of  a  hostile  position  in  the  daylight ;  hence  the  value  of  the 
night  march,  preparatory  to  an  attack  at  close  quarters  at 
dawn.  In  the  second  place,  it  was  the  opening  of  a  new 
chapter  in  the  world's  history.  The  English  protectorate  in 
Egypt  would  mean  responsibility  for  all  the  lands  of  the 
Nile  valley,  and  while  Wolseley  was  scattering  the  armies  of 
Arabi,  the  Mahdi,  Mohammed  Ahmed,  was  preaching  and 
fighting  in  the  far  Soudan,  and  raising  a  revolt  that  would 
mean  lon'g  years  of  warfare.  (3ut  of  the  armies  that  were 
defeated  at  Tel-el-Kebir  and  surrendered  at  Kafr-dowar  and 


242  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Cairo  Evelyn  Wood  and  Grenfell  would  build  up  a  dis- 
ciplined fighting-  force  that  in  years  to  come  would  march 
side  by  side  with  and  as  comrades  of  the  victors,  and  carry 
the  flags  of  Britain  and  Egypt  a  thousand  miles  into  the 
heart  of  Africa. 


CHAPTER   X 

ADOWA 
March  1,  1896 

The  battle  of  Adowa,  fought  on  March  i,  1896,  between 
Menelek's  huge  army  of  semi-barbarian  warriors  and 
Baratieri's  force  of  ItaHan  regulars  and  native  levies  under 
European  officers,  was  an  epoch-making  event.  It  was  the 
first  great  victory  won  by  a  non-European  race  over  the 
white  man  which  had  lasting  and  decisive  results.  No 
effort  was  made  to  reverse  its  grim  verdict.  It  marked  the 
close  of  a  period  of  four  centuries,  during  which  the  superior 
arms,  tactics  and  morale  of  the  white  man  had  enabled  him  to 
scatter,  when  and  where  he  would,  the  badly  armed  levies  of 
the  "  inferior  races,"  and  to  parcel  out  the  earth  at  his  will. 

Like  all  the  other  European  powers,  the  new  kingdom 
of  Italy  had  colonial  ambitions  and  when,  in  the  later  years 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  a  general  scramble  for  African 
territory  began,  the  Premier,  Crispi,  formed  a  project  for 
obtaining  a  share  of  it  for  Italy  on  the  shores  of  the  Red 
Sea  and  in  the  highlands  of  Abyssinia.  While  England  was 
fighting  the  dervishes  about  Suakin  an  Italian  expedition 
seized  Massowah,  a  Turkish  town  on  the  Red  Sea  shore 
which  was  the  port  for  Northern  Abyssinia  and  the  starting- 
point  for  the  caravan  route  to  Kassala,  then  in  the  possession 
of  the  Mahdists.  Fortified  posts  were  established  along  this 
caravan  route,  and  in  1894  Kassala  was  taken  by  General 
Baratieri,  the  governor  of  the  Italian  Red  Sea  Colony. 

Before  Kassala  was  occupied,  the  Italians  had  gained  a 
footing/  in  the  Abyssinian  highlands.  Kassai,  Prince  of 
Tigre,  the  northern   district  of  Abyssinia,  had  helped  the 


244  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

British  against  King  Theodore  in  1867,  and  used  the  arms 
they  presented  to  him  to  make  himself  Negus  Negusti,  or 
"  King  of  Kings  "  —  that  is,  overlord  or  emperor  of  Abys- 
sinia, under  the  name  of  Johannes.  He  opposed  the  Italians 
when  they  marched  on  to  the  plateau  and  fortified  them- 
selves at  Asmara ;  and  after  his  death  in  battle  with  the 
Dervishes,  Ras  Alula,  who  had  been  one  of  his  most  trusted 
chiefs,  continued  a  desultory  warfare  against  Baratieri. 

In  order  to  strengthen  their  position,  the  Italians  secured 
the  alliance  of  a  remarkable  man,  Menelek,  the  Prince  of 
Shoa,  in  South  Abyssinia,  who  now  claimed  the  title  of 
Negus.  The  Italians  supplied  him  freely  with  arms,  and 
supported  his  claim,  and  he  secured  the  submission  of  Ras 
Alula  and  the  Tigre  province.  Menelek  was  then  proclaimed 
"  Emperor  of  Ethiopia,"  and  by  a  treaty  with  the  Italians 
ceded  the  coast  district  and  the  Asmara  region  to  them.  In 
Europe  it  was  announced  that  he  had  accepted  their  pro- 
tectorate over  Abyssinia,  and  that  all  its  relations  with  other 
countries  were  to  be  conducted  by  the  Italian  Foreign  Office. 

The  seizure  of  Kassala  displeased  the  new  emperor.  He 
had  hoped  to  conquer  the  district  himself.  There  also  seems 
to  have  been  a  serious  misunderstanding  about  the  so-called 
"  Protectorate  "  clause  in  the  treaty.  In  the  Italian  version 
it  was  clear  that  Menelek  was  bound  to  use  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment as  his  intermediary  in  all  negotiations  with  foreign 
powers.  But  in  the  duplicate  Abyssinian  version  it  was 
stated  that  the  Negus  "  might  "  use  the  good  offices  of  Italy 
in  such  negotiations.  One  day  a  French  visitor  to  Menelek's 
capital  at  Addis  Abeba  carefully  explained  to  him  the  terms 
and  the  meaning  of  the  official  Italian  version.  The  Negus 
was  furious.  He  said  he  had  been  tricked  and  deceived,  and 
he  protested  against  the  Protectorate.  In  return  for  railway 
and  mining  concessions,  French  capitalists  provided  him 
with  funds  to  pay  ofif  an  Italian  loan  of  four  millions,  and 
the  French  Government,  in  exchange  for  a  supply  of  mules 


ADOWA  245 

for  the  Madagascar  expedition,  gave  him  a  large  quantity  of 
Gras  rifles  and  animnnition,  and  French  dealers  further  in- 
creased his  stock  of  guns,  rifles,  and  other  etiuipments  for 
war.  Even  before  these  supplies  reached  him  he  had  begun 
hostilities  early  in  1895,  by  sending  one  of  his  chiefs,  Ras 
Mangasha,  a  son  of  Johannes,  to  raid  the  Italian  territory. 
Mangasha  had  only  10,000  men  with  him,  and  was  badly 
beaten  by  Baratieri  at  Coatit  on  January  14.  This  easy 
success  led  the  Italians  to  despise  their  enemy.  They  pushed 
their  frontier  forward  into  Tigre,  garrisoning  several  points ; 
while  Menelek,  with  the  help  of  his  French  friends,  pre- 
pared for  operations  on  a  larger  scale. 

The  crisis  came  in  December,  1895.  General  Arimondi, 
who  commanded  the  Italian  advanced  positions  in  Tigre.  had 
fortified  the  little  town  of  Makalla,  and  sent  out  to  the 
southward  a  column  of  2000  native  levies  under  Italian 
officers,  and  commanded  by  Major  Toselli.  Toselli  had 
camped  at  the  village  of  x'Vmba  Alagi.  He  was  not  aware 
that  there  was  any  large  force  of  Abyssinians  in  the  neigh- 
borhood until  the  morning  of  December  7,  when  he  was 
attacked  by  some  20,000  of  the  enemy,  and  driven  back  to 
Makalla,  with  a  loss  of  1300  native  soldiers  and  20  Italian 
officers,  more  than  half  his  force. 

The  victors  of  Amba  Alagi  were  only  the  vanguard  of 
a  huge  army  of  more  than  100.000  men  which  Menelek 
had  assembled,  and  with  which  he  besieged  Makalla.  The 
little  garrison  made  a  splendid  defense,  but  through  want  of 
water  was  forced  to  surrender  on  January  20,  1896.  Bara- 
tieri had  hoped  it  would  hold  out  till  he  could,  with  the  help 
of  reinforcements  from  Italy,  assemble  an  army  for  its  relief. 
He  could  now  only  hope  to  avenge  this  twofold  disaster. 

Menelek  released  his  prisoners  and  proposed  terms  of 
peace ;  J)Ut  the  Italian  Government  informed  Baratieri  that 
there  could  be  no  peace  till  a  victory  had  been  won  that 
would  wipe  out  the  memory  of  Amba  Alagi  and  Makalla. 


246  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Menelek  had  moved  his  army  from  Makalla  to  a  strong 
position  in  the  hills  above  Adowa.  The  Italians  had  concen- 
trated in  a  fortified  camp  a  few  miles  to  the  eastward  on  the 
mountain  road  to  Adi  Caje.  Baratieri's  forces  gradually 
rose  to  about  25,000  men,  of  whom  10,000  were  Italian 
regulars  and  the  rest  native  troops  under  European  officers. 
He  had  some  70  guns,  mostly  small  mountain  artillery.  The 
lines  of  communication,  by  which  ammunition  and  supplies 
were  brought  up  from  the  coast,  lay  along  the  narrow  and 
difficult  mountain  paths  from  Massowah  by  Senafe  and  Adi 
Caje,  and  by  a  second  line  through  Asmara  and  Coatit. 
These  lines  had  to  be  guarded  against  hostile  raids,  and  it 
was  with  the  utmost  difficulty  that  Baratieri  was  able  to  feed 
his  army  in  its  highland  camp.  He  had  to  refuse  further 
reinforcements,  because  to  increase  his  numbers  would  have 
been  to  risk  starvation.  But  his  spies  informed  him  that 
Menelek's  hordes  about  Adowa  were  in  the  same  straits. 
They  had  eaten  up  the  scanty  supplies  of  the  district,  and 
depended  on  caravans  coming  from  a  distance.  He  reckoned 
that  very  soon  Menelek  would  have  either  to  attack  the 
Italian  fortified  camp  or  to  disband  his  army.  Acting  on  the 
defensive,  Baratieri  thought  he  could  count  with  certainty 
on  a  victory.  If,  instead  of  attacking,  Menelek  dispersed  his 
army,  the  Italians  could  assume  the  offensive. 

In  Italy,  as  the  weeks  went  by,  there  was  a  growing  dis- 
content with  Baratieri's  Fabian  tactics.  Crispi,  the  Premier, 
telegraphed  to  him  a  message  urging  him  to  action.  When 
he  still  waited,  General  Baldissera  was  sent  out  to  supersede 
him.  Precautions  were  taken  to  keep  this  step  secret  until 
Baldissera  could  reach  the  front,  but  while  he  was  still  at 
sea  some  of  Baratieri's  friends  succeeded  in  sending  him  the 
news. 

For  a  few  days  the  general  vacillated  between  an  anxiety 
to  strike  a  blow  before  his  successor  arrived  and  a  realization 
of  the  inadequate  force  available  for  the  attempt.    Once  he 


I 


ADOWA  247 

was  on  the  point  of  falling  back  on  Adi  Caje  to  shorten  his 
line  of  supply,  but  rumors  that  Menelek  was  also  thinking  of 
retreat  induced  him  to  hold  on.  Then  his  spies  brought  him  a 
false  report  that  the  Abyssinians  were  actually  withdrawing, 
that  some  thousands  had  already  gone,  and  on  the  last  day  of 
February  he  suddenly  decided  to  advance  against  the  enemy. 
Garrisons  on  the  lines  of  communication,  and  a  strong 
column  sent  off  to  deal  with  hostile  raiders  and  ordered  too 
late  to  rejoin,  had  greatly  reduced  his  fighting  force.  He 
had  available  for  active  service  on  this  last  day  of  February 
about  17,000,  of  whom  rather  more  than  10.000  were  Ital- 
ian's, the  rest  natives.  There  were  56  guns  (44  light  moun- 
tain guns  and  12  quick-firers).  The  little  army  was  organ- 
ized in  four  brigades.  Three  were  to  form  the  right,  left, 
and  center  of  the  advance  and  the  battle  line ;  the  fourth 
was  to  follow  in  reserve.  The  brigade  commanders,  organi- 
zation, and  numbers  were  as  follows : 

Right  Column.     General  Dabormida. 

Second  Infantry  Brigade. 

Two  regiments,  each  of  3  battalions     .     2640  men  I  Three  batteries 
Native  militia  and  irregulars  ....       960    "     )  =  18  guns. 

3600  men. 

Centre  Column.     General  Ariuondi.  j^ 

First  Infantry  Brigade. 
One  regiment  of  Bersaglieri  (rifles),  2  battalions  .       773  men  ■s  ^^^  batteries 

One  line  regiment,  3  battalions iSoo     "    (  _  j2  guns 

Native  troops 220     "    ) 

2493  men. 

Left  Column.     General  Albertone. 

Native  Brigade. 

Four  native  battalions      .     3700  men  1  i\  batteries  (native  gunners)  =  6  guns. 
Native  irregulars      .     .     .       376     "    )  2  Italian  batteries     .     .     .     .  =  8    " 

4076  men.  14  guns. 

Reserve.    General  Ellena. 

Third  Infantry  Brigade. 
Five  line  battalions  and  one  .Alpine  battalion     2930  men  )  Two  Q.  F. 


Native  battalion 1150     "    |  batteries 

Engineers 70     "    )  =  12  guns. 

4150  men. 


248 


FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 


Summary 

Generals 

Infantry 

Artillery 

Right. 
Center. 
Left. 
Reserve. 

Dabormida. 
Arimondi. 
Albertone. 
EUena. 

3,600  men. 

2,493     " 
4,076 

4,150     " 

18  guns. 
12       " 
14      " 

12  (Q.  F.)  guns. 

Totals    .   .   14,319  men. 

56  guns. 

This  represents  the  effective  fighting  force.  Besides,  there 
were  nearly  3000  more  Italians  and  natives  belonging  to 
departmental  corps  (transport,  ambulances,  etc.). 

General  Baratieri's  plan  was  to  march,  in  the  night  be- 
tween February  29  and  March  i,  by  three  roughly  parallel 
mountain  tracks,  and  occupy  a  strong  and  (as  he  believed) 
easily  defensible  position  within  short  striking  distance  of 
the  enemy's  camps.  The  position  was  formed  by  the  bold 
mass  of  hills  known  as  Mount  Belah,  with  the  lower  summit 
of  Belah  Hill,  and  the  great  buttress  marked  on  Italian  maps 
as  the  "  Spur  of  Belah."  Two  deep,  ravine-like  valleys 
guarded  the  flanks,  and  to  the  front  there  was  a  good  open 
field  of  fire  across  a  wide  hollow,  through  which  ran  a 
mountain  torrent.  In  its  rear^the  hills  of  Rebbi  Arienni  and 
Mount  Rajo  formed  a  second  line  of  defense  and  a  position 
for  the  reserve. 

Baratieri  hoped  to  have  three  of  his  brigades  formed  up 
on  the  Mount  Belah  position  at  daybreak  on  March  i,  with 
Ellena's  Brigade  in  reserve  at  Rebbi  Arienni.  Italian  offi- 
cers with  native  scouts  would  then  be  sent  out  to  the  front 
to  reconnoiter  the  enemy's  positions.  Subsequent  action 
would  depend  on  their  reports.  He  anticipated  that  either 
they  would  find  that  Menelek's  hordes  were  dispersing  and 
retiring,  in  which  case  he  could  follow  them  up  and  harass 
their  retreat ;  or,  if  they  still  held  together,  he  hoped  his 
advance  would  provoke  the  enemy  into  attacking  him  on  his 


ADOWA  249 

chosen  position,  where  he  considered  that  the  weapons  and 
the  discipHned  tactics  of  a  civilized  army  would  enable  him 
to  deal  with  any  number  of  mere  semi-barbarians. 

The  night  march,  over  narrow  stony  paths,  in  the  midst 
of  tangled  tropical  vegetation,  and  in  utter  darkness,  proved 
to  be  a  difficult  and  tedious  operation.  The  men  had  often 
to  move -in  single  file.  The  guides  of  one  brigade  mistook 
the  way,  and  it  blocked  for  hours  the  progress  of  another, 
on  to  whose  line  of  advance  it  had  wandered.  Worst  of 
all,  Albertone's  Brigade  on  the  left  made  a  mistake  that 
ruined  the  whole  plan. 

In  Baratieri's  orders  to  Albertone  he  was  directed  to 
occupy  the  "  Hill  of  Kidane  Merct,"  and  on  a  very  rough 
sketch-map,  drawn  up  by  the  headquarters  staff,  Kidane 
Meret  was  marked  as  the  name  of  the  rocky  northern  slope 
of  Mount  Kaulos,  due  south  of  Mount  Belah,  and  divided 
from  it  by  a  wide  gully  running  up  towards  Mount  Rajo. 
Baratieri  intended  that  Albertone  should  hold  this  ground 
in  order  to  guard  the  flank  of  the  Belah  position.  It  was 
a  badly-chosen  post  for  the  left  brigade,  for  it  was  itself 
dominated  by  the  higher  slope  of  Mount  Kaulos.  In  the 
darkness  before  dawn  Albertone  reached  this  spot,  and  was 
halting  his  brigade  when  the  native  guides  told  him  he  had 
not  yet  reached  Kidane  Meret.  They  said  it  was  a  hill 
further  to  the  front,  near  Mount  Enda  Kidane.  It  a]i]:iears 
that  so  far  as  the  name  went  they  were  quite  right,  and 
the  improvised  staff  map  was  wrong. 

Albertone  had  a  bad  quarter  of  an  hour.  He  was  ordered 
to  march  to  Kidane  Meret,  and  there  appeared  to  be  two 
"  Kidane  Merets."  The  guides  assigned  to  him  by  the  gen- 
eral insisted  that  the  real  Kidane  Meret  was  out  in  front ; 
the  staff  map  said  it  was  where  he  stood.  After  some  hesi- 
tation'he  decided  to  trust  the  guides  rather  than  the  map, 
which  was  notoriously  unreliable.  Probably  the  decision 
was   helped   by   his   seeing,   even   in   the  half-light  of   the 


2SO  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

early  twilight,  that  he  was  halting  in  a  hollow  between  two 
huge  masses  of  mountain  side. 

The  brigade  moved  on.  It  descended  a  valley  towards 
the  left,  crossed  a  mountain  stream,  and  then,  turning  south- 
westwards,  reached  a  rising  ground,  and  as  day  broke  came 
out  on  the  slopes  above  another  valley.  The  guides  pointed 
to  a  summit  in  front,  on  the  other  side  of  the  hollow,  as 
Mount  Enda  Kidane,  and  declared  that  the  hill  of  Kidane 
]\Ieret  was  its  northwestern  spur. 

Albertone  knew  enough  of  the  general  position  to  sus- 
pect that  his  prolonged  advance  had  brought  him  near  the 
ground  on  which  the  enemy  were  camped.  He  halted  on  the 
slopes  above  the  valley,  and  sent  forward  across  it  a  native 
battalion  to  occupy  the  hill  of  Kidane  Meret  as  an  advanced 
guard,  and  explore  the  ground  in  the  neighborhood. 

Meanwhile  as  the  day  broke  Baratieri  had  reached  the 
hill  of  Belah.  The  head  of  the  right  column  (Dabormida) 
was  coming  up  to  the  spur,  north  of  the  hill.  On  to  the  hill 
itself  marched  the  head  of  the  center  column  (Arimondi). 
Ellena,  with  the  reserve,  was  still  toiling  over  the  mountain 
paths  far  to  the  rear.  The  mass  of  Mount  Belah  cut  off 
all  view  to  the  southward,  but  Baratieri  felt  sure  that  be- 
yond it  Albertone  was  in  position  on  the  "  Kidane  Meret  " 
of  the  map. 

As  the  sun  rose  over  the  mountains  there  came  the 
sound  of  distant  firing  from  the  left  front.  Baratieri  at- 
tached no  importance  to  it.  He  took  it  as  an  indication 
that  scouting  parties  thrown  forward  by  Albertone  were  in 
action  with  the  enemy's  outposts.  He  thought  the  firing, 
indistinctly  heard,  was  not  very  far  off,  and  did  not  consider 
it  heavy  enough  for  a  serious  action.  He  busied  himself 
arraying  the  troops  of  his  right  and  center  as  they  reached 
the  position,  sending  most  of  Arimondi's  Brigade  to  occupy 
the  southwestern  slopes  of  Mount  Belah.  It  was  from 
Arimondi  he  first  learned  that  Albertone  was  not  in  position 


ADOWA  251 

south  of  Belah,  and  he  then  connected  his  absence  with  the 
firing  heard  further  to  the  front,  and  began  to  be  anxious 
about  other  possible  and  unexpected  developments. 

Let  us  now  see  what  the  Abyssinians  were  doing.  Mene- 
lek's  army  lay  in  camp  and  bivouac  around  Adowa.  Ras 
Makonnen  held  the  place  itself  with  15,000  of  the  men  of 
Harrar.  Menelek's  own  camp  was  immediately  to  the  west 
of  it.  He  had  with  him  the  warriors  of  Shoa  and  Amhara 
—  25,000  riflemen  and  6000  horsemen  —  besides  his  warlike 
Empress  Taitu's  corps  of  3000  foot  and  6000  horse.  In  the 
royal  camp  most  of  the  artillery  of  the  army  was  concen- 
trated —  36  guns,  including  some  new  Hotchkiss  quick- 
firers.  The  only  other  artillery  in  possession  of  any  of  the 
chiefs  was  a  battery  of  six  mountain  guns  with  Ras  Alula 
and  Mangasha,  who  commanded  the  men  of  Tigre,  12,000 
rifles  strong,  on  the  left.  Ras  Mikael,  who  camped  just 
north  of  Adowa,  had  with  him  some  5000  Galla  horsemen, 
born  riders  from  the  plains  of  the  south,  mounted  on  wiry 
little  horses,  and  armed  with  spears  or  rifles. 

The  whole  force  was  about  120,000  strong.  There  were 
80,000  armed  with  rifles,  nearly  all  breech-loaders,  and 
mostly  of  the  French  Gras  pattern,  lately  superseded  in  the 
French  army  by  the  Lebel.  There  were  some  thoroughly 
up-to-date  Lebels,  a  considerable  number  of  Remingtons, 
and  a  few  Martinis.  There  were  about  10,000  horsemen, 
and  a  great  body  of  irregulars  —  armed  peasants  assembled 
with  spear  and  sword  and  shield. 

The  leaders  of  this  great  host  were  aware  of  Baratieri's 
advance  long  before  he  had  reached  Mount  Belah.  They 
were  well  served  by  their  spies.  Some  of  these  were  actually 
taking  pay  from  Baratieri's  intelligence  department,  and 
thus  secured  facilities  for  coming  and  going  between  Adowa 
and  the  Italian  camp,  giving  the  enemy  unimportant  or  false 
and  misleading  news,  and  bringing  back  to  their  friends  re- 
liable  information.      It   was   one   of   these  agents,   in    Ras 


252  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Alula's  employ,  who  roused  him  in  the  middle  of  the  night 
with  the  welcome  tidings  that  the  white  men  had  left  their 
fortified  stronghold,  and  were  trailing  along  the  mountain 
paths  in  straggling  columns  a  few  miles  away.  Word  was 
sent  to  Menelek  and  the  other  chiefs,  and  before  the  sun 
rose  the  army  of  Ethiopia  was  in  battle  array  and  beginning 
to  move  eastwards  in  irregular  masses  to  find  and  fall  upon 
the  Italians.  An  English  historian  of  the  war  has  given 
a  vivid  description  of  the  scene : 

"  The  whole  of  this  great  host  was  now  upon  the  alert.  A  hun- 
dred and  twenty  thousand  men  thrown  up  from  the  unknown  depths 
of  Africa  were  preparing  to  rush  against  the  Europeans.  The  chiefs 
were  issuing  their  commands;  but  each  warrior  knew  the  general 
plan  of  the  battle,  and  was  accustomed  to  take  his  own  course  in  a 
moment  of  difificulty.  How  extraordinary  must  the  scene  have  ap- 
peared during  these  gray  hours  before  dawn  amongst  the  irregular 
and  crowded  tents !  Thousands  of  lean,  fierce-looking  Ethiopians, 
in  the  cloak  of  brilliant  colors  that  they  wear  in  the  day  of  battle ; 
riflemen;  spearmen  from  the  hills;  swordsmen  buckling  the  crooked 
blade  on  to  their  right  side,  so  as  to  give  free  play  to  the  shield 
arm  ;  wild  riders  from  the  plains  ;  priests  giving  absolution  ;  women 
and  children  even  ;  and  here  and  there  some  great  feudal  chief,  with 
black  leopard  or  lion  skin,  on  his  horse,  with  gold  embossed  shield, 
silver  bracelets,  and  all  the  magnificence  of  barbarian  war.  The  sun 
had  not  yet  risen  when  they  moved  out  across  the  fertile  plain  of 
Adowa."  ^ 

Menelek's  own  Shoans,  with  the  men  of  Amhara  and 
Gojjam,  streamed  eastwards  in  a  huge  column  towards  Enda 
Kidane ;  and  here,  shortly  after  six  o'clock,  the  swarm  of 
rifle-armed  scouts  thrown  out  in  front  of  their  advance  came 
in  contact  with  Albertone's  vanguard,  the  First  Native  bat- 
talion, under  Colonel  Turitto. 

For  some  time  Turitto  did  not  realize  that  he  had  a 
formidable  mass  of  enemies  in  his  front.  The  Shoans 
came  on  in  a  scattered  line  of  skirmishers  through  the 
broken,  rocky  ground,  and  the  native  battalion,  formed  in 

*  G.  F.  H.  Berkeley,  "  The  Campaign  of  Adowa." 


ADOWA  253 

line,  held  them  back  with  its  well-directed  fire;  but  when 
the  fight  had  gone  on  for  more  thari  an  hour,  it  was  evident 
that  the  enemy  was  being  continually  reinforced.  Masses 
of  dark  warriors  appeared  on  the  flanks  of  the  line,  and 
Turitto  began  to  fall  back.  At  first  his  rear  companies 
checked  the  pursuit,  but  then  the  enemy  came  on  in  a  wild 
rush,  and  swept  away  the  rearguard.  The  retreat  became  a 
disorderly  flight,  pressed  by  thousands  of  exulting  barba- 
rians. Turitto  had  i8  Italian  officers  with  him:  14  were 
shot  down,  two  taken  prisoners.  The  remnant  of  the  bat- 
talion was  saved  by  the  main  body  of  Albertone's  Brigade, 
on  the  slopes  of  Adi  Vetshi,  opening  fire  with  mountain 
guns  and  rifles  on  the  enemy  as  they  tried  to  cross  the  valley 
in  their  front,  at  the  heels  of  the  fugitives. 

Albertone  was  now  in  a  position  of  extreme  peril.  Thanks 
to  the  false  information  conveyed  to  Baratieri  by  the  spies, 
he  had  marched  out  fully  expecting  that  his  work  would  bo 
to  harass  the  retirement  of  a  starving  and  demoralized 
enemy.  But  now  that  his  vanguard  battalion  had  been 
driven  in  upon  him  a  hopeless  wreck,  with  most  of  its  white 
officers  hors  de  combat  —  though  he  had  checked  the  first 
rush  of  the  pursuit  —  he  saw  that  thousands  of  exulting 
enemies  were  swarming  over  the  ridges  in  his  front,  spread- 
ing out  to  right  and  left,  throwing  forward  the  flanks  of 
their  line  into  the  horns  of  the  enveloping  crescent  that  is 
the  typical  attack  formation  of  a  rush  of  the  wild  races  in 
so  many  parts  of  Africa.  The  enemy  was  not  moving  in 
ordered  lines,  but  coming  on  in  irregular  Ixxlies  grouped 
around  their  chiefs.  y\long  the  front  of  the  advance  the 
riflemen  were  firing,  but  as  yet  their  shooting  was  doing 
very  little  harm. 

To  meet  this  rush  he  had  his  native  brigade  —  three  bat- 
talions still  intact,  a  few  hundred  irregulars  —  a  little  more 
than  3000  rifles  in  all,  and  14  light  mountain  guns,  six  of 
them  served  bv  native  gunners,  the  other  eight  grouped  in 


254  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

two  batteries  manned  by  Sicilians.  He  had  formed  his 
brigade,  in  a  line  just  over  a  mile  long,  on  the  rocky,  bush- 
covered  slopes,  with  his  guns  in  the  left  center,  where  the 
curve  of  the  hill  made  a  salient  in  his  front.  Against  three- 
fold or  fourfold  odds  he  would  have  been  safe  enough,  but 
here  he  was  faced  by  tens  of  thousands.  Away  to  his  right 
their  fire  came  from  the  thorny  scrub  on  the  nearer  slopes  of 
Mount  Gusoso.  To  his  left  they  were  hurrying  across  the 
stream  in  the  hollow,  and  coming  up  the  slopes  to  envelop 
him  on  that  side  also.  Three  miles  of  wild  hill  country  sep- 
arated him  from  the  main  body  on  Mount  Belah.  To  attempt 
to  retire  would  have  been  to  be  at  once  surrounded  on  all 
sides  by  a  rush  of  his  lightly-equipped  and  fleet-footed 
opponents ;  but  to  stand  his  ground  meant  also  being  soon 
cut  off  and  attacked  on  all  sides,  unless  the  sound  of  his 
guns  brought  prompt  help  from  the  main  body. 

From  the  first  there  were  unpleasant  signs  that  the  sight 
of  the  hostile  multitude,  coming  steadily  forward  in  spite 
of  heavy  loss  from  shell  and  rifle  fire,  was  telling  on  the 
nerves  of  some  of  the  native  troops,  and  even  of  the  native 
ofiicers.  And  the  position  looked  still  worse  when  suddenly 
shells  began  to  burst  in  the  Italian  batteries.  Menelek  had 
brought  up  to  the  hill  of  Enda  Kidane  his  Hotchkiss  quick- 
firers  —  a  better  weapon  than  Albertone's  mountain  guns 
—  and  the  stream  of  shells  they  poured  into  his  position 
began  to  work  havoc  among  the  native  and  the  Sicilian 
gunners. 

When  Albertone's  artillery  came  into  action,  Baratieri  at 
Mount  Belah  knew  at  last  that  something  serious  was  hap- 
pening to  his  missing  brigade.  He  had  only  vague  ideas  as 
to  its  position,  but  he  made  an  attempt  to  send  it  help.  He 
ordered  his  right  brigade,  under  General  Dabormida,  to 
move  forward  and  cooperate  with  Albertone,  either  by  help- 
ing him  to  beat  off  the  enemy,  or,  if  they  were  too  strong, 
by  covering  a  retirement  on  the  main  position.     Dabormida 


ADOWA  255 

had  with  him  six  European  battalions  and  three  batteries, 
and  a  battalion  of  native  irregulars  —  about  4000  men  and 
18  guns.  It  was  a  day  of  mishaps  for  the  Italians.  Dabor- 
mida  descended  into  the  valley  in  front  of  the  Spur  of 
Belah ;  then,  misled  by  the  sound  of  the  cannonade  echoing 
among  the  hills,  he  took  a  wrong  direction.  Instead  of  going 
up  the  valley  —  a  line  of  march  which  would  soon  have 
brought  him  on  to  the  track  of  Albertone's  advance  —  he 
moved  down  the  stream  north  of  Mount  Derer  towards  the 
valley  of  Miriam  Shiavitu.  A  mass  of  mountains  with 
precipitous,  cliff-like  faces  now  separated  him  from  Alber- 
tone,  and  he  was  marching  down  the  long  hollow  up  which 
the  warriors  of  Ras  Alula,  Mangasha,  and  Makonnen  were 
advancing  to  the  attack. 

The  brigade  halted  in  the  valley  some  three  miles  from 
Mount  Belah.  The  hollow  down  which  the  stream  ran  was 
about  half  a  mile  wide.  On  the  left  the  hills  rose  in  bold 
rock  faces  furrowed  with  ravines ;  on  the  right  there  were 
undulating  slopes,  and  on  these,  and  in  the  valley  bottom, 
were  stretches  of  scrub,  alternating  with  high  sunburnt 
grass.  Officers  were  sent  forward  to  reconnoiter,  and  the 
men,  weary  with  the  night  march,  threw  themselves  on  the 
ground,  and  many  of  them  slept.  An  examination  of  the 
stream  showed  that  the  water  was  not  fit  to  drink ;  but 
most  of  the  men  had  already  emi)tied  their  water-bottles,  the 
sun  was  hot,  and  it  proved  to  be  impossible  to  prevent  hun- 
dreds from  drinking  freely  of  it. 

Major  de  Vito,  who  commanded  the  irregulars  attached 
to  the  brigade,  sent  in  word  that  an  extensive  camp  was  in 
sight  to  'the  front,  north  of  Adowa,  and  that  large  bodies 
of  the  enemy  were  moving  between  it  and  the  hills  to  the 
southward,  whence  came  the  sound  of  the  cannonade. 
Dabormida  then  directed  De  Vito  to  move  in  that  direction 
with  his  irregulars  and  gain  touch  with  Albertone;  and  at 
a  quarter  past  nine  he  sent  a  despatch  back  to  Baratieri,  in 


2s6  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

which  he  wrote :  "  I  am  holding  out  a  hand  to  the  Native 
Brigade,  while  keeping  a  strong  body  of  troops  massed  near 
the  road  to  Adowa  and  watching  the  heights  on  my  right." 
This  report  gave  the  commander-in-chief  the  impression 
that  Dabormida  had  actually  got  into  touch  with  Albertone. 
He  had  no  idea  that  two  miles  of  mountain  country  held 
by  the  enemy  interposed  between  his  advanced  brigades. 

As  De  Vito  climbed  to  the  top  of  the  high  ground  on 
Dabormida's  left,  he  saw  that  the  enemy  was  also  ad- 
vancing along  the  heights  and  was  close  at  hand.  He  ran 
forward  with  his  men  to  seize  a  bold  ridge  that  offered  a 
vantage  ground  for  defense.  To  reach  it  the  native  bat- 
talion had  to  scramble  across  a  deep  ravine;  but  they 
gained  the  ridge,  formed  in  line,  and  stopped  the  first  rush 
of  the  Tigre  men.  But  the  enemy  came  on  again  in  greater 
numbers.  De  Vito  was  shot  dead,  and  his  irregulars  were 
hustled  across  the  ravine  after  a  hard  fight,  and  driven  in 
with  the  loss  of  all  but  one  of  their  fourteen  white  officers. 

During  the  fight  on  the  ridge  Dabormida  had  formed 
up  his  brigade  for  battle.  Colonel  Ragni  deployed  the  three 
battalions  of  the  Third  Regiment  on  the  left.  Two  of  them, 
sent  well  up  the  heights,  covered  the  retirement,  or  rather 
the  flight,  of  the  broken  native  battalion.  In  the  valley  the 
three  batteries  (i8  mountain  guns)  were  drawn  up  in  line 
among  the  long  grass.  On  their  right  was  the  Sixth  Regi- 
ment, under  Colonel  Airaghi  —  one  battalion  deployed  in  a 
long  firing  line,  the  two  others  in  reserve  well  to  the  rear. 
On  the  extreme  right  a  few  hundred  native  auxiliaries,  under 
Major  Prevasi,  were  thrown  out  to  watch  the  rising  ground 
on  that  side. 

On  the  heights  to  the  left  the  steady  fire  of  Ragni's  men 
beat  back  rush  after  rush  of  the  enemy.  Along  the  valley 
a  fierce  attack  developed  against  the  center  of  the  brigade. 
The  bush  and  long  grass  were  alive  with  riflemen  and  spear- 
men  moving  directly  against   the  batteries,   firing  as  they 


ADOWA  257 

came,  and  a  mass  of  the  Galla  cavalry  charged  the  battalion 
on  the  right.  The  Galla  horsemen  were  driven  back  by 
the  Italian  rifles  and  a  salvo  of  shells  from  the  nearest 
battery.  The  fire  from  the  bush  caused  few  casualties  in 
the  brigade,  for  the  enemy  shot  wildly  and  sent  most  of 
their  bullets  high  over  the  heads  of  the  Italians.  To  sup- 
port the  attack  an  Abyssinia  battery  came  into  action  on 
the  heights  to  the  left,  but  its  guns  fired  slowly  and  made 
bad  practice.  Dabormida  turned  one  of  his  batteries  on  the 
enemy's  artillery,  and  soon  nearly  silenced  it. 

For  more  than  two  hours  he  easily  repulsed  every  attack. 
The  men  were  perfectly  steady,  and  as  they  felt  their  power 
of  holding  back  the  rushes  of  the  barbarians,  and  saw  the 
heaps  of  dead  strewing  the  ground  over  which  their  assail- 
ants had  charged,  they  became  quite  cheerful  with  the  sense 
of  victory,  joked  with  each  other,  and  greeted  Dabormida 
with  loud  "  z'k'as  "  as  he  rode  along  the  line. 

But  two  miles  to  the  southward  there  was  dire  disaster 
for  the  Italian  arms  —  the  beginning  of  the  end.  Here 
Albertone  was  facing  the  main  attack.  At  first  the  fight 
seemed  to  be  going  well  for  him.  Though  the  shell  fire  of 
Menelek's  Hotchkiss  batteries  caused  some  loss  and  tended 
to  shake  the  native  battalions,  their  white  officers  steadied 
them,  and  the  rushes  of  the  enemy  across  the  valley  in  front 
were  stopped  before  they  could  reach  its  eastern  side.  The 
Sicilian  gunners  were  making  splendid  practice,  and  inflict- 
ing heavy  loss  on  the  Shoans.  But  the  danger  was  not  from 
the  frontal  attacks,  but  from  the  thousands  that  were  con- 
tinually pushing  forward  on  the  flanks,  most  of  them  be- 
yond the  immediate  view  of  the  defense,  and  then  turning 
inwards  to  strengthen  and  extend  the  horns  of  the  hostile 
crescent. 

Twice  Baratieri  had  sent  orders  to  the  Native  Brigade 
to  retire,  but  the  messages  had  not  reached  Albertone. 
However,  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock,  while  Dabormida 


2S8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

was  still  victorious  away  on  the  right,  Albertone  decided 
that  he  must  try  to  fight  his  way  back  to  the  main  body. 
Losses  were  increasing.  He  had  engaged  his  last  reserve. 
Black  crowds  of  the  enemy  were  surging  round  his  flanks. 
To  hold  on  any  longer  west  of  Adi  Vetshi  would  be  to  be 
hemmed  in  by  tens  of  thousands. 

The  retirement  began  from  the  right  over  the  shoulder 
of  the  hiJl,  A  battalion  and  the  two  Sicilian  batteries  were 
to  protect  the  retreat,  the  batteries  retiring  alternately. 
"  You  must  sacrifice  yourselves  to  save  the  brigade,"  said 
Albertone  to  the  gunners.  They  nobly  obeyed.  As  the 
brigade  moved  round  the  hill  the  Sicilians  fought  their 
guns  to  the  last,  firing  in  the  faces  of  the  enemy,  who  were 
now  emboldened  by  the  sight  of  the  invaders  giving  way, 
and  rushed  recklessly  to  the  charge,  yelling  out  their  savage 
battle-cry,  " Elbagume!  elhagume!"  ("Kill!  kill!").  They 
closed  with  the  bayonets  of  the  rearguard.  They  got  in 
among  the  guns.  The  infantry  broke.  The  Sicilians  fought 
with  carbine  and  bayonet,  swords,  rammers ;  but  they  were 
few  against  many,  and  the  batteries  were  taken  with  the 
loss  of  nearly  every  one  of  their  defenders.  There  were 
four  officers  and  62  men  with  the  Third  Battery  at  the 
beginning  of  the  fight.  Only  one  officer  and  two  men 
came  out  of  it.  Of  the  four  officers  and  73  men  of  the 
Fourth  Batterly  only  four  men  escaped  from  the  rout. 

The  native  batteries  had  already  fired  their  last  round, 
and  were  retiring  with  the  guns  on  the  pack-saddles  of  their 
mules  in  the  midst  of  what  was  left  of  the  infantry.  The 
pursuers  had  closed  in  on  the  brigade  on  all  sides.  Some 
of  the  white  and  native  officers  managed  to  keep  their  men 
together,  and  fought  in  the  midst  of  a  yelling  mob  of 
savages.  The  brigade  made  slow  progress,  leaving  a  trail 
of  dead  behind  it,  and  every  rush  on  its  flanks  and  rear 
reduced  its  numbers.  The  mules  were  shot  down,  and  all 
the  guns  abandoned  to  the  enemy. 


ADOWA  259 

Shortly  after  ten  o'clock  Baratieri,  from  Mount  Belah, 
saw  the  first  signs  of  the  disaster  to  his  advanced  left 
brigade.  Numbers  of  disbanded  native  soldiers  were  seen 
running  towards  the  main  position  across  the  valley  in 
front,  closely  pursued  by  the  Shoans.  Some  shells  were 
fired  at  these  to  check  them,  but  it  was  difficult  to  do  so, 
they  kept  so  close  behind  the  beaten  men.  Then  away  to 
the  right  it  was  seen  that  a  party  of  the  enemy  were  attack- 
ing a  battalion  that  Baratieri  had  pushed  out  along  the  high 
ground  on  that  side  to  secure  communication  with  Dabor- 
mida.     The  battalion  held  its  own. 

But  then  over  the  heights  in  front  a  huge  mass  of 
savage  warriors  poured  into  the  valley,  and  regardless 
of  the  artillery  fire  directed  upon  them  by  Arimondi's 
batteries,  swept  up  the  Spur  of  Belah.  Their  swift  advance 
came  as  a  surprise.  It  was  the  main  central  column  of 
the  attack,  which  had  moved  up  from  below  Mount  Nasruai, 
been  reinforced  from  that  which  had  outflanked  Albertone's 
right,  and  then  moved  across  the  rocky  ground  west  of 
Mount  Derer,  while  Dabormida's  left  was  busy  repelling  the 
immediate  attack  upon  it.  The  column  had  then  ])oured 
like  a  flood  over  the  northern  slope  of  Derer.  across  the 
stream  below  it,  and  up  the  Spur  of  Belah,  its  vanguard 
sweeping  on  towards  the  hill  of  Rebbi  Arienni,  where 
Ellena  met  it.  He  had  not  all  his  brigade  with  him.  for 
part  of  it  had  already  moved  forward  to  reinforce  Arinioiuli 
on  Mount  Belah. 

The  Italian  army  was  now  cut  up  into  three  unequal 
detachments.  Far  out  in  front  was  Dabormida's  Brigade, 
intact  and  locally  victorious,  but,  though  the  general  was 
not  yet  aware  of  it,  separated  by  the  last  rush  of  the  enemy 
from  the  main  body.  On  the  left  front  Albertone's  Brigade, 
or  rather  the  wreck  of  it.  was  surrounded  by  an  exultant 
mob  of  barbarian  victors.  In  the  center  was  the  main  body, 
now  closely  attacked  by  an  overwhelming  number  of  enemies 


26o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

who  had  established  themselves  on  the  main  position,  and 
threatened  to  drive  a  wedge  between  the  two  brigades. 

A  battalion  of  Bersaglieri  dashed  at  the  spur  to  re- 
capture it,  but  mere  weight  of  numbers  drove  them  back. 
Their  colonel  was  killed.  He  was  seen  wounded,  cut  off 
from  his  men,  defending  himself  with  his  sword  with  one 
knee  on  the  ground.  He  was  run  through  by  one  of  the 
Galla  spearmen.  Arimondi  had  now  to  face  another  attack 
from  the  front  and  the  left.  All  that  held  together  of 
Albertone's  Brigade  had  been  destroyed.  The  general  him- 
self was  badly  wounded,  and  was  a  prisoner. 

Then  most  of  those  who  had  been  attacking  the  Native 
Brigade  left  the  work  of  mere  massacre  and  went  forward 
against  Mount  Belah.  Menelek  brought  up  his  quick-firers 
to  engage  Arimondi's  artillery.  The  hills  and  the  valley 
west  of  Belah  were  black  with  moving  crowds  of  the 
enemy,  "  swarming  like  ants  on  a  disturbed  ant-hill."  A 
rush  came  up  the  hollow  south  of  Belah,  over  the  ground 
Albertone  was  to  have  held.  Here  was  posted  Colonel 
Galliano's  native  battalion,  called  up  shortly  before  from  the 
reserve.  Galliano's  men  were  supposed  to  be  among  the 
best  in  the  army.  They  were  the  heroic  defenders  of 
Makalla.  But  they  had  not  been  twenty  minutes  under  fire 
when  they  suddenly  broke  and  fled.  Galliano  with  his 
white  officers  and  a  few  brave  men  met  the  rush  of  the 
enemy.  He  was  wounded  in  the  face,  knocked  down,  and 
made  prisoner.  His  captors  were  leading  him  to  the  rear, 
when  he  became  faint  with  loss  of  blood  and  sat  down  on  the 
ground  to  rest.    Then  one  of  the  Shoans  blew  his  brains  out. 

Arimondi's  left  was  now  exposed.  He  was  attacked 
fiercely  from  the  front,  and  from  the  spur  the  enemy's  rifle- 
men began  to  climb  the  hill  and  fire  down  on  him  from  the 
upper  slopes  of  Belah.  Baratieri  sent  him  an  order  to  retire 
to  Mount  Rajo,  where  he  would  have  Ellena  on  his  right. 
The  retreat  along  the  ridge  between  Belah  and  Rajo  was 


ADOWA  261 

made  amid  a  storm  of  fire  and  incessant  charges  of  the 
Abyssinians.  One  of  these  rushes  broke  into  the  ItaHan 
cokimn  close  to  Arimondi.  The  general,  wounded  in  the 
knee  by  a  bullet,  defended  himself  sword  in  hand,  but  was 
killed  just  as  the  charge  was  repulsed. 

Ellena  was  barely  holding  his  own.  Baratieri  formed  up 
Arimondi's  Brigade  on  Mount  Rajo,  but  he  could  see  that 
the  battalions,  which  had  lost  heavily  in  the  retirement,  had 
little  fight  left  in  them.  The  men,  tired  with  the  night  march 
and  harassed  with  thirst  under  the  burning  sun,  looked  ex- 
hausted, and  the  fire  with  which  they  answered  back  the 
fusillade  that  poured  from  Mount  Belah  was  wild  and  un- 
controlled. He  made  up  his  mind  to  begin  an  ordered  re- 
tirement while  what  was  left  of  the  two  brigades  could  still 
keep  together,  and  before  he  was  outflanked  and  surrounded 
by  a  further  advance  of  the  enemy. 

Brave  deeds  were  done  before  what  was  left  of  the  two 
brigades  moved  down  the  eastern  slopes  of  Rajo  and  Rebbi 
Arienni  into  the  valley  of  Gundapta,  but  it  is  clear  from  all 
the  narratives  that  the  men  had  lost  heart,  and  they  did 
not  make  anything  like  the  persistent  fight  that  had  char- 
acterized the  resistance  of  the  two  other  brigades.  The 
attack  that  raged  round  them  was  more  furious  than  ever. 
Italian  officers  who  survived  the  day  say  that  the  men  of 
Shoa  and  Amhara  seemed  actually  to  have  gone  mad.  They 
bounded  forward,  yelling  and  leaping  high  in  the  air,  and 
only  firing  when  they  were  close  up  to  the  rearguard.  Losses 
seemed  to  produce  no  effect  whatever  on  them.  Before  men 
animated  by  this  battle  madness  the  tired,  dis])irited  soldiers 
seemed  helpless. 

The  beaten  army  broke  into  three  columns,  each  follow- 
ing a  different  track  out  of  the  Gundapta  hollow,  in  crossing 
which  they  had  left  another  wide  trail  of  dead  behind  them. 
Baratieri  rode  with  the  rearguard  till  the  valley  was  crossed 
with  Ellena  near  him.  and  the  two  generals  repeatedly  ral- 


262  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

lied  a  few  companies  for  a  stand,  and  sometimes  were  able 
to  bring  the  guns  again  into  action.  The  valley  would  never 
have  been  crossed  if  the  pursuers  had  made  a  persistent 
effort  to  head  off  the  beaten  army.  They  only  followed  it 
up  and  lashed  at  its  flanks,  and  Menelek  and  Ras  Makonnen 
soon  called  off  a  considerable  part  of  their  forces,  and 
most  of  the  artillery,  to  move  westwards  and  help  in  the 
destruction  of  Dabormida's  isolated  brigade  and  a  battalion 
under  De  Amicis,  that  had  been  cut  off  with  it  by  the  rush 
over  the  Spur  of  Belah. 

While  the  main  position  was  being  captured,  Dabormida, 
in  the  valley  of  Miriam  Shiavitu,  anxious  though  he  was  at 
having  no  tidings  from  his  commander-in-chief,  was  under 
the  impression  that  elsewhere  the  fight  was  probably  going 
as  well  as  it  was  in  his  own  immediate  front.  Until  mid- 
day he  had  repelled  every  attack  of  the  Abyssinians.  Then, 
as  they  no  longer  tried  to  advance,  and  their  fire  had  slack- 
ened into  an  irregular  fusillade  that  did  practically  no  harm, 
he  ventured  to  assume  the  offensive  all  along  his  line.  On 
the  heights  Ragni  was  met  by  such  a  burst  of  hostile  fire 
that  he  could  not  gain  any  ground,  but  in  the  valley  itself 
the  Italians  twice  won  their  way  forward  with  the  bayonet. 
Dabormida  himself  led  these  charges,  and  before  the  ad- 
vancing line  of  steel  the  enemy  broke  so  rapidly  that  only 
a  few  of  them  were  bayoneted.  The  second  charge  had 
carried  forward  the  line  to  a  swell  of  ground  that  gave  a 
better  field  of  fire  for  the  guns.  Dabormida  brought  for- 
ward his  artillery.  The  men  greeted  him  with  loud  cheers. 
"  Viz'a  il  generale!  Viva  il  re!  J^ittoria!  Vittoria!"  was 
shouted  on  all  sides.  In  the  midst  of  this  exultation  a  native 
servant  of  one  of  the  officers  caught  his  master  by  the  arm, 
and,  pointing  back  up  the  valley,  said  excitedly :  "  Look, 
look,  there  come  the  enemy !  "  Over  the  rising  ground,  a 
mile  in  rear  of  the  brigade,  guns,  riflemen,  and  spearmen 
were  moving  down  into  the  valley,  and  swarms  of  the  Galla 


ADOWA  263 

cavalry  were  riding  out  northwards  to  occupy  its  slopes  on 
that  side. 

For  the  first  time  in  the  day  Dabormida  looked  anxious. 
"  This  is  serious,"  he  said  to  his  staff  officers.  "  What  has 
become  of  the  headquarters  ?  They  have  not  sent  me  a 
word.  They  seem  to  have  vanished  into  space."  Instantly 
he  sent  Airaghi  with  two  battalions  to  meet  the  attack  in 
his  rear,  and  warned  Prevasi  to  protect  the  flank.  He  was 
right  in  saying  that  the  position  had  become  serious.  There 
were  some  30,000  victorious  enemies  across  his  line  of 
retreat.  With  hours  of  fighting  the  ammunition  supply  had 
run  low.  And  his  battalions  had  lost  a  terrible  proportion 
of  their  officers,  largely  because,  as  one  of  the  survivors 
noted  in  his  narrative  of  the  disaster,  "  from  a  false  sense 
of  pride  they  persisted  in  standing  during  the  fight,  while 
their  men  were  lying  down  and  firing."  Dabormida,  after 
sending  Airaghi  to  attack  the  enemy,  decided  that  the  only 
chance  of  saving  the  brigade  was  to  fight  his  way  back  to 
Belah.  He  told  his  officers  that  no  doubt  Raratieri  would 
hold  out  a  hand  to  him  and  assist  his  retreat.  He  had  no 
idea  that  by  that  time  Baraticri  was  himself  fighting  for 
the  very  existence  of  what  was  left  of  the  main  body  on  the 
eastern  slopes  of  the  Gundapta  valley. 

For  more  than  three  hours  the  brigade  struggled  against 
overwhelming  numbers,  painfully  winning  its  way  towards 
the  upper  end  of  the  valley,  where  De  Amicis  was  fighting, 
ringed  round  with  a  host  of  enemies.  It  was  the  final 
failure  of  the  ammunition  that  ended  the  fight,  and  at  last 
enabled  the  victorious  enemy  to  break  into  the  lines  of 
both  the  brigade  and  the  battalion  that  supported  it.  The 
final  struggle  took  place  in  a  deluge  of  rain  and  a  thunder- 
storm of  tropical  violence.  By  this  time  Dabormida's  Bri- 
gade had  been  broken  into  fragments.  Here  the  exhausted 
and  despairing  men  surrendered,  and  asked  for  quarter  that 
was  not  always  granted;    there  they   fought   in   desperate 


264  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

groups  among  the  rocks  —  with  sword,  bayonet,  and  rifle- 
butt  —  till  numbers  told,  and  the  last  survivors  were  killed 
or  taken. 

Weeks  after,  when,  during  the  negotiations  for  peace, 
the  Italians  were  allowed  to  send  burial  parties  into  the 
Shiavitu  valley,  they  found  in  more  than  one  instance  a 
dead  man  still  grasping  the  enemy  he  had  slain  in  the  last 
death  struggle.  Few  of  the  officers  survived  the  day. 
Airaghi,  badly  wounded,  said  to  his  comrades,  "  I  am  old, 
you  are  still  young;  save  yourselves  and  leave  me."  They 
helped  him  to  seat  himself  against  a  tree,  with  his  face 
towards  the  enemy,  and  stood  by  him  till  a  few  minutes  later 
he  leaned  forward  and  died. 

De  Amicis  had  held  his  ground  at  the  head  of  the  valley 
till  the  brigade  joined  him.  The  remnant  of  his  battalion 
then  for  a  while  formed  its  rearguard.  He  was  last  seen 
disappearing,  sword  in  hand,  into  the  midst  of  a  rush  of 
Ras  Alula's  men.  Where  Dabormida  himself  was  killed  is 
not  certainly  known.  For  a  long  time  he  was  in  the  midst 
of  the  rearguard  fight,  his  horse,  wounded  by  a  bullet  in  the 
head,  still  carrying  him  well.  Then  he  was  on  foot  amongst 
his  men.  Some  said  afterwards  they  saw  him  fall  dead 
while  trying  to  mount  a  mule.  But  he  seems  to  have  been 
still  living,  though  badly  wounded,  when  the  brigade  was 
finally  broken.  A  comrade  and  friend  of  his,  who  accom- 
panied the  burial  parties  later  on,  thought  he  recognized 
him  in  a  corpse  found  in  a  hollow  near  the  east  end  of  the 
valley.  An  old  native  woman,  who  lived  in  a  hut  close  by, 
said  it  was  the  body  of  a  "  great  chief,  who  wore  spectacles 
and  a  watch  and  golden  stars  (decorations),"  who  had 
asked  her  for  water,  and  then  lay  down  on  the  ground  and 
died.  Plunderers  had  stripped  the  body  of  watch  and 
orders,  belt  and  sword. 

A  very  few  of  the  survivors  hid  themselves  in  the  hills 
and   straggled   into   the   Italian   camp.     The   brigade  was 


ADOWA  265 

practically  annihilated  —  a  sad  ending-  to  a  day  that  had 
begun  with  hard-won  success.  The  main  body,  under  Bara- 
tieri  and  Ellena,  narrowly  escaped  the  same  fate.  For  six 
miles  the  pursuit  pressed  them  closely.  Weary,  hungry, 
parched  with  burning  thirst,  and  with  only  a  few  cartridges 
left,  the  men  broke  down,  discipline  gave  way :  only  a  few 
stood  by  their  officers ;  the  rest  were  a  beaten  mob.  The 
stragglers  were  ruthlessly  massacred.  Officers  and  men, 
too  exhausted  to  move  another  step,  turned  and  waited  to 
have  a  last  shot  before  the  spears  of  the  enemy  were  upon 
them.  The  storm  that  thundered  over  the  mountain  gorges 
was  a  relief.  The  pursuit  slackened,  and  the  men  could 
drink  from  the  torrents  that  now  poured  down  every  ravine. 
After  dark  the  fugitives,  no  longer  pursued,  halted  for  a 
brief  rest.  On  the  hills  behind  them  they  saw  red  flames 
rising  from  every  summit  for  miles.  They  were  bonfires, 
lighted  by  Menelek's  orders  to  signal  his  victory  to  every 
valley  in  sight,  and  call  the  mountaineers  to  insurrection 
against  the  white  men. 

Next  day  the  remnant  of  the  army  readied  its  fortified 
camp,  which  was  in  a  few  hours  abandoned,  in  order  to 
concentrate  at  Adi  Caje  and  shorten  the  line  for  convoys 
and  reinforcements.  Menelek  made  no  immediate  effort  to 
follow  up  his  success.  In  fact,  a  considerable  part  of  his 
army  dispersed  in  the  next  few  days.  Tt  was  impossible 
to  keep  it  togi^ther  and  feed  it.  Only  for  Baratieri's  rash 
enterprise  it  would  have  retired  without  fighting. 

The  victors  of  Adowa  are  said  to  have  lost  in  the  battle 
7000  killed  and  10,000  wounded.  This  is  probably  no  over- 
estimate, for  they  had  ilung  themselves  in  dense  masses 
against  breech-loading  cannon  and  repeating  rifles.  The 
loss  of  the  vanquished  army  was  terril)le.  Seventeen  thou- 
sand officers  and  men  marched  otit  to  battle.  Of  these, 
6678  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  nearly  3000  more  were 
taken  prisoners  —  a  total  loss  of  nearly  10,000  men.    It  was 


266  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  greatest  disaster  that  had  ever  befallen  a  civilized  army 
in  Africa  in  modern  times. 

The  particulars  of  the  losses  showed  that  the  victors 
must  have  massacred  large  numbers  of  the  wounded  dur- 
ing the  fight.  In  a  battle  between  civilized  armies  the 
wounded  outnumber  the  dead  by  ten  to  one.  At  Adowa, 
on  the  losing  side,  there  were  more  than  twice  as  many 
killed  as  there  were  wounded.  The  Italians  had  261  officers 
and  2981  men  killed,  besides  954  more  returned  as  perma- 
nently missing.  These  may  be  counted  as  having  also  been 
killed,  and  never  found  during  the  subsequent  examination 
of  the  battle-field  by  the  burial  parties.  Their  bodies  lay 
in  the  bush  and  the  mountain  ravines,  out  of  sight,  or  had 
been  destroyed  by  beasts  and  birds  of  prey.  Of  the  native 
soldiers,  about  2000  were  killed,  making  the  total  killed 
5196. 

The  wounded,  most  of  whom  remained  in  the  hands  of 
the  victors,  were  31  Italian  officers  and  439  men,  and  958 
of  the  native  auxiliaries  —  a  total  of  only  1428.  The  Italian 
prisoners  numbered  1865.  Of  the  native  troops,  at  least 
1000  were  taken,  and  some  estimates  make  the  number  1500. 

More  than  400  of  the  native  prisoners  were  sentenced 
as  rebels  to  the  loss  of  a  foot  and  a  hand,  and  thus  crippled 
they  were  turned  adrift.  Even  some  of  the  white  prisoners 
were  treated  with  savage  cruelty ;  many  died  before  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  could  restore  them  to  Italy. 

Peace  was  not  long  delayed.  There  was  no  general 
desire  in  Italy  to  avenge  Adowa.  Crispi's  Abyssinian  ad- 
venture was  very  unpopular,  and  the  people,  horrified  at  the 
disaster,  protested  against  any  more  victims  being  sacrificed 
to  "  the  black  Sphinx  of  Africa."  Menelek  was  thus  able 
to  secure  the  independence  of  Italian  control  for  which  he 
had  fought. 

An  important  though  indirect  result  of  Adowa  was  the 
beginning  of  the  reconquest  of  the  Soudan.    Encouraged  by 


ADOWA  267 

the  news  of  the  disaster  to  the  Italians,  the  Mahdists  moved 
against  their  garrison  at  Kassala,  and  it  was  feared  that  this 
was  only  the  prelude  to  a  general  revival  of  their  activity 
in  the  valley  of  the  upper  Nile.  As  a  counterstroke  the 
British  Government  decided  on  the  advance  into  the  Don- 
gola  province  of  an  Egyptian  army  under  General  Sir 
Herbert  (now  Lord)  Kitchener.  This  was  the  first  step 
in  the  three  years  of  campaigning  that  culminated  in  the 
victory  of  Omdurman. 


CHAPTER    XI 

THE    BATTLE    BEFORE    SANTIAGO 
(El  Caney  and  San  Juan) 
July  1,  1898 

The  most  important  operations  in  which  American  troops 
were  engaged  since  the  War  of  Secession  were  those  in 
Eastern  Cuba  during  the  conflict  with  Spain  in  1898.  The 
chief  mihtary  event  of  the  campaign  was  the  battle  before 
Santiago  on  July   i. 

The  fighting  gave  further  startling  proof  of  the  value  of 
improvised  defenses  held  by  brave  men  armed  with  modern 
rifles,  even  when  attacked  by  regular  troops  of  the  best 
quality.  This  was  most  strikingly  illustrated  in  the  pro- 
longed defense  of  El  Caney  village  by  a  mere  handful  of 
riflemen  against  a  whole  division  of  highly  trained  infantry. 

Before  the  war  there  had  been  in  the  United  States  a 
disposition  to  underrate  the  Spanish  soldier.  In  this  fight- 
ing before  Santiago,  however,  the  opposing  forces  came  to 
know  each  other.  In  the  midst  of  the  conflict  there  arose 
between  them  the  bond  of  chivalrous  admiration  that  brave 
men  feel  for  each  other  when  matched  in  battle,  and  on 
the  day  when  Santiago  at  last  surrendered,  an  onlooker 
told  how  the  meeting  between  the  American  and  Spanish 
officers  was  like  a  reunion  of  friends. 

When  the  war  began  the  United  States  Government  mobi- 
lized the  few  regular  regiments  it  possessed,  and  called 
out  for  service  a  large  number  of  volunteer  and  militia 
organizations.  Large  training  camps  were  formed  at  vari- 
ous points.    To  that  of  Tampa  in  Florida  most  of  the  regu- 


THE    BATTLE    BEFORE    SANTIAGO      269 

lar  reg-iments  were  sent.  The  troops  at  Tampa  were  in- 
tended to  be  the  vanguard  of  the  army  that  was  to  invade 
central  Cuba  and  take  Havana.  But  tlic  course  of  events 
gave  it  a  different  destination.  Havana  was  never  attacked, 
and  was  not  surrendered  until  after  the  conclusion  of 
peace,  when  Spain  withdrew  from  Cuba. 

The  only  really  efficient  naval  force  the  Spanish  Gov- 
ernment possessed  was  a  squadron  of  four  cruisers  and  some 
torpedo  destroyers  that  concentrated  at  St.  Vincent  in  the 
Cape  de  Verde  Islands,  and  sailed  for  the  West  Indies  on 
April  29.  American  cruisers  sent  out  into  the  Atlantic 
failed  to  iind  the  Spanish  squadron,  and  there  were  the 
wildest  rumors  as  to  its  whereabouts.  On  May  14  Cervera 
touched  at  the  Dutch  island  of  Curagoa,  and  then  putting 
to  sea  disappeared  once  more  from  all  search.  After  some 
anxious  days,  during  which  there  were  reports  that  it  was 
threatening  this  or  that  city  of  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  it  was 
discovered  that  the  elusive  squadron  had  taken  refuge  in  the 
landlocked  harbor  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  the  oldest  city  in 
the  island  and  its  capital  in  the  early  days  of  the  Spanish 
conquest. 

The  city  stands  on  the  shore  of  a  wide  arm  of  the  sea, 
approached  from  the  ocean  only  by  a  narrow  channel  that 
winds  through  a  ravine-like  rift  in  the  great  clififs  of  the 
coast.  On  one  side  of  the  entrance  rises  the  white-towered 
Morro  Castle  with  batteries  of  old  guns,  tier  above  tier. 
On  the  shelving  strip  of  shore  below  the  castle  some  heavier 
guns  were  mounted  in  newer  works.  Moored  across  the 
entrance  an  old  cruiser  served  as  a  floating  battery.  Some 
of  her  guns  had  been  mounted  in  earthworks  on  the  Socapa 
height  opposite  Morro  Castle.  The  channel  was  further  de- 
fended by  submarine  mines.  Admiral  Sampson  blockaded 
the  harbor  with  the  American  fleet,  and  engaged  the  bat- 
teries of  Morro  and  Socapa,  but  he  soon  decided  that  to 
attempt  to  force  his  way  through  the  narrow  chasm  of  the 


270  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

harbor  mouth  would  be  a  perilous  operation,  in  which  he 
might  easily  sacrifice  some  of  his  best  ships  without  result. 

It  was  therefore  decided  that  a  military  expedition  should 
be  landed  on  the  coast  near  Santiago  with  the  object  of 
attacking  the  place  and  taking  its  seaward  defenses  in  the 
rear,  thus  opening  the  way  for  the  fleet  to  pass  through 
the  narrows  and  capture  or  destroy  Cervera's  squadron. 

It  had  not  been  intended  that  the  United  States  troops 
should  be  employed  in  this  part  of  the  island,  or  be  sent  to 
Cuba  at  all  till  the  end  of  the  unhealthy  summer  season  of 
intense  heat  and  tropical  rains.  When  the  expedition  to 
Eastern  Cuba  was  ordered  the  preparations  for  military 
action  were  still  in  a  very  backward  state.  Thus,  for  in- 
stance, so  few  transports  were  ready  that  the  comparatively 
small  force  sent  to  the  island  had  to  be  conveyed  in  two 
successive  voyages.  The  greater  number  of  the  men  called 
out  for  service  were  still  being  trained.  The  expedition  was 
therefore  chiefly  composed  of  the  regulars  from  Tampa. 

On  June  lo  a  detachment  of  marines  was  landed  at 
Guantanamo  Bay  east  of  Santiago,  which  was  at  first  in- 
tended to  be  the  point  of  disembarkation  for  the  army. 
They  had  some  hard  fighting  with  the  local  Spanish  troops, 
but  it  was  decided  that  the  place  was  too  far  from  the  city,^ 
and  the  landing  was  eventually  made  at  Daquiri,  seventeen 
miles  from  Santiago,  and  at  Siboney,  a  little  nearer  to  it. 
At  Daquiri  there  was  an  old  pier  and  at  Siboney  an  open 
beach.  On  Tuesday,  June  14,  the  first  part  of  the  expe- 
dition sailed  from  Tampa  under  the  escort  of  a  powerful 
squadron.  Between  transports  and  warships  there  were 
fifty  steamers  in  all.  Some  of  the  former  were  very  slow 
craft,  and  it  was  not  till  the  twentieth  that  the  expedition 
joined  Admiral  Sampson's  fleet  ofif  Santiago. 

The  troops  were  under  the  command  of  General  William 

^  In  1762  a  British  expedition  against  Santiago  was  landed  at 
Guantanamo.    The  enterprise  was  a  faikire. 


THE    BATTLE    BEFORE    SANTIAGO      271 

R.  Shafter,  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War.  In  i86r,  at  the 
age  of  twenty-six,  he  joined  a  Micliigan  voUmteer  regiment. 
He  won  successive  promotions  by  good  service  in  the  field, 
and  received  the  rank  of  colonel  for  his  gallantrv  at  the 
Battle  of  Fair  Oaks.  He  was  transferred  to  the  regular 
army,  and  as  Colonel  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  gained 
further  distinction  in  an  Indian  campaign.  In  1897  he  was 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  general  and  given  the  command  in 
California  whence,  on  the  outbreak  of  the  Spanish  War, 
he  was  transferred  to  the  command  at  Tampa.  His  record 
showed  he  was  a  good  officer,  but  he  had  the  disadvantage 
of  being  rather  a  corpulent  man  and  hardly  fit  for  a  tropical 
campaign  in  the  worst  season  of  the  year. 

He  had  two  divisions  of  infantry  and  a  cavalry  division 
under  his  command,  besides  a  mixed  brigade  of  infantry 
and  cavalry  and  a  volunteer  brigade.  The  cavalry  leader 
was  General  Joseph  Wheeler,  a  veteran  of  the  old  Confed- 
erate Army.  Wheeler's  division  was  made  up  of  the  First, 
Third,  Sixth,  Ninth,  and  Tenth  United  States  Cavalry  and 
a  volunteer  regiment  of  cowboys  raised  by  Colonel  Roose- 
velt, afterwards  President  of  the  United  States,  and  known 
officially  as  the  First  United  States  Volunteer  Cavalry, 
popularly,  as  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders.  But  only  enough 
horses  could  be  embarked  to  mount  two  troops  of  regular 
cavalry.  Even 'the  Rough  Riders  had  to  tram])  on  foot,  and 
it  was  a  recognized  joke  in  the  expedition  to  call  them 
"  Roosevelt's  Weary  Walkers." 

The  infantry  divisions  and  the  two  additional  brigades 
were  organized  as  follows : 

First  Division..    General  J.  F.  Kent 

First  Brigade,  General  Hawkins,  Sixth  and  Sixteenth  United  States 
Infantry;    Seventy-first  New  York  Vohanteers. 

Second  Brigade,  Colonel  Pearson,  Second.  Tenth,  and  Twenty-lirst 
United  States  Infantry. 

Third  Brigade.  Colonel  Wikoff,  Ninth,  Thirteenth,  and  Twenty- 
fourth  United  States  Infantry. 


272  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 


Second  Division.    General  H.  W.  Lawton 

First  Brigade,  Colonel  Van  Horn,  Eighth  and  Twenty-second  United 
States  Infantry;    Second  Massachusetts  Volunteers. 

Second  Brigade,  Colonel  Miles,  First,  Fourth,  and  Twenty-fifth 
United  States  Infantry. 

Third  Brigade,  General  Chaffee,  Seventh,  Twelfth,  and  Seventeenth 
United  States  Infantry. 


Independent  Brigade,  General  Bates,  Third  and  Twentieth  United 
States  Infantry ;    one  squadron.  Second  United  States  Cavalry. 

Volunteer  Brigade,  General  Duffield,  Thirty-third  and  Thirty-fourth 
Michigan  and  Ninth  Massachusetts  Volunteers. 

There  were  thus  i8  regtilar  and  5  vohtnteer  regiments  of 
infantry.  The  expedition  was  weak  in  artillery.  There 
were  four  field  batteries,  each  of  four  guns ;  two  heavy 
batteries,  one  of  four  5-inch  siege  guns,  the  other  of  four 
7-inch  howitzers.  There  were  two  batteries,  each  of .  four 
field  mortars,  a  battery  of  four  Gatling  machine-guns,  and 
besides  two  experimental  pieces  of  artillery,  a  revolving 
cannon  and  a  pneumatic  dynamite  gun.  There  were  two 
companies  of  engineers  with  a  signal  and  balloon  detach- 
ment. The  transport,  ambulance,  and  sanitary  equipment 
was  very  defective. 

The  total  fighting  force  embarked  for  Cuba  on  the  first 
expedition  was  16,887  officers  and  men.  Before  the  attack 
on  the  outworks  of  Santiago,  General  Duffield's  Brigade 
arrived,  numbering  2995  officers  and  men.  Thus  the  total 
force  was  nearly  20,000  in  all. 

Shafter's  task  was  to  land  his  troops  under  the  cover  of 
Sampson's  guns,  march  for  a  few  miles  through  a  tract  of 
hilly  coimtry  covered  with  dense  btish,  and  on  reaching  the 
landward  edge  of  this  difficult  ground  attack  Santiago, 
which  was  an  open  town,  roughly  improvised  into  a  fortress 
by  a  series  of  small  forts,  blockhouses,  trenches,  and  wire 
entanglements.     It  was  expected  that  a  considerable  force 


THE   BATTLE    BEFORE    SANTIAGO      273 

of  Cuban  insurgents  would  cooperate.  The  Intelligence 
Department,  depending  largely  on  news  received  from  the 
Cubans,  was  badly  served.  There  was  an  exaggerated 
estimate  of  the  strength  of  the  Santiago  garrison.  General 
Linares,  who  commanded  there,  had  really  no  more  than 
6000  effective  men  at  the  outset  —  4000  Spanish  regulars, 
1000  volunteers,  and  1000  men  temporarily  landed  from  the 
fleet,  the  guns  of  which  could  assist  in  the  defense  of  that 
part  of  his  lines  which  lay  nearest  the  harbor.^  The  Ameri- 
cans were  also  unaware  of  a  most  serious  factor  in  the  situ- 
ation. As  the  diary  of  Mr.  Ramsden,  the  British  Consul 
at  Santiago,  shows,  when  the  expedition  landed  the  place 
was  already  very  short  of  supplies,  and  the  troops,  sailors, 
and  citizens  were  mostly  living  on  reduced  rations. 

Shafter  was  disappointed  at  finding  tliat  the  Cuban  in- 
surgents, who  had  made  the  most  boastful  promises,  were 
able  to  give  him  very  little  effective  cooperation.  They 
were  few  in  numbers,  ill-disciplined,  and  not  particularly 
anxious  for  serious  fighting.  He  soon  realized  that  his 
regulars  would  have  to  do  the  work. 

The  landing  of  men,  horses,  guns,  and  stores  proved  to 
be  a  slow  and  difficult  business,  and  the  difficulties  were 
increased  by  the  inexperience  and  inefficiency  of  numbers 
of  the  transport  -and  commissariat  officers  who  owed  their 
appointments  to  political  friends  at  Washington.  The  ad- 
vance through  the  bush  over  tracks  that  the  rainy  season 
had  turned  into  quagmires  was  a  terrible  experience,  es- 
pecially for  the  artillery.  Only  the  light  field-guns  were 
dragged  up  to  the  front  by  the  united  toil  of  man  and  beast. 
The  few  Spanish  detachments  that  had  been  watching  the 
coast  fell  back  upon  Santiago  and  the  only  fighting  in  the 

*  There  was  a  very  much  larger  force  in  the  Santiago  province, 
but  the  troops  were  scattered  in  numerous  garrisons  and  detach- 
ments. Linares  might  easily  have  concentrated  a  very  strong  army 
in  the  city,  but  the  want  of  supplies  made  him  reluctant  to  call  in 
any  large  part  of  his  outlying  forces. 


274  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

bush  belt  was  a  sharp  skirmish  in  which  Roosevelt's  Rough 
Riders  and  two  regiments  of  regular  cavalry  (all  on  foot) 
were  engaged  with  a  few  hundred  Spaniards  at  Las 
Guasimas  on  June  24. 

General  Shafter  was  anxious  not  to  commit  himself  to 
a  serious  attack  on  the  Spanish  positions  until  he  had 
received  further  reinforcements,  brought  up  all  his  artillery, 
and  accumulated  a  reserve  of  supplies  at  the  front.  But 
hearing  that  Linares  expected  to  receive  large  reinforce- 
ments within  the  next  few  days,  he  decided  on  June  30 
to  concentrate  his  available  force  for  battle  and  attack  the 
Spaniards  next  day.  The  object  of  the  first  operations  was 
to  be  to  drive  the  enemy  from  two  advanced  posts  in  front 
of  the  city,  namely,  the  fortified  village  of  El  Caney  and 
the  intrenched  hill  of  San  Juan.  At  the  same  time,  in  order 
to  prevent  the  Spanish  general  from  drawing  any  help  from 
the  troops  who  guarded  the  works  near  the  harbor  entrance, 
there  was  to  be  a  demonstration  along  the  coast  railway 
against  the  enemy's  position  near  Aguadores  at  the  mouth 
of  the  San  Juan  River.  The  troops  assigned  for  this 
operation  would  be  part  of  Dufiield's  Volunteer  Brigade,  and 
the  movement  would  be  supported  by  the  guns  of  the  fleet. 

On  the  main  battle-field,  inland,  General  Lawton's  Divi- 
sion, with  Capron's  Battery  and  with  the  help  of  Garcia's 
Cuban  Brigade,  was  to  attack  El  Caney  at  sunrise  on  July 
I.  It  was  expected  that  its  capture  would  not  take  more 
than  an  hour  or  two.  While  El  Caney  was  being  attacked 
General  Kent's  Division  and  the  dismounted  cavalry  division 
were  to  form  up  on  the  edge  of  the  woods  west  of  the  hill 
of  El  Pozo  with  Grimes's  Battery  and  the  dismounted  cav- 
alry. General  Bates's  Brigade  was  to  be  kept  as  a  reserve. 
As  soon  as  El  Caney  was  captured  Lawton  was  to  move 
on  the  flank  of  the  San  Juan  position,  while  Kent  attacked 
it  in  front.  There  were  hopes  that  after  the  capture  of  San 
Juan  the  attack  might  be  pressed  home  against  the  east  front 


THE    BATTLE    BEFORE    SANTIAGO      275 

of  the  city.  To  attack  its  southern  front  was  out  of  the 
question,  as  the  troops  advancing-  against  the  Spanish 
trenches  on  this  side  would  come  under  the  enfilading  fire 
of  Cervera's  ships  lying  in  the  inner  harbor. 

Shafter's  whole  plan  was  based  upon  an  underestimate 
of  the  fighting  capacity  of  his  enemy.  lie  thought  it  would 
be  a  fairly  easy  business  to  rush  the  outposts  of  Santiago 
and  then  take  the  city  itself.  Once  in  possession  of  it  he 
could  attack  the  defenses  of  the  harbor  mouth  from  the 
rear  with  the  certainty  that  they  could  not  make  an  effective 
resistance  on  that  side. 

At  3  p.  M.  on  June  30  orders  were  issued  that  the  troops 
detailed  for  next  day's  battle  were  to  march  at  four  o'clock 
and  spend  the  night  in  the  woods  in  front  of  the  enemy's 
advanced  positions. 

The  march  was  along  two  narrow  forest  tracks  deep  in 
mud.  To  watch  the  enemy's  positions  a  captive  balloon  was 
sent  up  over  the  trees.  The  march  was  not  coiupletcd  till 
some  hours  after  sunset.  One  of  the  correspondents  who 
watched  the  advance  has  given  a  vivid  description  of  the 
scene.  This  is  how  Mr.  Richard  Harding  Davis  records  his 
impressions : 

"  Apparently  the  order  to  move  forward  had  been  given  to  each 
regiment  at  nearly  the  same  time,  for  they  all  struck  their  tents 
and  stepped  down  into  the  trail  together.  It  was  as  though  fifteen 
regiments  were  encamped  along  the  sidewalks  of  Fifth  Avenue,  and 
were  all  ordered  at  the  same  moment  to  move  into  it  and  march 
down  town.  If  Fifth  Avenue  were  ten  feet  wide  one  can  imagine 
the  confusion.  The  balloon  was  ascending  for  the  first  time,  and  its 
great  glistening  bulk  hung  just  above  the  tree-tops,  and  the  men  in 
the  different  regiments,  picking  their  way  along  the  trail,  gazed  up  at 
it  open-mouthed.  .  .  .  Twelve  thousand  men,  with  their  eyes  fixed 
on  a  balloon  and  treading  on  each  other's  heels  in  three  inches  of 
mud,  move  slowly,  and  after  three  hours  it  seemed  as  if  every  man 
in  the  United  States  was  under  arms  and  stumbling  and  slipping 
down  that  trail.  The  lines  passed  until  the  moon  rose.  They 
seemed  endless,  interminable.  There  were  cavalry,  mounted  and  dis- 
mounted, artillery  with  cracking  whips  and  cursing  drivers,  Rough 


276  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Riders  in  brown,  and  Regulars,  both  black  and  white,  in  blue.  Mid- 
night came  and  they  were  still  slipping  forward.  General  Sumner's ' 
headquarters  tent  was  pitched  to  the  right  of  El  Pozo  hill.  Below 
us  lay  the  valley,  a  mile  and  a  half  in  length  and  a  mile  and  a  half 
wide,  from  which  a  white  mist  was  rising.  Near  us,  drowned  under 
the  mist,  7000  men  were  sleeping,  and  farther  to  the  right  General 
Chaffee's  ^  P"ive  Thousand  were  lying  under  the  bushes  along  the 
trails  to  El  Caney,  waiting  to  march  on  it  and  eat  it  up  before 
breakfast.  It  was  as  yet  an  utterly  undiscovered  country.  Three 
miles  away  across  the  basin  of  mist  we  could  see  the  street  lamps  of 
Santiago  shining  over  the  San  Juan  hills.  Above  us  the  tropical 
moon  hung  bright  and  clear  in  the  dark  purple  sky,  pierced  with 
millions  of  white  stars.  Before  the  moon  rose  again  every  sixth 
man  who  had  slept  in  the  mist  that  night  was  either  killed  or 
wounded." 

On  July  I  the  sun  rose  in  an  overcast  sky  amid  steaming 
mists,  the  presage  of  a  sultry,  tropical  day.  The  bivouacs 
had  broken  up  before  dawn  and  as  the  day  began  the  men 
were  forming  up  for  the  battle.  The  fleet  was  closing  in 
to  the  shore  to  support  the  movement  of  Duffield's  Volun- 
teers along  the  coast  railroad.  Kent's  Infantry  and  the 
dismounted  cavalry  regiments  were  moving  forward  through 
the  woods  near  El  Pozo.  Grimes's  Battery  was  taking 
position  on  the  northern  spur  of  the  hill,  and  a  group  of 
stafif  officers,  foreign  attaches,  and  correspondents  went  with 
it,  for  El  Pozo  Hill  was  a  good  central  point  of  view. 
Lawton's  Division,  which  was  to  begin  the  fighting,  had 
passed  the  night  on  the  edge  of  the  woods  south  of  El 
Caney  and  now  moved  forward  over  the  intervening  ridges. 
Capron's  Battery  went  with  it  and  the  right  or  outward 
flank  of  the  advance  was  protected  by  the  only  two  troops 
of  mounted  cavalry  with  the  army.  Between  Kent  and 
Lawton  there  were  some  Cuban  guerilla  bands  in  the  bush, 
and  on  the  extreme  right  the  Cuban  General  Garcia  had 

^  General  Wheeler  was  ill,  and  General  Sumner  had  taken  tem- 
porary command  of  the  cavalry  division. 

*  Really  "  Lawton's  Five  Thousand."  Chaffee  commanded  only  a 
brigade  of  about  2000  men  in  Lawton's  Division. 


THE   BATTLE   BEFORE    SANTIAGO      277 

brought  up  a  strong  force  of  insurgents,  who  were  ex- 
pected to  cooperate  in  the  attack  of  the  village  from  the 
northeastward. 

Lawton  hoped  not  merely  to  capture  El  Caney  but  to 
make  most  of  its  garrison  prisoners  if  they  tried  to  hold 
on  to  the  place.  For  this  purpose  he  had  planned  an  en- 
veloping attack.  General  Chafifee's  Brigade  (Seventh, 
Twelfth,  and  Seventeenth  United  States  Infantry)  on  the 
right  was  to  move  round  towards  the  east  of  the  village. 
The  First  Brigade,  under  General  Ludlow  ^  ( Eighth  and 
Twenty-second  United  States  Infantry  and  Second  Massa- 
chusetts), in  the  center  was  to  attack  the  south  front  of  the 
place.  The  Second  Brigade  under  Colonel  Miles  (First, 
Fourth,  and  Twenty-fifth  United  States  Infantry)  on  the  left 
of  the  division  was  to  attack  from  the  westward.  No  Span- 
iards were  met  with  during  the  short  advance  through  the 
open  to  the  crest  of  a  long  rise  of  the  ground  from  which 
there  was  a  clear  view  of  El  Caney  a  mile  and  a  half  away 
on  another  of  the  long  swells  by  which  the  lower  ground 
rises  towards  the  Maestra  Mountains.  Around  lay  scattered 
bush,  open  stretches  of  pasture-land  where  cattle  grazed, 
tall  clumps  of  palms.  The  village  looked  so  quiet  at  first  it 
was  suggested  that  it  had  been  abandoned.  But  thin  wisps 
of  smoke  were  rising  here  and  there,  showing  that  cocking 
was  going  on  among  the  tiled  and  thatched  cottages  that 
clustered  round  the  church.  Then  some  soldiers  were  seen 
lounging  at  the  entrance  of  a  small  stone  fort.  This  was 
not  the  only  defense  of  the  place.  Four  blockhouses  were 
dotted  round  El  Caney  with  trenches  between  them  and 
barbed  wire  entanglements  further  to  the  front.  From  liis 
position  near  the  battery  that  had  unlimbered  on  the  oppo- 
site crest  General  Lawton  and  his  staff  could  easily  search 

•  Colonel  Van  Horn,  who  originally  commanded  this  brigade,  had 
died  of  an  accidental  injury,  and  had  been  replaced  by  Brigadier- 
General  William  Ludlow,  United  States  Volunteers. 


278  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  village  with  their  field-glasses.  What  surprised  them 
was  the  complete  absence  of  movement.  At  6.40  Captain 
Capron  was  ordered  to  open  fire  with  his  four  guns,  while 
the  infantry  was  still  pushing  forward  to  its  attack  posi- 
tions. The  first  shell  burst  well  over  the  fort.  The  second 
made  a  fair  hit  upon  it,  knocking  down  some  stones.  But 
there  was  no  return  fire.  Only  here  and  there  along  the  line 
of  the  trenches  there  was  a  glimpse  of  a  straw  hat  bobbing 
up  for  a  moment,  showing  that  the  Spaniards  were  quietly 
slipping  into  their  works.  The  guns  were  turned  on  one 
of  the  blockhouses  and,  making  good  practice,  soon  sent  a 
lot  of  the  timber-work  flying  in  fragments.  Still  there 
was  not  a  shot  in  reply. 

Capron  was  firing  his  guns  over  the  heads  of  the  infantry 
who  were  advancing  across  the  lower  ground  between  the 
artillery  position  and  the  village.  The  blue-coated  regulars, 
flung  out  into  long  firing  lines,  showed  like  dark  dots  among 
the  tall  grass.  About  six  o'clock,  when  they  were  a  thou- 
sand yards  from  the  Spanish  trenches,  they  opened  fire 
with  section  volleys.  Then  at  last  there  came  a  sharp 
crackle  of  answering  rifle  fire  from  the  trenches.  The 
Spaniards  shot  well  and  here  and  there  a  man  went  down 
among  the  grass.  To  Ludlow's  left  Miles's  men  then 
began  firing  at  the  west  side  of  El  Caney.  There  was 
still  no  sign  that  Chaffee  was  in  action  on  the  right.  He 
had  further  to  go  than  the  two  other  brigades.  He  was 
working  round  eastwards  of  El  Caney  with  the  mounted 
troopers  watching  his  flank  and  Garcia's  Cubans  streaming 
along  to  his  right,  a  noisy  excited  crowd,  whose  move- 
ments were  in  strange  contrast  to  the  deliberate  advance  of 
the  American  Regulars. 

It  was  evident  that  the  Spaniards  had  no  guns  in  El 
Caney,  and  Capron's  Battery,  at  a  range  of  a  mile  and  a 
half,  was  beyond  the  reach  of  their  Mausers.  But  though 
the  American  gunners   were  thus  able  to  shoot  as  coolly 


Sporosk  trtnch.c5  — , — ,    focti  » 


i  Miles 


No.  ig  —  The  Battle  before  Santiago,  Ji'i.y  i,  1898 
(Situation  at  the  beginning  of  the  action,  with  inset  sketch  map  of  the  country  near  Santiago) 


THE    BATTLE   BEFORE   SANTIAGO      279 

as  if  they  were  at  target  practice,  they  had  only  four  light 
guns  and  a  very  limited  supply  of  shells.  Transport  defi- 
ciencies had  crippled  the  artillery.  An  attack  on  such  a 
position  as  El  Caney  should  have  been  prepared  and  sup- 
ported by  the  concentrated  fire  of  several  batteries,  that 
would  make  it  impossible  for  the  Spaniards  to  shoot  coolly 
from  their  trenches.  But  after  a  brisk  fire  for  the  first  few 
minutes  Capron  had  to  husband  his  ammunition,  firing  at 
a  slow  rate,  that  could  hardly  be  expected  to  demoralize 
steady  troops,  and  the  Spaniards  who  held  El  Caney  were 
as  steady  as  rocks. 

Presently  Garcia's  Cubans  got  round  to  the  northeast  of 
the  village  and  opened  a  rapid  rifle  fire  at  a  range  that 
meant  only  useless  waste  of  cartridges.  They  were  shoot- 
ing at  a  blockhouse  north  of  El  Caney.  Its  little  garrison 
soon  took  no  notice  of  them.  Chaffee  pushed  forward  to 
a  long  grassy  ridge  east  of  El  Caney.  A  sunken  road  be- 
hind it  gave  good  cover  for  the  approach,  and  when  the 
men  deployed  along  the  crest  they  were  within  five  hundred 
yards  of  the  Spanish  trenches.  But  here  the  advance  was 
brought  to  a  dead  stop  for  hours.  A  storm  of  Mauser 
bullets,  flying  low  through  the  grass,  swept  the  ridge  and 
made  many  victims.  Every  one  was  surprised  at  the  rapidity 
of  the  Spanish  rifle  fire,  which  kept  up  its  unwavering 
intensity  for  hours.  The  fire  came  from  many  points  — 
from  the  trenches,  the  blockhouses,  the  little  stone  built 
fort,  the  roofs  of  the  houses  and  the  village  church,  and 
from  the  rifles  of  picked  sharpshooters  in  the  branches  of 
some  tall  shade  trees  inside  the  Spanish  lines.  With  the 
smokeless  powder  the  enemy  were  using  it  was  difficult  for 
the   Americans   to   localize   the  points  where   the   riflemen 

were  posted. 

Four  guns,  nine  regiments,  and  a  miscellaneous  mob  of 
Cuban  insurgents  were  now  in  action  against  El  Caney,  and 
it  was  already  evident  that  it  had  been  a  mistake  to  expect 


28o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

that  the  place  would  be  easily  rushed  in  the  early  hours  of 
the  morning.  There  would  be  a  long  fire  fight  before  any 
attempt  could  be  made  to  close  on  the  village.  The  heavy 
fire  kept  up  by  the  Spaniards  gave  the  impression  that  a 
large  garrison  was  in  the  place.  Only  after  the  battle  was 
it  discovered  that  El  Caney  was  held  by  a  mere  handful. 
It  was  a  new  revelation  of  the  power  of  the  modern  rifle 
in  the  hands  of  brave  men  holding  an  intrenched  position. 

General  Linares  had  put  in  command  of  El  Caney  one  of 
his  best  officers,  General  Vara  de  Rey.  He  had  with  him 
in  the  village  his  brother  and  his  two  sons.  The  force  he 
commanded  was  made  up  of  three  companies  of  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Infantry  of  the  Line  (the  "  Regimento  de  la  Consti- 
tucion  "),  half  a  company  of  the  Cuba  Regiment,  and  two 
weak  companies  of  volunteers  —  in  all  just  520  rifles.  He 
had  so  much  ground  to  hold  that  he  put  every  man  into 
the  firing  positions  and  had  no  reserve  in  hand.  The 
ammunition  supply  was  66,000  cartridges. 

At  eight  o'clock  the  attack  had  come  to  a  standstill,  after 
suffering  heavy  loss.  Chaffee  had  pushed  forward  part  of 
his  brigade  to  a  range  of  only  300  yards,  but  the  men  could 
go  no  further.  Every  one  who  tried  to  get  forward  was 
dropped  by  a  Mauser  bullet.  The  other  two  brigades  had 
worked  up  to  a  range  of  about  600  yards  and  there  had  come 
to  a  standstill.  Colonel  Miles  had  had  to  order  the  Second 
Massachusetts  to  cease  firing  and  remain  lying  down  behind 
the  advance  as  a  reserve.  The  volunteers  had  done  well 
and  moved  forward  steadily,  but  they  had  old-fashioned 
Springfield  rifles  firing  black  powder,  and  the  dense  white 
cloud  that  hung  over  their  advance  made  them  an  easy 
target  for  the  Spaniards,  whose  fire  concentrated  on  them 
rather  than  on  the  regulars  to  right  and  left.  The  up-to-date 
armament  of  the  latter  made  them  less  easily  visible.  To 
push  the  volunteers  on  would  have  been  to  incur  a  uselessly 
disproportionate  loss.     So  after  two  hours'  fighting  the  en- 


THE    BATTLE   BEFORE   SANTIAGO     281 

gagement  around  El  Caney  had  become  an  exchange  of  fire 
between  the  sheltered  Spaniards  and  the  Americans  lying 
out  in  the  grass  under  a  scorching  sun,  the  battery  firing  at  a 
slow  deliberate  rate  and  evidently  not  producing  much  effect. 

Generals  Kent  and  Sumner  had  meanwhile  been  waiting 
at  El  Pozo  Hill  with  their  staff,  anxiously  watching  with 
field-glass  and  telescope  Lawton's  attack  away  to  the  right. 
They  were  not  to  launch  their  own  men  against  the  San 
Juan  position  till  Lawton  could  move  against  its  flank 
after  taking  El  Caney.  But  it  now  looked  as  if  it  would 
be  some  time  before  any  such  cooperation  could  be  ex- 
pected. From  El  Pozo  Hill  not  very  much  could  be  seen, 
but  there  was  enough  to  show  that  things  were  moving 
very  slowly  on  the  right.  The  boom  of  Capron's  guns  came 
plainly  enough,  mingling  with  a  dull  sound  of  the  distant 
rifle  fight.  A  cloud  of  white  smoke  in  the  bright  sun- 
light showed  the  position  of  the  battery.  A  crowd  of 
spectators  gathered  on  the  hill  —  staff'  officers,  correspond- 
ents, artists,  foreign  attaches.  Grimes's  Battery  stood  un- 
limbered  and  silent  with  its  gun  muzzles  pointing  over  the 
bush  towards  San  Juan  Hill.  A  blockhouse  topped  the  hos- 
tile ridge  and  its  sides  were  scored  with  trenches.  Beyond 
there  was  a  glinjpse  of  the  city  and  the  shining  expanse 
of  the  inner  harbor  where  Cervera's  ships  lay  anchored. 
But  not  a  Spaniard  was  moving  anywhere.  On  the  forest 
tracks  round  El  Pozo  and  to  the  west  of  it  the  troops  were 
moving  up,  crowding  towards  two  openings  in  tlie  margin 
of  the  bush.  Over  the  trees  the  balloon  swung  with  a  staff 
officer  in  its  car. 

At  eight  o'clock  Kent  became  impatient  to  be  doing  some- 
thing and  ordered  Grimes  to  open  fire  on  San  Juan.  I'or 
a  quarter  of  an  hour  the  four  guns  dropped  shells  about 
the  blockhouse  on  the  ridge  and  tried  to  send  some  shots 
into  the  trenches.  As  at  El  Caney.  the  Spaniards  for  a 
while    made    no    rei)ly.      l^^r   a    (juarter   of    an    hour    this 


282  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

target  practice  went  on  and  then  a  loud  report  and  the 
scream  of  a  shell  told  that  the  enemy  had  artillery,  and 
was  bringing  it  into  action.  The  first  shell  burst  short. 
No  one  could  make  out  where  the  gun  was  that  fired  it, 
for,  unlike  the  American  artillery,  that  of  the  Spaniards 
used  smokeless  powder,  and  the  guns  were  evidently  well 
masked.  A  second  shell  burst  in  the  farm  of  El  Pozo, 
wounding  some  Cubans  who  had  gathered  there,  and  scat- 
tering the  rest  of  them.  A  third  burst  among  Grimes's 
guns,  a  fourth  among  some  of  the  dismounted  cavalry  to 
the  right  rear  of  them.  The  crowd  of  spectators  began  to 
break  up  and  take  to  cover.  The  Cubans  showed  a  marked 
zeal  for  carrying  ofif  wounded  men  to  the  rear,  and  a  cor- 
respondent noted  that  it  took  eight  or  ten  Cubans  to  carry 
every  wounded  man. 

The  guns  the  Spaniards  had  brought  into  action  were  two 
Hontoria  quick-firers  placed  just  behind  the  crest  of  San 
Juan  Hill.  A  section  of  two  guns  is  a  lieutenant's  com- 
mand, but  these  two  were  directed  by  an  artillerist  of  world- 
wide reputation,  Colonel  Ordonez.  Like  El  Caney,  San 
Juan  was  held  by  only  a  small  garrison.  Li  the  trenches 
and  the  blockhouse  on  the  hill  itself  there  were  just  300 
rifles  under  Colonel  Baquero  —  a  company  and  a  half  of 
the  Puerto  Rico  Regiment,  a  company  of  the  Talavera 
Regiment  and  half  a  company  of  volunteers.  In  reserve 
between  the  hill  and  the  city  there  were  three  more  com- 
panies of  the  Talavera  men  under  the  personal  command 
of  Linares,  the  Governor  of  Santiago.  One  company  was  to 
the  right  rear  of  the  hill,  the  other  two  to  the  left,  at  a 
point  where  the  road  from  the  city  branched  off  to  San 
Juan  and  El  Caney.  Thus  the  whole  force  opposed  to 
Kent's  Division  of  Infantry  and  Sumner's  dismounted 
cavalry  with  four  guns  amounted  only  to  600  rifles  and 
two  cjuick-firers. 

These  two  gims  were  worked  to  such  effect  by  Ordonez 


THE    BATTLE   BEFORE   SANTIAGO     283 

that  Grimes's  Battery  tried  in  vain  to  silence  them.  At 
times  they  ceased  to  make  the  American  battery  their  tar- 
get and  burst  their  shrapnel  among  the  trees,  where  the 
Spaniards  now  perceived  that  the  Americans  were  con- 
centrating along  the  margin  of  the  bush.  Then  the  infantry 
in  the  San  Juan  trenches  opened  fire  with  their  long- 
ranging  Mausers,  sending  volley  after  volley  at  random 
into  the  trees.  This  fire  and  the  showers  of  shrapnel  balls 
from  the  bursting  shells  did  a  surprising  amount  of  exe- 
cution, for  the  men  were  packed  together  on  the  tracks 
through  the  woods.  It  was  a  trying  ordeal  for  soldiers 
thus  to  fall  to  the  fire  of  an  enemy  that  they  could  not 
see ;  to  find  the  deadly  rain  of  lead  tearing  and  ripping 
through  the  trees  and  thinning  their  ranks,  as  they  tramped 
slowly  through  the  mud  and  the  steaming  heat  of  the  bush 
trail  to  deploy  along  the  margin  of  the  more  open  ground. 
The  balloon,  a  white  globe  above  the  tree-tops,  proved  an 
attractive  target  for  the  Spanish  gunners.  They  missed  it 
several  times,  but  the  bursting  shrapnel  bullets  came  crash- 
ing down  among  the  men  below.  It  was  with  a  sense  of 
relief  that  at  last  they  saw  a  shell-burst  riddle  the  lower 
part  of  the  balloon.  As  the  gas  escaped  the  silk  caught  in 
the  net,  formed  a  Jiarachute,  and  came  down  slowly  with- 
out hurting  the  occupants  of  its  car. 

Along  the  edge  of  the  wood  there  were  bursts  of  rifle 
firing  or  a  dropping  shot  here  and  there,  for  it  was  hard 
to  endure  loss  without  attempting  a  reply.  The  officers 
always  sttM-nly  ordered  the  firing  to  stop,  for  the  word  had 
been  passed  that  there  was  to  be  nc?  random  blazing  away 
of  useful  ammunition  until  the  time  came  for  the  attack  to 
develop.  Shafter's  plan  tied  the  generals'  hands  and  they 
had  to  wait  for  Lawton,  losing  men  all  the  time.  Grimes's 
Battery  steadily  shelled  the  San  Juan  Ridge,  trying  in  vain 
to  find  the  invisible  guns  that  were  moved  whenever  the 
American  shells  came  too  near  them. 


284  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

All  the  while  the  attack  on  El  Caney  was  at  a  standstill. 
The  Cubans  on  General  Chaffee's  right  sent  him  word 
that  they  had  fired  away  nearly  all  their  ammunition  and 
asked  him  to  send  them  a  fresh  supply.  "  Tell  General 
Garcia,"  said  Chaffee  to  the  messenger,  "  that  I  have  barely 
enough  for  my  own  men  who  are  fighting,  and  I  have  no 
cartridges  to  waste  on  fireworks."  General  Chaffee  was  on 
foot,  walking  up  and  down  along  his  line,  watching  the 
firing  and  looking  out  for  any  chance  to  get  forward. 
Twice  a  Spanish  bullet  tore  his  uniform,  but  he  was  un- 
wounded.  But  while  thus  taking  risks  himself,  if  he  saw 
any  other  officer  standing  up  he  would  shout  to  him  to 
lie  down  with  his  men.  There  was  no  mere  reckless  swagger 
about  this  fine  soldier.  He  wanted  to  get  about  and  see 
everything  for  himself,  so  he  took  the  necessary  risk. 
Captain  Lee,  the  British  attache,  accompanied  the  right 
attack,  and  he  gives  us  an  interesting  word  picture  of  its 
leader : 

"  Wherever  the  fire  was  thickest  the  general  strolled  about  un- 
concernedly, a  half-smoked  cigar  between  his  teeth  and  an  expres- 
sion of  exceeding  grimness  on  his  face.  The  situation  was  a  trying 
one  for  the  nerves  of  the  oldest  soldier,  and  some  of  the  younger 
hands  fell  back  from  the  firing  line  and  crept  towards  the  road. 
In  a  moment  the  general  pounced  upon  them,  inquiring  their  desti- 
nation in  low  unhoneyed  accents,  and  then,  taking  them  persuasively 
by  the  elbow,  led  them  back  to  the  extreme  front." 

Captain  Lee  gives  us  in  his  narrative  another  picture  —  this 
time  of  the  seamy  side  of  war.  There  were  few  doctors 
with  the  army,  and  though  there  was  a  dressing  station  near 
the  battery,  only  the  slightly  wounded,  who  could  limp  so 
far,  could  have  their  wounds  dressed,  for  there  were  no 
stretcher  bearers.  The  most  that  could  be  done  for  those 
who  were  badly  hit  was  to  take  them  to  some  more  sheltered 
spot  near  at  hand.  At  several  points  along  the  hollow 
road  behind  the  firing  line  wounded  men  were  thus  col- 
lected.   Here  is  what  Captain  Lee  saw  as  he  passed  along  it ; 


THE   BATTLE   BEFORE   SANTIAGO     285 

"  I  found  nearly  a  hundred  killed  and  wounded  laid  out  in  as 
many  yards  of  road,  and  so  close  were  they  that  one  could  only 
pass  by  stepping  over  them.  There  was  a  strange  silence  among 
these  men ;  not  a  whimper  or  a  groan,  but  each  lay  quietly  nursing 
his  wound,  with  closed  eyes  and  set  teeth,  only  flinching  when  the 
erratic  sleet  of  bullets  clipped  the  leaves  off  the  hedge  close  above 
their  heads.  Some  of  the  slightly  wounded  were  tending  those  who 
were  badly  hit,  and  nothing  could  have  surpassed  the  unskilled 
tenderness  of  these  men.  1  was  astonished  too  at  their  thoughtful 
consideration.  '  Keep  well  down,  sir,'  several  said  as  I  stopped  to 
speak  to  them,  '  them  Mausers  is  flying  pretty  low,  and  there 's 
plenty  of  us  here  already.'  The  heat  in  the  little  road  was  intense, 
there  was  no  shade  nor  a  breath  of  air,  and  the  wounded  lay  swel- 
tering in  the  sun  till  the  head  reeled  with  the  rank  smell  of  sweat 
and  saturated  flannel.  Right  amongst  the  wounded  lay  curled  up  a 
Cuban,  apparently  asleep.  On  approaching  him,  however,  it  was 
only  too  apparent  that  he  had  been  dead  for  several  days,  and  on  the 
tree  overhead  two  sleek  and  gorged  vultures  looked  down  furtively 
at  his  ever-increasing  number  of  companions.  The  stench  was  over- 
powering, and  a  sudden  lull  in  the  battle  brought  into  sickening 
prominence  the  angry  buzzing  of  the  disturbed  flies  and  the  creak- 
ing of  the  land  crabs  which  waited  in  the  bush." 


This  realistic  description  not  only  gives  one  a  vivid  idea 
of  the  price  that  has  to  be  paid  for  victory,  but  also  brings 
out  some  of  the  fine  characteristics  of  the  American  soldier. 

The  other  two  attacks  on  El  Caney  had  come  to  a  stop  at 
600  yards  from  the  enemy's  lines.  The  village  was  ringed 
with  a  long,  curved  firing  line  and  was  replying  with  a  storm 
of  rifle  fire  that  seemed  never  to  slacken.  Away  to  the 
left  the  artillery  duel  went  on  between  the  guns  on  El 
Pozo  and  San  Juan  hills,  and  the  Spanish  fir#  was  search- 
ing with  deadly  effect  the  margins  of  the  bush  where 
Kent's  and  Smnner's  men  waited  wearily  for  the  order  to 
advance.  And  now  a  third  action  was  about  to  begin  near 
the  coast,  and  the  fleet  was  to  cooperate  with  the  army. 

General  Duffield,  who  had  been  detailed  to  attack  at  the 
crossing  of  the  San  Juan  River  near  its  mouth,  had  brought 
up  the  Thirty-third  Michigan  Volunteers  and  some  C"nl)an 
scouts  along  the  coast  railway  from  Siboney  to  a  point  near 


286  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  old  castle  of  Aguadores  which  the  Spaniards  had  aban- 
doned. They  had  a  battery  on  the  other  side  of  the  river 
and  rifle  trenches  along  the  bank,  and  they  had  destroyed 
the  railway  bridge  across  the  stream,  which  however  was 
reported  to  be  fordable  at  more  than  one  point.  Shortly 
after  ten  o'clock,  Duffield  signaled  to  the  fleet  that  he  was 
ready  to  advance,  and  Admiral  Sampson  opened  fire  on  the 
Spanish  position  with  the  guns  of  his  flagship  the  Neiv  York 
and  three  other  vessels.  Under  this  bombardment  the 
Spaniards  were  driven  from  their  fort,  and  the  ships  then 
tried  to  enfilade  the  trenches  on  the  west  bank  of  the  San 
Juan.  Duflield  had  pushed  a  firing  line  down  to  the  other 
bank  and  engaged  the  enemy.  After  a  while  Sampson 
signaled  that  he  had  cleared  the  trenches  of  the  Spaniards 
and  the  river  might  be  crossed.  But  the  general  signaled 
back  that  his  men  were  still  under  a  heavy  Mauser  fire. 
Until  about  noon  he  continued  his  efforts  to  drive  the  enemy 
from  the  river  bank,  while  the  naval  guns  steadily  shelled 
the  position.  Then  at  last  the  general  decided  that  he  could 
not  force  the  crossing,  and  that  the  "  demonstration  "  had 
been  carried  far  enough,  and  signaled  that  he  was  about  to 
cease  fire  and  fall  back  to  Siboney.  So  the  fight  by  the 
river  mouth  ended  in  what  the  Spaniards  described  as  a 
success.  Sampson,  hoping  that  he  might  still  indirectly 
help  by  producing  a  panic  in  Santiago,  began,  shortly  after 
noon,  a  long-range  bombardment  of  the  city.  For  some 
hours  the  big  shells  hurtled  over  the  hills  and  burst  in  the 
streets  and  among  the  houses.  They  caused  some  loss  of 
life  and  a  good  deal  of  alarm,  but  had  no  appreciable  effect 
on  the  fate  of  the  day. 

During  the  two  hours  of  Duffield's  abortive  engagement  at 
Aguadores  there  had  been  no  change  in  the  situation  around 
El  Caney  and  before  San  Juan.  Bates's  Brigade  had  been 
brought  up  and  placed  between  Chaffee  and  Ludlow.  Still 
the  firing  went  on   round  the  intrenched  village,   with  no 


THE    BATTLE   BEFORE   SANTIAGO     287 

sign  of  progress  in  the  attack.  The  Spaniards  seemed  as 
steady  and  resokite  as  ever  in  their  defense,  but  really  hour 
by  hour  they  were  suffering  losses  they  could  ill  afford,  and 
their  ammunition  supply  was  not  inexhaustible.  Between 
one  and  two  o'clock  General  Shafter  became  very  anxious 
at  the  deadlock.  He  was  ill  that  day  and  lay  on  a  camp 
bed  under  a  tent  near  the  farm  of  La  Redonda  listening 
to  the  din  of  the  fight.  He  had  expected  that  by  noon  at 
latest  the  outlying  positions  would  have  been  carried.  He 
now  sent  a  staff  officer  to  General  Lawton,  directing  him 
to  abandon  the  attack  on  El  Caney  and  move  all  his  troops 
to  the  left  to  cooperate  in  the  attack  on  the  San  Juan  Ridge. 
Lawton  had  the  courage  to  disregard  these  orders.  He 
sent  back  word  to  Shafter  that  to  withdraw  from  the  fight 
in  which  he  was  engaged  would  be  to  acknowledge  defeat; 
that  he  was  not  beaten ;  and  that  he  meant  to  carry  the 
thing  through  at  all  costs  and  take  El  Caney. 

While  Shafter  and  Lawton  were  exchanging  these  mes- 
sages the  attack  on  El  Caney  had  been  pushed  home. 
Sumner  and  Kent  had  realized  that  to  adhere  strictly  to 
Shafter 's  plan  and  wait  till  El  Caney  had  fallen  would  be 
to  expose  their  men  to  a  prolonged  trial  of  enduring  serious 
loss  without  being  able  to  take  any  action  in  reply.  By  noon 
Sumner's  cavalry  men  were  all  up  to  the  front  and  in  line 
along  the  edge  of  the  bush,  north  of  the  El  Pozo-San  Juan 
trail.  Kent's  Infantry  were  still  forming  on  their  left  to 
the  south  of  the  track.  Eight  more  guns  (Captain  Park- 
hurst's  and  Captain  Best's  batteries)  had  been  brought  up 
beside  Grimes's  Battery  on  the  El  Pozo  Spur.  The  troops 
already  in  line  were  exchanging  rifle  fire  with  the  Spaniards, 
but  suffering  considerable  loss,  and  it  was  felt  that  it  would 
be  as  costly  to  keep  them  halted  where  they  were  as  to 
push  them  on  to  the  attack.  After  a  conference  with  the 
staff  officer  who  represented  Shafter  at  the  actual  fighting 
front  the  generals  decided  to  push  on. 


288  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

As  Kent's  Third  Brigade  under  Colonel  Wikoff  formed 
in  front  of  the  San  Juan  trenches  there  was  a  heavy  out- 
burst of  fire  from  the  hill.  Wikoff  dropped,  shot  through 
the  head,  and  was  dead  in  a  few  minutes.  Colonel  Worth 
of  the  Thirteenth  Regiment  took  command  of  the  brigade, 
but  had  hardly  done  so  when  he  was  seriously  wounded. 
Colonel  Liscum  of  the  Twenty-fourth  took  his  place  and 
was  badly  wounded  almost  immediately.  The  remaining 
regimental  commander.  Colonel  Ewers  of  the  Ninth  In- 
fantry, then  took  command.  To  the  right  General  Hawkins 
had  pushed  the  Sixth  Infantry  forward  into  the  open 
ground.  In  a  few  minutes  one  in  every  four  of  the  men 
was  down  and  the  regiment  had  to  fall  back  and  take  cover 
for  a  while. 

Sumner  had  all  his  men  well  forward,  and  he  now  made 
a  dash  for  an  outlying  ridge  to  the  north  front  of  the  main 
San  Juan  Hill.  The  attack  was  made  by  the  Rough  Riders, 
the  First,  Ninth,  and  part  of  the  Tenth  cavalry.  It  was  a 
charge  on  foot.  Almost  the  only  mounted  man  was  Colonel 
Roosevelt,  who  rode  among  the  cowboys.  They  cut  through 
a  wire  entanglement,  forded  the  San  Juan  River  and  scram- 
bled up  the  hill  under  a  deadly  fire.  As  they  reached  the 
top  the  Spaniards  abandoned  their  trenches. 

A  battery  of  machine-guns  had  by  this  time  been  brought 
up  along  the  road  and  opened  an  effective  fire  on  the  San 
Juan  trenches.  Kent's  Infantry  were  now  advancing,  Haw- 
kins's Brigade  leading,  with  the  old  general  at  its  head,  his 
white  hair  uncovered  as  he  waved  his  hat  and  cheered  the 
men  on.  The  wave  of  infantry  swept  through  the  river, 
over  the  ground  beyond,  and  then  halfway  up  the  hill. 
Elere  the  charge  came  to  a  standstill  for  some  anxious 
moments.  The  men  were  being  pelted  with  the  Spanish 
bullets  in  front,  while  from  the  rear  came  a  shower  of  shells 
upon  them  from  their  own  guns  on  El  Pozo.  The  gunners, 
wrapped  in  a  dense  cloud  smoke,  had  not  clearly  marked  the 


THE    BATTLE   BEFORE   SANTIAGO     289 

progress  of  the  advance  they  were  supporting.  Just  in  the 
nick  of  time  the  artillery  found  out  their  mistake  and  ceased 
fire.  The  infantry  pressed  on  up  the  slope,  and  as  they 
reached  the  crest  the  Spaniards  ran  down  the  reverse  slope 
of  the  height.  It  was  just  half  past  one.  The  San  Juan 
heights  were  captured  and  the  Stars  and  Stripes  fluttered 
out  from  the  Spanish  blockhouse  on  the  highest  summit. 
As  Kent's  men  reached  the  crest,  Sumner  had  made  a  dash 
from  the  outlying  hill  and  driven  the  enemy  from  the  north- 
ern end  of  the  main  ridge. 

The  two  Spanish  guns  had  been  drawn  back  to  the  second 
line  near  the  town,  the  Talavera  companies  flinging  out  a 
firing  line  to  cover  this  movement  and  the  retreat  of  their 
comrades  from  the  hill.  Colonel  Baquero,  who  commanded 
at  San  Juan,  had  been  killed.  Linares,  the  Governor,  was 
wounded  while  covering  the  retirement  and  gave  over  the 
command  to  General  Toral.  Ordonez  was  shot  through 
both  legs.  Caula,  the  chief  of  the  engineers,  was  severely 
wounded.     The  garrison  was  losing  some  of  its  best  men. 

The  Spaniards  now  opened  a  heavy  fire  from  their  lines 
along  the  edge  of  the  town  behind  the  hills.  The  Americans 
began  hastily  intrenching  the  ground  they  had  won,  and 
answered  back  with  rifles  and  machine-guns.  Presently  a 
field-battery  was  brought  up  to  the  San  Juan  Ridge  from 
El  Pozo.  Every  moment  the  hold  of  the  victors  on  the 
hill  was  becoming  stronger.  Once  only  the  Spaniards  tried 
to  retake  it.  A  column  of  sailors  advanced  from  the  town 
headed  by  Captain  Bustamentc,  Cervcra's  chief  of  the  staff. 
They  were  driven  back  by  the  fire  from  the  hill  and  Busta- 
mente  was  baldy  wounded.  After  this  the  firing  on  both 
sides  went  on  till  sundown. 

But  though  San  Juan  was  won.  El  Caney  still  continued 
its  dogged  resistance,  although  the  handful  of  Spaniards 
who  had  held  it  all  day  were  now  in  action  against  a 
battery  and  ten  regular  regiments.     By  three  o'clock  the 


290  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

fire  of  the  defense  was  visibly  slackening.  The  Spaniards 
were  beginning  to  husband  their  last  cartridges.  General 
Chaffee  saw  that  the  favorable  moment  had  come  and  gave 
his  brigade  the  order  to  charge.  They  came  on  with  a 
splendid  rush.  Men  with  cutters  dashed  forward  and  made 
openings  in  the  wire  entanglements.  Reckless  of  heavy  loss 
the  men  in  blue  surged  over  the  trenches  and  up  to  the 
little  fort,  which  surrendered  on  the  first  summons.  The 
few  men  in  the  trenches  threw  down  their  rifles  or  ran 
back  to  the  village. 

As  he  rallied  them  there  the  heroic  Vara  de  Rey  was 
shot  through  the  legs.  His  men  were  carrying  him  to 
shelter  when  he  was  killed  by  a  bullet  through  the  head. 
His  brother  had  already  been  badly  wounded,  one  of  his 
sons  killed,  the  other  wounded.  But  for  an  hour  more  the 
fight  went  on.  The  Spaniards  held  out  in  the  church,  the 
houses,  and  some  of  the  trenches.  It  was  not  until  about 
four  o'clock  that  a  converging  rush  of  all  the  troops  in 
action  against  El  Caney  ended  the  long  struggle.  Even 
then  a  handful  of  officers  and  men,  some  eighty  in  all,  mostly 
wounded,  made  good  their  retreat  and  succeeded  in  reaching 
Santiago. 

It  had  been  a  magnificent  defense.  One  of  the  corre- 
spondents who  watched  carefully  the  fight  on  Chaffee's  front 
has  given  a  description  of  how  one  of  the  trenches  was  held, 
which  is  worth  quoting,  not  only  for  its  picturesque  realism 
but  also  as  a  generous  American  tribute  to  a  gallant  enemy : 

"I  shall  never  cease  to  see  (he  writes),  when  the  word  Caney  is 
spoken,  a  line  of  some  fifty  or  sixty  light-blue  clad  men  standing  in 
a  trench,  the  line  bent  in  the  middle ;  at  the  bending  of  the  line 
some  blue-jacketed  young  officer  standing,  always  exposed  to  the 
belt  and  sometimes,  as  he  stood  up  on  the  level  ground,  exposed  to 
the  feet ;  the  men  rising  at  the  word  of  this  officer's  command  for 
hours  and  hours,  delivering  volley  after  volley  full  in  our  faces ; 
standing,  as  they  did  so,  exposed  to  the  waist,  confronting  3000 
men,  grimly  and  coolly  facing  death,  drawing  their  dead  up  out  of 
the  trench  as  they  fell,  to  make  standing  room  for  living  men,  hold- 


THE   BATTLE   BEFORE   SANTIAGO     291 

ing  thus  their  trench  immovably  from  morning  until  evening.  .  .  . 
Those  figures  of  Spaniards  in  the  shallow  trench  were  really  very 
uncouth.  Their  jackets  of  thin  blue  cotton  were  merely  loose 
tunics,  too  short  and  coarse  to  have  any  dignity,  and  the  trousers 
were  baggy  and  ill-fitting.  On  their  heads  the  men  had  great  straw 
hats,  almost  black  with  use,  with  brims  turned  up  behind  and  down 
before.  Sometimes  the  hats  came  ofif,  and  with  my  glass  I  watched 
along  the  trench  the  shaggy  black  heads  of  Castilian  youths,  which 
looked  better.  .  .  .  My  glass  revealed  every  movement  they  made,  — 
even  the  cool  turning  of  the  head  that  was  in  one  big  black  straw 
hat  to  make  some  observation  to  another.  No  smoke  obscured  our 
vision,  nor  did  the  pour  of  our  bullets  upon  their  trench  restrain 
them  from  coolly  answering  our  fire.  All  day  long  the  fight  went 
on,  and  still  these  Spaniards  rose  and  delivered  their  fire  as  if  they 
were  part  of  a  machine.  Even  when  the  fort  fell  they  and  their  com- 
mander appeared  to  take  no  heed  of  the  situation  of  their  comrades. 
They  seemed  to  assume  that  they  had  been  placed  there  to  defend 
that  trench  and  they  had  no  other  thought  but  to  defend  it." 


And  the  Spanish  writers  express  equal  admiration  of  the 
Americans.  An  officer  wrote  that  he  saw  Chaffee's  men 
coming  on  Hke  moving  statues,  as  if  they  had  no  Hfe  to 
lose,  no  sense  of  danger. 

At  El  Caney  the  Spaniards  lost  some  250  men,  killed  or 
seriously  wounded,  just  half  of  the  garrison  ;  158  were  made 
prisoners,  many  of  them  wounded.  At  San  Juan  the  loss 
of  the  defense  was  about  150  men.  These  figures  do  not 
include  men  who  received  slight  wounds  that  did  not  dis- 
able them.  The  Spaniards  had  shown  splendid  fighting 
power,  but  there  was  no  generalship.  The  best  judges  of 
war  among  the  American  officers  were  agreed  that  if  Linares 
had  concentrated  on  the  fighting  front  some  thousands  of 
men  who  were  holding  other  positions  that  were  not  at- 
tacked he  would  probably  have  won  a  victory,  with  disas- 
trous results  for  the  expedition. 

The  American  losses  were  serious.  In  the  attack  on  El 
Caney,  including  Bates's  Brigade,  6653  men  were  engaged. 
The  casualties  were  81  killed  and  360  wounded.  The  heav- 
iest loss  fell  on  the  Seventh  Infantry  of  Chaffee's  Brigade. 


292  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

The  regiment  had  33  killed  and  99  wounded.  The  official 
return  of  the  losses  at  San  Juan  includes  those  of  the  long- 
range  fighting  of  July  second  and  third,  but  these  losses  were 
not  serious  and  the  bulk  of  the  loss  was  incurred  in  the 
battle  of  July  i.  The  force  engaged  (Sumner's  Cavalry 
Division  and  Kent's  Infantry)  amounted  to  8412  men. 
There  were  135  killed  and  958  wounded.  On  July  2  and  3 
Lawton's  Division  and  Bates's  Brigade,  which  were  moved 
up  to  prolong  the  line  before  the  city,  lost  8  killed  and  52 
wounded.    The  total  losses  may  be  thus  tabulated : 

TOTAL  FORCE     KILLED 

Sumner  and  Kent's  divisions  .    .     8,412  135 

Lawton's    Division    and    Bates's 

Brigade 6,653  81 


VOUNDED 

TOTAL 

958 

1.093 

360 

441 

Totals  15,065  216         1,318         1,534 

Under  the  conditions  of  this  tropical  campaign,  and  with 
the  inadequate  hospital  service,  the  plight  of  even  the 
slightly  wounded  was  serious.  The  few  surgeons  worked 
with  the  most  devoted  energy,  but  they  were  so  shorthanded 
that  most  of  them  were  busy  dressing  wounds  and  perform- 
ing necessary  operations  all  through  the  night  of  the  battle 
and  the  following  day.  At  the  same  time  sickness  in  more 
than  one  form  was  making  victims  among  the  exhausted 
soldiers. 

But  the  ground  won  had  to  be  held  at  all  costs.  The 
troops  that  had  captured  El  Caney  were  moved  up  to  the 
fighting  front  before  the  city,  and  with  only  the  scantiest 
intervals  of  rest  the  Americans  were  at  work  entrenching 
themselves  on  a  long  line  to  the  east  and  north  of  Santiago. 
As  the  sun  rose  on  July  2  the  Spaniards  opened  a  heavy 
fire  from  their  trenches  and  blockhouses  along  the  front  of 
the  city.  The  Americans  answered  back.  This  exchange 
of  fire  went  on  till  about  eight  o'clock,  then  ceased  till  noon 
and   broke   out   ag-gin    and    went   on    in   a   more   desultory 


THE    BATTLE    BEFORE    SANTIAGO      293 

fashion  till  sundown.  There  was  little  loss.  Both  sides 
fought  under  cover,  that  of  the  American  lines  improving 
hour  by  hour.  This  fighting  has  sometimes  been  called  the 
"  Battle  of  Santiago."  It  was  really  the  first  day  of  the 
siege.  That  there  would  have  to  be  a  siege  was  a  disap- 
pointment to  Shafter.  Prostrated  as  he  was  by  illness,  he 
wrote  a  depressing  message  to  the  War  Department  at 
Washington,  reporting  that  the  defenses  of  Santiago  were 
too  strong  to  be  rushed ;  that  he  had  only  a  very  thin  line 
in  front  of  it,  had  lost  heavily  and  was  losing  daily  by 
sickness.  It  was  difficult  to  bring  up  supplies  and  he  was 
thinking  seriously  of  retiring  to  the  coast  range  till  matters 
could  be  improved,  roads  made,  and  supplies  collected. 
He  had  no  idea  that  the  Spaniards  were  starving,  and  that 
on  the  very  day  he  wrote  (July  3)  the  whole  situation  would 
be  changed.  That  morning  Cervera,  unable  to  supply  his 
fleet  at  Santiago,  put  out  to  sea,  and  his  squadron  was 
completely  destroyed  in  a  running  fight  with  the  American 
fleet.  The  defense  had  thus  lost  its  chief  support.  Once  the 
fleet  was  driven  away  the  place  was  easily  reduced  by  a  close 
investment  on  the  land  side.  Every  day,  despite  much 
suffering  from  the  climate  and  an  outbreak  of  fever,  the 
Americans  strengthened  their  hold  on  the  place.  After  a 
two  days'  bombardment  Santiago  surrendered  on  July  16 
and  its  fall  practically  ended  the  war  and  secured  the  libera- 
tion of  Cuba. 


CHAPTER    XII 

OMDURMAN 
September  2,  1898 

The  Mohammedans  believe  that  when  the  last  day  of 
the  world  is  approaching  a  prophet  will  be  sent  who  will  be 
not  only  a  preacher,  but  also  a  conqueror ;  who  will  spread 
the  religion  and  rule  of  Islam  throughout  the  earth ;  and 
who  will  be  known  as  the  "  Mahdi "  —  that  is,  the  guided 
one  (guided  by  God).  Hardly  a  century  has  passed  since 
the  days  of  Mohammed  without  the  appearance  in  one  Mo- 
hammedan country  or  another  of  a  popular  leader,  who 
claimed  to  be  "  the  Mahdi."  Such  a  claim  has  always  been 
a  favorite  resource  with  the  chiefs  of  revolts  against  oppres- 
sion, for  to  pose  as  a  heaven-sent  prophet  and  religious  re- 
former would  make  their  followers  believe  they  were  fight- 
ing in  a  holy  war. 

So  in  the  days  when  Egypt  and  the  Soudan  were  falling 
into  a  chaos  of  misgovernment  under  the  rule  of  the  Khedive 
Ismail  and  his  lieutenants,  and  the  oppression  of  the  tribes 
on  the  upper  Nile  had  made  them  ready  for  rebellion,  Mo- 
hammed Ahmed,  an  Arab  of  the  Dongola  province  and  a 
religious  teacher,  declared  that  he  was  the  Mahdi.  When 
he  came  into  conflict  with  the  government,  his  successes 
seemed  to  the  Soudanese  almost  miraculous  and  a  proof  of 
his  claim.  In  the  summer  of  1881,  with  a  crowd  armed 
with  sticks  and  a  few  spears,  he  surprised  and  disarmed  the 
troops  sent  against  him.  Other  victories  followed.  The 
revolt  of  Arabi  and  the  war  with  England  had  temporarily 
paralyzed  the  Soudan  Government.  The  Mahdi  overran 
whole  provinces. 


OMDURMAN  295 

An  expedition  sent  against  him  under  General  Hicks,  a 
British  ofificer  in  the  Egyptian  service,  was  destroyed  ahnost 
to  a  man.  Khartoum  was  besieged.  The  chivalrous  Gordon 
had  gone  there  on  the  eve  of  the  investment,  in  the  hope  of 
saving  the  situation.  He  was  involved  in  the  fate  of  the 
Soudanese  capital.  A  British  expedition  under  Wolseley 
toiled  up  the  Nile  and  fought  its  way  across  the  desert, 
only  to  arrive  too  late.  Khartoum  had  been  stormed  and 
Gordon  killed  on  January  26,  1885,  during  the  last  stage  of 
the  desert  campaign. 

It  was  then  decided  to  abandon  the  Soudan,  and  for  a 
few  years  the  Mahdi,  and  his  successor  Abdullahi,  known 
as  the  Khalifa,  ruled  over  an  empire  that  extended  from  the 
great  lakes  of  the  Nile  northwards  to  the  Second  Cataract, 
and  from  the  Red  Sea  to  the  western  borders  of  Darfur. 
Its  capital  was  the  great  city  of  Omdurman,  that  had  grown 
up  around  the  village  of  that  name  opposite  Khartoum,  with 
the  domed  tomb  of  the  Mahdi  for  its  central  sanctuary. 
For  the  first  time  for  centuries  the  frontiers  of  civilization 
had  been  forced  back  by  a  barbarian  revolt. 

There  was  a  state  of  intermittent  war  about  Suakin  on 
the  Red  Sea  coast,  and  more  than  one  British  expedition 
was  sent  to  break  up  Mahdist  gatherings  in  the  district. 
On  the  upper  Nile,  at  the  foot  of  the  Second  Cataract, 
Wadi  Haifa  was  garrisoned  as  the  frontier  fortress  of 
Egypt.  Southward  the  wild  rocky  desert  of  the  Batn-el- 
Hagar  made  the  approach  of  Dervish  raiders  difficult.  The 
Arab  riverside  village  was  converted  into  a  fortress.  A 
rampart  of  sun-dried  bricks,  with  its  flanks  resting  on  the 
Nile,  surrounded  the  government  buildings,  barracks,  work- 
shops, and  hospital.  Outlying  forts,  with  Krupp  guns  and 
Maxims,  looked  out  over  the  undulating  plain  of  barren 
sand  between  the  river  and  the  desert  hills.  Gunboats  pa- 
trolled the  river  up  to  the  cataract,  and  the  telegraph  linked 
the  garrison  of  Egyptian  and  Soudanese  troops  with  Egypt. 


296  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

In  1889  the  Dervishes  had  attempted  to  march  past  Haifa 
by  the  other  bank  of  the  Nile,  and  were  routed  at  Toski. 
After  this  there  were  only  insignificant  raids  on  frontier 
villages  by  the  river.  An  advanced  post,  the  fort  of  Sarras, 
was  occupied,  and  was  held  by  an  Egyptian  garrison  a  day's 
march  south  of  Haifa.  Enterprising  officers  made  excur- 
sions into  the  Batn-el-Hagar,  and  mapped  the  stony  wilder- 
ness. To  the  frontier  mess  at  Haifa  there  came  from  time 
to  time  rumors  of  an  advance  into  the  Dervish  empire,  and 
talk  of  the  time  when  Gordon's  fate  would  be  avenged. 
These  rumors  became  more  frequent  in  1895,  when  the  Aus- 
trian Slatin  Bey,  once  a  lieutenant  of  Gordon,  then  a  prisoner 
of  the  Mahdi  and  the  Khalifa,  made  his  escape  from 
Omdurman,  and  told  of  dissensions  in  the  Dervish  camp, 
and  the  readiness  of  many  of  the  tribes  to  welcome  a  de- 
liverer from  the  Khalifa's  sway. 

The  destruction  of  Baratieri's  army  at  Adowa,  the  news 
that  the  Dervishes  were  marching  on  the  Italian  garrison  of 
Kassala,  the  fear  that  the  recent  defeat  of  a  European  army 
would  rouse  the  Mahdist  empire  to  a  new  outburst  of 
activity,  led  the  British  Government  to  decide  in  March, 
1896,  that  there  should  be  an  advance  on  the  upper  Nile. 
Something  must  be  done  to  restore  the  white  man's  prestige. 
The  Dongola  province  was  to  be  reoccupied.  Perhaps  this 
first  step  forward  would  open  the  way  to  a  march  on 
Omdurman  and  Khartoum. 

Then  began  the  series  of  campaigns,  along  the  river  and 
across  the  desert,  by  which  Lord  Kitchener  won  a  world- 
wide reputation.  He  showed  what  great  things  could  be 
done  with  small  means.  An  engineer  officer,  he  made  it  an 
engineer's  as  well  as  a  soldier's  war.  Hector  Macdonald, 
by  a  rapid  march  across  the  Batn-el-Hagar,  seized  the 
crag-girt  valley  of  Akasha  on  the  Nile  bank,  by  the  southern 
edge  of  the  stony  desert ;  and  then  across  the  waste  of 
rock    and    sand    the    desert    railway    was    laid    by    soldier 


VVadI  HflLFR 


Sarra' 


DONGOL^t, 
Sept  n.lB' 


Jlie,  dat&s,  are.  t/vose  oj 
laities  (^J/Of  °}  thl. 
Occupati,on.    oj  pltlctS 


AbiL  Haracfl 


ISO  i.OO 


1  Miles 


...'^NiliLaru  fs  arras -T^otUjola  provmre  Icdi  down  '8^4,  )y 

Kailuiap  [woJiHai|ab''Atbara..  |S97-9»fJ       ^^ 
Sepf  1 189fi 


2CTViKleof  Afifltbara 
N^  April  8   i49a 


^X^ 


\ 


^ 


No.  2o  —  Stages  ok  tuk  Auvanck  to  KmaktouiM,  iSg()-i8cj8 


OMDURMAN  .  297 

workers,  who  toiled  with  their  arms  piled  beside  the  line, 
and  pickets  holding  the  ridges  in  front. 

When  the  railway  was  nearing  Akasha,  the  little  army, 
some  9000  strong,  Egyptians  and  Soudanese,  officered  by 
picked  European  leaders,  concentrated  at  the  advanced  post 
and,  marching  by  night,  attacked  and  destroyed  at  dawn,  on 
the  first  Sunday  in  June,  1896,  the  Dervish  army  that  held 
Ferkeh,  the  gate  of  the  Dongola  province.  A  rapid  pursuit 
by  cavalry  and  camel  men  cleared  the  Nile  valley  of  the 
enemy  for  50  miles.  Then  there  was  a  long  halt  while 
again  the  desert  railway  crept  forward  mile  by  mile,  a  flotilla 
was  hauled  up  the  rapids  of  the  Second  Cataract,  and  gun- 
boats, built  in  England  and  taken  to  pieces  to  be  packed 
as  cargo,  were  brought  by  the  railway  to  an  improvised 
riverside  dockyard  in  the  heart  of  Africa,  and  were  there 
rebuilt,  launched,  engined,  and  armed. 

Then  the  army  and  the  flotilla  moved  southwards.  The 
batteries  of  Hafir  were  passed  by  the  gunboats,  the  Dervish 
army  retreated  without  risking  another  battle,  and  Dongola 
was  occupied.  The  gunboats  pushed  on  and  cleared  the 
Nile  banks  of  the  enemy  up  to  the  foot  of  the  Fourth 
Cataract. 

In  the  following  year  (1897)  another  railway  was  laid 
across  the  desert,  from  Haifa  by  Murat,  to  cut  off  the  great 
bend  ot  the  Nile  and  strike  the  river  at  Abu  flamed.  Abu 
Hamed  was  gallantly  stormed  by  Macdonald,  P)crber  was 
occupied,  and  the  railway  was  continued  towards  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Atbara  and  the  Nile. 

In  the  spring  of  1898  the  Emir  Mahmoud  took  the 
offensive  with  a  Dervish  army,  and  was  defeated  on  the 
banks  of  the  Atbara  by  a  mixed  British  and  Egyptian  force. 
In  the  early  autumn  the  army  and  flotilla  that  were  to  move 
on  Omdurman  concentrated  under  Kitchener's  command 
around  Fort  Atbara,  the  railhead  at  the  meeting-place  of  the 
Atbara  and  the  Nile.     A  young  guardsman  on  his  arrival 


298  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

there  remarked  that  it  was  a  long  way  from  Cairo.  "  It 
took  me  ten  days  to  get  here,  sir,"  he  said  to  Kitchener. 
"  It  has  taken  most  of  us  two  years  and  a  half,"  replied  the 
general. 

The  army  and  flotilla  combined  under  his  command  rep- 
resented the  most  powerful  fighting  force  that  had  till  then 
been  seen  in  Africa.  It  was  an  army  of  many "  nations. 
There  were  the  white  soldiers  of  England,  Ireland,  Scot- 
land, and  Wales,  the  Egyptian  fellahin  regiments,  some  of 
them  entirely  officered  by  Arabs  and  Turks,  others  with 
British  officers  in  the  higher  ranks  of  command.  There 
were  the  black  Soudanese  regiments,  negroes  and  mixed 
half-negro  half-Arab  races  filling  their  ranks,  which  repre- 
sented most  of  the  tribes  of  the  tropical  upper  Nile.  Then 
there  were  the  Arab  auxiliaries  —  Ababdeh  from  the  borders 
of  the  desert  by  the  First  and  Second  Cataracts ;  Jaalin 
from  the  Bayuda  desert,  eager  for  vengeance  on  the  Khalifa, 
who  a  year  before  had  massacred  their  kindred ;  and  Shuri- 
kiyeh  from  the  Atbara  valley,  under  a  chief  whose  father 
had  stood  by  Gordon  at  Khartoum. 

The  regular  land  forces  mustered  about  45,000  men. 
There  was  a  British  division  under  General  Gatacre.  Its 
first  brigade  had  been  in  the  Soudan  since  the  previous 
winter,  when  Gatacre  had  led  it  in  person  at  the  storming 
of  Mahmoud's  camp  on  the  Atbara.  It  was  now  commanded 
by  General  Wauchope,  and  was  made  up  of  the  First 
Cameron  and  First  Seaforth  Highlanders,  and  the  First 
Lincolns  and  First  Warwick.  The  Second  Brigade,  which 
arrived  on  the  eve  of  the  advance,  was  made  up  of  the  First 
Grenadier  Guards,  the  First  Battalion  of  the  Rifle  Brigade, 
the  First  Northumberland  Fusiliers,  and  the  Second  Lanca- 
shire Fusiliers,  the  brigadier  being  General  Lyttelton.  The 
Egyptian  Division  was  commanded  by  Generald  Archibald 
Hunter,  who  had  seen  every  campaign  on  the  Nile  from  the 
days  of  the  formation  of  the  new  Egyptian  army ;    and  his 


OMDURMAN  299 

four  brigades,  each  of  four  battalions,  were  commanded  by 
men  who,  hke  himself,  though  young  soldiers,  were  veterans 
in  desert  warfare.  Two  of  the  brigades  were  made  up 
chiefly  of  Soudanese  soldiers,  many  of  whom  had  had 
their  first  experience  of  war  fighting  under  the  banner  of 
the  Mahdi  or  the  Khalifa.  The  organization  of  the  division 
was  this : 

First  Brigade               Second  Brigade  Third  Brigade               Fourth  Brigade 

Colonel  H.  Macdonald  Colonel  Maxwell  Colonel  Lewis  Colonel  Collinson 

2d  Egyptians  8th  Egyptians  3d  Egyi)tians          ist  Egyptians 

9th  Soudanese  12th  Soudanese  4th  Egyptians  5th  Egyptians 

lOth  Soudanese  13th  Soudanese  7th  Egyptians  17th  Egyptians 

I ith  Soudanese  14th  Soudanese  15th  Egyptians  i8th  Egyptians 

There  was  a  regiment  of  British  cavalry,  the  Twenty-first 
Lancers,  setting  out  on  their  first  campaign,  and  eager  to 
do  some  stirring  deed.  The  Egyptian  cavalry  were  ten 
squadrons  of  Lancers  under  Colonel  Broadwood,  and  there 
was  Tudway's  camel  corps  of  eight  companies  of  riflemen. 
A  horse  battery  of  six  93/2-potinder  Krtipp  gtms  was  at- 
tached to  the  Egyptian  cavalry,  who  had  also  some  Maxims. 
Maxim  detachments  (incltuling  a  Maxim  battery  manned 
by  the  Royal  Irish  Fusiliers)  were  also  with  the  infantry. 
The  Egyptian  field  artillery  had  four  batteries,  each  of  six 
new  Maxim-Nordenfelt  quick-firing  guns,  throwing  a  123/2- 
pound  shell.  The  British  artillery  was  made  up  of  a  battery 
of  six  15-pounder  field  guns  (Thirty-second  Royal  Field 
Artillery),  a  battery  of  six  5-inch  howitzers  (Thirty- 
seventh  Royal  Field  Artillery),  and  a  detachment  of  garrison 
artillery  with  two  40-pounder  siege  guns.  The  howitzers 
and  siege  guns  had  with  them  a  supply  of  the  new  high 
explosive  lyddite  shells,  of  the  destructive  power  of  which 
terrible  things  were  told. 

Besides  the  44  guns  with  the  land   forces,  there  was  a 
formidable  array  of  quick-firing  guns  and  Maxims  mounted 


300  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

on  the  gunboats,  which  were  also  provided  with  high  power 
electric  searchlights. 

The  first  move  was  made  by  detachments,  partly  by  march- 
ing, partly  by  river  transport,  to  a  concentration  camp  at 
Wad  Hamed,  below  the  Shabluka  cataract.  The  regular 
troops  were  massed  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river ;  the  Arab 
irregulars,  under  Colonel  Stuart  Wortley,  on  the  other  side. 
A  huge  flotilla  of  gunboats,  steamers,  and  barges  and  sailing 
boats  lay  on  the  wide  waters  of  the  Nile.  August  24  was 
fixed  for  the  start  of  the  march  on  Omdurman.  Twenty- 
one  days'  provisions  had  been  collected  for  the  campaign, 
which  was  to  be  short  and  sharp.  Two  days'  rations  were 
distributed  to  the  troops  on  the  twenty-fourth.  The  flotilla 
conveyed  the  rest,  and  was  to  serve  as  a  moving  supply 
magazine  from  which  distributions  would  be  made  to  the 
various  units  on  shore. 

On  the  twenty-third  the  Sirdar  Kitchener  reviewed  his 
army,  and  the  British,  Egyptian,  and  Soudanese  regiments, 
formed  in  line  in  the  desert  with  a  front  of  two  miles,  pre- 
sented a  magnificent  spectacle.  It  was  a  force  with  which  a 
leader  might  promise  to  "  go  anywhere  and  do  anything." 
Colonel  Wingate,  of  the  Intelligence  Department,  and  his 
right-hand  man,  Slatin  Pasha,  had  information  from  Om- 
durman that  the  Khalifa  was  gathering  every  available  fight- 
ing man,  and  meant  to  await  the  attack  at  or  near  Omdur- 
man, where  he  counted  on  assembling  at  least  60,000  war- 
riors under  his  black  banner. 

The  march  through  the  desert,  round  the  hills  by  the 
Shabluka  cataract,  was  made  by  detachments,  and  the  army 
was  again  concentrated  south  of  the  cataract  on  the  evening 
of  August  ^j.  Omdurman  was  now  only  35  miles  away  in 
a  direct  line,  though  the  march  by  the  river  bank  would  add 
slightly  to  the  distance.  From  the  summit  of  Jebel  Royan, 
the  mountain  at  the  head  of  the  cataract  on  the  right  bank, 
where  a  lookout  and  signal   station  had  been   established. 


OMDURMAN  301 

the  telescope  showed  a  white  spot  just  on  the  far  horizon. 
It  was  the  dome  of  the  Mahdi's  tomb  in  the  midst  of  the 
capital  of  the  Khalifa.  Stuart  Wortley,  with  his  2500 
Arabs,  was  on  the  river  bank  near  Jebel  Royan.  He  had 
just  been  joined  by  nearly  a  hundred  deserters  from  the 
enemy's  camp  (a  party  of  Batahin  Arabs  with  their  chief), 
and  his  scouts  had  come  on  the  track  of  retiring  Dervish 
patrols.  It  was  afterwards  ascertained  that  the  Khalifa  had 
kept  all  his  fighting  men  near  Omdurman,  except  a  party 
of  about  200  horsemen,  whom  he  sent  forward  to  watch 
the  Sirdar's  advance. 

The  army  now  moved  onward  by  short  marches,  covered 
by  a  screen  formed  by  the  mounted  troops.  On  August  31  it 
halted  just  fifteen  miles  from  Omdurman.  The  camp  was 
on  the  northern  slope  of  the  hollow  of  Wadi  Suetne,  a  val- 
ley covered  with  low-growing  thorn  scrub.  Beyond  were 
the  ridges  of  the  Kerreri  Hills,  rising  only  a  few  hundred 
feet  above  the  desert.  It  was  known  that  from  their  south- 
ern slopes  an  open  plain  of  hard  sand  and  gravel  stretched 
along  the  Nile  bank  to  the  gates  of  the  Khalifa's  capital. 
During  the  day  the  cavalry  had  sighted  and  driven  in  his 
scouts,  and  the  gunboats  had  shelled  and  broken  up  their 
camp  in  a  hollow  of  the  Kerreri  Hills.  Next  day  might 
perhaps  witness  the  great  battle.  In  any  case  within  twenty- 
four  hours  the  expedition  would  be  before  Omdurman. 

On  the  morning  of  September  i  the  Sirdar  formed  his 
army  in  battle  array,  and  marched  southward  over  the 
Kerreri  Hills.  The  British  division  was  on  the  left,  near 
the  Nile.  Then  came  the  Egyptian  infantry  brigades,  and  on 
the  extreme  right,  guarding  the  desert  flank,  the  Egyptian 
mounted  troops.  The  gunboats  steamed  ahead  on  the  river, 
and  on  the  right  bank  Stuart  Wortley  advanced  with  his 
motley  crowd  of  Arab  "  friendlies  "  —  known  to  the  British 
soldiers  as  the  "  Skallywags."  As  the  Kerreri  ridge  was 
passed  the  Twenty-first  Lancers  were  sent  forward  in  the 


302  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

plain  beyond,  and  one  of  their  parties  occupied  the  isolated 
hill  of  Jebel  Surgham  in  its  midst,  and  established  there  a 
heliograph  signal  station.  Away  to  the  right  Broadwood 
advanced  with  his  squadrons,  crossed  the  hollow  of  Khor 
Shambat,  and  reached  the  hills  that  look  down  on  the  land 
front  of  Omdurman.  Those  who  now  saw  the  sacred  city 
of  the  Mahdi  for  the  first  time  were  astonished  at  its 
enormous  extent.  It  stretched  for  some  six  miles  along  the 
riverside,  a  wilderness  of  low,  flat-roofed  houses,  high  over 
which  rose  the  white  dome  of  the  Mahdi's  tomb,  glittering 
in  the  sun. 

That  dome  was  soon  to  be  the  target  of  British  artillery. 
Stuart  Wortley's  "  f riendlies,"  marching  by  the  farther  bank 
of  the  Nile,  had  driven  parties  of  Dervishes  out  of  the  river- 
side villages,  and  finally  seized  Halfiya,  a  village  behind  the 
first  of  the  islands  below  the  confluence  of  the  two  Niles. 
From  this  point  the  dome  of  the  tomb  was  a  little  more  than 
a  mile  away.  At  Halfiya  the  howitzer  battery  was  landed 
from  barges,  and,  taking  the  dome  as  its  target,  began  to 
throw  its  heavy  lyddite  shells  into  Omdurman.  At  the 
same  time  the  gunboats  steamed  up  between  the  island  and 
the  northern  end  of  the  city,  and  came  into  action  against 
the  enemy's  batteries  along  its  river  front.  The  Mahdists 
fought  their  guns  bravely,  but  they  were  soon  silenced. 
Huge  breaches  were  blown  in  the  river  wall  by  the  fire  of 
the  gunboats,  and  the  howitzers,  with  their  heavy  lyddite 
shells,  wrecked  the  dome,  and  did  considerable  damage  to 
the  buildings  around  it. 

Omdurman  was  crowded  with  the  tens  of  thousands 
whom  the  Khalifa  had  mustered  for  the  battle.  While  the 
bombardment  was  still  in  progress  he  ordered  them  to  move 
out  into  the  open  and  advance  against  the  Sirdar's  army, 
promising  them  speedy  victory,  and  telling  them  that  it  had 
been  prophesied  that  the  plain  of  Kerreri  would  be  white 
with  the  skulls  of  their  enemies. 


OMDURMAN  303 

The  Dervish  army,  more  than  50,000  strong,  poured  out 
of  the  city,  and  formed  in  battle  array  facing  towards  the 
north,  on  the  sandy  slopes  between  C)mdurni;ui  and  the  hills 
where  Broadwood  had  halted.  It  was  about  eleven  o'clock 
when  the  Khalifa  began  to  advance  towards  the  Khor 
Shambat  hollow.  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  who  was  then 
a  lieutenant  attached  to  the  Twenty-first  Lancers,  has  given 
a  striking  description  of  the  appearance  of  the  great  host  as 
seen  from  near  Jebel  Surgham." 

"  Suddenly,"  he  says,  "  the  whole  black  line  began  to  move.  Be- 
hind it  other  immense  masses  and  lines  of  men  appeared  over  the 
crest ;  and  while  we  watched,  amazed  by  the  wonder  of  the  sight, 
the  whole  face  of  the  slope  became  black  with  swarming  savages. 
Four  miles  from  end  to  end,  and  as  it  seemed  in  five  great  divisions, 
this  mighty  army  advanced  swiftly.  The  whole  side  of  the  hill 
seemed  to  move.  Between  the  masses  horsemen  galloped  continu- 
ally; before  them  many  patrols  dotted  the  plain;  above  them  waved 
hundreds  of  banners ;  and  the  sun,  glinting  on  many  thousand  hos- 
tile spear  points,  spread  a  sparkling  cloud.  It  was  perhaps  the  im- 
pression of  a  life  time ;  nor  do  I  expect  ever  again  to  see  such  an 
awe-inspiring  or  formidable  sight.  ...  A  strong  detachment  of  the 
mulazcmim,  or  guard,  was  extended  in  front  of  the  center.  AH 
Wad  Helu,  with  his  bright  green  flag,  prolonged  the  line  to  the  left; 
and  his  5000  warriors  soon  began  to  reach  out  towards  the  Egyptian 
cavalry.  The  center  and  main  force  of  the  army  was  comi)oscd  of 
the  regular  troops,  formed  in  squads,  under  Osman  Shcik-cd-Din  * 
and  Osman  Azrak.  This  great  body  comprised  12,000  black  rifle- 
men, and  about  13,000  black  and  Arab  spearmen.  In  their  midst  rose 
the  large  dark  green  flag  which  the  Sheik-ed-Din  had  adopted.  The 
Khalifa  with  his  own  bodyguard,  about  2000  strong,  followed  the 
center.  In  rear  of  all  marched  Yakub  with  the  black  flag  and  13,000 
men  —  nearly  all  swordsmen  and  spearmen,  who,  with  those  ex- 
tended in  front  of  the  army,  constituted  the  guard.  The  riglit  wing 
was  formed  by  the  brigade  of  the  Khalifa  Sherif,  consisting  of 
2000  Danagla  tribesmen,  whose  principal  ensign  was  a  broad  red  flag. 
Osman  Digna,  with  about  1700  Hadendoa,  guarded  the  extreme  right 
and  the  flank  nearest  Omdurman,  and  his  fame  needed  no  flag. 
Such  was  the  great  army  which  now  moved  swiftly  towards  the 
watching  squadrons ;  and  these,  pausing  on  the  sandy  ridge,  pushed 
out  a  fringe  of  tentative  patrols,  as  if  to  assure  themselves  that  what 
they  saw  was  real." 

*  "The  River  War,"  vol.  ii,  p.  S7.  *  The  son  of  the  Khalifa. 


304  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Before  the  steady  advance  of  the  Dervishes  the  cavalry 
began  to  fall  back  on  the  main  body,  which  as  yet  could 
have  no  sight  of  the  enemy.  The  Sirdar  had  halted  near 
the  huts  of  the  village  of  Egeiga,  on  the  bank  of  the  Nile, 
between  the  Kerreri  Hills  and  Jebel  Surgham.  The  troops 
were  formed  round  and  outside  the  little  group  of  mud- 
built  houses  in  a  semicircle,  convex  towards  the  desert  plain 
in  front,  and  with  the  wings  thrown  back  to  the  river  bank, 
which  here  rose  steeply  from  the  waterside  with  a  narrow 
stretch  of  beach  a  few  feet  below  it.  The  British  division 
was  in  line  on  the  left ;  three  Egyptian  brigades  formed 
the  center  and  right.  CoUinson's  Brigade  was  in  reserve 
inside  the  semicircle.  In  the  intervals  between  the  bri- 
gades and  battalions  the  artillery  and  the  Maxim  guns  were 
posted. 

The  heliograph  on  Jebel  Surgham  flashed  and  flickered 
out  in  dots  and  dashes  the  news  that  the  enemy  were  ad- 
vancing in  force,  and  Colonel  Martin  of  the  Twenty-first 
Lancers,  while  his  men  were  retiring,  sent  Lieutenant  Win- 
ston Churchill  galloping  back  to  give  the  Sirdar  some  de- 
tails. Churchill  reported  that  the  Dervish  army  was  then 
about  four  miles  away,  and,  if  they  continued  their  advance, 
would  be  attacking  in  another  hour.  The  Sirdar  was  quite 
calm  and  confident.  "  We  want  nothing  better,"  he  said. 
"  We  have  a  good  field  of  fire  here.  They  may  as  well 
come  to-day  as  to-morrow." 

But  the  Dervish  army  came  no  further  than  the  long 
hollow  of  Khor  Shambat.  There  they  halted  in  masses  as 
they  stood,  and  prepared  to  bivouac.  Their  cavalry  patrols 
during  the  late  hours  of  the  afternoon  exchanged  a  few 
shots  with  the  scouts  sent  out  by  the  Twenty-first  Lancers 
beyond  Jebel  Surgham.  Broadwood  had  drawn  in  his 
squadrons,  the  horse  battery  and  the  camel  corps,  to  the 
base  of  the  Kerreri  Hills  on  the  right  of  the  Sirdar's  array. 
As  darkness  came  on  the  men  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  army 


OMDURMAN  305 

lay  down  to  sleep  where  they  stood.  The  British  division 
had  covered  its  front  with  a  zareba  hedge,  a  mass  of  thorn 
bushes  cut  down  and  piled  together.  Hunter's  Soudanese 
and  Egyptian  battalions'  were  content  to  throw  up  a  low 
parapet  of  sand  and  gravel.  Their  officers  had  longer  ex- 
perience of  desert  warfare  than  those  of  the  white  battalions. 
The  low  parapet  gave  some  protection  against  bullets,  and 
enabled  the  men  behind  it  to  fire  kneeling.  The  zareba 
hedge  forced  its  defenders  to  stand  while  firing. 

It  was  fully  expected  that  there  would  be  a  night  attack. 
It  looked  as  if  the  Khalifa  had  marched  out  during  the  day 
in  order  to  be  within  easy  striking  distance  as  soon  as  the 
darkness  gathered.  But  it  was  only  a  partial  darkness  after 
all,  for  the  Sirdar  had  timed  his  advance  so  as  to  approach 
Omdurman  in  the  period  of  moonlit  nights,  and  the  full 
moon  was  shining  in  all  its  splendor  in  a  cloudless,  star- 
spangled  sky,  with  the  brightness  characteristic  of  the 
tropical  night  in  the  desert.  It  silvered  the  wide  expanse  of 
sand  sloping  gently  upwards  from  the  riverside,  and  through 
the  sheen  of  moonlight  came  the  long  beams  of  brighter  rays 
from  the  searchlights  of  the  gunboats,  which  swept  the 
desert,  startling  the  wild  warriors,  who  saw  in  it  some 
strange  menace  of  magical  power. 

By  this  double  light  keen-eyed  sentinels  and  scouts 
watched  the  expanse  of  sand  and  gravel  in  front  of  the 
Sirdar's  position.  Hour  after  hour  went  by.  and  still 
there  was  no  attack.  The  Khalifa  had  lost  his  best  chance. 
It  was  only  just  before  the  sun  rose  that  he  broke  up  his 
bivouacs  and  formed  his  huge  army  in  battle  array. 

At  half  past  four,  even  before  the  twilight  l)egan  to 
whiten  the  sky  far  away  on  the  other  side  of  the  Nile, 
bugle  and  trumpet,  fife  and  drum,  sounded  the  reveille  in 
the  Sirdar's  lines.  The  men  stood  to  their  arms  in  the 
darkness.  The  rush  might  come  in  the  dangerous  hour 
before  the  dawn.     But  all  was  quiet  in  front,  and  as  the 


3o6  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

twilight  began  to  dim  the  stars  British  and  Egyptian  cavalry- 
patrols  were  sent  out  through  the  darkness  to  have  a  sight 
of  the  enemy  as  soon  as  there  was  light  enough  to  distin- 
guish objects  at  a  little  distance. 

Lieutenant  Churchill,  anxious  to  see  all  that  was  to  be 
seen,  in  his  double  capacity  of  a  cavalry  scout  and  the  war 
correspondent  of  a  London  paper,  was  with  the  party  that 
rode  up  to  the  crest  of  Jebel  Surgham.  Beyond  could  be 
seen  the  lines  and  masses  of  the  Dervish  army,  looking  in 
the  half-light  like  "  dark  blurs  and  streaks  relieved  and 
diversified  with  an  odd-looking  shimmer  of  light  from  the 
spear  points." 

As  the  sun  rose,  the  Mahdists  began  to  move  forward, 
still  hidden  from  the  Sirdar's  position  by  a  long  swell  of 
sandy  ground  between  Surgham  and  the  Kerreri  Hills. 
Only  the  advanced  cavalry  scouts  saw  this  first  stage  of  the 
enemy's  advance,  and  Mr.  Churchill's  graphic  description  of 
the  impression  it  produced  upon  these  watchers  on  the 
Surgham  ridge  is  well  worth  a  full  quotation :  ^ 

"  As  it  became  broad  daylight  —  that  is  to  say,  about  ten  minutes 
to  six  —  I  suddenly  became  aware  that  all  the  masses  were  in  mo- 
tion and  advancing  swiftly.  Their  emirs  galloped  about  and  before 
their  ranks ;  scouts  and  patrols  scattered  themselves  all  over  the 
front.  Then  they  began  to  cheer.  They  were  still  a  mile  away  from 
the  hill,  and  were  concealed  from  the  Sirdar's  army  by  the  folds  of 
the  ground.  The  noise  of  the  shouting  was  heard,  albeit  faintly,  by 
the  troops  down  by  the  river;  but  to  us,  watching  on  the  hill,  a 
tremendous  roar  came  up  in  waves  of  intense  sound,  like  the  tumult 
of  a  rising  wind  and  sea  before  a  storm.  In  spite  of  the  confidence 
which  I  felt  in  the  weapons  of  civilization  —  for  all  doubts  had  dis- 
persed with  the  darkness  —  the  formidable  aspect  of  this  host  of 
implacable  savages,  hurrying  eagerly  to  the  attack,  provoked  a  feel- 
ing of  loneliness,  which  was  shared,  I  think,  by  the  rest  of  the  little 
patrol.  .  .  .  Although  the  Dervishes  were  steadily  advancing,  a  be- 
lief that  their  musketry  was  inferior  encouraged  a  nearer  view,  and 
we  trotted  round  the  southwest  slopes  of  Surgham  Hill  until  we 
reached  the  sandhills  on  the  enemy's  side.     Thence  the  whole  array 

^  "  The  River  War,"  vol.  ii,  p.  107  et  seq. 


No.  21  —  Battle  of  Omdurman,  September  2,  1898 
I.  The  First  Derv^xsh  Attack 


OMDURMAN  307 

was  visible  in  minute  detail.  It  seemed  that  every  single  man  of  all 
the  thousands  could  be  examined  separately.  The  pace  of  their 
march  v^as  fast  and  steady,  and  it  was  evident  that  it  would  not  be 
safe  to  remain  long  among  the  sandhills.  Yet  the  wonder  of  the 
scene  exercised  a  dangerous  fascination,  and  for  a  while  we  tarried." 
"The  emblems  of  the  more  famous  emirs  were  easily  distinguish- 
able. On  the  extreme  left  the  chiefs  and  soldiers  of  the  bright 
green  flag  gathered  under  Ali  Wad  Helu ;  between  this  and  the 
center  the  large,  dark  green  flag  of  Osman  Sheik-ed-Din  rose  above 
a  dense  mass  of  spearmen,  preceded  by  long  lines  of  warriors  armed 
presumably  with  rifies;  over  the  center,  commanded  by  Yakub,  the 
sacred  black  banner  of  the  Khalifa  floated  high  and  remarkable; 
while  on  the  right  a  great  square  of  Dervishes  was  arrayed  under 
an  extraordinary  number  of  white  flags,  amid  which  the  red  ensign 
of  Sherif  was  almost  hidden.  All  the  pride  and  might  of  the  Der- 
vish empire  was  massed  on  this  last  great  day  of  its  existence. 
Riflemen  who  had  helped  to  destroy  Hicks,  spearmen  who  had 
charged  at  Abu  Klea,  Baggara  fresh  from  raiding  the  Shillooks, 
warriors  who  had  besieged  Khartoum  —  all  marched  inspired  by  the 
memories  of  former  triumphs  and  embittered  by  the  knowledge  of 
late  defeats,  to  chastise  the  impudent  and  accursed  invaders." 

The  front  of  the  jT^reat  array  was  about  five  miles.  The 
left  stretched  out  towards  the  Kerreri  Hills ;  the  center, 
with  the  black  flag,  marched  directly  upon  Jebel  Surii^ham ; 
the  rio^ht  moved  so  that  it  would  presently  sweep  round 
to  the  south  of  it.  Under  a  splutter  of  fire  from  the  enemy's 
nearest  riflemen  the  Lancer  patrols  galloped  from  their 
point  of  observation  and  withdrew  with  the  regiment  to  the 
low  bank  of  the  river,  behind  the  left  flank  of  the  Sirdar's 
line. 

The  Khalifa  had  dragged  out  with  him  three  small  Krupp 
guns.  Two  of  these,  placed  near  the  northern  shoulder  of 
Jebel  Surgham,  fired  the  first  shots  of  the  battle  as  the 
Dervish  array  topped  the  long  swell  of  sand  between  the 
hill  and  the  Kerreri  ridges,  and  the  white  flags  came  pour- 
ing round  the  south  side.  The  Dervish  shells  fell  short  and 
did  not  burst;  they  only  threw  up  great  splashes  of  sand 
in  front  of  the  British  division.  At  once  the  challenge  was 
answered.     The  Sirdar's  artillery  thundered  out  from  his 


3o8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

battle  line  and  from  the  high-placed  quick-firers  of  the  gun- 
boats, that  lay  like  floating  castles  of  steel  on  the  flanks  of 
his  position.  The  range  was  about  a  mile  and  a  half.  A 
storm  of  shells  burst  over  the  front  of  the  advancing  array, 
and  every  bursting  shell  strewed  the  ground  with  dead  and 
wounded.  But  on  through  the  deadly  shower  the  enemy 
came,  a  long  white  line  topped  with  hundreds  of  fluttering 
banners,  and  flowing  like  a  tide  over  the  crest  of  the  sandy 
slope,  with  the  huge  wave  of  shouting  men  pressing  on 
behind  it. 

The  Khalifa  had  sent  nearly  30,000  men  forward  for 
the  first  attack.  On  the  right,  Sherif  with  the  white  flags, 
about  6000  strong,  moved  over  and  round  the  Jebel  Surg- 
ham  height ;  in  the  center,  some  8000  under  Osman  Azrak 
marched  directly  on  the  Sirdar's  position ;  on  the  left, 
Osman  Sheik-ed-Din,  with  the  strongest  of  the  three  corps 
—  a  force  estimated  at  some  15,000  —  made  for  the  Kerreri 
ridges,  with  the  intention  of  moving  through  the  broken 
ground  and  falling  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Egyptians. 
The  Khalifa  had  a  reserve  of  more  than  20,000  men,  whom 
he  held  back  for  later  eventualities.  His  idea  probably  was 
that,  if  the  first  rush  failed,  the  enemy  would  leave  their 
fortified  position  to  pursue  the  beaten  Dervishes,  and  he 
could  then  fall  upon  them  by  surprise  in  the  open  desert. 
Behind  Jebel  Surgham  he  halted  with  the  black  flag  and 
some  17,000  of  his  best  fighting  men,  including  his  picked 
guard,  the  Mulazemin,  and  the  Baggara  cavalry.  Over 
the  ridge  of  Um  Mutragan,  a  prolongation  of  the  Kerreri 
range,  he  sent  Ali  Wad  Helu  with  some  5000  more.  In 
recent  campaigns  the  Dervishes  had  stood  on  the  defensive 
and  been  defeated.  Their  earlier  victories  had  all  been 
won  by  the  headlong  rush  with  spear  and  sword.  The 
Khalifa  was  this  day  trying  to  revert  to  the  old  aggressive 
tactics,  without  having  as  yet  any  clear  idea  of  the  terrible 
power  of  the  new  weapons  opposed  to  him. 


OMDURMAN  309 

As  Osman  Azrak  and  Sherif's  thousands  came  on  there 
was  a  spkitter  of  rifle  fire  from  their  front,  but  the  range 
was  too  long  for  their  old  Remington  rifles.  At  first  the 
only  return  fire  was  that  of  the  artillery  ashore  and  afloat. 
But  as  the  advancing  wave  of  spears  came  within  a  mile 
and  a  half  the  Grenadier  Guards  on  the  left  opened  fire 
with  their  long-ranging  Lee-Metfords.  Battalion  after 
battalion  joined  in  along  the  front  of  the  British  line.  The 
firing  was  by  volleys ;  then  the  Maxims  began  to  shower 
out  their  bullets ;  finally,  as  the  range  shortened  to  under  a 
thousand  yards,  the  Soudanese  and  Egyptian  battalions  were 
able  to  use  their  Martinis.  Twelve  thousand  rifles  were 
pouring  their  bullets  into  the  immense  target  offered  by  the 
charging  Dervishes.  The  batteries  and  the  gunboats  were 
covering  their  front  with  a  hail  of  bursting  shells  and  de- 
scending showers  of  shrapnel  balls,  and  the  Maxims  were 
pouring  out  their  streams  of  lead.  Through  this  storm  of 
death  the  Dervishes  still  came  on.  "  I  am  sorry  for  those 
brave  men !  "  exclaimed  the  Italian  attache,  Count  Calderari, 
as  he  watched  the  desert  warriors  thus  rushing  to  de- 
struction. 

Meanwhile  on  the  enemy's  left  the  Shcik-ed-Din's  men 
had  reached  the  Kerreri  Hills.  The  thousands  who  followed 
his  green  standard  had  a  less  formidable  task,  and  at  first 
could  flatter  themselves  that  they  had  a  certain  measure  of 
success.  Colonel  Broadwood  had  with  him  his  ten  sciuadrons 
of  native  lancers  —  all  led  by  British  officers  —  Tudway's 
mounted  riflemen  of  the  Camel  Corps,  and  the  horse  bat- 
tery, and  Maxims.  He  met  the  rush  on  the  first  of  the 
Kerreri  ridges.  The  Camel  Corps  were  in  line  on  the 
right,  partly  sheltered  by  rocks  and  boulders.  On  the 
left  were  the  six  guns  and  some  dismounted  troopers.  The 
rest  of  the  cavalry  was  massed  behind  the  left  flank  in  the 
hollow  between  the  two  ridges. 

Kitchener,   from  the  main  position,  had   seen   the  enor- 


3IO  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

nious  mass  of  the  Dervish  left  turning  to  the  Kerreri  Hills, 
and  had  sent  word  to  Broadwood  to  bring  in  his  mounted 
troops  to  the  right  of  the  infantry,  where  they  would  be 
protected  by  the  fire  of  the  battle  line.  Broadwood  had  been 
serving  for  years  with  his  chief,  and  the  two  men  thoroughly 
understood  and  trusted  each  other.  The  cavalry  commander 
therefore  ventured  to  send  back  word  that  he  thought  he 
could  do  better  by  acting  on  his  own,  and  keeping  the 
Sheik-ed-Din's  15,000  men  occupied  for  a  while  at  a  dis- 
tance from  the  main  battle-field.  It  was  a  daring  resolve, 
but  Broadwood  and  his  men,  in  the  days  before  the  battle  of 
the  Atbara,  had  already  had  the  experience  of  successfully 
playing  with  thousands  of  wild  tribesmen  in  the  open  desert. 
The  steady  fire  of  his  line  of  rifles,  carbines,  Maxims; 
and  Krupp  guns  checked  the  first  rush  of  the  enemy.  But  a 
great  mass  of  Dervishes  began  to  pour  up  the  hills  and 
round  the  right  flank  of  the  Camel  Corps,  and  there  was 
imminent  danger  of  the  line  being  overwhelmed  and  rolled 
up.  The  order  was  given  to  retreat.  The  Camel  Corps 
mounted  and  rode  down  the  stony  valley  between  the  two 
ridges,  while  the  cavalry  and  the  horse  battery  crossed  it  to 
the  second  ridge,  where  the  guns  came  into  action  again. 
But  disregarding  this  fire,  the  Dervishes  rushed  down  the 
hills  after  Tudway's  camel  men,  and  on  the  stony  ground 
the  tribesmen  moved  much  faster  than  the  camels,  and  it 
looked  as  if  the  Camel  Corps  would  be  surrounded  and 
massacred.  But  at  this  moment  the  gunboat  Melik  came 
to  the  rescue.  She  steamed  down  to  a  point  whence  her 
guns  swept  the  whole  length  of  the  valley  down  which  the 
Dervishes  were  racing  after  the  Camel  Corps.  Her  quick- 
firers  and  Maxims  —  manned  by  picked  men  of  the  Royal 
Marine  Artillery  —  poured  a  rapid  fire  into  the  enemy,  and 
as  a  second  gunboat  appeared,  they  turned  from  the  now 
dangerous  pursuit  of  the  Camel  Corps,  leaving  the  ground 
strewn  with  dead.     Tudway  led  his  men  along  the  river 


OMDURMAN  311 

bank  to  the  flank  of  the  battle  Hne,  wheie  he  sent  some  of 
them  to  join  in  the  defense  on  the  rip^ht  of  Lewis's  Brigade. 

Foiled  of  what  they  had  thought  an  easy  prey,  the  Sheik- 
ed-Din's  men  now  turned  to  attack  Broadwood's  Cavalry. 
He  might  have  retired  like  the  Camel  Cor])s  bv  the  river- 
side way  that  the  gunboats  kept  open,  but  after  firing  a  few 
shells  at  the  enemy  he  led  his  men  down  the  north  slope 
of  the  hills,  and  reached  the  wide  expanse  of  scrub-covered 
desert  that  extended  to  and  beyond  the  hollow  of  Wadi 
Suetne.  Here  he  had  free  scope  for  the  swift  and  easy 
movements  of  his  mounted  men,  and  alternately  making 
a  stand  and  again  retiring,  he  drew  the  enemy  three  miles 
away  from  the  battle-field.  With  his  few  hundred  lances 
and  carbines  and  his  six  guns  he  was  keeping  fully  occupied 
15,000  riflemen  and  spearmen.  There  is  no  better  proof 
of  the  high  state  of  discipline  the  native  Egyptian  troops 
had  reached  under  their  white  leaders  than  the  success  of 
Broadwood's  daring  manceuver. 

The  Dervishes  showed  reckless  courage,  and  moved  at 
a  speed  no  civilized  troops  could  have  kept  up  for  long. 
Some  of  their  rushes  were  very  dangerous.  Once  they  were 
checked  only  by  Major  Mahon  '  charging  into  the  nearest 
of  them  at  the  head  of  his  squadron.  The  Dervishes  scored 
one  momentary  success.  Two  of  the  guns  of  the  horse  bat- 
tery stuck  fast  in  a  soft  place,  and  were  rushed  ;  but  before 
the  gunners  abandoned  them  to  the  enemy,  they  removed 
and  carried  ofif  the  breech-locks,  so  as  to  render  them 
useless. 

At  last  Osman  Sheik-cd-Din  realized  that  he  could  not 
run  down  his  agile  opponents,  and  that  he  was  only  suffer- 
ing useless   loss,   and  being  led   far   from   the   real  battle- 

*  This  young  cavalry  officer  had  served  with  distinction  on  the 
upper  Nile  in  the  campaigns  of  1896-1898.  He  was  afterwards 
famous  as  the  commander  of  the  force  that  relieved  Mafeking  dur- 
ing the  South  African  War. 


312  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

field.  He  rallied  the  tribesmen  and  began  to  withdraw 
towards  the  Kerreri  Hills,  followed  for  a  while  by  the 
shells  of  the  horse  battery.  Broadwood  then  marched  back 
along  the  river  bank,  picking  np  on  his  way  the  two  guns 
that  had  been  temporarily  lost. 

Meanwhile  the  great  frontal  attack  of  the  Dervishes  had 
ended  in  disastrous  failure.  The  marvel  is  that  it  lasted 
as  long  as  it  did,  before  the  brave  men  who  formed  its 
successive  lines  and  rushes  realized  that  it  was  hopeless. 
Wave  after  wave  of  fresh  men  moved  forward  as  the  front 
of  the  attack  crumbled  under  the  tornado  of  bullet  and 
shell.  Some  of  the  mounted  emirs  who  rode  in  the  fore- 
most ranks  seemed  to  have  a  charmed  life,  and  they  brought 
their  followers  on  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  Sirdar's  batttle 
front.  As  the  range  shortened,  the  fire  of  the  Dervish 
riflemen,  who  mingled  with  the  leading  spearmen,  began  to 
produce  some  small  effect.  Most  of  the  bullets  flew  high, 
but  here  and  there  an  officer  or  a  man  was  hit.  The  first 
to  be  wounded  was  Corporal  Mackenzie  of  the  Seaforths, 
who  was  hit  in  the  leg  by  a  bullet  that  did  not  penetrate. 
He  had  the  wound  dressed,  and  returned  to  his  post  in  the 
line.  Then  a  private  of  the  Lincolns  dropped  dead,  shot 
through  the  head.  The  casualties  became  more  frequent 
when  some  hundreds  of  the  black  riflemen  found  shelter 
in  a  long  hollow  of  the  sand  about  five  hundred  yards  away, 
where  they  lay  down  and  shot  steadily  from  cover.  Cap- 
tain Caldecott  of  the  Warwicks  was  killed.  Captain  Bagot 
of  the  Guards  and  Captain  de  Rougemont  of  the  Artillery 
were  wounded.  The  group  of  war  correspondents,  who 
watched  the  fight  from  the  rear  of  the  British  line,  had  two 
casualties  in  their  small  number.  Colonel  Rhodes  (the 
brother  of  Cecil  Rhodes),  acting  as  correspondent  of  the 
Times,  was  severely  wounded  in  the  shoulder;  and  the 
veteran  Charles  Williams  of  the  Daily  Chronicle  had  a 
narrow  escape  of  being  killed,  a  bullet  scoring  the  side  of 


OMDURMAN  313 

his  head  just  below  the  temple  —  the  third  wound  he 
had  received  in  action  during  his  long  and  adventurous 
career. 

As  soon  as  the  Sirdar  saw  that  the  impetus  of  the  enemy's 
onset  was  being  checked,  he  swung  the  right  of  his  line 
forward  from  the  river,  so  as  to  give  fuller  effect  to  the 
fire  of  Lewis's  Brigade  and  the  batteries  attached  to  it.  In 
the  front  of  the  native  troops,  armed  with  the  Martini,  the 
main  rush  of  the  Dervishes  came  up  to  a  ])oint  about  300 
yards  away.  In  front  of  the  British  battalions,  who  shot 
with  the  small-bore  magazine  rifle,  no  considerable  body  of 
Dervishes  got  nearer  than  500  yards.  But  a  few  brave  men 
were  killed  much  closer  to  the  line.  In  front  of  the  Mrst 
British  Brigade  a  splendidly-built  young  Arab  dashed  on 
alone  with  his  spear  at  the  charge  until  he  droi)pe(l  at  200 
yards.  In  front  of  Maxwell's  native  brigade  a  gray-bearded 
standard-bearer  and  five  sjiearmen  came  on  through  the 
shower  of  bullets,  and  fell  one  by  one,  till  at  last  the  old 
man  dropped  dead  less  than  150  yards  from  the  front. 
Long  after  the  other  mounted  emirs  had  disappeared,  a 
chief  dressed  in  a  new  white  jibba,  bright  with  many 
colored  patches,  was  still  to  be  seen  riding  in  the  foremost 
rank  of  the  attack.  He  fell  only  when  it  was  nearing  its 
final  collapse.  His  body  was  identified  as  that  of  Osinan 
Azrak,  one  of  the  most  famous  of  the  INLihdist  leaders.  He 
had  fought  in  all  the  Dervish  campaigns  on  the  Nile,  and 
his  name  had  long  been  a  terror  in  connection  with  daring 
raids  on  the  frontier. 

The  fire  from  (he  Anglo-Egyptian  lines  had  been  so 
rapid  and  continuous  that  ritles  became  too  hot  for  the  men 
to  hold.  Grasping  them  by  the  leathern  slings,  the  soldiers 
in  the  first  line  would  exchange  them  for  those  of  the  reserve 
companies.  The  Maxims  had  repeatedly  to  cease  fire  in 
order  to  cool  down  after  blowing  off  in  jets  of  steam  all  the 
water  in  their  casings.     There  was  abundance  of  ammu- 


314  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

nition.  Reserves  of  it  lay  close  at  hand  in  barges  by  the 
river  bank. 

At  half  past  seven  the  attack  began  to  slacken.  There 
was  a  last  rush  towards  the  front  held  by  the  Egyptians ; 
and  then,  shortly  before  eight  o'clock,  the  last  of  the  spear- 
men disappeared  over  the  long  ridge  by  Jebel  Surgham. 
They  carried  ofif  numbers  of  their  wounded  with  them. 
Some  of  the  riflemen  held  on  in  their  sheltering  hollow,  but 
they  were  driven  from  their  cover  by  the  shells  of  the 
artillery.  Then  the  firing  ceased,  and  among  the  men  in 
the  ranks  there  was  a  feeling  that  the  battle  had  been  won. 
The  losses  of  those  who  held  the  main  position  had  been 
trifling.  It  had  been  for  them  more  like  a  slaughter  of  the 
enemy  than  a  battle. 

But  the  hardest  fighting  of  the  day  was  yet  to  come. 
The  Sirdar  knew  quite  well  that,  besides  the  remnant  of 
those  he  had  defeated,  there  were  thousands  of  enemies  still 
in  front  of  him,  notably  those  who  were  returning  from 
the  unsuccessful  attempt  to  overwhelm  the  mounted  troops. 
It  seemed  likely  that,  having  failed  in  the  great  attack,  the 
Khalifa  would  lead  back  his  warriors  to  defend  Omdurman ; 
and  Kitchener,  though  he  knew  he  was  taking  a  risk,  de- 
cided to  break  up  his  defensive  battle  array  at  once  and 
march  on  the  city,  in  order  to  seize  it  before  the  Dervishes 
could  rally  to  its  defense.  If  they  got  there  first,  its  cap- 
ture would  mean  prolonged  and  costly  street  fighting. 

While  the  brigades  that  had  formed  the  battle  line  were 
wheeling  out  on  to  the  expanse  of  sand  in  their  front  and 
forming  for  the  advance  southwards,  Colonel  Martin  of  the 
Twenty-first  Lancers  was  ordered  to  take  his  regiment  out 
towards  Jebel  Surgham.  and  clear  the  ground  between  the 
hill  and  the  river  of  any  parties  of  the  enemy,  in  order 
to  prepare  the  way  for  the  march  of  the  infantry.  The 
Lancers  had  since  early  morning  been  only  spectators  of  the 
fight,  and  ofiicers  and  men  were  all  eager  for  action. 


OMDURMAN  315 

As  they  rode  out  towards  the  hill,  with  a  couple  of 
patrols  well  in  advance  of  them,  they  looked  very  dififerent 
from  a  Lancer  regiment  on  home  service.  Khaki  had  re- 
placed the  brilliant  uniforms,  a  clumsy  brown  helmet  the 
swagger  Polish  schapka,  and  their  mounts  were  wiry  little 
Arab  horses,  that  made  the  men  look  too  big  for  thcni. 
But  every  man  and  horse  was  thoroughly  fit,  and  the 
squadrons  moved  and  changed  formation  with  the  accuracy 
of  a  machine. 

On  one  of  the  spurs  that  ran  out  from  Surgham  the 
regiment  halted  and  dismounted  to  rest  the  horses,  while 
the  patrols  examined  the  ground  to  the  southward.  They 
saw  great  crowds  of  fugitives  streaming  away  towards 
the  city.  It  was  half  past  eight,  and  the  day  had  become 
intensely  hot,  and  here  and  there  the  desert  mirage  con- 
fused the  view  over  the  sun-scorched  sands.  "  The  mirages 
blurred  and  distorted  the  picture,  so  that  some  of  the 
routed  Arabs  walked  in  air  and  some  through  water,  and 
all  were  misty  and  unreal."  Stragglers  in  small  parties 
were  making  their  way  to  the  river,  and  one  of  the  patrols 
reported  that  in  this  direction  a  long  hollow,  running  down 
from  the  south  side  of  Jebel  Surgham  to  the  Nile,  was 
held  by  about  1000  of  the  enemy.  If  these  were  swept 
away  the  Lancers  could  strike  in  upon  the  Dervish  line  of 
retreat,  and  would  clear  the  way  for  the  southward  march 
of  the  infantry. 

The  body  of  Dervishes  in  the  hollow  were  some  of 
Osman  Digna's  men  —  Hadendoa  tribesmen  from  the  Red 
Sea  coast  district  —  the  "  Fuzzie-wuzzies,"  to  give  them  the 
name  that  the  soldiers  who  fought  in  the  Suakin  cam- 
paigns invented  in  allusion  to  their  way  of  dressing  the 
hair.  Their  position  was  clearly  seen  from  the  gunboats, 
which  were  within  easy  range,  and  one  wonders  why  no 
effort  was  made  to  shell  them  out  of  their  cover.  Colonel 
Martin  considered  that  his  orders  to  "  clear  the  front  "  nn- 


3i6  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

plied  that  he  should  attack  them ;  and  at  8.25  the  regiment 
mounted,  moved  down  the  slope  towards  the  river,  formed 
column  of  troops,  and  at  a  point  about  250  yards  north 
of  the  hollow  formed  line  facing  it. 

The  ground  west  of  the  hollow  was  concealed  from  view 
by  a  ridge  of  rock  jutting  out  from  the  hill,  and  behind 
this  screen  Dervish  reinforcements  had  been  joining  the 
Hadendoas  while  the  Lancers  were  forming  for  the  charge. 
As  the  line  advanced  all  that  was  visible  of  the  enemy  was 
a  party  of  about  100  riflemen  firing  from  the  edge  of  the 
hollow.  Their  fire  was  wild  —  high  and  almost  harmless 
—  and  the  Lancers  galloped  through  it  and  charged  into  the 
dense  mass  of  sword  and  spearmen,  who  awaited  their  onset 
without  flinching. 

It  is  a  very  rare  experience  for  cavalry  to  crash  into 
an  unbroken  array  of  infantry.  There  was  a  tremendous 
shock.  More  than  a  score  of  men  were  dismounted,  and 
the  Dervishes  were  rolled  over  in  heaps.  But  they  held 
together,  and  began  to  fight  with  the  Lancers,  who  were 
now  in  among  them,  struggling  through  the  mob  of  enemies 
and  dragging  them  with  them.  There  was  a  melee  that 
lasted  about  two  minutes.  Most  of  the  Lancers  were  so 
wedged  in  the  crowd  that  all  they  could  do  was  to  hold 
together  in  small  parties  and  urge  their  horses  forward. 
Their  lances  were  useless  after  the  first  shock.  Around 
them  the  fanatic  tribesmen  surged  in  a  dense  crowd,  those 
who  were  nearest  to  the  horsemen  stabbing  and  hamstring- 
ing the  horses,  striking  at  the  riders  with  sword  or  spear, 
or  trying  to  drag  them  down  from  the  saddle.  Then  the 
Lancers  broke  through,  and  came  struggling  out  of  the 
press,  some  dismounted,  many  wounded.  As  they  got  clear 
of  the  enemy  they  faced  about  and  re-formed. 

In  the  two  minutes'  fight  officers,  65  men,  and  119  horses 
had  been  killed  or  wounded.  Colonel  Martin  had  come 
through  untouched,  though  he  had  led  the  charge  without 


OMDURMAN  317 

drawing  either  sword  or  pistol.  Major  Wyndham  had  his 
horse  killed,  and  fought  his  way  out  on  foot.  Lieutenant 
Molyneux  had  his  horse  shot  dead  as  he  rode  into  the 
hollow.  He  fell  among  the  enemy,  but  regained  his  feet, 
and  shot  a  Dervish  who  attacked  him.  As  he  did  so  an- 
other Dervish  slashed  his  arm  with  a  sword,  and  he  dropped 
his  revolver.  Wounded  and  disarmed,  he  was  trying  to 
struggle  out  of  the  crowd,  and  had  nearly  reached  safety, 
when  four  spearmen  barred  his  way.  At  this  moment  up 
rode  Private  Byrne,  already  badly  wounded  by  a  bullet. 
He  had  turned  back  on  seeing  the  officer's  peril.  He  rode 
at  and  scattered  the  spearmen,  receiving  a  lance  wound  in 
the  chest  as  he  did  so,  and  then  brought  Molyneux  in  hold- 
ing by  his  stirrup  leather.  Byrne  was  covered  with  blood 
from  his  two  wounds ;  but  he  took  his  place  in  the  ranks, 
and  at  first  refused  to  fall  out,  begging  to  be  allowed  "  to 
have  another  go  at  them." 

Lieutenant  Nesham  had  a  wonderful  escape.  His  bridle 
was  cut,  his  left  hand  nearly  severed  by  a  sword-cut,  his 
helmet  hacked  down  to  the  scalp,  and  his  thigh  pierced 
by  a  spear.  The  Dervishes  caught  him  by  the  legs  to  pull 
him  down  ;  but  this  drove  the  spurs  in,  and  his  horse,  though 
already  badly  wounded,  made  a  wild  bound  that  shook  the 
assailants  off  and  carried  him  out  of  the  throng.  Lieutenant 
Grenfell,  the  son  of  Lord  Grenfell.  had  his  horse  killed. 
He  fought  on  foot,  pistol  in  hand ;  but  when  he  had  fired 
the  six  shots  he  fell  riddled  with  spear  wounds.  When 
the  regiment  rallied.  Captain  Kenna,  who  had  already  gal- 
lantly helped  Major  Wyndham  to  escape,  rode  back  into 
the  Dervish  swarm,  followed  by  Lieutenant  de  Montmorency 
and  Corporal  Swarbrick,  to  save  young  Grenfell.  if  he  still 
lived,  or  recover  the  body  if  he  were  dead.  They  found 
Grenfell  lying  dead,  pierced  with  many  wounds,  on  the 
slope  of  the  hollow,  and  some  Dervishes  hacking  at  the 
body  with  their  swords.     They  drove  them  off,  and  were 


3i8  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

placing  the  body  on  a  horse  when  the  animal  bolted.  Then 
a  strong  party  of  Dervishes  rushed  at  them,  and  they  had 
to  abandon  their  attempt  and  rejoin  the  regiment. 

Lieutenant  Winston  Churchill  was  one  of  the  few  officers 
who  came  out  of  the  charge  unwounded  and  with  his  horse 
untouched,  and  with  even  his  clothing  and  saddlery  unin- 
jured. He  gives  a  very  interesting  account  of  his  sensations 
during  the  critical  two  minutes : 

"  The  whole  scene  flickered  exactly  like  cinematograph  picture ; 
and,  besides,  I  remember  no  sound.  The  event  seemed  to  pass  in 
absolute  silence.  The  yells  of  the  enemy,  the  shouts  of  the  soldiers, 
the  firing  of  many  shots,  the  clashing  of  sword  and  spear,  were  un- 
noticed by  the  senses,  unregistered  by  the  brain.  Several  others  say 
the  same." 

The  Dervishes  rallied  in  their  hollow  after  the  melee, 
defiant  and  exultant.  Two  hundred  yards  away  the  Lancers 
had  re-formed  in  line,  about  200  effective  men,  and  even  of 
these  many  were  wounded,  and  numbers  of  horses  still  in 
the  ranks  had  been  badly  hurt.  All  were  eager  to  charge 
again,  but  Colonel  Martin  felt  that  another  melee  amid  such 
stubborn  foes  might  mean  the  destruction  of  the  regiment. 
He  formed  column  of  troops,  and  under  a  spatter  of  fire 
from  the  enemy  he  led  his  men  round  to  the  ground  be- 
tween the  Dervishes  and  the  river.  There  he  halted,  and 
sent  forward  a  firing  line  of  dismounted  men  with  carbines 
to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  the  hollow.  This  proved  effective, 
and  the  enemy  soon  retreated  behind  the  shoulder  of  Jebel 
Surgham,  leaving  a  very  few  dead  behind  them.  The  easy 
and  rapid  success  of  this  attack  suggests  that  the  charge  — 
brilliant  feat  of  arms  as  it  was  —  might  be  considered  an 
unnecessary  sacrifice. 

To  the  leading  brigades  of  the  infantry,  forming  for  the 
march  on  Omdurman,  all  that  had  been  seen  of  the  Lancers* 
charge  was  a  great  cloud  of  sand  and  dust  shooting  up 
towards  the  sky.    The  British  Division  had  formed  with  its 


AU-WAD-HtLU    8,05MAN    fiHUK-ED-OlW 

altn.ck  o^ter  the      ^^  i        ■-      t      ff 


■riM  Briqadea  in  €cVelon  for  advance  souWv 

t5iiS         „         |ormed  to  m.eet  the  KhoUfo-'s  ottoit. 

i  Lytteltons  Bl-i^e. 

l.  w/iuchopes 

3  Maxwell's 

4.  Lewis's 

5  MacdonalO's      . 

6.  collinson's       " 

>-  i  — ^-Wou-cKope.  qo\n(^ 
to  re-L*vforce  Mocdorujli 
^  ^  Gunboa.ts 


YAKUB    ^ 
the  Khalifa 
attackinq 


SurgKcoa,; 


^. 


'^  Char(3e  of  (he 
-  ■  '  Lancers  = 


J  Miles 


No.   22  —  Battle  of  Omdurman.    II.    Movement.s  in  the  Sec- 
ond Phase  of  the  Fight 


OMDURMAN  319 

left  towards  the  Nile,  facing  south.  Six  hundred  yards  to 
its  right  rear  was  Maxwell's  Brigade.  Next,  and  still 
farther  from  the  river,  came  Lewis,  and  another  600  yards 
farther  back  Macdonald's  Brigade  of  one  Egyptian  and 
three  black  battalions.  Nearer  the  river  marched  Collinson's 
reserve  brigade  with  the  baggage.  Macdonald  was  farthest 
out  into  the  desert  and  nearest  to  the  hills,  behind  which  it 
was  known  that  great  masses  of  the  enemy  had  disappeared. 
So  General  Hunter,  who  arranged  the  details  of  the  move- 
ment for  the  Egyptian  Division,  strengthened  Macdonald 
with  three  batteries  of  artillery  and  eight  Maxim  guns. 

The  army,  thus  re-formed  in  a  great  echelon  of  brigades 
to  move  on  the  city,  had  hardly  begun  its  march  when  the 
battle  suddenly  blazed  out  again,  more  furiously  than  ever. 
There  was  first  a  crackle  of  firing  from  the  crest  of  Jebel 
Surgham,  which  the  enemy's  riflemen  had  re-occupied. 
Then  a  great  wave  of  fighting  men,  with  war  drums  beat- 
ing, horns  sounding,  and  rifles  firing  from  their  front,  swept 
round  the  north  shoulder  of  the  hill,  rushing  in  an  eager 
onset  towards  Maxwell's  Brigade.  On  the  left  of  the  attack 
the  charging  line  prolonged  itself  farther  and  farther  along 
the  rise  of  the  desert  towards  the  Kerreri  Hills ;  on  the 
right,  a  mass  of  spears  topped  the  crest  of  Surgham.  High 
over  the  center  of  the  advancing  Dervishes  towered  the 
Khalifa's  black  standard.  He  was  charging  with  his  own 
picked  guard,  with  Yakub's  reserve  division,  the  Baggara 
horsemen,  and  all  that  had  been  rallied  from  the  first 
attack. 

The  onset  was  something  of  a  surprise,  but  it  was  met 
with  disciplined  alertness  and  steadiness  by  British,  Egyp- 
tians, and  Soudanese.  Maxwell  was  nearest  to  the  rush. 
He  swung  round  his  brigade  into  line,  facing  west,  and 
opened  a  rolling  fire  from  cannon  and  rifle.  Away  to  his 
right,  separated  from  him  by  nearly  half  a  mile  of  desert, 
Macdonald  had  as  promptly  formed  his  fighting  line,  bring- 


320  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

ing  his  three  batteries  of  quick-firing  guns  into  action  with 
deadly  efifect  against  the  Dervish  left.  Lewis  moved  up  his 
brigade  into  the  wide  gap  between  Maxwell  and  Macdonald. 
The  British  brigades  began  to  form  on  Maxwell's  left.  The 
Khalifa's  onset  was  more  dangerous  than  the  morning  at- 
tack; for  in  front  of  it  there  was  now  not  a  close-formed 
line,  shoulder  to  shoulder,  with  its  flanks  on  the  river,  and 
a  wide  field  of  fire  in  front,  but  a  hastily-formed  line  with 
wide  gaps  between  its  units,  and  its  flanks  "  in  air,"  and  in 
front  only  a  few  hundred  yards  to  the  points  at  which  the 
attack  broke  from  cover. 

But  splendid  as  was  the  Mahdist  rush,  the  fire  of  the 
defense  stopped  and  shattered  it.  As  its  first  fierce  impulse 
died  away  a  new  danger  appeared.  Over  the  western  ridges 
of  Kerreri  came  another  host  of  enemies  —  the  20,000  who 
followed  the  green  standards  of  Ali  Wad  Helu  and  Osman 
Sheik-ed-Din. 

Their  attack  was  meant,  no  doubt,  to  be  simultaneous 
with  that  of  the  Khalifa  and  Yakub.  It  had  come  too  late ; 
but  even  so,  Macdonald's  Brigade  on  the  extreme  right  was 
in  deadly  peril.  For  while  he  was  still  engaged  with 
Yakub's  left  —  his  brigade  facing  westward  —  this  new 
army  came  pouring  over  the  hills  on  his  right  flank.  It 
looked  as  if  his  four  native  battalions  would  be  overwhelmed 
and  swept  away.  The  veteran  Highlander  met  the  danger 
with  consummate  coolness  and  skill.  Still  firing  with  part 
of  his  line  on  Yakub,  he  gradually  changed  front,  sending 
one  by  one  his  battalions,  batteries,  and  Maxim  sections  to 
form  on  a  new  front  to  the  north  to  face  the  green  flag 
attack.  At  first  he  was  fighting  on  two  fronts,  and  the 
complex  manoeuver  of  the  change  of  front  was  carried  out 
under  a  sharp  fire,  and  at  a  moment  when  all  saw  the  possi- 
bility of  disaster,  with  the  clockwork  precision  of  a  drill 
parade.  In  the  midst  of  the  crash  of  the  conflict  Macdonald 
was  so  thoroughly  self-possessed  that  he  checked  the  officers 


OMDURMAN  321 

of  one  of  his  battalions  for  beginning  to  follow  another  in 
the  change  of  front  before  he  gave  them  the  order  to  move. 

There  v^^ere  many  losses  in  the  ranks  from  the  heavy  fire 
of  the  advancing  Dervishes.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sloggett  of 
the  Army  Medical  Corps  was  shot  down  while  giving  first 
aid  to  a  wounded  man.^  On  the  right  the  Dervish  rush  was 
stopped  at  400  yards ;  but  on  the  left  it  came  to  perilously 
close  quarters,  so  close  that  men  were  hit  by  spears  hurled 
by  the  foremost  of  the  enemy.  Lieutenant  Smyth  of  the 
Royals,  Macdonald's  staff  officer,  was  wounded  in  this  way. 
But  just  as  it  seemed  that  it  would  come  to  a  desperate 
hand-to-hand  fight  of  bayonet  against  spear  the  Dervishes 
began  to  give  way. 

Help  was  coming  from  various  quarters,  but  Macdonald 
had  won  his  splendid  fight  before  the  first  reinforcements 
actually  reached  him.  The  Camel  Corps  rode  up  on  his 
right.  The  Sirdar  had  sent  Wauchope's  British  Brigade  to 
his  help,  and  the  Lincoln  Regiment,  doubling  out  in  advance, 
arrived  in  time  to  send  some  rapid  volleys  from  its  maga- 
zine rifles  into  the  breaking  ranks  of  the  enemy.  The  gun- 
boats fired  some  long-ranging  shells  into  the  rearward  sup- 
ports of  the  attack.  CoUinson's  Brigade  marched  up  from 
the  river,  eager  to  have  a  share  in  the  fight ;  and  Broad- 
wood's  squadrons,  formed  in  line,  rode  over  the  broken 
Kerreri  slopes. 

The  battle  was  now  won.  Ali  Wad  Helu  was  carried  off 
badly  wounded,  and  his  followers  and  the  Sheik-ed-Din's 
men  were  driven  into  the  desert.  Maxwell,  with  Lyttclton's 
British  Brigade  on  his  left,  had  assumed  the  offensive, 
stormed  the  Surgham  crest,  and  routed  the  Khalifa's  Divi- 
sion. Lewis  had  charged  at  Yakub.  The  emir  was  killed 
and  his  tribesmen  scattered,  and  the  sacred  black  standard 

*  At  first  he  was  reported  to  be  dead,  but  though  the  bullet  had 
touched  the  base  of  the  heart,  he  recovered,  and  was  doing  military 
duty  again  a  few  months  later. 


322  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

of  Mahdism  was  captured  by  Major  Hickman  and  the 
Fifteenth  Soudanese  after  a  hard  struggle,  in  which  many 
of  the  KhaHfa's  veterans  fell  fighting  to  the  death  in  its 
defense. 

Hickman  carried  the  black  flag  to  the  Sirdar,  who  had 
ridden  with  his  staff  to  the  top  of  one  of  the  spurs  of  Sur- 
gham.  It  was  unfurled  beside  him,  and  at  once  shells  be- 
gan to  burst  dangerously  near  the  group  of  officers.  "  Down 
with  that  flag !  "  exclaimed  Slatin,  the  first  to  realize  what 
was  happening.  The  shells  had  come  from  one  of  the  gun- 
boats, the  commander  of  which  had  taken  the  sudden 
appearance  of  the  black  flag  on  Surgham  Hill  to  be  a  sign 
that  the  Khalifa  had  rushed  the  height. 

The  Dervishes  were  now  retreating  by  the  desert  towards 
Omdurman.  Broadwood,  with  his  cavalry,  the  Camel  Corps, 
and  the  horse  battery,  was  hanging  on  their  rear  and  mak- 
ing crowds  of  prisoners.  Nearer  the  city  the  Twenty-first 
Lancers  were  worrying  their  flank.  It  was  half  past  eleven. 
The  battle  had  lasted  more  than  five  hours. 

It  was  now  time  to  reap  the  fruits  of  victory.  The  army 
was  marched  to  Khor  Shambat,  just  outside  the  city,  where 
the  high  Nile  had  inundated  part  of  the  long  hollow,  and 
there  was  a  convenient  place  for  the  men  to  rest  a  while, 
refill  their  water-bottles,  and  eat.  The  Khalifa  had  escaped 
into  the  city,  where  his  war  horns  and  drums  were  sound- 
ing, and  he  had  proclaimed  that  the  place  was  to  be  de- 
fended to  the  last.  But  very  few  rallied  to  him,  most  of  the 
beaten  army  continuing  its  flight.  An  offer  of  terms  which 
the  Sirdar  sent  him  by  a  native  envoy  was  rejected,  and 
at  two  o'clock  Maxwell's  Brigade  was  ordered  to  march  into 
Omdurman.  The  Sirdar  rode  near  the  head  of  the  column. 
The  captured  black  standard  was  carried  before  him  as  a 
visible  proof  of  his  victory.  Slatin  rode  beside  him,  re- 
entering as  a  conqueror  the  city  where  he  had  lived  as  a 
slave.     In  the  suburbs  some  of  the  leading  men  appeared 


OMDURMAN  323 

to  offer  their  submission,  and  receive  from  the  Sirdar  an 
assurance  that  all  who  accepted  the  new  state  of  things 
would  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  victors.  After  this 
became  known  the  people,  who  feared  a  sack  and  massacre, 
came  in  large  numbers  to  welcome  the  conqueror. 

But  there  was  still  some  resistance.  Here  and  there 
shots  were  fired  from  housetops,  and  the  gate  of  the  inner 
wall  was  strongly  held.  It  was  blown  in  and  stormed  with 
the  bayonet  by  the  Thirteenth  Soudanese.  Guided  by  Slatin, 
at  last  the  Khalifa's  house  was  reached.  Outside  the  gate  a 
handful  of  horsemen  charged  the  head  of  the  column.  The 
skirmish,  brief  as  it  was,  enabled  the  Khalifa  to  make  his 
escape  at  the  last  moment. 

As  the  Sirdar  entered  the  courtyard  of  the  house  an 
unfortunate  event  occurred.  There  was  scattered  firing  in 
the  city  and,  under  the  impression  that  the  Khalifa's  house 
was  still  being  held  by  the  enemy,  a  battery  outside  the  wall 
began  to  throw  shells  into  it.  The  firing  was  quickly 
stopped,  but  not  before  a  bursting  shell  had  killed  the 
Hon.  Hubert  Howard,  one  of  the  correspondents  of  the 
Times. 

The  stricken  field  of  Omdurman  had  broken  the  power 
of  Mahdism.  It  was  some  months  before  the  last  scattered 
bands  of  Dervishes  were  hunted  down,  and  the  Khalifa 
himself  was  killed  in  battle  fighting  against  a  column  com- 
manded by  Sir  Reginald  Wingate,  one  of  Kitchener's  most 
trusted  lieutenants  and  later  his  successor  in  the  sirdarship. 

Thanks  to  the  superior  armament  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian 
army  and  the  attacks  made  by  the  Dervishes  in  dense 
masses,  the  losses  of  the  latter  were  fearfully  heavy,  those 
of  the  former  comparatively  trifling.  By  far  the  most 
serious  loss  incurred  in  the  victorious  army  was  that  of  the 
Twenty-first  Lancers  in  their  charge.  In  all  the  other  units, 
British  and  Egyptian,  the  proportion  of  killed  to  wounded 
was  singularly  low,  the  result  probably  of  the  bad  powder 


324 


FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 


with  which  the  enemy's  cartridges  were  loaded.  The  fol- 
lowing is  a  tabular  summary  of  the  losses  of  the  Sirdar's 
army : 


Killed 

Wounded 

Totals 

British  officers 

Correspondents 

British  rank  and  file     ...     , 

Native  officers 

Native  rank  and  file     ...     . 

2 

I 

25 

2 

18 

IS 
2 

136 

8 

273 

17 

3 

161 

10 
291 

48 

434 

482 

In  the  battle  about  500,000  bullets  and  3500  shells  were 
fired  at  the  Dervishes.  The  largest  expenditure  of  cart- 
ridges was  that  of  Macdonald's  Brigade — 160,000  rounds. 
It  is  estimated  that  this  tornado  of  fire  killed  9700  Dervishes, 
and  at  least  10,000  more  were  wounded,  and  perhaps  a 
higher  number.  About  5000  prisoners  were  taken  on  the 
field. 

Omdurman  will  perhaps  rank  in  history  as  the  last  great 
battle  in  which  a  non-European  power  fought  with  the 
weapons  and  tactics  of  primitive  races  against  the  arms  of 
civilization.  Soldiers  of  the  white  race  can  hardly  expect 
to  have  again  the  opportunity  of  winning  a  decisive  victory 
at  so  small  a  cost. 


CHAPTER    XIII 

PAARDEBERG 
February  18,  1900 

The  South  African  War,  in  which  the  mihtia  of  the  two 
Boer  repnbHcs  were  opposed  to  the  larj^est  army  that 
Britain  ever  put  in  the  field,  began  on  October  ii,  1899, 
and  was  ended  by  the  Convention  of  Vereeniging  on  May 
31,  1902.  Within  a  few  years  the  bitter  feelings  aroused 
by  the  unequal  conflict  were  happily  obliterated  by  the 
creation  of  a  United  South  Africa,  in  which  those  who 
had  fought  so  long  under  hostile  flags  joined  hands  under 
the  banner  of  the  empire,  with  Louis  Botha,  who  had  been 
the  soul  of  the  long  resistance  on  the  Boer  side,  acting  as 
the  first  Prime  Minister  of  the  Union. 

We  have  here  to  deal  only  with  certain  military  aspects 
of  the  war,  as  exemplified  in  the  battle  which  was  its  turn- 
ing-point. In  the  course  of  these  narratives  of  typical  battles 
of  the  recent  period  of  military  history  we  have  seen  how, 
at  the  Alma,  infantry,  armed  with  the  muzzle-loading  rifle 
and  fighting  in  line,  were  able  to  defy  and  break  u|i  with 
heavy  loss  massed  columns  of  attack,  armed  mainly  with 
the  old  musket.  In  the  story  of  Sadowa  wc  saw  the  breech- 
loading  rifle  assert  its  power  over  the  muzzle-loader.  The 
battles  of  the  French  war  further  enforced  the  lesson  of  the 
terrible  power  of  the  new  weapon,  and  the  extended  firing 
line  became  the  normal  fighting  formation  of  civilized  troops. 
The  battles  of  the  American  Civil  War  had  proved  the 
w^orth  of  improvised  fortifications  on  the  battle-field,  but 
it  was  onlv  after  Plevna  had  shown  the  difficulty  of  forcing 


326  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

such  defenses,  held  by  steady  infantry  armed  with  the 
breech-loader,  that  the  full  meaning  of  this  lesson  was  gen- 
erally appreciated. 

But  new  inventions  further  increased  the  effect  of  the 
infantry  weapon.  Various  devices  were  adopted  for  en- 
abling the  soldier  to  reload  rapidly  from  a  magazine  attached 
to  the  rifle,  or  a  clip  holding  several  cartridges.  The  bore 
of  the  barrel  was  reduced,  so  as  to  diminish  the  air-resistance 
to  the  bullet's  flight ;  and  chemical  research  supplied  ex- 
plosives that  not  only  gave  greater  driving  power,  but 
also  produced  no  cloud  of  smoke  in  front  of  and  around 
the  firing  line.  Infantry  armed  with  the  new  rifles  could 
thus  fire  rapidly,  with  their  targets  clearly  in  sight,  and 
send  out  a  shower  of  bullets  whose  high  velocity  gave 
them  a  flat  line  of  flight,  sweeping  the  ground  for  500 
or  600  yards.  They  could  make  good  shooting  up  to  1000 
yards,  and  against  closed  bodies  of  troops  or  other  large 
targets  the  rifle  could  now  do  damage  up  to  a  mile  and 
a  half. 

There  were  corresponding  improvements  in  artillery,  but 
it  was  the  coming  of  the  new  magazine  small-bore  and  long- 
range  rifles,  using  smokeless  powder,  that  set  the  military 
experts  of  the  world  investigating  the  effect  of  such  weapons 
on  the  tactics  of  the  battle-field,  and  the  South  African  War 
afforded  the  first  practical  test,  on  a  large  scale,  of  the  new 
theories. 

In  England,  on  the  eve  of  the  war,  there  was  a  complete 
misconception  of  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  coming  con- 
flict, and  the  advantages  of  the  new  weapons  for  the  defense 
were  greatly  underrated.  It  was  expected  that  the  war 
would  be  no  very  serious  business,  and  it  was  decided  that 
only  a  single  army  corps  should  be  sent  to  South  Africa. 
On  the  day  when  Sir  Redvers  Buller  was  embarking  at 
Southampton  to  take  command  of  the  army  at  the  front,  an 
old  friend  of  his,  the  late  Charles  Williams,  came  to  see  him 


PAARDEBERG  327 

off.  Williams,  after  havii\e^  acted  as  a  war  correspondent 
in  many  campaigns,  was  then  in  l^roken  health.  "  I  am 
sorry  you  cannot  come  with  me,"  said  the  general,  as  he 
bade  him  good-by.  "  But  you  are  not  missing  mucli.  This 
little  war  will  be  all  over  by  Christmas !  " 

But  by  Christmas  Ladysmith,  Kimberley,  and  Mafeking 
were  besieged  by  the  Boers.  They  had  established  their 
commandos  in  the  north  of  Cape  Colony.  Besides  winning 
minor  successes,  they  had  defeated  in  one  week  Gatacre  at 
Stormberg,  Methuen  at  Magersfontein,  and  Buller  himself 
at  Colenso.  The  whole  British  plan  of  cam[)aign  had  gone 
to  pieces.  Reinforcements  were  being  hurried  to  South 
Africa  from  all  parts  of  the  empire,  Lord  Roberts  was  on 
his  way  to  the  Cape  to  save  the  situation,  and  Lord  Kitchener 
had  been  called  from  the  Nile  to  assist  him  in  solving  the 
difficult  problem  of  breaking  this  unexpectedly  formidable 
resistance  of  an  army  of  farmers. 

Such  was  the  fighting  power  that  the  Boers  had  shown 
that  at  the  time  their  numbers  were  greatly  overestimated. 
It  was  long  before  it  was  realized  that  Buller  had  been  re- 
pulsed from  the  crossing  of  the  Tugela  at  Colenso  by  5000 
riflemen  and  a  few  guns.  But  the  Boers  owed  their  first 
successes  as  much  to  the  blunders  of  their  ojiponents  as  to 
their  own  remarkable  aptitude  for  defensive  war.  They 
were  largely  an  army  of  mounted  riflemen.  They  could  thus 
make  long  and  rapid  marches,  and  concentrate  on  a  threat- 
ened point  long  before  it  could  be  reached  by  the  British 
soldiers,  plodding  along  slowly,  with  the  further  encum- 
brance of  a  long  train  of  heavy  transport  wagons.  They 
had  up-to-date  repeating  rifies,  and  were  good  .shots.  Tlu-y 
knew  how  to  make  the  rocky  ko])je  or  the  hollow  of  a 
river-bed  into  an  improvised  fortress.  The  war  began  in 
the  South  African  summer,  when  wide  stretches  of  the 
rolling  expanse  of  the  veldt  are  almost  a  desert.  The 
British  commanders  were  at  first  so  short  of  trans])ort  that 


328  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

they  could  only  operate  near  a  railway  line,  from  which 
they  could  draw  supplies.  This  enabled  the  Boer  leaders 
to  await  their  advance  in  prepared  positions  across  their 
track.  The  attempt  to  rush  such  positions  from  the  front, 
over  open  ground  swept  by  the  rapid  fire  of  Mauser  rifles, 
held  by  sharpshooters  fighting  under  cover,  proved  to  be 
a  costly  or  an  impossible  operation. 

It  was  said  at  the  outset  of  the  war  that,  though  the 
Boers  might  make  a  stand  among  the  mountain  passes  of 
northern  Natal,  they  would  be  helpless  against  disciplined 
troops  on  the  open  plains  of  the  Free  State  and  the  Bechu- 
analand  border.  But  at  the  Modder  River  it  was  found  that 
the  low  sweeping  showers  of  bullets  could  make  a  hollow 
in  an  open  plain  all  but  impregnable  ;  and  at  Magersfontein, 
instead  of  occupying  the  kopjes,  the  Boers  dug  their  trenches 
on  the  level  ground  in  front  of  them. 

Lord  Roberts  arrived  in  South  Africa  when  the  fortunes 
of  the  British  arms  were  at  their  lowest.  There  was  an 
appalling  record  of  costly  failures ;  and  Kimberley  and 
Ladysmith  were  closely  besieged,  and  were  believed  to  be 
near  the  end  of  their  resources.  He  completely  altered  the 
situation  by  a  new  policy.  By  the  beginning  of  February 
he  had  concentrated  along  the  railway  on  the  western  border 
of  the  Free  State  an  army  of  four  infantry  divisions,  with 
a  cavalry  division  under  General  French.  In  all,  there  were 
about  45,000  men.  It  was  not  a  large  army,  but,  unlike 
every  British  force  that  had  till  now  been  got  together  in 
South  Africa,  it  ivas  mobile.  It  was  no  longer  tied  to  a 
railway  line,  for  with  Kitchener's  help  Roberts  had  formed 
an  adequate  wagon  train  for  transport  and  supply.  The 
new  field  army  could  go  anywhere,  and  French's  division  of 
cavalry,  horse  artillery,  and  mounted  riflemen  could  move 
as  quickly  as  the  Boers  themselves. 

His  plan  was  to  relieve  Kimberley,  not  by  a  costly  frontal 
attack  on  the  Magersfontein  kopjes,  where  Cronje's  bur- 


PAARDEBERG  329 

ghers  were  entrenched  on  the  direct  Hne  of  approach  along 
the  railway,  but  by  entering  the  Free  State  and  sending 
French  to  sweep  rapidly  round,  eastward  and  northward, 
across  the  fords  of  the  Riet  and  Modder  rivers.  Methuen's 
Division  would  watch  Cronje's  front,  while  the  rest  of  the 
army,  following  up  French,  would  outflank  him.  His  force 
would  be  destroyed,  or  at  least  cut  off  from  the  Free  State. 
Roberts  would  then  march  across  the  open  veldt  on  Bloem- 
fontein.  This  movement  would,  it  was  expected,  help 
Buller  to  relieve  Ladysmith  by  making  the  Free  State 
burghers  hurry  back  from  Natal  to  the  defense  of  their 
capital. 

This  was  the  plan  which,  though  it  did  not  work  out 
quite  as  smoothly  as  had  been  anticipated,  not  onl\-  suc- 
ceeded, but  changed  the  whole  situation  in  South  Africa. 
Cronje,  covering  the  siege  of  Kimberley  in  his  entrench- 
ments at  Magersfontein,  was  not  alarmed  at  the  first  reports 
that  British  cavalry  had  crossed  the  Free  State  border  and 
were  moving  towards  the  drifts  (wagon  fords)  of  the  Mod- 
der. He  said  that  the  British  could  not  send  any  big  force 
far  from  the  railway.  When  they  advanced  to  the  rescue 
of  the  "  Diamond  City  "  they  would  have  to  march  near  the 
line,  and  he  would  stop  them  again  in  front  of  the  Magers- 
fontein ridge.  He  would  not  worry  himself  about  mere 
cavalry  raids.  All  he  did  was  to  send  off  parties  of  his 
best  mounted  men,  under  Commandants  Froneman  and 
Christian  de  Wet,  to  observe  the  movements  of  the  cavalry. 
Some  of  the  foreign  officers  who  were  with  Cronje  warned 
him  that  French's  advance  would  be  the  prelude  of  a  great 
movement  round  his  flank  that  would  make  the  Magersfon- 
tein position  untenable,  and  they  urged  him  to  move  before 
it  was  too  late.  He  would  not  listen  to  their  advice.  "  Vou 
can  teach  me  nothing  of  war."  he  said  to  the  French  Colonel 
Villebois  de  Mareuil.  "  I  was  winning  battles  when  you 
were  a  boy  at  school." 


330  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

French  had  started  on  his  march  from  the  railway  on 
February  ii.  On  the  twelfth  he  crossed  the  river  Riet  at 
De  Kiel's  Drift.  Then  riding  nearly  directly  north  across 
the  veldt,  through  a  blaze  of  heat  that  played  sad  havoc 
with  his  horses,  he  seized  Rondeval  and  Klip  Drifts  on  the 
Modder  on  the  evening  of  the  thirteenth.  There  was  a  brief 
halt  to  rest  horses  and  men  and  allow  the  infantry  to  close 
up  to  the  river.  As  soon  as  General  Kelly-Kenny's  Division 
appeared,  French  crossed  by  Rondeval  Drift.  A  few  miles 
north  he  found  Froneman's  burghers  extended  in  a  long, 
thin  firing  line  on  a  semicircle  of  hills  across  his  path.  He 
formed  a  column  of  brigades,  and  swept  through  them  in  a 
splendid  charge,  with  a  loss  of  less  than 'a  score  of  men. 
The  way  to  Kimberley  was  now  open.  On  the  alarm  of  his 
approach  the  besiegers  had  broken  up,  and  were  retiring 
northwards  and  eastwards.  On  the  evening  of  February  15 
French  rode  into  the  cily.  Next  morning  he  went  out  to 
the  northwards  to  try  to  capture  the  siege  artillery  of  the 
Boers,  but  they  got  their  guns  away  safely. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  fifteenth  Cronje  had  an  anxious 
time  in  his  laager  near  the  Magersfontein  Kopje.  The  stub- 
born old  burgher  chief  had  at  last  woke  up  to  the  fact  that 
this  was  no  mere  cavalry  raid  into  the  Free  State,  but  that 
a  great  army  had  crossed  its  border.  Froneman  rode  in 
and  told  of  the  long  array  of  squadrons  and  horse  batteries 
that  had  swept  like  a  hurricane  through  his  broken  line, 
and  dashed  northwards  to  fall  upon  the  besiegers  of  Kim- 
berley. Then  in  his  own  front  Methuen's  guns  began  a 
fierce  bombardment  of  the  Magersfontein  lines  —  the  usual 
prelude  of  an  attack.  Finally,  there  was  news  that  showed 
that  it  was  not  only  in  his  front  and  away  to  the  eastward 
at  Klip  Drift  that  his  enemies  were  in  force ;  for  a  British 
column  had  stormed  Jacobsdal,  which  had  been  for  months 
his  depot  of  supplies.  Some  hundreds  of  the  Transvaal  men, 
without  consulting  him  or  waiting  for  orders,  saddled  up 


No.  23  —  The  Relief  of  Kimberley  and  Cronje's  Retreat  to 
Paardeberg 


PAARDEBERG  331 

and  rode  away  to  cross  the  Vaal  at  Barkly  West,  and  so 
rejoin  the  besiegers  of  Kimberley  in  their  retreat.  Clearly 
the  end  had  come.  To  remain  longer  at  Magersfontein 
would  be  to  be  hopelessly  surrounded  there. 

One  of  the  foreign  officers  who  were  with  him  says  that 
for  some  time  Cronje  was  in  a  state  bordering  on  colla])se. 
He  sat  in  his  tent  in  moody  silence,  with  his  brave  w^ife, 
who  tried  to  comfort  and  encourage  him.  A  more  energetic 
and  resourceful  soldier  would  have  realized  that  Roberts  was 
taking  great  risks,  and  would  have  collected  all  his  best 
men  for  a  wide  sweeping  move  against  the  railway.  But 
at  this  stage  of  the  war  even  the  younger  Boer  leaders  were 
only  just  beginning  to  find  out  the  value  of  aggressive 
tactics.  This  very  evening  De  Wet,  who  had  ridden  away 
to  the  southwards,  was  nearly  wrecking  Roberts's  plan  by 
capturing  the  great  supply  convoy  at  Waterval  Drift  on  the 
Riet,  but  even  he  did  not  understand  how  to  follow  up  and 
reap  the  full  fruits  of  his  success.  And  Cronje,  when  he 
began  to  form  a  plan,  thought  only  of  escaping.  His  best 
line  of  retreat  would  have  been  that  which  some  of  his  men 
had  already  taken  —  across  the  Vaal,  northwest  of  Kim- 
berley. But  what  Froneman  had  told  him  of  French's  army 
of  horsemen  made  him  afraid  to  take  that  line,  and  he  de- 
cided to  try  to  reach  Bloemfontein  by  a  march  along  the 
Modder.  He  would  have  to  pass  across  the  front  of  the 
British  outposts  at  Klip  Drift  and  be  well  on  his  way  east- 
ward before  French  could  be  recalled  from  Kimberley.  To 
do  this  he  would  have  to  make  a  forced  march  during  the 
night. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  he  sent  orders  to  the  burghers 
to  evacuate  their  trenches  and  laagers  as  silently  as  i)os- 
sible  as  soon  as  it  was  dark  that  evening,  and  assemble 
at  the  head  laager  behind  the  Magersfontein  ridge.  It 
was  near  midnight  when  all  were  mustered  and  ready  to 
march. 


332  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

He  had  some  5000  men  with  him,  of  whom  about  one- 
third  were  on  foot.  There  were  large  numbers  of  women 
and  many  children.  These  would  travel  in  the  wagons,  of 
which  there  were  several  hundred.  For  want  of  sufficient 
oxen  for  the  teams  he  had  to  abandon  80  wagons  before  he 
started.  It  was  a  fine,  bright  moonlight  night,  and  the  long 
column  of  horsemen  and  wagons  trailed  out  along  the  veldt, 
moving  in  no  set  order,  but  with  mounted  scouts  guarding 
its  front  and  flanks.  It  is  strange  that  no  effort  had  been 
made  to  keep  a  watch  on  Cronje.  French  could  at  least 
have  spared  a  squadron  to  move  towards  Magersfontein  as 
he  dashed  for  Kimberley.  Patrols  could  have  been  sent 
along  the  Riet  and  Modder  from  Jacobsdal  and  Klip  Drift, 
and  Methuen  might  have  kept  a  closer  watch  on  the  position 
in  his  front.  None  of  these  precautions  were  taken.  The 
result  was  that,  all  unknown  to  the  British,  who  lay  north, 
south,  and  east  of  him,  Cronje's  huge  column  moved  safely 
across  the  veldt  through  the  moonlit  night.  Had  he  chosen 
to  abandon  a  few  more  of  his  cumbrous  wagons,  had  he 
succeeded  in  marching  just  a  mile  or  two  more  before  the 
sun  rose,  he  would  have  been  out  of  sight  behind  the  kopjes 
northeast  of  Klip  Drift  by  daylight  on  the  sixteenth,  and 
would  have  been  safe  at  Bloemfontein  before  Roberts  had 
any  explanation  of  his  mysterious  disappearance. 

As  it  was,  he  very  nearly  got  away  unseen.  At  6  a.  m. 
Kitchener  was  with  Kelly-Kenny  on  a  kopje  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  Modder  looking  down  on  Klip  Drift.  A  brigade 
of  mounted  infantry  had  crossed  the  river  en  route  for 
Kimberley.  Their  advanced  guard  was  moving  up  the  hol- 
low of  the  hills,  where  French  had  charged  the  day  before, 
when  over  the  ridges  to  their  right  they  saw  a  great 
dust-cloud  rising  —  the  sure  sign  of  a  large  column  on 
the  move.  And  across  their  front  came  an  ox  wagon,  a 
straggler  from  Cronje's  convoy.  The  wagon  was  promptly 
captured,  and  its  occupants  admitted  that  they  had  marched 


PAARDEBERG  333 

all  night  with  Cronje,  who  was  east  of  the  kopjes  with  a 
large  convoy. 

Boer  scouts,  who  were  still  on  the  hilltops,  saw  the  wagon 
taken.  The  mounted  infantry  halted,  and  signals  were  being 
exchanged  with  the  British  outposts  at  the  drift.  Kitclicner 
had  sent  an  immediate  order,  "  Go  for  the  convoy  " ;  but  the 
mounted  infantry,  a  newly-formed  force,  many  of  whose 
units  were  not  yet  quite  at  home  in  the  saddle,  wasted  some 
time  before  riding  for  the  ridge  on  their  right,  and  by  the 
time  they  were  on  the  move  it  had  been  strongly  reoccupied 
by  Cronje's  rearguard  under  Commandant  Roos,  to  whose 
help  the  artillery  commander,  Albrecht,  sent  back  a  field- 
gun  and  a  pom-pom.  The  mounted  infantry  rode  for  the 
end  of  the  ridge  nearest  the  river ;  but  the  Boer  shells  and 
rifles  drove  them  back,  and  they  blundered  into  a  stretch  of 
bog  by  the  Modder,  where  for  a  while  all  was  hopeless  con- 
fusion. Kitchener  and  Kelly-Kenny  then  brought  an  in- 
fantry brigade  and  some  batteries  into  action  ;  but  Roos  held 
on  to  his  position  for  more  than  three  hours,  and  only  aban- 
doned it  when  Cronje  had  marched  another  five  miles,  passed 
the  kopjes  north  of  Dreiput  Drift,  and  formed  up  another 
rearguard  upon  them.  Roos  galloped  back  to  the  Dreiput 
kopjes  and  fought  another  successful  rearguard  action  there. 
He  was  still  holding  his  ground  when  the  sun  set  and 
darkness  stopped  the  attack. 

After  dark  Cronje  marched  again.  He  now  felt  quite 
safe ;  and  safe  enough  he  would  have  been  if  he  had 
marched  all  night.  But  many  of  his  teams  were  showing 
signs  of  fatigue,  and  instead  of  lightening  his  convoy  liy 
abandoning  some  of  the  wagons,  he  halted  for  nearly  four 
hours  after  midnight  to  rest  the  oxen.  Before  sunrise  he 
was  again  moving  slowly  eastward.  At  nine  he  was  pass- 
ing Paardeberg  Hill.  A  little  before  eleven  he  halted  on 
the  north  side  of  Vendutie  Drift,  and  prepared  to  cross,  the 
convoy  meanwhile  forming  up  in  a  laager  of  many  lines, 


334  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

while  horses  and  oxen  rested  and  grazed  on  the  patches  of 
veldt  grass,  and  the  women  began  to  cook  a  meal  for  the 
men. 

Cronje  now  felt  he  had  succeeded.  It  would  take  some 
hours  to  pass  the  heavy  wagons  down  the  slope  of  the  drift 
into  the  deep  hollow  of  the  Modder  and  up  the  opposite 
bank.  Then  he  would  be  on  the  fair  way  to  Bloemfontein, 
having  shaken  off  all  pursuit.  He  had  hopes  of  immediate 
reinforcement.  Commandant  Ferreira,  with  1500  or  more  of 
the  besiegers  of  Kimberley,  had  ridden  eastwards,  and  it 
was  thought  he  might  be  somewhere  near  the  drift.  A 
signaling  party  with  a  heliograph  was  sent  out  to  the  high 
ground  north  of  Kameelfontein  Farm  to  try  to  get  into  touch 
with  him. 

There  were  as  yet  no  signs  of  the  pursuit  from  the  west. 
Cronje  flattered  himself  that  he  had  shaken  it  off.  But  now 
there  came  a  surprise  for  him.  Into  the  laager  crashed  a 
bursting  shell,  and  then  another  and  another.  A  battery  had 
suddenly  come  into  action  against  the  great  mass  of  wagons 
and  oxen,  men  and  horses.  And  the  hostile  guns  were 
where  no  one  expected  them ;  not  to  the  west,  but  north- 
ward between  Kameelfontein  and  the  wagon  laager.  Formed 
bodies  of  mounted  men  were  moving  near  the  guns.  French 
had  suddenly  come  on  the  scene.  It  was  one  of  his  two 
horse  artillery  batteries  that  had  opened  on  the  laager,  where 
for  the  moment  there  was  something  like  a  panic,  horses 
and  oxen  breaking  away  on  the  veldt,  and  men  running  to 
the  shelter  of  the  deeply-hollowed  river-bed. 

On  the  sixteenth,  when  Roberts  heard  that  Cronje  had 
marched  in  the  night  past  the  Klip  Drift  outposts,  he  tele- 
graphed to  Methuen  at  Modder  Bridge  camp  to  ascertain 
whether  the  Magersfontein  lines  were  really  abandoned  by 
the  enemy.  It  was  not  till  half  past  eleven  that  Methuen 
was  able  to  verify  this.  Meanwhile  information  sent  by 
Kitchener  had  satisfied  Roberts  that  Cronje,  with  a  large 


PAARDEBERG  335 

force,  was  trying  to  escape  eastward.  He  ordered  Colvile's 
Division,  which  inchided  the  Highland  Brigade,  to  reinforce 
Kelly-Kenny,  and  telegraphed  to  the  latter  that  he  was 
to  take  any  directions  given  by  Kitchener  as  coming  from 
himself.  He  also  tried  to  telegraph  to  French  at  Kimberley 
to  make  a  forced  march  and  head  off  Cronje.  But  the 
message  did  not  get  through.  The  field  telegraph  cable  that 
had  been  laid  down  as  the  cavalry  advanced  had  been  inter- 
rupted.^ When  French  returned  to  Kimberley  in  the  after- 
noon from  his  unsuccessful  pursuit  of  the  Boers,  there  were 
rumors  in  the  town  that  Cronje  was  retiring  along  the 
Modder,  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  verify  the  report. 
French  went  early  to  bed,  after  telling  his  officers  that  the 
brigade  would  have  a  rest  next  day.  Before  midnight  he 
was  roused,  for  a  message  from  Roberts  had  been  signaled 
on  by  flashlight  from  Methuen  at  Modder  camp,  and  a 
despatch  rider  had  come  in  from  Klip  Drift  with  a  letter 
from  Kitchener.  These  messages  told  of  Cronjc's  escape, 
and  directed  French  to  march  at  once  and  head  him  ofif 
east  of  Paardeberg. 

The  cavalry  brigade  was  in  no  condition  for  another 
forced  march.  So  many  horses  had  broken  down  under 
the  trying  work  of  the  last  few  days  that  only  1200  men 
would  be  available  at  the  outset.  By  3  a.  m.  hVcnch  rode 
off  with  Broadwood's  Brigade  and  two  batteries.  To  reach 
the  point  named  in  his  orders,  the  Koodoosrand  Drift  cast 
of  Vendutie  Drift,  he  had  nearly  30  miles  to  go  with  tired 
horses  and  men. 

He  reached  the  high  ground  north  of  Vendutie  Drift  soon 
after  Cronje  laagered  his  convoy.  Albrccht  brought  three 
guns  into  action  against  the  horse  artillerv.  Along  the 
Koodoosrand  kopjes  dismounted  troopers  skirmished  with 

*  According  to  one  account,  it  had  been  Inirnt  through  by  a  fire 
in  the  veldt  grass;  according  to  another,  it  was  cut  by  Cronjc's  men 
during  the  night  march. 


336  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  Boer  riflemen.  French  was  short-handed,  and  could  only 
hold  on  to  his  position  till  further  units  of  his  division 
joined  him.  If  the  Boers  had  been  more  aggressive,  he 
might  have  paid  dearly  for  his  daring  dash  upon  their  line 
of  retreat;  for  Ferreira,  with  his  1500,  was  only  a  few 
miles  away,  and  had  actually  come  in  touch  with  the  brigade 
on  the  march.  But  when  he  saw  the  cavalry  he  had  lost 
heart  and  drawn  off  again  to  the  northward.  Had  he  come 
on  in  earnest  when  he  heard  the  cannon  near  Paardeberg, 
French's  tired  handful  of  lancers  and  hussars  might  have 
been  caught  between  hammer  and  anvil. 

Round  the  laager  and  along  the  river  banks  the  Boers 
were  digging  entrenchments.  There  was  not  very  much 
water  in  the  Modder,  and  men  and  animals  and  some  of  the 
wagons  found  shelter  on  the  dry  strips  of  river  margin 
under  its  high  banks.  In  the  afternoon  the  mounted  infantry 
began  to  arrive  from  the  westward,  and  skirmished  with  a 
Boer  rearguard  near  Paardeberg  Hill.  Kelly-Kenny's  Divi- 
sion, followed  later  by  Colvile's,  halted  after  dark  on  the 
south  bank  of  the  Modder,  near  Paardeberg  Drift.  Kit- 
chener was  with  the  vanguard,  eager  for  action.  But  it  was 
too  late,  and  the  men  were  too  tired,  for  a  serious  attack 
to  be  made  before  next  day.  Kitchener  lay  down  and  slept 
on  the  ground  near  the  outpost  line.  If  the  Boers  did  not 
succeed  in  slipping  away  in  the  night,  he  meant  to  storm 
the  laager  in  the  morning. 

Cronje  held  a  council  of  war  in  the  evening.  Most  of 
his  officers  urged  him  to  cross  the  drift  under  cover  of  the 
darkness  and  march  away,  even  if  some  of  the  convoy  had 
to  be  left  behind.  A  messenger  came  in  from  Ferreira 
promising  cooperation,  and  suggesting  that  he  should  break 
out  to  the  northwards.  But  Cronje  stubbornly  rejected 
all  advice.  He  would  stay  and  fight,  and  make  the  river- 
bed a  fortress;  and  the  British,  he  predicted,  would  first 
be  unable  to  rush  it,  and  then  would  find  that  they  could 


PAARDEBERG  337 

not  keep  an  army  round  him,  far  from  the  railway,  and 
with  the  Boer  commandos  on  the  veldt  worrying  their 
convoys. 

Long  before  daybreak  Kitchener  was  up  and  arranging 
for  the  projected  attack.  y\t  3  a.  m.  he  told  Colonel  Hannay, 
commanding  the  brigade  of  mounted  infantry,  to  move  up 
to  the  drifts  east  of  the  laager,  seize  them,  send  some  of 
his  men  across,  and  be  ready  to  attack  from  that  side.  As 
the  sun  rose  and  showed  the  Boers  still  halted  by  the  river, 
Kitchener  met  Kelly-Kenny  and  outlined  to  him  his  plan  for 
storming  the  laager  and  the  entrenchments  along  the  hollow 
of  the  Modder. 

The  position  was  briefly  this :  Cronje's  exact  force  was 
not  known.  He  had  some  thousands  of  fighting  men,  with 
a  very  few  guns  and  an  enormous  convoy.  The  convoy 
lay  huddled  in  a  great  mass  in  the  sloping  depression  of 
the  veldt  north  of  Vendutie  Drift.  The  deep  trough  of  the 
river-bed,  with  the  dense  bush  that  bordered  much  of  its 
course,  was  held  by  the  Boer  riflemen  for  about  a  couple 
of  miles  along  the  winding  course  of  the  Modder.  both  above 
and  below  the  laager;  and  they  had  dug  trenches  and  rifle- 
pits  in  the  banks,  and  sent  parties  to  hold  the  drifts  east- 
ward as  far  as  Koodoosrand.  They  were  thus  holding  a 
long  front,  in  which  there  must  be  a  good  deal  of  ground 
weakly  garrisoned.  North  of  the  river  was  a  semicircle  of 
hills,  nine  miles  from  point  to  point.  French  had  his  guns 
on  the  slope  of  this  amphitheater,  and  blockaded  the  river 
fortress  on  this  side.  On  the  south  side  the  slope  of  the 
ground  from  the  river  was  broken  by  a  series  of  kopjes, 
whose  lower  spurs  offered  good  positions  for  guns  to  com- 
bine with  those  on  the  north  side  in  bombarding  the  laager 
and  the  river  entrenchments.  For  the  attack  there  wore 
some  15,000  men  available.  While  the  artillery  was  at  work, 
the  troops  would  be  pushed  forward  along  the  riverside,  both 
from  east  and  west,  and  the  laager  would  be  nislu-d  by  a 


338  FAMOUS    xMODERN    BATTLES 

combined  attack  from  both  sides/  Kelly-Kenny  was  op- 
posed to  the  plan,  and  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  an  assault 
would  be  premature,  and  probably  unnecessary.  Every  hour 
was  bringing  reinforcements,  and  Cronje  could  be  effectually 
dealt  with  by  investing  and  bombarding  the  laager.  If  he 
tried  to  break  out  he  would  be  easily  driven  back,  and  his 
improvised  fortress  would  be  a  trap  for  him. 

But  Kitchener's  mind  was  already  made  up.  It  would  be 
better  to  finish  the  business  at  one  stroke.  Kelly-Kenny  still 
held  to  his  own  opinion  that  the  slow  and  sure  method  was 
the  better  one ;    but  the  chief  of  the  staff  could  speak  with 

^  The  forces  available  on  the  morning  of  the  eighteenth  were : 
North  bank  of  the  Modder.  —  General  French. 
Broadwood's  Cavalry  Brigade  and  12  guns  R.H.A.  (Gordon's  Bri- 
gade and  two  more  batteries  expected  from  Kimberley  during 
the  day). 

South  bank  of  the  Modder.  —  General  Lord  Kitchener. 

(a)  Colonel  Hannay's  Mounted  Infantry  Brigade.  —  Second, 
Fourth,  Fifth,  Sixth,  and  Seventh  battalions  Mounted  In- 
fantry and  the  New  South  Wales  Mounted  Infantry  and 
Kitchener's  Horse    (this  last  a  South  African  corps). 

{h)   The  Sixth  Infantry  Division.  —  General  Kelly-Kenny. 

Thirteenth  Brigade   (Knox).  —  Second  East  Kent,  Second 

Gloucester,  First  West  Riding,  First  Oxfordshire  Light 

Infantry. 
Eighteenth    Brigade     (Stephenson).  —  First    Yorks,    First 

Essex,  First  Welsh. 
Artillery.  —  Seventy-sixth,  Eighty-first,  and   Eighty-second 

batteries  R.F.A. ;   two  naval  12-pounders. 

(c)    The  Ninth  Infantry  Division.  —  General  Colvile. 

Third  (^Highland)  Brigade  (Macdonald).  —  Second  Black 
Watch,  Second  Seaforth  Highlanders,  First  Argyll  and 
Sutherland  Highlanders. 

Nineteenth  Brigade  (Smith-Dorrien). — First  Gordon  High- 
landers, Second  Duke  of  Cornwall's  L.I.,  Second  Shrop- 
shire, Royal  Canadian  Regiment. 

Artillery.  —  Eighty-third,  Eighty-fourth,  and  Eighty-fiftli 
R.F.A. ;  Sixty-fifth  R.F.A.  (Howitzers);  two  naval  4.7 
guns;    two  naval  12-pounders. 


PAARDEBERG  339 

the  authority  of  Lord  Roberts,  and  as  he  had  begun  to  issue 
his  orders  for  the  attack,  it  was  no  use  arguing  the  matter 
further.  So  that  day  saw  the  hard  fight  that  is  known  as 
the  battle  of  Paardeberg,  the  most  costly  day's  work  of  the 
war,  but  at  the  same  time  its  turning-point ;  at  first  sight  a 
failure,  but  really  the  beginning  of  decisive  success. 

It  was  Kitchener's  first  battle  in  South  Africa.  He  fought 
it  under  endless  difficulties.  It  was  an  improvised  attack, 
carried  through  without  the  help  of  a  properly  organized 
staff,  and  with  a  divided  command.  French's  cooperation 
was  all-important ;  but  until  after  half  past  seven  it  was  not 
possible  to  signal  to  him  even  the  briefest  message,  for  the 
sky  was  packed  with  rain  clouds,  and  (an  unusual  experience 
at  that  season  in  South  Africa)  there  was  not  one  ray  of 
sunlight  with  which  to  set  the  heliographs  flashing  their  dots 
and  dashes  from  hill  to  hill  across  the  river.  Battalions  and 
batteries  had  to  be  moved  out  in  the  twilight  over  unfamiliar 
ground  from  the  points  where  they  had  happened  to  halt  the 
night  before. 

Hannay's  Mounted  Infantry  were  the  first  to  move. 
Leaving  the  Second  and  Seventh  M.I.  near  Paardeberg 
Drift,  he  marched  eastward  with  the  rest  between  the  kopjes 
and  the  river.  The  Second  M.I.  sent  a  company  across  the 
river  at  Paardeberg  Drift  to  reconnoiter  the  farther  bank, 
while  the  Seventh  began  to  explore  the  broken  ground  and 
bush  above  the  drift  on  the  south  bank.  The  Boers  were  on 
the  alert,  and  both  parties  were  fired  on  wherever  they  ap- 
proached the  riverside.  Those  who  had  crossed  found  that 
at  the  sharp  bend  of  the  Modder  above  Paardeberg  Drift  a 
"  donga,"  or  dry  hollow,  running  up  towards  Gun  Hill  was 
strongly  held  by  the  enemy. 

While  this  skirmishing  w^as  in  progress,  there  was  an- 
other fight  just  south  of  the  drift  opposite  the  laager,  where 
one  of  Hannay's  detachments  of  mounted  infantry  —  "  Kit- 
chener's Horse"  — going  too  far  to  the  left,  came  under 


340  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

fire  from  a  Boer  trench  at  a  range  of  only  400  yards.  Some 
of  them  turned  and  rode  away  towards  the  kopjes,  others  dis- 
mounted and  repHed.  They  found  themselves  under  such  a 
rapid  and  well-aimed  fire  that  advance  and  retreat  were  alike 
out  of  the  question.  They  lay  flat,  and  sent  back  a  few 
random  shots,  while  the  bullets  of  unseen  enemies  whistled 
closely  over  them  from  the  belt  of  bush  along  the  riverside. 

At  6  A.  M.  the  Sixth  Division  (Kelly-Kenny)  began  to 
form  for  the  attack.  Kitchener  sent  off  Brigadier-General 
Stephenson  with  the  Welsh  and  Essex  regiments  to  support 
Hannay  in  his  move  on  the  upper  drifts.  The  rest  of 
Stephenson's  Brigade  and  the  whole  of  Knox's  were  to  form 
the  main  attack,  advancing  against  the  Boer  trenches  along 
the  south  bank  below  the  laager.  Colvile  had  ridden  up  to 
Signal  Hill,  and  the  leading  brigade  of  his  division  —  Mac- 
donald's  Highlanders  —  was  coming  up  between  the  hill  and 
the  river. 

Two  batteries  had  been  placed  in  position  on  a  knoll  east 
of  Signal  Hill.  Shortly  before  seven  Kitchener  ordered 
them  to  open  on  the  laager  and  the  Boer  position  in  the 
river-bed  near  it.  French's  guns  quickly  joined  in  from 
the  northern  slopes.  Other  batteries  were  brought  up,  and 
through  the  long  day,  whatever  was  the  fate  of  the  battle, 
the  converging  shell-fire  poured  into  the  Boer  camp.  Cap- 
tain Boyle,  one  of  French's  staff,  noted  in  his  diary  his  im- 
pression of  the  bombardment. 

"  All  the  day  (he  writes)  without  intermission  till  7  p.  m.,  the 
guns  threw  shrapnel  and  lyddite  into  the  laager  and  river-bed. 
Wagon  after  wagon  of  ammunition  exploded  like  a  terrific  fusillade 
for  over  an  hour,  and  meanwhile  the  infantry  began  their  advance. 
It  seemed  as  if  no  living  man  could  ever  come  out  of  that  laager. 
Sh'ell  after  shell,  the  livelong  day,  dropped  into  their  very  center; 
yet  no  surrender,  no  white  flag  was  shown." 

When  Kitchener  saw  the  Boer  wagons  taking  fire  and 
the  ammunition  exploding,  Albrecht's  guns,  silenced,  and  the. 


PAARDEBERG  341 

infantry  lines  working  steadily  forward  to  the  river  bank, 
he  took  a  sanguine  view  of  the  prospect.  Turning  to  a 
group  of  officers  he  said  cheerfully,  "  It  is  now  seven,  we 
shall  be  in  the  laager  by  half  past  ten.  I  shall  then  load  up 
French  and  send  him  on  to  Bloemfontein  at  once."  Per- 
haps he  was  thinking  of  another  "  laager  "  —  Mahmoud's 
zareba  on  the  Atbara  —  which  he  had  stormed  with  a  rush 
of  infantry  after  a  brief  bombardment.  But  here  the  attack, 
which  at  first  had  gone  rapidly  forward  towards  the  winding 
belt  of  green  scrub  that  marked  the  river  line,  began  to  move 
more  slowly,  and  came  to  a  standstill.  A  point  had  been 
reached  beyond  which  progress  was  more  dif^cult.  About 
300  yards  from  the  south  bank  of  the  river  there  was  a  low 
ridge  of  rocks  and  boulders  which  afTorded  some  cover. 
Here  the  advancing  infantry  gathered  in  a  strong  firing  line; 
but  the  open  ground  beyond  was  swept  with  a  deadly  hail 
of  bullets  from  the  enemy's  trenches,  and  for  some  time  the 
forward  move  was  stopped. 

Colvile  had  as  yet  received  no  orders,  but  on  his  own 
initiative  he  was  preparing  to  send  his  division  across  Paar- 
deberg  Drift,  to  attack  the  laager  by  a  move  up  the  north 
bank.  But  on  a  request  from  Kitchener  to  support  the  left 
of  Knox's  attack,  he  sent  Macdonald's  Highland  Brigade  up 
the  south  bank  from  near  the  drift.  At  the  storming  of  the 
Dervish  zareba  on  the  Atbara,  where  the  enemy's  fire  was 
contemptible,  Macdonald  had  successfullx'  taken  his  Sou- 
danese Brigade  into  action  shoulder  to  shoulder.  But  at 
Magersfontein  the  Highland  Brigade  had  attacked  in  the 
same  close  formation,  and  had  been  hurled  l)ack  with  heavy 
loss  by  a  burst  of  Mauser  fire.  So  now  the  three  battalions 
were  formed  in  three  long  parallel  lines  in  single  file,  with 
four  paces  between  each  man  and  In's  immediate  follower. 
They  moved  up  the  river  bank  in  this  thin  formation  till, 
as  they  came  under  fire,  they  faced  towards  the  river,  and 
the  advance  became  an  extended  firing  line,  with  two  other 


342  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

extended  lines  following  it  up.  Two  and  a  half  brigades 
were  now  in  action  against  the  Boers  along  the  river  west  of 
the  laager.  It  is  not  likely  that  there  were  more  than  1200 
to  1500  men  opposed  to  them  in  this  part  of  the  position,  but 
the  repeating  rifle  had  increased  at  least  fourfold  the  resist- 
ing power  of  good  shots  fighting  under  cover  and  well  sup- 
plied with  cartridges. 

The  sun  now  broke  through  the  gray  clouds,  and  for  a 
while  the  heliographs  began  to  flicker  out  their  messages. 
From  the  north  side  French  reported  that  parties  of  Boers 
were  coming  up  from  the  eastward  —  a  sign  of  an  attempt 
to  relieve  the  beleaguered  position.  Kitchener  signaled  back 
an  order  for  the  cavalry  to  keep  ofif  these  intruders.  On  the 
south  bank  the  preparations  for  attacking  the  laager  from 
the  eastward  were  progressing.  Hannay's  Mounted  Infantry 
had  seized  the  hill  that  was  afterwards  known  as  Kitchener's 
Kopje,  making  prisoners  of  a  small  party  of  Boers  who  were 
found  there.  He  had  pushed  on  to  the  crossings  at  Vander- 
berg's  and  Banks  drifts,  beating  off  the  Boers  who  were 
watching  them,  sent  some  of  his  men  across,  and  at  Banks 
Drift  got  into  touch  with  some  of  French's  men,  a  squadron 
of  the  Twelfth  Lancers. 

Dismounted  troopers  were  skirmishing  with  parties  of 
Boers  who  had  appeared  on  the  Koodoosrand  heights.  These 
were  Ferreira's  men.  Some  of  them  crossed  by  the  neigh- 
boring drift,  reached  the  kopjes  on  the  south  bank,  and  en- 
gaged the  nearest  of  Hannay's  Mounted  Infantry.  General 
Stephenson  had  now  arrived  to  support  him  with  the  Welsh 
and  Essex  regiments.  Sending  some  of  his  companies  to 
help  in  driving  back  the  Boers,  who  had  crossed  the  river, 
Stephenson  deployed  the  rest,  and  opened  fire  on  the  laager 
from  the  southeast.  A  battery  was  sent  to  him,  and  the 
guns  began  also  to  fire  on  the  laager.  They  had  not  been 
long  in  action  when  suddenly  shells  burst  among  them,  com- 
ing not  from  the  laager  in  their  front,  but  from  the  hills  in 


PAARDEBERG  343 

their  rear,  east  of  Ostfontein  Farm,  and  four  companies 
of  the  Welsh  regiment  that  were  moving  up  between  these 
hills  and  the  Modder  came  under  a  heavy  ritle  fire  from  the 
same  direction. 

This  unexpected  diversion  was  the  work  of  Commandant 
Steyn,  a  relative  of  the  Free  State  president.  He  had  been 
hurried  up  from  Natal  with  two  guns  and  some  hundreds  of 
burghers  when  the  news  came  that  Roberts  had  invaded  the 
Free  State,  and  he  had  pushed  on  to  the  help  of  Cronje. 
The  attention  of  the  attack  was  so  riveted  on  the  laager  and 
the  fighting  along  the  river  that  Steyn's  artillery  fire  from 
the  Ostfontein  kopjes  gave  the  first  news  of  his  arrival. 
Now  the  guns  of  the  battery  that  had  been  firing  on  the 
laager  were  swung  round  to  silence  the  intruders.  The 
Welsh  and  the  Essex  men,  and  as  many  of  the  mounted 
infantry  as  were  anywhere  near,  were  also  turned  to  re- 
])elling  the  newcomers,  and  for  a  while  no  more  was 
thought  of  the  projected  attack  on  the  laager  from  the 
eastward. 

On  the  western  side  of  the  battle-field  and  on  the  south 
bank  there  were  moments  when  it  seemed  that,  despite  the 
steady  stream  of  lead  that  came  sweeping  the  ground  from 
the  riverside  trenches,  the  attack  would  succeed.  Little 
groups  of  men  worked  their  way  forward  by  lines  of  boulders 
or  along  the  shallow  dry  watercourses  hollowed  out  during 
the  rains.  Colonel  Bowles  and  Brigadier-General  Knox 
were  wounded,  but  the  fight  was  now  in  the  hands  of  com- 
pany leaders  and  sergeants  commanding  sections.  In  modern 
war,  once  an  attack  has  gained  a  certain  amount  of  ground 
and  come  to  a  sto]).  the  only  way  to  carry  it  forward  as  a 
whole  is  to  push  in  a  fairly  strong  body  of  fresh  men,  whose 
onward  dash  will  carry  the  rest  onward  with  them.  But 
the  Sixth  Division  had  now  exhausted  its  reserves,  and 
there  was  no  means  of  giving  this  new  impulse  to  the  ad- 
vance.    Some  of  the  Yorkshire  men,  however,  did  actually 


344  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

reach  the  river  bank.  The  enemy's  fire  had  slackened  in 
their  immediate  front,  and  they  suddenly  dashed  forward 
with  fixed  bayonets.  The  Boers  disappeared  into  the  hol- 
low of  the  river-bed,  and  the  Yorkshires  reached  the  bank, 
and  even  made  an  attempt  to  struggle  through  the  Modder 
and  attack  the  enemy  on  the  north  side.  One  brave  fellow. 
Sergeant  Cook,  got  across,  but  was  shot  down  as  he  landed. 
It  was  a  moment  when,  if  there  had  been  a  reserve  to 
throw  into  the  fight,  the  whole  river  bank  might  have 
been  won.  As  it  was,  the  Yorkshires  who  had  gone  for- 
ward could  only  take  cover  and  hold  on  in  the  bush  of  the 
river  margin. 

Away  to  their  left  three  companies  of  the  Highland 
Brigade  crossed  by  the  shallows  near  Paardeberg  Drift. 
Keeping  to  the  broken  ground  near  the  north  bank,  they 
began  to  work  their  way  towards  the  laager,  till,  about 
300  yards  from  the  large  gully  that  ran  north  from  the 
bend  below  Gun  Hill,  they  were  stopped  by  a  cross-fire  from 
the  Boers  in  the  gully  and  those  entrenched  in  the  river 
banks.  The  rest  of  the  Highland  Brigade  were  at  a  stand- 
still, lying  down  under  fire.  Macdonald  was  hit,  and  had  to 
hand  over  the  command  to  one  of  his  colonels. 

It  was  now  long  after  ten  o'clock,  and  the  laager,  though 
heavily  bombarded,  was  as  safe  as  ever  from  direct  attack. 
Kitchener  came  back  to  Signal  Hill,  where  for  the  first  time 
that  day  he  met  Colvile.  Of  the  Ninth  Division  only  the 
Highland  Brigade  was  as  yet  in  action,  so  Colvile  had  still 
in  hand  Smith-Dorrien's  Brigade  (Gordon  Highlanders, 
Canadians,  Corn  walls,  and  Shropshires).  He  had  originally 
intended  to  send  all  his  division  to  the  north  side  of  the 
Modder,  and  Kitchener  now  agreed  that  Smith-Dorrien's 
four  battalions  and  some  guns  should  be  sent  across  Paarde- 
berg Drift.  A  battery  followed,  and  was  posted  near  Gun 
Hill.  To  its  right  the  Shropshires  and  Cornwalls  formed 
to  attack  the  gully  and  the  river  trenches  near  it.     The 


-.,  ssrrenqy   s.\r»fr»h3J 


lJMl|\i\\|  ^  ^' 


in 


PAARDEBERG  345 

Canadians  came  next  in  the  line,  and  then  north  of  Gun 
Hill  the  Gordons  extended  a  long  firing  line,  with  their 
extreme  left  in  touch  with  French. 

Kitchener  had  now  built  up  the  scheme  of  the  western 
attack  so  that  on  both  sides  of  the  river  a  converging  fire 
was  being  directed  against  the  enemy's  positions.  But  turn- 
ing to  the  scene  of  what  was  intended  to  be  a  simultaneous 
attack  from  the  eastward,  he  saw  that  there  all  his  arrange- 
ments had  gone  to  pieces,  for  most  of  the  troops  he  had 
sent  up  the  river  were  still  skirmishing  with  the  Boers  who 
had  appeared  on  the  Ostfontein  heights.  Steyn's  two  guns 
had  been  silenced,  and  Stephenson's  two  battalions  were 
winning  their  way  up  the  kopjes.  But  this  meant  a  com- 
plete abeyance  of  the  real  business  of  the  day.  Kitchener 
heliographed  to  French,  asking  him  if  he  could  not  send 
some  of  his  cavalry  across  the  river  to  keep  off  the  intrusive 
outside  Boers ;  but  French  had  now  nothing  to  spare,  for 
Ferreira's  men  had  been  showing  themselves  in  increasing 
numbers  on  his  left  along  the  Koodoosrand  Hills,  and  he 
could  just  find  enough  men  to  check  them,  for  Gordon's 
Cavalry  Brigade  had  not  yet  arrived.  Gordon  was  on  his 
way  from  Kimberley,  but  with  horses  so  broken  down  that 
he  had  to  march  his  regiments  at  the  walk. 

Kitchener  now  rode  over  to  the  scene  of  the  fighting  on 
the  right.  The  fire  of  the  Boers  from  the  Ostfontein  kopjes 
had  almost  ceased,  and  it  looked  as  if.  they  were  beaten  off. 
He  saw  General  Stephenson  and  Colonel  Hannay,  and  told 
them  to  disregard  everything  but  the  attack  on  the  laager. 
Hannay 's  Mounted  Infantry  were  to  cross  the  Modder  and 
press  on  by  the  right  bank,  while  Stephenson's  two  battalions 
attacked  along  the  south  side  of  the  river.  Hannay,  leav- 
ing a  few  men  to  watch  the  kopjes,  collected  all  the  rest  of 
his  mounted  infantry  and,  crossing  the  nearest  drift,  pushed 
up  to  within  700  yards  of  the  laager.  There  he  was  stopped 
by  an   increasingly  heavy   fire   from   the   trenches  on   the 


346  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

veldt.  Stephenson,  on  the  other  bank,  did  not  get  so  far. 
He  found  it  impossible  to  advance  beyond  the  shelter  of  a 
dry  watercourse  about  looo  yards  from  the  laager. 

It  was  now  near  three  o'clock.  Kitchener  still  believed 
that  if  a  combined  rush  upon  the  Boer  position  could  be 
made  from  all  sides  at  once  it  would  be  taken.  He  sent 
messages  to  Colvile  and  Kelly-Kenny,  urging  them  to  push 
on ;  and  he  himself  rode  over  again  to  Stephenson,  told  him 
to  withdraw  as  many  of  the  Welsh  and  Essex  men  as  possi- 
ble from  their  advanced  position,  take  them  across  Vander- 
berg's  Drift,  and  support  Hannay's  attack.  While  the  in- 
fantry were  crossing,  a  messenger  arrived  from  Hannay 
with  a  report  that  he  found  it  absolutely  impossible  to  get 
any  further  forward.  Kitchener  sent  the  messenger  back 
to  Hannay  with  this  written  order : 

"  The  time  has  now  come  for  a  final  effort.  All  troops  have  been 
warned  that  the  laager  must  be  rushed  at  all  costs.  Try  and  carry 
Stephenson's  Brigade  on  with  you.  But  if  they  cannot  go,  the 
mounted  infantry  should  do  it.  Gallop  up,  if  necessary,  and  fire 
into  the  laager." 

It  would  seem  that  when  he  wrote  the  note  the  chief  of  the 
staff  imagined  that  the  reference  to  Stephenson  would  be 
a  sufficient  indication  to  Hannay  that  he  was  to  act  with 
the  two  infantry  battalions  that  were  then  crossing  the 
drift.  Hannay,  unfortunately,  took  the  message  to  be  an 
order  for  immediate  action ;  and  without  even  taking  any 
steps  to  discover  where  Stephenson  was  and  what  he  was 
doing,  and  without  waiting  to  collect  all  the  men  of  his 
own  force  who  had  crossed  the  river,  he  got  a  small  party 
together  —  some  fifty  or  sixty  —  ordered  them  to  mount, 
and  putting  himself  at  their  head,  galloped  for  the  laager. 
As  he  dashed  through  his  advanced  firing  line  he  shouted 
to  the  men  to  come  on  with  him.  A  good  many  ran  for- 
ward on  foot,  and  as  the  little  party  on  horseback  was  now 


PAARDEBERG  347 

drawing  all  the  fire  of  the  trenches  in  front,  they  got  to 
a  point  about  300  yards  from  the  laager.  There  they  had  to 
stop  and  throw  themselves  down,  for  Hannay's  wild  charge 
had  ended  in  failure.  Men  and  horses  dropped  as  he  rode 
on  amid  a  storm  of  bullets.  He  was  almost  alone  when 
he  leaped  his  horse  over  the  Boer  trench  and  fell  riddled 
with  Mauser  balls  fired  from  rifles  that  nearly  touched  him. 
It  was  a  mad  action,  but  in  its  very  failure  it  sliowed  that 
the  attack  which  Kitchener  had  in  mind  might  have  suc- 
ceeded; for  it  would  have  been  a  very  different  business  if 
Hannay  with  all  his  mounted  infantry  had  ridden  up  to 
close  quarters,  bringing  on  behind  him  not  a  handful  of  men, 
but  Stephenson's  two  battalions,  ready  to  dash  in  with  the 
bayonet. 

As  it  was,  the  Welsh  and  Essex  regiments  only  came 
into  action  after  Hannay  had  ridden  to  his  death.  They 
reinforced  the  firing  lines  of  the  mounted  infantry,  occu- 
pied some  dongas  running  down  to  the  river  a  few 
hundred  yards  from  the  laager,  and  got  no  further. 
Stephenson  later  on  brought  a  party  of  the  Royal  Engi- 
neers across  the  river,  marked  out  a  line  of  shelter  trenches 
about  1500  yards  from  the  laager,  and  drew  his  men  back 
to  this  position. 

The  attack  on  the  west  side  also  failed  to  get  in,  hut 
here  also  there  was  no  organized  effort  to  carry  out 
Kitchener's  instructions.  The  strange  thing  is  that  no  or- 
ders or  information  as  to  what  was  intended  reached  the 
brigadier  Smith-Dorricn,  who  ought  to  have  been  the  or- 
ganizer of  the  attempt  against  the  west  front  of  the  Boer 
laager.  At  a  quarter  past  five  he  was  surprised  at  seeing 
the  right  of  his  line  suddenly  charge  forward,  gain  a  few 
hundred  yards  of  ground,  and  then  come  to  as  sudden 
a  halt,  some  of  the  men  throwing  themselves  down,  a  few 
running  back.  It  was  all  over  before  he  could  do  anything 
to  control  or  support  the  movement.     Colonel  Aldworth  of 


348  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

the  Cornwalls  had  given  the  order  for  the  forward  rush, 
apparently  under  the  impression  that  his  brigadier  and  the 
other  battahon  commanders  of  the  brigade  had  received  the 
same  order  that  had  reached  him.  With  the  Cornwalls  some 
of  the  Highlanders  and  of  Colonel  Otter's  Canadians  dashed 
to  the  front,  the  French  Canadians  shouting,  "  Vive  la 
Reine!"  Men  and  officers  fell  fast  under  the  burst  of  fire 
that  met  them  as  they  rose  and  rushed  on.  Half  the  dis- 
tance to  the  nearest  trench  had  been  covered  when  Aldworth 
was  hit  and  dropped.  He  raised  himself  on  his  left  elbow, 
and  pointing  forward  with  his  sword  called  out,  "  Come  on, 
Cornwalls !  "  and  then  sank  down  and  expired.  The  charge 
did  not  go  many  steps  further.  The  men  lay  down  and  be- 
gan to  fire.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  partial  unsupported  assaults 
ended  in  defeat. 

While  the  attacks  on  the  laager  were  thus  giving  place 
to  mere  efforts  to  hold  the  ground  that  had  been  gained  till 
nightfall,  two  new  bodies  of  troops  reached  the  field.  Gor- 
don's cavalry  brigade  arrived  on  French's  right,  and  on  its 
appearance  Ferreira's  burghers  withdrew  from  the  Koodoos- 
rand  Hills.  The  other  arrival  was  De  Wet's  commando. 
Late  on  the  evening  of  the  sixteenth  he  had  news  that 
Cronje  was  trying  to  reach  Bloemfontein,  and  he  marched 
northwards  across  the  veldt  to  join  him.  On  the  afternoon 
of  the  eighteenth  he  heard  the  roar  of  guns  from  Paarde- 
berg,  and  "  marched  for  the  cannon."  With  a  quick  tactical 
instinct  he  made  for  the  hills  on  the  track  that  leads  from 
the  drifts  of  the  battle-field  southeast  towards  Bloemfontein, 
picked  up  some  of  the  burghers  who  had  retired  from  the 
Ostfontein  kopjes,  learned  from  them  what  the  situation 
was,  and  then  rode  hard  for  Kitchener's  Kopje.  It  was 
held  by  only  a  handful  of  mounted  infantry.  Some  fifty 
of  them  were  made  prisoners,  the  rest  hustled  off  the  hill. 
De  Wet  got  up  two  guns  and  a  pom-pom  to  the  top,  opened 
fire  on  the  rear  of  the  Eighty-first  Field  Battery,  which 


PAARDEBERG  349 

was  in  action  against  the  laager  from  a  position  just 
below  the  kopje.  While  the  guns  were  limbering  up,  he 
made  an  attempt  to  capture  them  with  a  rush  of  his  men, 
who  fired  as  they  came  on.  The  battery  was  saved  with 
difficulty. 

The  seizure  of  the  kopje  by  a  force  of  unknown  strength, 
and  accompanied  by  artillery,  turned  attention  from  the 
laager  to  this  new  danger.  Kelly-Kenny  hurried  up  men 
and  guns  to  bar  the  way  of  what  seemed  a  determined 
effort  to  break  through  the  British  positions  and  join 
hands  with  the  beleaguered  Boers.  The  coming  of  dark- 
ness put  an  end  to  a  confused  fight  on  the  ground  between 
Kitchener's  Kopje  and  the  Modder. 

Both  sides  were  utterly  exhausted.  Kitchener  thought 
for  a  while  of  a  night  attack  on  the  laager,  but  had  to 
abandon  the  idea,  for  the  men  were  "  dead  beat."  After 
hard  marching  and  scanty  sleep  they  had  been  fighting  for 
twelve  hours  under  a  burning  sun,  many  of  them  without 
food  or  water  since  a  hurried  meal  at  sunrise.  The  first 
need  of  all  was  a  few  hours  of  rest.  The  Boers  felt  the 
want  as  much  as  their  opponents.  They  had  had  a  terrible 
experience,  fighting  for  long  hours  under  a  rain  of  bullets 
and  the  ceaseless  din  of  the  shells,  that  burst  over  trenches 
and  laager,  sending  down  showers  of  shrapnel  balls  or  shat- 
tering wagons,  and  cratering  the  ground  with  lyddite  ex- 
plosions. De  Wet  sent  in  a  message  urging  Cronje  to  come 
out  by  way  of  the  kopje  he  had  seized ;  but  even  if  the  old 
burgher  leader  had  consented,  his  men  were  too  exhausted 
to  march. 

Lord  Roberts  arrived  in  the  early  morning  of  the  nine- 
teenth. At  first  it  was  thought  Cronje  was  about  to  sur- 
render, but  the  message  he  sent  out  had  been  mistranslated. 
All  he  asked  for  was  a  truce  to  bury  the  dead.  Kitchener 
was  for  renewing  the  attack ;  but  Roberts  vetoed  the  pro- 
posal.   The  battle  had  been  a  costly  day's  work.     More  than 


350  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

1200  men  had  been  killed  or  wounded^  —  the  heaviest  loss 
incurred  in  a  single  day  during  the  war.  With  the  field 
hospitals  crowded  as  they  were,  he  shrank  from  incurring 
further  loss,  and  chose  the  slow  but  sure  plan  of  closely 
investing  and  besieging  the  laager-fortress.  It  was  no 
easy  matter  even  to  accomplish  this.  Ferreira,  Steyn, 
and  De  Wet  had  to  be  driven  off  and  held  at  bay,  and 
the  dogged  resistance  of  the  Boers  worn  down ;  and  the 
besieging  army  had  to  be  kept  on  short  rations,  for  it  was 
a  serious  business  to  bring  the  supply  convoys  across  the 
veldt. 

Cronje  did  not  surrender  till  February  27.  By  that  time 
the  British  had  pushed  up  the  river-bed  close  to  the  laager 
by  sap  and  trench,  and  were  ready  to  make  a  final  assault, 
which  he  could  not  hope  to  resist.  The  victory  was  all 
the  more  welcome  because  it  came  on  the  anniversary 
of  Majuba.  For  the  first  time  in  the  weary  struggle  a 
solid  success  had  been  won,  and  a  Boer  army  not  merely 
driven  off  but  destroyed.  The  operations  against  Cronje, 
by  drawing  away  large  bodies  of  the  Free  State  men 
from  Natal,  had  also  lightened  Buller's  task  in  the  relief  of 
Ladysmith. 

For  many  weeks  after  Kitchener's  battle  of  Paardeberg 
the  British  public  at  home  knew  little  of  what  had  happened 
on  February  18.  The  casualty  lists  were  issued,  and  at  first 
suggested  one  more  "  disaster  " ;  but  the  censorship  cut 
down  the  news  sent  by  the  correspondents  until  it  became 
unintelligible.  It  is  hard  to  understand  such  mistaken  ret- 
icence. It  was  an  injustice  to  Kitchener  and  to  the  army, 
for  it  conveyed  a  false  impression.     Looking  back  on  the 

*  The  British  casualties  were : 

Killed      .    .     Officers  20  Men    300  Total     320>.  Out  of  15,000  pres- 

Wounded   .     Officers  52  Men     8cx)  Total     942  I  ent  on  the  field. 

—               I  Equal  a  loss  of 

Total "jz  1,190  1.262''  about  8  per  cent. 


PAARDEBERG  351 

battle  of  Paardeberg,  we  can  now  see  that  it  was  a  turning- 
point  of  the  war.  Had  Cronje  been  allowed  a  day's  rest 
on  February  18,  the  chances  are  that  by  nightfall  he  would 
have  been  moving  off  to  Bloemfontein  with  Do  Wet  and 
Steyn.  Kitchener  had  the  true  idea  that  he  must  be  held 
at  any  cost,  and  not  only  held,  but  grappled  with  and 
beaten.  With  a  divided  command,  and  none  of  the  mechan- 
ism in  which  armies  are  directed  with  certain  effect,  he 
did  what  he  could  with  the  means  at  hand,  and  it  was 
not  his  fault  that  he  failed  to  inspire  more  cautious  leaders 
with  his  own  fiery  energy.  Even  so,  he  held  Cronje,  and 
handled  him  so  roughly  that  the  investment  became  possi- 
ble. The  investment  proved  to  be  more  costly  than  a 
reuewed  assault  would  have  been.  There  was,  it  is  true,  no 
long  catalogue  of  killed  and  wounded  in  battle,  but  there 
were  terrible  lists  of  deaths  from  fever  and  enteric,  con- 
tracted in  the  half  starved  camps  around  the  Paardeberg 
laager. 

Kitchener  had  fought  his  way  close  up  to  Cronje's  lines. 
A  fresh  division  was  at  hand  for  a  renewed  assault  on  the 
nineteenth.  But  it  was  vetoed.  So  Paardeberg,  which  laid 
the  foundation  of  success,  was  counted  for  a  while  as  a 
defeat.  If  we  can  imagine  that  on  the  morrow  of  Rezonville 
the  old  Prussian  King  had  refused  to  follow  up  Bazainc. 
Prince  Frederick  Charles's  fight  along  the  Verdun  road  on 
August  16,  1870,^  would  not  to-day  be  remembered  in  Ger- 
many as  the  day  that  prepared  the  way  for  the  decisive 
victory  of  Gravelotte.  Kitchener's  battle  of  February  18 
was,  like  Rezonville,  a  fight  that  was  only  a  beginning.  He 
was  not  allowed  to  follow  it  up;  but  even  so,  it  must  be 
counted  as  the  battle  that  marked  the  beginning  of  a  new 
era  in  the  South  African  War,  the  era  of  energetic  effort 
to  compass,  not  the  repulse  but  the  destruction  of  the  enemy 
—  a  day,  too,  on  which  a  soldier  of  real  genius  acted  on  the 

*  See  chapter  vi. 


352  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

sound  principle  that  it  is  the  true  poHcy  to  incur  even  heavy- 
losses  of  a  few  hours'  fighting  for  an  adequate  object,  rather 
than  prolong  a  conflict  for  days  and  weeks  by  adopting  the 
slower  methods  that  in  the  end  waste  life  and  involve  suf- 
fering on  a  far  larger  scale. 


CHAPTER   XIV 

MUKDEN 

February  20  — March  10,  1905 

Mukden  —  the  final  battle  of  the  war  between  Russia  and 
Japan  —  was  probably  the  greatest  battle  in  the  world's  his- 
tory.''' More  than  600,000  men  were  engaged  in  the  pro- 
longed struggle,  which  lasted  nearly  three  weeks,  during 
part  of  which  the  opposing  lines  were  extended  over  a  front 
of  more  than  eighty  miles. 

It  had  long  been  predicted  that  the  evolution  of  modern 
war  would  result  in  the  battles  of  the  future  assuming  these 
colossal  proportions.  There  was  a  time  —  not  so  long  ago 
—  when  wars  were  fought  out  by  relatively  small  armies  of 
professional  soldiers ;  but  during  the  last  half  century  na- 
tion after  nation  has  adopted  some  form  of  universal  service, 
or  some  approximation  to  this  system.  Thus  mi^dcrn  war 
has  tended  to  become  a  conflict  of  nations  in  arms.  The 
very  triumphs  of  peaceful  invention  have  made  it  possible 
to  concentrate,  feed,  direct,  and  move  vast  armies.  The 
railway,  the  telegraph  and  telephone,  the  methods  of  pre- 
serving and  packing  enormous  quantities  of  provisions  — 
these  and  othei  developments  of  modern  industry  have  all 
helped  to  make  it  possible  to  maintain  and  manoeuver  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  in  the  field.  .'\nd  a  commander-in-chief 
of  to-day  does  not  fritter  away  his  forces  in  minor  opera- 
tions, but  collects  together  every  available  man  and  gun 
for  a  stroke  at  a  decisive  point.  So  in  the  wars  of  the 
future  we  shall  see  what  v/as  seen  at  Mukden  —  the  aniud 


354  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

manhood  of   whole  nations  meeting  in  prolonged  conflict 
extending  over  wide  tracts  of  country. 

Russia,  when  she  forced  Japan  into  war,  made  the  mis- 
take of  completely  underrating  her  opponent.     A  Russian 
general  assured  his  countrymen  that,  even  if  Japan  could 
obtain  command  of  the  sea,  she  could  not  by  any  possibility 
transport  100,000  men  to  the  mainland  of  Asia  and  maintain 
them  there.     But  Japan,  whose  armies  in  the  memory  of 
men  still  living  had  been  armed  with  bows  and  arrows  and 
matchlock  muskets  and  spears,  and  whose  navy  had  been 
made  up  of  war  junks,  had,  in  the  lifetime  of  a  generation, 
learned  to  use  the  weapons  and  the  war  methods  of  civilized 
nations,    and   had    "  bettered   the    instruction."      Her   navy 
swept  the  sea.     Her  armies  poured  across  it  into  Korea  and 
Manchuria.    In  every  department  on  sea  and  land  there  was 
the  highest  type  of  efficiency.     The  Japanese  soldier  had  a 
traditional  contempt  for  death  and  danger ;   but  his  officers, 
while   ready   to    risk   heavy   loss    for    an    adequate   object, 
showed  they  had  learned  better  than  even  those  of  Europe 
how  to  minimize  the  human  cost  of  war  and  keep  their 
ranks  full.     Disease,  which  in  all  previous  wars  had  killed 
more  men  than  fell  on  the  battle-field,  was  brought  down  to 
a  minimum  in  the  Japanese  armies.     In  the  actual  fighting, 
losses  were  reduced  by  skilled  intrenching  and  by  an  elabo- 
rate system  of  masking  the  positions  of  guns  and  men  and 
hiding  the   lines   on   which   they   moved.      Large   use   was 
made  of  night  marching  in  the  approach  to  hostile  positions. 
But  when  the  crisis  of  a  fight  came  life  was  freely  spent, 
and  the  Japanese  soldiers  showed  a  reckless  courage  in  com- 
ing to  close  quarters  with  the  bayonet. 

A  highly-trained  stafif,  educated  by  German  experts,  had 
reduced  the  direction  of  the  campaign  to  a  fine  art.  In 
the  great  battles  the  commander-in-chief  would  establish  his 
headquarters  in  a  temple  or  a  country  house,  link  it  with 
every  point  of  his  firing  line  by  telegraph,  telephone,  and 


MUKDEN  355 

signal  stations,  and  then  with  his  marked  maps  before  him 
direct  the  unseen  battle  like  an  expert  playing  a  chess  game. 
Army  after  army  was  sent  to  the  front  till  there  were  more 
than  500,000  men  in  the  field.  The  Russians,  heavily  out- 
numbered at  the  outset,  had  to  supply  and  reinforce  the 
army  in  the  Far  East  by  a  single  line  of  railway  stretching 
through  some  thousand  miles  of  Northern  Asia.^  It  was 
only  by  the  greatest  efforts  that  they  made  good  the  losses 
of  the  campaign,  and  after  long  months  gradually  brought 
up  the  number  of  Kuropatkin's  army  in  Manchuria  to  some- 
thing like  equal  numbers  with  the  Japanese  field  forces  im- 
mediately opposed  to  him. 

The  war  had  begun  with  a  Japanese  occupation  of  Korea 
and  the  invasion  of  Manchuria  by  the  crossing  of  the  Yalu. 
The  fleet,  under  Togo,  had  secured  the  command  of  the  sea, 
and  as  soon  as  the  Japanese  were  established  in  Southern 
Manchuria,  another  army  was  transported  to  the  Liao-tung 
peninsula,  and  Port  Arthur  was  besieged.  The  armies  in 
Manchuria  were  strongly  reinforced.  They  fought  their 
way  over  the  mountain  passes  into  the  plain  of  the  Liao 
and  the  Hun-ho ;  Niu-chwang  was  seized  to  give  a  nearer 
base  of  supply  for  a  further  advance;  and  then  the  three 
armies  of  Kuroki,  Nozu,  and  Oku  closed  in  upon  Liao-yang, 
and  after  several  days  of  fighting  occupied  the  city  on  Sep- 
tember 3,  Kuropatkin  abandoning  his  intrenched  position 
and  retiring  on  Mukden. 

The  Russian  general  had  originally  intended  to  make  his 
next  stand  forty  miles  further  north,  at  Tie-ling,  where  the 
^Liao  River,  the' old  "  Mandarin  road,"  and  the  modern  rail- 
way pass  side  by  side  through  a  wide  opening  in  the  hills. 
the  natural  gateway  between  Southern  and  Northern  Man- 
churia. But  he  halted  about  Mukden,  because  tin-  jai>anese 
pursuit  was  very  slack,  and  gave  him  ami)le  breathnig  tune, 
'  From  Moscow  to  Harbin  Junction,  the  Russian  base  in  Northern 
Manchuria,  was  a  journey  of  5400  miles. 


356  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

and  because  his  government  insisted  on  the  loss  of  prestige 
that  would  result  from  the  famous  city  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy  without  a  struggle. 

For  Mukden  is  one  of  the  historic  cities  of  the  Far  East. 
It  has  a  population  of  about  300,000,  who  live  partly  in 
the  old  walled  city,  and  partly  in  its  extensive  suburbs. 
The  walled  city  is  a  square  inclosure,  surrounded  by  massive 
ramparts,  brick-built,  and  with  fantastically  decorated  gates. 
It  was  the  capital  of  the  Manchu  dynasty  that  conquered 
China  in  the  seventeenth  century  and  reigned  at  Pekin  until 
the  establishment  of  the  Chinese  Republic.  To  the  north 
and  northeast  of  the  city  there  are  two  extensive  parks,  with 
marble  gateways,  numerous  pagodas  and  halls  for  ceremo- 
nial rites,  avenues  of  colossal  figures  of  uncouth  animals 
carved  in  stone,  and  grave  mounds  surrounded  by  groves  of 
sacred  trees.  These  parks  are  the  burial  places  of  the  Man- 
chu dynasty,  and  in  the  operations  round  Mukden  both  the 
Russian  and  the  Japanese  commanders  took  the  greatest  care 
that  no  troops  should  enter  the  inclosures,  and  that  no  injury 
should  be  done  to  their  groves  and  temples.  There  was  a 
tacit  agreement  as  to  this  neutralization  of  the  tombs  of  the 
emperors  and  their  surroundings,  for  both  the  belligerents 
were  anxious  to  avoid  giving  offense  to  the  court  of  Pekin. 

East  of  Mukden  extends  the  central  mountain  mass  of 
Manchuria.  From  the  valleys  of  this  hill  region  numerous 
rivers  running  from  east  to  west,  and  turning  southwest 
after  passing  the  railway  line,  flow  down  to  swell  the  great 
stream  of  the  Liao-ho.  Mukden  stands  on  the  edge  of 
the  plain  that  stretches  westwards  to  and  beyond  the  great  * 
river  —  a  cultivated  tract  with  many  villages  and  small 
country  towns.  By  the  capture  of  Liao-yang  the  Japanese 
had  got  possession  of  the  Yen-tai  coal  mines,  the  chief 
source  of  fuel  supply  for  working  theManchurian  railway. 
Kuropatkin  laid  down  a  light  railway  to  the  mines  of  Fu- 
shun,  east  of  Mukden,  to  compensate  for  this  loss,  and  the 


MUKDEN  357 

Fu-shun  line  was  used  for  the  transport  of  troops  from  the 
center  to  the  left  of  the  Russian  positions  during  the  subse- 
quent fighting. 

Kuropatkin  began  to  intrench  defensive  lines  along  the 
Hun-ho  and  Sha-ho  rivers,  south  of  Mukden.  The  Japanese 
had  pushed  forward  to  the  south  side  of  the  Sha-ho,  and 
along  its  southern  bank  they  threw  up  formidable  lines  of 
trenches,  redoubts,  and  batteries.  The  river  is  500  yards 
wide  in  the  season  of  rains.  Now,  at  the  end  of  the  sum- 
mer, its  bed  was  a  great  sandy  hollow  along  whicli  wound 
the  river,  reduced  to  some  60  yards  in  width,  l)nt  mostly 
too  deep  to  ford.  It  thus  formed  a  huge  ditch  along  the 
front  of  the  Japanese  lines,  except  for  a  few  miles  near 
Sha-ho-pu,  where  the  Russians  held  both  banks.  The  Japa- 
nese plan  was  to  hold  on  here  until  Port  Arthur  surrendereil. 
Nogi  would  then  bring  up  the  besieging  army  to  the  Sha-ho 
lines ;  further  reinforcements  would  have  arrived  from 
Japan,  and  the  general  advance  against  Mukden  would 
begin. 

In  October  Kuropatkin  assumed  the  offensive,  and  ad- 
vanced against  the  Sha-ho  lines.  But  he  was  repulsed  after 
several  days  of  hard  fighting.  The  two  armies  then  faced 
each  other  on  opposite  sides  of  the  Sha-ho.  Both  were 
receiving  reinforcements  and  working  hard  at  intrenching, 
and  erecting  huts  for  the  coming  hard  weather.  There  was 
almost  a  truce.  The  men  at  the  outposts  exchangeil  ciga- 
rettes and  other  little  comforts,  and  it  was  arranged  that 
unarmed  parties  from  both  sides  should  be  allowed  to  come 
down  to  the  river  to  draw  water  without  being  fired  upon. 
In  November  the  severe  winter  weather  began.  \W  the 
end  of  the  month  hills  and  plain  were  covered  with  snow, 
and  the  rivers  were  freezing. 

The  informal  truce  was  broken  by  occasional  outbursts 
of  hostilities,  but  no  serious  operations  were  attempted  on 
either  side   during  the  earlier  part   of  the  winter   season. 


358  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

The  first  week  of  January,  1905,  brought  the  news  that 
Port  Arthur  had  at  last  surrendered  to  General  Nogi. 

During  the  month  of  January,^hile  Marshal  Oyama, 
the  Japanese  generalissimo,  and  his  chief  of  the  stafif, 
Kodama,  were^ already  preparing  for  their  great  stroke 
against  Mukderi^  the  Russians  ventured  on  two  attempts 
against  the  Sha-ho  positions.  The  first  was  indirect  —  a 
raid  by  a  division  of  Cossacks,  under  General  Mitschenko, 
against  the  railway  in  the  left  rear  of  the  Japanese  and 
their  magazines  at  Niu-chwang.  The  raid  was  ill-directed, 
and  was  repulsed  after  very  little  damage  had  been  done. 
Then,  in  the  third  week  of  January,  General  Gripenberg 
with  70,000  men  crossed  the  three-foot  ice  on  the  Hun-ho, 
and  fell  upon  Oyama's  left  at  Hei-tou-kai.  He  was  beaten 
back  after  a  hard-fought  battle. 

The  Japanese  knew  better  than  to  waste  their  energies 
on  any  partial  attacks.  They  were  steadily  accumulating 
their  resources  for  the  decisive  effort  and  acting  all  the 
while  under  the  veil  of  a  strict  press  censorship,  aided  by 
the  patriotic  reticence  of  soldiers  and  people.  In  letters 
home  from  the  front  places  were  never  named  in  the  dating 
or  the  body  of  the  letter,  regimental  and  divisional  num- 
bers were  omitted,  and  the  Japanese  newspapers,  when  they 
published  photographs  taken  at  the  front,  gave  them  the 
vaguest  of  descriptive  titles.^ 

There  were  rumors  of  a  new  Japanese  army,  later  on 
officially  known  as  the  "  Fifth  Army,"  imder  General  Kawa- 
mura,  having  landed  at  the  mouth  of  the  Yalu  and  dis- 
appeared into  the  hills.  There  were  conjectures  that  this 
army  was  destined  to  march  northwards  through  the  coast 
districts  of  Manchuria,  and  combine  with  the  fleet  in  an 
attack  on  Vladivostock.     Every  one  knew  that  Nogi's  army, 

^  For  instance,  "  The  engineer  company  intrenching  at  a  cer- 
tain place  in  Manchuria."    "  Officers  of  the regiment  of  infantry 

in  winter  quarters."    '"  An  outpost  of  the cavalry  at  the  front." 


MUKDEN  .  359 

after  reducing  Port  Arthur,  would  not  be  left  idle  in  the 
Liao-tung  peninsula.  It  must  be  on  its  way  to  the  figbling 
front,  but  there  was  the  strictest  secrecy  as  to  what  part  of 
Oyama's  lines  it  was  to  reinforce. 

While  the  Japanese  were  steadily  accumulating  men  and 
guns  behind  their  fortified  lines,  Kuropatkin  could  now  hope 
for  no  further  reinforcements  for  some  weeks  to  come. 
For  January  22  was  the  "  Red  Sunday  ".  of  St.  Petersburg, 
when  the  unarmed  crowds,  marching  on  the  palace  to  i)eli- 
tion  the  Czar  for  a  constitution,  had  been  shot  down  in  hun- 
dreds in  the  streets,  and  these  terrible  scenes  of  repression 
had  been  foUo^^d  by  attempts  at  revolt  and  general  dis- 
organization,-m|J  only  in  European  Russia,  but  in  the  great 
centers  of  po|)i,ulation  along  the  Siberian  Railway. 

The  Japanese  had  good  reason  to  act  while  this  period 
of  stress  was  increasing  from  day  to  day  the  anxieties  oi 
the  Russian  commander.  There  was  another  reason  for 
early  action.  While  the  hard  cold  of  the  winter  lasted  the 
rivers  could  be  crossed  anywhere  on  a  broad  front  on  the 
thick  ice  that  covered  them,  and  the  plain  of  the  Liao  could 
be  traversed  by  men  and  guns  in  any  direction.  Once  the 
thaw  began  the  rivers  would  be  swollen  with  floods  from 
the  melting  snow  on  the  hills  and  encumbered  with  drift 
ice,  and  the  level  lands  towards  the  Liao  would  be  for  a 
while  an  impassable  quagmire.  So  in  the  middle  of  Febru- 
ary Oyama  made  the  first  moves  that  preluded  a  general 
advance  northwards. 

He  had  no  easy  problem  to  solve.  An  elaborate  system 
of  espionage  had  given  him  a  complete  knowledge  of  the 
Russian  defense  preparations.  In  his  immediate  front  the 
enemy  held  a  fortified  line  some  sixty  miles  long.'  The 
right  extended  for  some  miles  into  the  plain  beyond  the 
liun-ho.  Thence  the  line  ran  eastwards  till  it  reached  the 
north  bank  of  the  Sha-ho,  where  the  river  bends  to  the  south- 

*  To  follow  this  description,  sec  map,  Battle  of  Mukden  —  I. 


36o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

west  not  far  from  the  railway  bridge.  Then  it  followed 
the  river,  crossing  it  near  Sha-ho-pu,  and  taking  in  some 
miles  of  the  south  bank.  Recrossing  the  river,  it  again 
followed  the  north  bank  into  the  hill  country,  and  was  then 
carried  through  the  mountains  to  a  little  beyond  the  Wang- 
fu  Pass.  Here  the  continuous  line  of  works  ended;  but 
the  Kautu  Pass,  north  of  the  Wang-fu,  was  also  fortified, 
and  there  were  detached  posts  with  less  elaborate  defensive 
works  watching  the  defiles  even  further  east. 

The  fortified  line  was  formed  of  a  succession  of  trenches, 
redoubts,  and  earthwork  batteries.  The  works  were  in 
places  strengthened  by  a  second  and  even  a  third  line  in 
their  rear,  and  in  front  there  were  obstacles  formed  of 
wire  entanglernents,  abattis  of  felled  trees,  pit-traps,  and 
ground  mines. 

But  this  was  only  the  first  advanced  line  of  defenses 
barring  the  approach  to  Mukden.  The  place  itself  had  been 
fortified  by  a  second  line  closer  in.  The  old  Chinese  ram- 
parts, with  their  canopied  gateways,  bright  with  painted 
carvings  and  towering  high  above  the  suburbs,  were  useless 
in  modern  war;  but  south  of  the  city  Kuropatkin  had 
thrown  up  an  inner  line  of  earthworks,  extending  for  some 
miles  along  the  south  side  of  the  Hun-ho,  and  with  its 
flanks  resting  on  the  river.  Right  and  left  of  it  were  sup- 
plementary lines  of  intrenchments.  One  of  these  ran  along 
the  north  bank  of  the  river  for  20  miles,  from  the  tombs 
of  the  emperors  to  near  the  town  of  Fu-shun,  The  other 
line,  intended  to  protect  Mukden  against  an  attack  from 
the  westward,  ran  south  to  north,  from  the  bank  of  the 
Hun-ho  River  to  a  point  about  six  miles  west  of  the  city, 
where  the  line  turned  and  was  carried  back  for  four  miles 
more  in  a  direction  a  little  north  of  east.  This  western  line 
was,  however,  in  a  very  incomplete  state. 

To  hold  these  extensive  works  Kuropatkin  had  gathered 
an  army  of  310,000  men  and  1200  field-guns,  besides  be- 


MUKDEN  361 

tween  200  and  300  heavy  guns,  and  88  machine-guns 
mounted  in  the  earthworks.  Sixteen  army  corps  had  been 
grouped  in  three  subordmate  armies.  On  the  left,  in  the 
hills,  was  the  First  Army,  under  General  Linievitch ;  in  the 
center,  south  of  Mukden  and  along  the  Sha-ho,  was  the 
Third  Army,  under  General  Bilderling ;  on  the  right,  in  the 
plain  west  of  the  railway  and  extending  beyond  the  Hun-ho, 
was  the  Second  Army,  commanded  by  General  Kaulbars. 

There  is  some  doubt  about  the  precise  numbers  of  the 
Japanese  armies  which  Oyama  had  concentrated  for  the 
advance.  The  Russians  thought  that  they  were  seriously 
outnumbered,  but  the  balance  of  evidence  goes  to  show  that 
the  Japanese  fighting  strength  was  also  about  300,000  men. 
There  were  263  battalions  of  infantry,  66  squadrons  of 
cavalry,  and  150  batteries  with  900  field-guns,  besides  170 
heavy  guns  of  position  (including  part  of  the  siege  train 
from  Port  Arthur)  and  200  machine-guns.  This  great  mass 
of  men  and  guns  was  organized  in  divisions  grouped  in  five 
armies,  each  of  the  average  strength  of  about  60,000  men. 
In  the  front  line  were  the  troops  that  had  held  the  Sha-ho 
lines  since  the  end  of  the  previous  summer ;  on  the  right  the 
First  Army,  under  Kuroki,  faced  Linievitch ;  in  the  center 
the  Fourth  Army,  under  Nozu,  was  opposed  to  Bilderling ; 
on  the  left  Oku,  with  the  Second  Army,  faced  Kaulbars  in 
the  plain.  Behind  Oku's  outer  flank,  unknown  to  the  Rus- 
sians, Oyama  had  placed  the  Third  Army,  under  Nogi,  the 
men  who  had  done  all  the  hard  fighting  before  Port  Arthur. 
The  distinctive  numbers  of  these  armies  indicated  the  order 
in  which  they  had  been  sent  to  the  seat  of  war.  Thus 
Kuroki's  men  of  the  First  Army  had  been  a  year  in  the 
field,  for  they  were  the  soldiers  who  had  landed  in  Korea 
and  won  the  first  battle  of  the  war  on  the  Yalu.  Behind 
the  extreme  right  in  the  hill  country  were  the  newest 
comers  —  the  Fifth  Army,  under  Kawamura.  Its  ranks 
were  largely  filled  with  reservists  lately  called  from  field, 


362  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

workshop,  desk,  and  counter,  and  young  recruits  fresh 
from  the  depots,  and  it  was  therefore  stiffened  by  the 
addition  of  a  division  detached  from  Nogi's  army.  Kawa- 
mura's  army  represented  Japan's  final  effort,  and  when 
the  fighting  began  the  remarkable  thing  was  that  his  young 
recruits  and  the  middle-aged  reservists  showed  as  much  en- 
durance, energy,  and  dash  as  Kuroki's  war-tried  veterans. 

To  attempt  to  force  the  Russian  fortified  lines  by  a  frontal 
attack  would  have  been  too  dangerous  and  costly  an  opera- 
tion. Oyama  had  to  devise  a  means  of  turning  the  enemy 
out  of  their  lines  by  pressure  from  a  flank.  It  was  fore- 
seen that  the  battle  would  last  for  many  days.  But  there 
was  a  problem  of  space  as  well  as  time.  On  earlier  battle- 
fields a  movement  of  a  mile  or  two  would  suffice  to  reinforce 
one  of  the  wings  from  the  center.  The  Japanese  were  good 
marchers.  There  w^ere  days  when  a  column  covered  50 
miles.  And  they  needed  to  march  well,  for  in  the  flanking 
movements  Oyama  had  projected,  this  battle  on  a  front  of 
80  miles  would  necessitate  marches  of  over  70  miles  for 
some  of  the  columns. 

In  order  to  enable  the  reader  more  readily  to  grasp  the 
scale  of  the  operations  in  a  great  battle  like  that  of  Mukden 
(and  such  will  be  some  of  the  decisive  battles  of  future 
wars),  let  us  suppose  such  a  fight  taking  place  in  the 
south  of  England.  The  defense  line  would  have  its  left, 
say,  at  London,  its  right  on  Salisbury  Plain.  A  flank 
march  such  as  Nogi  executed  at  Mukden  would  be  repre- 
sented by  an  army  moving  out  from  Southampton  and 
sweeping  round  through  Dorsetshire  and  the  border  of 
Somerset,  past  Bath,  across  the  north  of  Wiltshire,  and  into 
Berkshire. 

Now  Oyama  had  to  keep  in  touch  with  every  point  of 
his  enormous  front,  and  to  maintain  this  touch  as  the  divi- 
sions made  their  long  marches.  This  meant  the  organization 
of  a  huge  system  of  field  telegraphs  and  telephones,  which 


MUKDEN  363 

had  to  be  extended  as  more  and  more  ground  was  won  — 
a  system  with  hundreds  of  miles  of  wires  and  cables,  and 
scores  on  scores  of  transmitting  and  receiving  stations,  with 
a  headquarters  office  like  the  central  telegraph  office  of  a 
large  city. 

And  there  was  another  pressing  problem.  The  attacking 
army  would  be  something  like  a  moving  city  of  300,000  men, 
who  would  have  not  only  to  be  fed  from  day  to  day,  but 
kept  supplied  also  with  ton  loads  of  ammunition  for  rifles 
and  artillery.  This  meant  a  complex  system  of  ever-moving 
convoys  in  the  mountains  and  in  the  plain. 

Finally,  enduring  as  the  Japanese  soldier  is,  men  could 
not  fight  for  days  on  days  without  rest,  so  it  must  be  ar- 
ranged to  have  reliefs  for  the  fighting  line,  all  the  more 
because  night  would  bring  no  rest  for  the  army  as  a  whole. 
In  the  presence  of  the  deadly  fire  of  the  weapons  of  to-day 
the  hours  of  darkness  are  valuable.  There  will  be  many 
night  attacks,  and  still  more  night  marches,  or  advances 
to  new  ground,  into  which  the  men  will  dig  themselves  so 
as  to  have  shelter  from  fire  when  the  day  comes.  Finally, 
provision  has  to  be  made  for  the  thousands  of  wounded 
who  will  have  to  be  given  first  aid  at  the  fighting  front,  and 
then  be  transported  to  the  great  field  hospitals  in  the  rear. 
These  are  the  complex  problems  the  commander  of  an  army 
of  our  day  has  to  face  on  the  eve  of  one  of  those  colossal 
battles. 

All  the  elaborate  preparations  had  been  completed  by  the 
middle  of  February,  and  by  that  time  Oyama  and  his  trusty 
chief  of  the  staff.  Kodama  —  "the  IMoltke  of  Japan"  — 
were  already  making  the  first  moves  in  the  deadly  game. 
Their  object  was  to  divert  the  attention  of  Kuropatkin  from 
certain  points  and  rivet  it  upon  others.  The  Russian  army 
was  drawing  some  of  its  supplies  from  Harbin  by  the  Man- 
churian  railway.  But  it  had  another  source  of  supply.  At 
Sin-min-ting,  on  the  western  side  of  the  Liao-ho,  and  there- 


364  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

fore  in  Chinese  territory,  there  was  the  terminal  station  of 
the  railway  hne  to  Northern  China  and  Pekin.  By  this 
line  Chinese  contractors  were  sending  up  large  quantities 
of  supplies  for  the  Russians,  which  were  then  taken  across 
the  frozen  plain  by  convoys.  In  the  middle  of  February 
Oyama  sent  more  than  one  column  of  mounted  troops  to 
sweep  round  the  extreme  right  of  Kaulbars's  Army,  and  not 
only  threaten  the  convoy  road  from  Sin-min-ting,  but,  push- 
ing further  north,  cut  the  Manchurian  railway  itself  behind 
Mukden.  One  of  these  raiding  parties,  after  cutting  the 
railway,  came  back  in  triumph  with  two  Russian  horse 
artillery  guns,  which  it  had  captured  in  a  fight  with  a 
Russian  column  despatched  to  cut  off  its  retreat. 

To  guard  his  lines  of  supply,  Kuropatkin  drew  back  to 
the  railway  and  the  convoy  track  the  cavalry  that  had  till 
now  been  watching  the  Japanese  left  in  the  plain.  The 
raids  might  have  suggested  to  Kuropatkin  that  the  principal 
attack  of  the  Japanese  would  come  in  the  form  of  an  at- 
tempt to  turn  the  right  of  his  line.  But  in  the  midst  of 
the  excitement  caused  by  the  cavalry  raids  on  the  railway 
there  came  news  of  the  sudden  activity  of  the  Japanese  far 
away  to  the  Russian  left  in  the  mountains.  Kawamura  had 
slipped  out  from  behind  Kuroki's  extreme  flank,  and  on 
February  20  came  in  contact  with  the  Russians.  Cossack 
detachments,  watching  the  narrow  mountain  roads  among 
the  precipices  and  ravines  of  the  Ta-lin  Mountains  beyond 
the  extreme  left  of  the  Russian  lines,  were  driven  in  by 
columns  of  little  Japanese  infantrymen,  that  came  tramping 
through  a  driving  snowstorm,  with  their  batteries  of  mule 
guns  behind  them. 

Linievitch  hurried  out  reinforcements  from  his  left.  Then, 
as  Kuroki's  army  became  active  all  along  his  front,  he  re- 
ported to  Kuropatkin  at  Mukden  that  the  enemy  were  mak- 
ing a  determined  effort  to  force  and  outflank  the  left  of  the 
whole  army. 


MUKDEN  365 

Kiiropatkin  had  for  some  time  been  expecting-  this.  He 
thought  that  the  Japanese,  who  had  already  shown  them- 
selves experts  in  hill  fighting,  were  more  likely  to  attack 
through  the  mountain  country  than  either  to  hurl  themselves 
against  his  fortified  center  or  risk  a  pitched  battle  on  the 
open  plain  of  the  Liao.  Linievitch's  news  confirmed  him  in 
this  view,  and  for  some  days  he  was  busy  marching  east- 
wards into  the  hills  all  the  troops  and  guns  he  thought  he 
could  spare  from  his  reserves,  and  from  other  parts  of  his 
long  line.     This  was  just  what  Oyama  wanted. 

Kawamura  was  advancing  from  the  southeast  in  two  long 
columns,  the  objectives  marked  out  for  which  were  the 
towns  of  Tita  and  Ma-chun-tun.  To  reach  these  points 
they  would  have  to  fight  their  way  through  the  passes  of 
the  Ta-lin  Mountains.  The  heaviest  fighting  fell  to  the 
lot  of  the  left  column,  which  on  February  23  found  its  way 
barred  by  a  Russian  division  holding  the  fortified  places  of 
Chin-lo-cheng,  22  miles  from  Ma-chun-tun.  All  day  the 
Japanese  attacked  through  a  blinding  snowstorm.  The  first 
assaults  on  the  Russian  position  were  beaten  back  with  heavy 
loss  —  part  of  it  due  to  the  explosions  of  numerous  ground 
mines  in  front  of  the  trenches.  Darkness  ended  the  fighting, 
and  the  Russians  everywhere  held  their  own.  Next  day 
Kawamura  had  two  divisions  in  action,  and  after  some 
severe  hand-to-hand  fighting  with  the  bayonet  the  Russians 
were  driven  from  their  trenches ;  but  not  until  the  ridges 
of  the  hills  on  their  ilank  had  been  captured,  and  finilier 
resistance  would  have  endangered  their  line  of  retreat.  Tn 
earlier  wars  this  two  days'  conflict  would  have  counted  as 
a  battle ;  here  it  was  but  an  incident  in  the  great  struggle 
between  hundreds  of  thousands. 

While  Kawamura  was  thus  forcing  his  way  through  the 
snowy  mountain  passes,  Kuroki,  with  the  First  .Army,  had 
come  into  action  on  his  left,  pressing  forward  against  the 
positions   to  right   and  left  of   the   Wang-fu   Pass.      Here 


366  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

there  was  the  first  night  fighting  of  the  great  battle.  These 
night  operations,  which  played  a  great  part  in  the  conflict, 
were  of  two  kinds.  A  firing  line  of  infantry,  which  had 
been  brought  to  a  standstill  during  the  day,  would  be  relieved 
at  nightfall  by  fresh  battalions.  These  would  move  forward 
some  distance ;  then,  after  throwing  out  a  line  of  skirmishers 
to  protect  themselves,  the  men  would  work  till  daylight 
digging  a  shelter  trench  and  throwing  up  the  earth  into  a 
low  parapet  in  front.  At  dawn  they  would  be  ready  to 
open  fire  from  this  improvised  cover.  It  was  the  method 
of  sieges  applied  to  the  battle-field. 

The  other  night  operations  meant  close  fighting  with 
sword  and  bayonet.  A  village,  a  farmstead,  a  knoll  in  the 
hills,  held  by  the  enemy,  would  be  the  object  of  the  attack. 
Usually  volunteers  would  be  called  for.  There  were  always 
more  than  enough.  Often  the  officers  and  men  would 
pledge  themselves  to  each  other  that  in  case  of  failure  they 
would  not  return  alive.  "  If  we  cannot  win,"  they  would 
say,  "  we  shall  all  meet  to-night  in  the  land  of  spirits."  At 
first  the  men  of  these  "  forlorn  hopes  "  used  to  wear  white 
bands  on  their  sleeves  to  enable  them  to  recognize  each 
other  as  friends  in  the  melee.  But  this  was  soon  found 
to  be  unnecessary.  "  The  Russians  are  tall,  we  are  short," 
would  be  the  officer's  warning  to  his  men,  "  so  when  it 
comes  to  the  fight  in  the  dark  run  any  tall  man  through." 
Then  they  stole  out  in  silence  to  the  attack.  The  European 
soldier  goes  out  to  battle  meaning  to  face  danger  fearlessly, 
but  hoping  to  escape  it.  In  the  Japanese  the  old  semi- 
barbarian  courage  survives.  He  really  feels  that  to  die 
fighting  is  the  best  of  good  fortune.  This  is  the  explanation 
of  the  reckless  fury  of  the  Japanese  onset. 

Along  the  center  and  left  of  Oyama's  Army  during 
these  first  days  there  was  no  forward  movement,  but  along 
the  Sha-ho  and  out  into  the  plain  some  of  the  guns  were 
in  action  shelling  the  Russian  lines,   for  it  was  important 


MUKDEN  367 

to  keep  Bilderling  and  Kaulbars  under  the  menace  of 
attack. 

Behind  Okii's  Hnes  Nogi,  with  the  conquerors  of  Port 
Arthur,  had  begun  to  move  westwards  towards  the  Hun-ho. 
His  flank  march,  as  yet  unsuspected,  was  to  be  the  great 
surprise  of  the  battle  for  Kuropatkin,  who  thought  that  his 
other  flank  in  the  hills  was  the  real  danger-point. 

On  the  last  day  of  February  Kawamura's  two  columns 
had  traversed  the  Ta-lin  Mountains.  The  right  column  was 
before  Tita,  the  left  before  Ma-chun-tun.  Here  they  found 
their  further  advance  barred  for  a  week  by  lines  of  defensive 
works  strongly  held,  for  by  this  time  Kuropatkin  had  hur- 
ried up  a  whole  army  corps  from  his  center  to  reinforce 
these  positions  on  his  extreme  left. 

Kawamura  was  not  able  to  overcome  the  stubborn  re- 
sistance of  the  Russians  until  Kuroki  had  gradually  pushed 
forward  on  his  left,  and  was  able  to  reinforce  and  cooperate 
with  him.  Kuroki  had  been  provided  with  heavy  guns  and 
howitzers,  and  it  was  a  surprise  to  the  Russians,  holding 
the  fortifications  of  the  Wang-fu  and  Kau-tu  passes,  to  find 
that  the  Japanese  had  been  able  to  drag  this  formi(lal)lc' 
artillery,  with  ample  supplies  of  its  ponderous  ammunition, 
over  the  rugged,  snow-covered  mountain  roads.  After  a  two 
days'  bombardment  with  high  explosive  shells,  the  Wang-fu 
Pass  was  stormed  on  February  T.y.  Two  days  later  the 
Kau-tu  was  taken  after  a  series  of  desperate  hand-tu-hand 
conflicts,  in  which  the  Japanese  lost  more  than  2000  men. 

In  the  center,  Nozu,  on  February  27,  brought  all  his 
artillery  into  action  against  the  op]:)osing  lines,  and  his 
infantry  began  to  work  gradually  forward  with  the  caiuKin 
firing  over  them.\  At  several  i)oints  they  caiue  into  close 
action  with  the  Russians,  but  mostly  they  lay  in  the  snow, 
scraping  up  a  little  of  the  frozen  surface  soil  for  a  shelter. 
and  firing  at  the  nearest  Russian  trenches.  All  this  activity 
on    Nozu's   ])art    was   intended    merely   to   keep    Bilderling 


368  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

thoroughly  occupied.  The  real  work  was  being  done  on 
the  right  and  left. 

On  this  same  eventful  day  —  February  27  —  Nogi,  march- 
ing his  men  of  the  Fourth  Army  in  several  parallel  columns, 
began  to  cross  the  Hun  River  on  the  ice.  His  movement 
was  screened  for  a  while  by  Oku  engaging  Kaulbars  and 
sending  out  two  divisions  of  the  Second  Army  to  extend 
his  own  line  across  the  Hun-ho  and  threaten  to  overlap  and 
turn  the  Russian  flank.  Kaulbars  met  the  move  by  extend- 
ing and  throwing  back  his  own  right.  On  the  plain  beyond 
the  two  armies  a  screen  of  Japanese  cavalry  was  thrown  out 
to  the  northwestward.  Behind  these  Nogi  pressed  steadily 
on.  His  cavalry  crossed  the  frozen  Liao-ho,  marched  up 
its  western  bank,  drove  a  brigade  of  Cossacks  before  them, 
and  early  on  March  i  dashed  into  Sin-min-ting,  seized  the 
railway  station,  and  captured  enormous  quantities  of  sup- 
plies destined  for  Kuropatkin's  army. 

By  this  time  Nogi's  infantry  columns  were  wheeling  to 
face  eastwards  and  march  on  Mukden  ;  then  turning  both 
the  outer  line  of  works  and  the  inner  line  along  the  Hun-ho, 
Nogi's  right  joined  hands  with  Oku's  left.  In  front  of 
the  great  attack  thus  developing  from  the  westward,  Kaul- 
bars was  marching  brigades  and  divisions  in  hot  haste  to 
form  a  new  battle  line  running  north  and  south  on  the 
plain,  and  was  appealing  to  Kuropatkin  for  reinforcements. 

The  battle  was  now  more  than  half  won  by  the  Japanese. 
The  marvelous  marching  and  fighting  qualities  of  their  men 
are  evident  from  the  fact  that  Oyama  was  thus  able  to  at- 
tack an  army  practically  equal  in  numbers  to  his  own  by 
turning  both  its  flanks,  extending  his  two  wings  over  an 
enormous  crescent-shaped  front,  pivoting  these  extensions 
on  his  fortified  center,  and  threatening  to  crush  his  enemy 
between  the  encircling  horns  of  the  crescent.  Had  the  Rus- 
sians been  at  all  equal  to  their  enemies  in  initiative,  mobility, 
and  energetic  determination  in  the  actual  conflict,  it  would 


No.  27  —  Battle  of  Mukden,  III 

(Movements  of  March  2-6,  and  position  on  March  6) 


MUKDEN  .         369 

have  been  courtin,£^  destruction  for  Oyama  to  take  such 
risks.  For  Kuropatkin  would  have  shattered  the  hostile 
ring  by  a  concentrated  attack  from  the  interior  of  it  as  it 
tried  to  close  upon  him. 

In  the  first  days  of  March  this  closing-  in  made  steady 
progress.  Far  away  to  the  east,  in  the  mountain  country, 
General  Rennenkampf.  the  officer  in  command  of  the  troops 
assembled  to  oppose  Kawamura,  made  a  dogged  resistance 
about  Man-chu-tun  and  Tita ;  but  Kuroki  was  forcing  back 
Linievitch's  left  and  driving  a  wedge  in  between  him  and 
Rennenkampf,  and  presently  was  able  to  threaten  the  latter 
on  the  flank,  and  directly  to  reinforce  Kawamura.  Then  at 
last  the  Russian  resistance  broke  down :  Man-chu-tun  was 
taken  on  March  8,  and  Tita  on  the  following  day. 

By  this  time  the  Russian  defense  had  everywhere  col- 
lapsed. The  strain  under  which  it  gave  way  was  the  result 
of  Nogi's  pressure  from  the  westward.  His  advance,  unless 
held  back,  would  cut  the  railway,  and  there  was  nothing  in 
front  of  him  in  the  way  of  prepared  defenses  except  the 
weak  and  in  many  places  incomplete  western  works.  Kuro- 
patkin steadily  reinforced  the  line  which  Kaulbars  had 
formed  by  extending  and  throwing  back  his  corps  to  the 
west  of  Mukden.  This  improvised  battle  line  had  some 
fifteen  miles  of  front,  and  all  along  it  Nogi,  reinforced  by 
Oku,  was  attacking  by  day  and  by  night  with  furious  energy. 
Every  man  in  that  fighting  line  of  Japanese  felt  that  a  speedy 
victory  meant  the  destruction  of  the  Russian  army.  Kaul- 
bars was  struggling  to  prevent  a  Far  Eastern  Sedan.  In 
the  towns  and  villages  of  the  plain  there  were  days  and 
nights  of  reckless  fighting  at  close  quarters.  One  by  one 
they  were  stormed,  or  burned  and  wrecked  by  the  Japanese 
artillery.  But  it  was  only  at  the  cost  of  terrible  losses  that 
Nogi's  men  slowly  won  their  way  forward.  By  the  end  of 
the  first  week  of  March  some  of  his  battalions  were  reduced 
to  the  strength  of  companies. 


Zjo  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

But  to  reinforce  and  sustain  for  a  while  the  fighting  Hne 
to  the  westward,  Kuropatkin  had  been  compelled  seriously 
to  weaken  the  rest  of  his  defense.  On  the  seventh  Kuroki 
telegraphed  to  Nozu,  in  the  center,  to  tell  him  that  he  felt 
the  Russian  resistance  slackening  in  his  front,  and  sug- 
gesting to  his  colleague  that  if  he  pressed  the  attack  along 
the  Sha-ho  in  the  center,  he  also  would  probably  find  that  a 
considerable  part  of  the  garrison  of  the  Russian  works  there 
had  been  withdrawn. 

Nozu  took  the  hint.  His  infantry  was  sent  forward 
against  the  trenches  along  the  river,  and  met  with  only  a 
half-hearted  resistance,  for  the  Russians  were  already  actu- 
ally falling  back  to  the  lines  of  the  Hun-ho.  Kuropatkin 
had  issued  orders  for  a  general  retreat  on  Tie-ling. 

The  famous  fortified  lines  on  which  100,000  men  had 
toiled  for  months  thus  fell  almost  without  a  struggle,  under 
the  indirect  pressure  exercised  by  the  flank  attacks.  The 
eastern  attack  in  the  hills  had  drawn  the  Russian  reserves 
away  to  their  left,  and  so  facilitated  the  all-important  stroke 
across  the  plain  of  the  Liao-ho  against  their  right.  When 
the  danger  on  that  side  was  realized,  it  could  be  met  only 
by  bringing  men  up  by  weary  forced  marches  from  all  parts 
of  the  widely  extended  positions.  These  reinforcements 
arrived  by  driblets,  and  were  able  only  to  delay  the  Japanese 
advance.  Kuropatkin  could  not  exert  any  serious  influence 
on  the  course  of  events,  for  he  had  frittered  away  his  re- 
sources, and  had  no  large  body  of  fresh  reserves  that  could 
be  thrown  into  the  fight  to  act  with  a  definite  purpose,  as, 
for  instance,  by  a  well-organized  counter-attack  on  the  ad- 
vancing enemy  on  a  large  scale.  In  those  first  days  of 
March,  up  to  the  moment  when  he  decided  to  save  his  army 
by  abandoning  Mukden,  he  was  simply  stopping  the  gaps 
in  a  long  weak  line,  fighting  on  ground  where  he  never 
anticipated  a  serious  encounter  with  the  enemy. 

As    Bilderling   gave   way   before    Nozu,    so   to   his   left 


No.  28  —  Battle  of  Mukden,  IV 

(Movements  of  March  7  and  8,  and  position  on  March  g,  igos) 


MUKDEN  371 

Linievitch,  after  sending  off  more  men  than  he  could  safely 
spare  on  the  long  march  to  reinforce  Kaulbars,  found  him- 
self so  weakened  that,  even  before  the  general  order  for  the 
retreat  reached  him,  he  was  retiring  before  Kuroki's  attacks. 
Kawamura's  left  column,  with  one  of  Kuroki's  divisions, 
pushed  on  to  the  Hun-ho,  opposite  Fu-shun.  The  weather 
had  suddenly  become  milder.  The  ice  on  the  Hun  was 
breaking  up,  and  it  was  with  great  difficulty  that  the  Japa- 
nese got  their  guns  over  the  river.  They  crossed  it  on  the 
ninth,  and  found  the  enemy  abandoning  the  lines  along  the 
north  bank.  By  midnight  the  walled  town  of  Fu-shun  was 
occupied  after  a  brief  rearguard  action. 

Nogi's  advance  from  the  westward,  and  Nozu's  victorious 
crossing  of  the  Sha-ho,  south  of  Mukden,  had  all  but  cut 
off  a  considerable  mass  of  Russian  troops  who  had  held  the 
fortified  lines  west  of  the  Sha-ho  railway  bridge.  Here 
some  thousands  of  Russians  were  made  prisoners.  Through- 
out the  ninth  and  tenth  Kuropatkin  was  fighting  no  longer 
for  victory,  but  only  to  hold  back  Nogi  from  the  railway  and 
the  Tie-ling  road  long  enough  to  extricate  as  nnich  of  his 
army  as  possible  from  the  closing  horns  of  the  crescent. 
He  no  longer  opposed  a  mere  passive  resistance  to  the 
terrible  pressure  from  the  westward ;  he  organized  more 
than  one  counter-attack,  and  the  Russians  fought  well 
enough  to  gain  some  little  breathing  time. 

But,  all  the  same,  the  tenth  was  the  crowning  day  of 
victory  for  Oyama.  He  need  no  longer  remain  in  the 
center  of  his  web  of  telegraph  wires,  receiving  reports, 
marking  off  positions  on  his  map,  sending  out  orders.  He 
could  now  leave  it  to  his  subordinate  commanders  to  reap 
the  fruits  of  the  three  weeks'  struggle  for  victory.  He 
rode  forward  early  in  the  day  towards  Mukden,  to  see  the 
closing  scenes. 

Along  the  Sha-ho,  far  as  the  eye  could  see  and  beyond 
the  range  of  sight,  extended  the  fortified  lines  from  which 


372  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

two  armies  had  watched  each  other  for  months.  They  were 
now  deserted.  The  great  siege  guns  were  silent.  Along 
the  captured  Russian  lines  there  were  only  the  ambulance 
men  and  burial  parties  of  impressed  Chinese  laborers  clear- 
ing away  the  wreck  of  battle.  Northwards,  Nozu's  vic- 
torious battalions  were  pressing  on  the  rear  of  the  retiring 
Russians,  who  had  abandoned  the  lines  of  the  Hun-ho,  and 
were  only  anxious  to  escape  through  the  suburbs  of  Muk- 
den. North  and  west  of  the  city  a  great  battle  was  raging 
for  miles.  The  Russians  were  making  their  last  stand';  and 
in  rear  of  the  fighting  line  trains  were  moving  along  the 
railway,  and  a  wide  stream  of  men,  horses,  guns,  and 
wagons  was  pouring  steadily  northwards  by  and  on  both 
sides  of  the  Tie-ling  road.  The  smoke  of  a  score  of  burn- 
ing villages  darkened  the  wintry  sky,  and  from  the  huge 
piles  of  stores  near  the  railway  station,  west  of  the  city, 
the  smoke  of  another  conflagration  began  to  ascend  as  the 
Russians  fired  the  magazines  they  M^ere  forced  to  abandon 
to  the  victors.  Far  away  from  the  hills  to  the  northeast 
came  the  dull  thunder  of  another  and  more  distant  can- 
nonade. There  Kuroki  and  Kawamura  were  hustling  the 
retreat  of  Linievitch's  army. 

Before  midday  Nozu,  after  receiving  the  surrender  of 
crowds  of  Russians,  had  ridden  forward  to  one  of  the  south 
gates  of  Mukden  and  received  the  surrender  of  the  city  from 
the  Chinese  civil  authorities,  to  whom  he  promised  the  pro- 
tection of  the  victors.  Everywhere  in  the  city  the  Red 
Cross  flag  was  flying.  It  had  become  a  vast  hospital  for 
the  Russian  wounded. 

North  of  the  city  thousands  more  of  prisoners  were 
taken.  The  rear  of  the  beaten  army  had  here  become  a 
mere  disorganized  crowd.  The  Japanese  artillery  sent  its 
shells  into  the  huddled  mass  of  men,  horses,  and  wagons, 
with  the  result  that  there  were  a  prompt  display  of  white 
flags  and  a  speedy  surrender.    Late  in  the  afternoon  Nogi's 


MUKDEN  373 

advance  cut  in  upon  the  railway  at  Pu-ho,  north  of  Mukden, 
and  stopped  all  further  traffic  along^  the  line.  Shortly  after 
this  the  heads  of  the  Jajianese  columns  were  across  the 
road.  Till  darkness  set  in  there  was  fierce  fighting  with 
the  rearguards  which  covered  the  retirement  of  the  enemy 
to  the  northward. 

During  the  succeeding  days  the  pursuit  was  so  vigorously 
pushed  that  Kuropatkin  decided  to  abandon  the  Tie-ling 
Pass  and  to  concentrate  towards  Harbin.  A  despatch  from 
St.  Petersburg  deprived  him  of  his  command,  and  in- 
trusted the  future  fortunes  of  the  Army  of  the  East  to  the 
veteran  Linievitch,  whose  long  resistance  to  the  advance  of 
Kawamura  and  Kuroki  had  made  him  for  the  Russians  the 
popular  hero  of  those  disastrous  days. 

But  there  were  to  be  no  more  great  battles  in  Man- 
churia. The  disorganization  of  Russia  at  home  by  the 
revolutionary  movement,  and  the  complete  destruction  of 
the  armada  sent  out  from  Europe,  when  it  met  Togo's  fleet 
in  the  straits  of  Tsu-shima,  compelled  the  Czar's  government 
to  ask  for  peace. 

The  Russian  losses  in  the  three  weeks'  battle,  and  es- 
pecially in  its  closing  stages,  were  enormous.  About  noon 
on  March  lo,  in  the  last  hours  of  the  fight,  Oyama  had 
telegraphed  to  Tokio :  "  We  have  taken  an  exceedingly  large 
number  of  prisoners  and  immense  quantities  of  arms,  am- 
munition, provisions,  forage,  and  war  material,  but  it  is 
as  yet  impossible  to  reckon  them  up."  To  this  day  there  is 
no  certainty  as  to  what  the  reckoning  really  was. 

The  Russian  Government  officially  admitted  a  loss  of 
96,500  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  or  prisoners.  But 
the  Japanese  stated  that  they  had  over  40,000  prisoners  in 
their  hands,  and  that  they  had  found  26,500  Russian  dead 
on  the  vast  battle-field.  They  further  estimated  the  number 
of  wounded  left  in  their  hands  or  sent  off  northwards  at 
some  90,000.     This  would  make  a  total  Russian  loss  of 


374  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

nearly    160,000    men,    or,    say,    about    half    their    fighting 
strength. 

The  Japanese  stated  their  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  at 
41,222  officers  and  men.  As  there  was  much  fierce  fighting 
at  close  quarters,  we  may  take  it  that  in  this  total  the  dead 
would  number  some  12,000  to  15,000.  Probably  the  united 
losses  of  both  sides  would  not  be  much  less  than  40,000 
killed  and  120,000  wounded  —  figures  so  large  that  one 
cannot  imagine  the  mass  of  human  misery  they  sum  up. 


CHAPTER    XV 

THE   BATTLE   OF   LULE   BURGAS 

October  28-31,  1912 

In  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-1878  the  decisive 
episode  was  the  struggle  for  Plevna.^  Having  repulsed  re- 
peated assaults,  Osman  Pasha  with  his  starving  army  tried 
to  fight  his  way  out,  but  was  wounded  and  compelled  to 
surrender.  After  this  no  effective  resistance  was  offered 
to  the  Russian  advance.  The  invaders  occupied  Adrian- 
ople,  then  practically  an  open  place.  There  was  only  a 
handful  of  troops  between  them  and  Constantinople.  The 
fortification  of  the  lines  of  Chatalja,  covering  the  ap- 
proach to  the  city,  had  barely  been  begun.  There  was  no 
hope  of  saving  the  capital.  Turkey  sued  for  peace,  and  an 
armistice  was  signed  at  Adrianople  on  January  31,  1878. 

This  was  followed  by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano,  which 
erected  Bulgaria  into  a  semi-independent  state,  after  it  had 
been  for  five  centuries  a  Turkish  province.  The  new  Bul- 
garia was  to  extend  from  the  Danube  to  the  shores  of 
the  Archipelago,  leaving  to  the  Turks  a  small  stretch  of 
territory  near  Constantinople.  Rut  the  European  powers 
protested,  and  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  narrower  limits 
were  assigned  to  the  new  principality,  and  the  district  be- 
tween the  northern  and  southern  chains  of  the  Balkans, 
from  the  upper  basin  of  the  Maritza  River  to  the  Black 
Sea,  was  formed  into  a  separate  province  to  be  known  as 
Eastern  Roumelia.     It  was  to  remain  under  the  rule  of  the 

*  See  chapter  viii. 


376  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Sultan,  but  was  to  have  a  Christian  governor  and  a  semi- 
independent  administration. 

Eastern  Roumeha  had  a  population  largely  of  Bulgarian 
origin  and  language,  and  there  was  also  a  considerable 
Bulgarian  element  in  the  Turkish  provinces  south  of  the 
Balkans,  especially  in  Macedonia.  The  politicians  of  Sofia 
from  the  very  first  hoped,  sooner  or  later,  to  win  dominion 
over  these  outlying  Bulgarian  districts  and  regain  the  fron- 
tiers assigned  to  the  principality  at  San  Stefano. 

A  necessary  factor  in  such  a  policy  was  the  creation  of 
a  powerful  army.  The  Bulgarian  army  was  in  its  earlier 
years  organized,  trained,  and  commanded  in  all  the  higher 
grades  by  officers  sent  from  Russia,  which  looked  on  the 
new  state  almost  as  an  outlying  province  of  the  Czar's 
Empire.  But  in  1885  the  principality  threw  off  this  Musco- 
vite tutelage,  and  almost  at  the  same  moment  a  movement, 
that  had  been  in  progress  for  some  time  for  the  union  of 
Eastern  Roumelia  with  Bulgaria,  came  to  a  head.  There 
was  a  revolution  at  Philippopolis,  the  capital  of  the  prov- 
ince ;  the  Turkish  flag  was  hauled  down,  and  Prince  Alex- 
ander of  Bulgaria  marched  his  army  across  the  passes,  to 
receive  the  homage  of  his  new  subjects  and  prepare  to 
meet  an  expected  armed  intervention  on  the  part  of  th^ 
Sultan. 

But  the  Turks  accepted  the  new  situation.  The  danger 
came  from  another  quarter.  The  Servians,  jealous  of  Bul- 
garia's sudden  increase  of  territory,  and  incited  by  the  ill- 
will  of  Russia,  were  marching  on  Sofia.  By  forced  marches 
the  Bulgarian  army  was  transferred  to  the  western  fron- 
tier. Only  a  few  weeks  before,  all  the  Russian  officers  had 
departed,  and  captains  had  suddenly  been  promoted  to  com- 
mand regiments,  brigades,  and  divisions.  But  these  young 
men  showed  that  there  were  born  soldiers  among  them. 
The  Servians  were  totally  defeated  in  the  three  days'  battle 
of    Slivnitza    (November    17-19,    1885),    and    the   way    to 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       377 

Belgrade  was  open  to  the  victors,  when  Austrian  diplomacy 
patched  up  a  peace  between  the  rival  Balkan  powers. 

A  Russian  intrigue  forced  Prince  Alexander  to  abdicate 
almost  on  the  morrow  of  his  victory,  and  after  a  regency 
of  some  months  Prince  Ferdinand  of  Coburg  was  elected 
to  the  vacant  throne.  His  policy  was  to  make  Bulgaria  the 
leading  power  in  the  Balkan  peninsula,  and  for  more  than 
twenty  years  he  was  patiently  preparing  for  the  day  when 
he  could  venture  to  challenge  Turkey  to  battle.  The  men 
who  had  led  the  Bulgarian  army  at  Slivnitza  devoted  them- 
selves to  the  task  of  training  the  whole  manhood  of  the 
principality  to  war.  And  meanwhile  an  organization,  which 
had  its  center  at  Sofia,  kept  the  Bulgarian  claim  to  Mace- 
donia before  the  world  by  exciting  more  than  one  insur- 
rection in  the  Turkish  province  and  maintaining  a  kind  of 
political  brigandage,  of  which  Turks,  Servians,  and  Greeks 
—  in  a  word  all  who  were  not  of  the  Bulgarian  race  — 
were  the  victims. 

At  last  Prince  Ferdinand  felt  himself  strong  enough  to 
declare  Bulgaria  independent  of  the  Sultan's  suzerainty  and 
to  proclaim  himself  king,  or  —  to  use  the  official  title  de- 
rived from  the  old  days  of  the  Bulgarian  Empire  in  the 
early  Middle  Ages  —  C:;ar  of  the  Bulgarians.  It  was  ex- 
pected that  the  Sultan  would  treat  this  action  as  a  challenge 
to  war,  but  Turkey  was  too  much  occupied  with  internal 
troubles  and,  after  a  formal  protest,  accepted  the  accom- 
plished fact. 

Successive  revolutions  at  Constantinople,  and  the  help- 
lessness of  the  Turks  in  the  war  with  Italy  about  Tripoli, 
made  the  politicians  of  the  Balkan  States  at  last  feel  that 
it  would  be  safe  to  venture  upon  a  war  of  aggression  against 
the  Porte.  Accordingly  in  the  spring  of  1912  they  agreed 
to  sink  their  mutual  differences  and  combine  their  forces 
for  what  thev  described  as  a  war  of  liberation,  that  was  to 
expel  the  Turk  from  Europe  and  free  the  Christians  of  the 


378  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Balkan  countries  from  his  yoke.  The  crusading-  element  in 
the  enterprise  made  it  popular  with  the  subjects  of  the  four 
allied  princes,  but  religion  had  really  very  little  to  do  with 
the  schemes  of  the  ambitious  politicians  and  soldiers  of 
Sofia  and  Belgrade,  Athens  and  Cettinje. 

So  the  Balkan  League  was  formed  —  an  alliance  of  Bul- 
garia, Servia,  Greece,  and  Montenegro.  Roumania,  a  Latin 
country,  held  aloof  from  what  was  mainly  a  Slav 
combination. 

The  allies  hoped  to  be  able  to  attack  Turkey  while  it 
was  still  involved  in  war  with  Italy,  but  on  the  very  eve 
of  hostilities  the  Sultan  abandoned  Tripoli  and  made  peace 
with  the  Italians.  Montenegro  moved  before  the  other 
allies  were  ready.  The  declaration  of  war  between  the  rest 
of  the  League  and  Turkey  came  on  October  17,  1912. 

The  Turks  were  not  really  ready  for  war,  but  they  com- 
mitted the  error  of  underestimating  the  fighting  force  of 
their  opponents.  Within  a  fortnight  Turkey  suffered  a 
series  of  defeats.  Servians,  Greeks,  and  Montenegrins 
gained  fairly  easy  successes  in  their  districts  of  the  theater 
of  war,  and  failed  only  where  two  of  the  fortresses  made 
an  obstinate  defense.  Collapse  was  the  characteristic  of 
the  Turkish  operations  in  the  open  field. 

But  the  most  serious  task  of  all  had  fallen  to  Bulgaria, 
and  on  the  success  of  her  arms  the  result  of  the  whole  war 
ultimately  depended.  Besides  supplying  a  contingent  for 
operations  in  Macedonia  in  combination  with  his  allies, 
King  Ferdinand  had  to  deal  with  the  main  Turkish  army 
in  Eastern  Thrace,  which  was  concentrating  to  bar  the  direct 
line  of  advance  on  Constantinople. 

With  a  population  of  less  than  four  millions,  Bulgaria 
had  called  more  than  300,000  men  to  arms.  It  was  a  stu- 
pendous effort  and  entailed  a  perilous  strain  on  the  resources 
of  the  country.  For  a  while  its  normal  life  had  to  cease. 
Bulgaria  is  chiefly  an  agricultural  country.     Village,  farm, 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LULE  BURGAS 


379 


and  field  were  swept  clear  of  every  able-bodied  man,  all  tbe 
horses  and  most  of  the  cattle.  Whole  herds  were  driven  off 
to  serve  as  a  reserve  of  meat  for  the  commissariat.  The 
draught-oxen  were  turned  over  to  the  transport,  and  the 
country  carts  were  requisitioned  with  them.  The  owners 
were  paid  in  paper  bonds  to  be  redeemed  after  the  war. 
There  was  a  similar  sweep-up  in  the  towns.  All  the  nun 
were  called  to  arms.  Every  shop  and  store  that  held  any- 
thing useful  for  war  was  cleared  out  by  requisition.  Women 
drove  the  tram-cars  in  the  cities.  Schoolboys  replaced  the 
postmen.  All  business  was  suspended.  The  foreign  bankers 
had  refused  a  loan.  The  emergency  was  met  by  paying  for 
all  that  was  requisitioned  in  treasury  bonds  and  making  a 
large  issue  of  paper  money. 

By  the  middle  of  October  all  the  ordinary  life  of  the 
country  had  come  to  an  end.  But  the  staff  of  the  army 
counted  upon  being  able  to  bring  the  war  to  a  successful 
conclusion  by  the  first  days  of  1913.  The  harvest  had  just 
been  reaped.  The  men  were  told  that  they  would  be  back 
to  plow  and  sow  their  fields  by  the  end  of  winter.  lUit 
to  accomplish  this  the  war  would  have  to  be  rushed  through 
and  serious  risks  taken. 

By  misleading  reports  in  the  press  the  Turks  were  made 
to  underrate  the  force  that  had  been  rapidly  got  together 
among  the  hills  north  of  Adrianople  and  Kirk  Kilisse.  On 
the  day  that  war  was  declared,  the  lUilgarians  had  already 
concentrated  on  this  part  of  the  frontier  three  armies  with 
a  combined  force  of  well  over  200,000  men.  On  the  right, 
waiting  for  the  word  to  march  down  the  Maritza  valley, 
was  the  Second  Army,  under  General  Ivanoff.  On  the  left, 
north  of  Kirk  Kilisse,  was  the  Third  Army,  under  General 
Dimitrieff.  Between  them,  looking  towards  the  opening 
of  the  Tundja  valley,  lay  the  First  Army,  under  General 
Kutincheff.  The  king,  with  his  headquarters  at  Stara 
Zagore  on  the  right  rear,  was  in  nominal  command  of  the 


38o  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES  " 

whole.  But  the  real  commander  was  his  "  chief  military 
adviser,"  General  Savoff,  who  had  for  years  been  the  or- 
ganizer of  the  army  and  was  the  author  of  the  plan  of 
campaign  on  which  it  was  now  to  act. 

The  Bulgarian  staff  was  on  the  whole  remarkably  well 
informed,  and  knew  that  the  Turks  were  not  ready  and 
that  their  army  was  badly  organized  and  only  partly  con- 
centrated. In  one  respect,  however,  the  information  pos- 
sessed by  General  Savoff  was  misleading.  He  believed  that 
Adrianople  was  ill-supplied  with  food  and  would  have  to 
surrender  very  soon  if  closely  blockaded.  The  fortress,  well 
protected  by  a  circle  of  outlying  forts  designed  by  German 
engineers,  was  a  strong  place,  and  effectually  closed  the 
main  road  and  the  railway  to  Constantinople.  There  is  a 
second  road  to  the  Turkish  capital  by  way  of  Kirk  Kilisse 
and  Bunarhissar,  mostly  a  mere  track  across  the  open  up- 
lands. To  the  east  of  this  line,  as  far  as  the  Black  Sea  coast, 
the  country  is  impracticable  for  an  army.  It  is  a  roadless 
tract  of  mountain  land  covered  with  dense  forests.  On  the 
eastern  road  there  was  no  serious  obstacle.  Savoff  knew 
that  Kirk  Kilisse,  though  generally  classed  as  a  fortress, 
was  really  an  open  town.  When  the  new  fortifications  were 
erected  at  Adrianople  after  the  Russian  war,  a  similar 
scheme  was  prepared  for  Kirk  Kilisse,  but  only  two  forts 
had  actually  been  erected,  and  these  were  weak,  badly  placed, 
poorly  armed,  and  now  in  bad  condition.  He  knew  also  that 
besides  the  garrison  of  Adrianople  the  Turks  had  pushed 
no  considerable  force  up  to  the  frontier.  Their  army  was 
concentrating  further  back.    His  plan  therefore  was : 

Ivanoff  with  the  Second  Army  to  advance  upon  and 
blockade  Adrianople. 

Dimitrieff  with  the  Third  Army  to  march  upon  Kirk 
Kilisse  and  take  it  by  direct  attack. 

Kutincheff  with  the  First  Army  to  support  the  movement 
by  interposing  between  Adrianople  and  Kirk  Kilisse,  and 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       381 

preventing  the  garrison  of  the  former  from  helping  their 
comrades  at  the  latter  place. 

These  operations  would  open  the  Kirk  Kilisse-Bunar- 
hissar  road.  Dimitriefif  would  advance  along  it.  Kutincheff 
would  move  across  country  south  of  Adrianople,  cut  the 
railway  and  advance  along  the  main  road  by  Lule  Burgas 
on  Chorlu,  keeping  in  touch  with  Dimitrieff  on  his  left. 
The  two  armies  would  combine  to  defeat  the  Turkish  main 
army,  and  if  possible  force  it  away  from  its  direct  line  of 
retreat  on  Constantinople.  For  this  purpose,  while  Kutin- 
chefif  attacked  it  in  front,  Dimitrieff  was  to  try  to  act 
against   its   right   flank  and  rear. 

The  Turks  had  nominally  five  army  corps  and  a  cavalry 
division  in  this  region  of  the  theater  of  war.  They  were 
supposed  to  number  over  200,000  men,  including  some  of 
the  Sultan's  best  troops.  The  general  expectation  in  Europe 
was  that  they  would  be  victorious. 

But  one  of  the  five  corps  never  existed  as  an  available 
unit.  It  was  to  have  constituted  the  reserve  of  the  army, 
but  the  regiments  destined  for  it  were  sent  one  by  one  to 
complete  the  garrisons  and  make  up  deficiencies  in  the  other 
corps.     These  were : 


Corps 

Commander 

Headqt'rs  in  peace  time 

First  Corps 

Second  Corps  .... 
Third  Corps     .... 
Fourth  Corps  .... 

Omar  Yaver. 
Torgut  Shefket. 
Mahmud  Mukhtar. 
Ahmed  Abouk. 

Constantinople. 
Itodosto. 
Kirk  Kiliss^. 
Adrianople. 

The  commander-in-chief  selected  by  the  War  Minister. 
Nazim  Pasha,  was  Abdallah  Pasha,  a  young  general, 
trained  by  the  German  reorganizer  of  the  Turkish  army, 
Von  der  Goltz.  Mahnnid  Mukhtar  Pasha  (a  son  of  (ihazi 
Mukhtar  Pasha,  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  war  with  Russia) 
was  also  a  favorite  pupil  of  the  Prussian  general  and  had 


382  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

served  for  a  while  in  the  German  Guard.  Ahmed  Abouk  was 
a  Circassian,  an  old  soldier,  with  more  of  the  traditional 
Ottoman  fighting  spirit  than  of  the  scientific  methods  of 
the  younger  men.  This  mingling  of  old  and  new  ways 
was  characteristic  of  the  whole  of  the  Sultan's  army.  The 
scheme  of  reorganization,  drawn  up  by  Von  der  Goltz,  had 
been  adopted,  but  had  not  yet  had  time  to  bear  fruit.  It  had 
gone  just  far  enough  to  destroy  much  of  the  old  army,  with- 
out yet  putting  a  new  fighting  machine  in  its  place.  Thus 
most  of  the  old  officers  had  been  removed  from  the  regi- 
ments, and  only  a  few  of  the  new  men  were  ready  to  re- 
place them.  The  army  was  from  the  first  terribly  short  of 
officers  of  any  kind. 

The  mobilization  had  proved  a  failure  for  want  of  time 
and  through  the  ill-advised  steps  taken  to  hurry  the  troops 
to  the  front.  The  Turks  have  always  been  a  minority  in 
their  European  provinces.  All  the  four  corps  assigned  to 
the  Eastern  Army  under  Abdallah  had  to  depend  on  drafts 
from  Asia  Minor  to  bring  them  up  to  their  war  strength. 
But  it  would  be  a  matter  of  some  weeks  for  most  of  these 
levies  even  to  reach  Constantinople.  In  Asia  Minor  there 
were  few  roads,  and  the  reservists  had  in  many  cases  to 
march  for  hundreds  of  miles  over  bad  roads.  Sea  tran- 
sport would  often  have  lightened  their  task,  but  up  to  the 
eve  of  the  war  the  Italian  fleet  held  hostile  command  of 
the  eastern  Mediterranean,  and  even  after  the  peace  with 
Italy  the  Turkish  fleet  made  no  effort  to  drive  away  the 
Greek  warships  that  were  cruising  in  the  Archipelago. 

To  bring  the  Turkish  regiments  up  to  war  strength  re- 
course was  had  to  various  expedients.  Volunteers,  many  of 
whom  had  never  till  then  handled  a  rifle,  were  enlisted. 
Thousands  of  men  were  passed  into  the  ranks  from  the 
second  line  of  the  Redif,  or  militia,  a  practically  untrained 
force.  A  further  and  very  serious  element  of  weakness 
was  the  fact  that  after  the  Young  Turk  Revolution  the  law 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       383 

of  conscription  had  been  extended  to  the  Christians.  This 
brought  into  the  ranks  numbers  of  Bulgarians,  Greeks,  and 
Armenians,  whose  loyalty  was  doubtful,  and  many  of  whom 
took  the  first  opportunity  that  offered  for  flight  or  surrender. 

Much  of  the  German  reorganization  scheme  existed  only 
on  paper.  Army  business  had  been  neglected  for  politics. 
The  commissariat  and  ambulance  services  were  in  such  a 
rudimentary  state  as  to  be  useless.  There  was  no  large 
reserve  of  ammunition,  and  no  means  for  its  rapid  distri- 
bution. The  four  army  corps  had  hardly  any  transport. 
None  of  them  had  a  field  telegraph  or  even  a  signal  corps. 

The  Turkish  army,  which  was  to  oppose  the  main  ad- 
vance of  the  Bulgarians,  was  thus,  when  the  war  broke 
out,  still  in  process  of  formation  out  of  very  defective 
materials.  Some  of  the  best  troops  had  been  diverted  from 
the  field  army  to  garrison  Adrianople.  Not  one  of  the  four 
army  corps  was  complete.  Three  of  them  (First,  Second, 
and  Fourth)  and  Salih  Pasha's  division  of  cavalry,  mus- 
tering less  than  a  thousand  sabers,  were  concentrating  on 
the  Adrianople  railway  from  Chorlu  to  Lule  Burgas,  the 
First  Corps  nearest  to  the  front.  Mahmud  Mukhtar  Pasha 
was  at  Kirk  Kilisse  with  most  of  his  corps  in  the  neighbor- 
hood. Von  der  Goltz  had  advised  that,  at  the  outset,  the 
Turks  should  stand  on  the  defensive,  holding  the  frontier 
fortresses,  but  concentrating  their  army  to  await  the  Bul- 
garian advance  on  a  strong  position  behind  the  upper 
Ergene  River,  near  Chorlu,  ground  that  could  be  further 
strengthened  by  intrenchments.  But  at  the  last  moment 
the  Sultan  abandoned  this  prudent  plan  and  ordered  a  gen- 
eral advance.  This  was  playing  into  the  hands  of  Savoff 
and  the  Bulgarians. 

As  they  crossed  the  border  the  three  Bulgarian  armies 
drove  in  the  small  detachments  that  were  watching  the  fron- 
tier. On  the  right  Ivanoff,  after  a  mere  skirmish,  captured 
the  town  of  Mustapha  Pasha  on  October  19,  and  pressed 


384  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

on  towards  Adrianople.  In  the  center  and  on  the  left 
Kntincheff  and  Dimitrieff  came  upon  the  heads  of  columns 
of  the  Third  Turkish  Corps,  sent  forward  by  Mahmud 
Mukhtar.  These  were  easily  forced  back  by  superior  num- 
bers. The  stress  of  the  fighting  fell  upon  Dimitrieff  and 
the  Third  Bulgarian  Army. 

Mukhtar  now  concentrated  a  considerable  part  of  the 
Third  Corps  to  hold  Kirk  Kilisse,  and  here,  on  October  24, 
the  first  serious  fighting  of  the  war  took  place.  The  Turks 
found  that  they  had  greatly  undervalued  their  opponents. 
Kirk  Kilisse  was  stormed,  the  two  forts  surrendered,  and 
Mukhtar  retired  along  the  Bunarhissar  road,  followed  up 
by  the  victors.  Omar  Yaver,  hurrying  up  to  his  assistance 
with  the  First  Corps,  ran  against  the  heads  of  Kutincheff's 
columns.  In  the  action  which  ensued  the  Turks  made  a 
poor  fight.  There  was  a  panic  among  the  new  recruits  of 
Omar's  regiments,  and  the  First  Corps  streamed  back 
towards  Lule  Burgas  in  a  disorderly  retreat  that  soon  de- 
generated into  a  flight. 

On  the  news  of  these  defeats  Abdallah  Pasha  pushed  the 
Second  and  Fourth  corps  forward  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Lule  Burgas,  with  Salih's  cavalry,  and  decided  to  risk  a 
battle,  which  proved  to  be  the  decisive  action  of  the 
campaign. 

The  country,  which  was  to  be  the  scene  of  the  great 
battle,  is  part  of  the  region  between  the  Ergene  River  and 
the  forest-clad  heights  of  the  Istrandza  Dagh.  From  the 
base  of  the  hills  the  ground  slopes  very  gent!y  towards  the 
river.  It  is  a  wide  stretch  of  open  rolling  downs,  in  which 
the  streams,  running  from  the  mountains  to  the  Ergene, 
have  worn  out  a  number  of  narrow  valleys,  the  only  breaks 
in  the  general  level.  There  is  little  cultivation  and  the 
villages  are  few.  The  roads  are  little  better  than  wagon 
tracks.  Along  the  course  of  the  streams,  here  and  there, 
one  finds  a  group  of  mud-built  huts.     After  a  few  hours 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       385 

of  rain  the  hollows  become  swampy,  and  the  roads,  even 
on  the  higher  ground,  difficult  for  guns  or  wheeled  traffic 
of  any  kind.  Otherwise  it  is  easy  to  traverse  the  country 
in  all  directions.  In  the  northern  part  of  the  district, 
towards  the  hills,  there  are  extensive  woods  near  Bunar- 
hissar  (the  "castle  by  the  spring")  and  Viza.  Towards 
the  river  the  country  is  all  open  and  almost  treeless,  except 
near  Lule  Burgas,  where  there  is  some  cultivation  and 
vineyards  cover  the  slopes  to  the  westward.  The  main 
road  from  Adrianople  to  the  capital  and  the  railway  line 
follow  the  course  of  the  river,  the  latter  being  carried 
across  the  loops  of  the  Ergene  by  iron-girder  bridges  on 
stone  piers. 

Mahmud  Mukhtar  had  retired  on  Viza  with  the  Third 
Corps,  followed  up  as  far  as  Bunarhissar  by  Dimitrieff 
and  the  Third  Bulgarian  Army.  It  would  seem  that  after 
the  vanguard  of  the  invaders  occupied  the  latter  town, 
Mahmud  Mukhtar  made  a  sudden  counter-stroke  and  drove 
them  out.  Dimitrieff's  despatch  to  headquarters  announc- 
ing this  check  caused  considerable  anxiety  there,  and  the 
rumor  spread  that  the  Turks  had  turned  back  and  re- 
captured Kirk  Kilisse  itself.  But  with  superior  numbers 
arrayed  against  him,  the  commander  of  the  Third  Corps 
could  not  hold  on  at  Bunarhissar.  He  continued  his  retreat 
to  Viza  and  asked  for  reinforcements,  and  above  all  for 
ammunition  and  supplies.  He  was  sent  some  relief  bat- 
talions originally  destined  for  the  reserve  corps. 

Abdallah  Pasha  had  sufficient  insight  to  guess  that  his 
opponent,  Savoff,  meant  to  use  Dimitrieff's  army  for  a 
blow  against  his  flank  and  rear,  that  might  seriously  en- 
danger his  line  of  retreat  on  the  capital.  When,  therefore, 
he  decided  on  making  a  stand  at  Lule  Burgas,  he  ordered 
Mahmud  Mukhtar  to  make  a  counter-attack  on  the  Bul- 
garians about  Bunarhissar.  in  order  to  check  their  further 
advance  and  keep  them  fully  occupied. 


386  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

The  fighting  thus  took  place  on  a  front  of  more  than 
20  miles,  though  there  was  a  considerable  gap  between 
the  left  of  Mahmud  Mukhtar's  force  advancing  from  Viza 
and  the  right  of  the  main  Turkish  army  near  Lule  Burgas. 
Here  Abdallah  had  chosen  for  his  position  the  line  of  high 
ground  forming  the  left  or  eastern  bank  of  the  narrow 
valley  through  which  the  Karagach  brook  runs  down  to 
the  Ergene.  Detachments  held  the  town  of  Lule  Burgas 
and  the  railway  station.  Part  only  of  the  First  Corps  had 
been  rallied,  and  a  considerable  number  of  fugitives, 
wounded  and  unwounded,  passed  through  the  lines  and 
continued  the  weary  tramp  eastwards,  accompanied  by 
great  numbers  of  refugees  from  the  district  already  over- 
run by  the  enemy,  —  men,  women,  and  children  bringing 
their  few  belongings  with  them  in  country  carts.  On  the 
hills  west  of  Lule  Burgas  a  rearguard  of  the  First  Corps 
had  halted  to  cover  this  exodus. 

On  the  main  position  the  Fourth  Corps  (Ahmed  Abouk) 
was  posted  on  the  left.  At  the  railway  bridge  over  the 
river  breastworks  had  been  erected  on  both  sides  of  the 
Ergene  and  on  the  southern  bank  trenches  had  been  dug 
to  bring  a  cross-fire  of  rifles  to  bear  on  the  approaches 
to  it.  Some  trenches  were  also  dug  along  the  crest  held 
by  the  main  battle  line.  In  the  center  was  posted  part 
of  the  First  Corps,  under  Omar  Yaver.  The  right,  facing 
Turk  Bey  and  extending  along  the  brook  to  Karagach 
village,  was  held  by  the  Second  Corps  under  Torgut 
Shefket.  Abdallah  Pasha  had  his  headquarters  behind  the 
center  at  the  village  of  Sakiskeui.  A  huge  grassy  mound 
close  to  the  village  —  perhaps  the  grave  of  the  dead  who 
fell  in  some  prehistoric  tribal  battle  —  afforded  a  lookout 
place  for  the  general  and  his  staff  commanding  a  wide 
view. 

Savoff  had  directed  Kutinchcff,  with  the  First  Bulgarian 
Army,  to  advance  on  Lule  Burgas.    He  was  reinforced  from 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       387 

Ivanoff's  army  before  Adrianople,  the  men  thus  withdrawn 
from  the  siege  of  the  fortress  being  replaced  by  bringing 
up  Servian  troops  by  rail  and  marching  up  new  levies  from 
Bulgaria  itself.  The  Bulgarian  forces  thus  available  for  the 
coming  battle  must  have  outnumbered  the  Turks  by  at  least 
50  per  cent.  None  of  Abdallah's  corps  were  complete. 
Troops  and  guns  were  still  coming  up  to  join  him.  At  no 
period  of  the  engagement  can  he  have  had  as  many  as 
100,000  men  in  line.  The  first  fighting  took  place  on  the 
afternoon  of  Monday,  October  28,  when  Kutincheff's  van- 
guard drove  in  the  Turkish  detachment  that  had  been  left 
on  the  high  ground  west  of  Lule  Burgas.  The  Turks  at 
sundown  still  held  a  tree-covered  ridge  above  the  town. 

On  Tuesday  morning  they  were  driven  from  this  posi- 
tion, which,  however,  they  had  no  intention  of  defending 
for  more  than  a  short  time,  for  so  far  it  was  on  the  part 
of  the  Turks  merely  a  delaying  action.  Behind  the  van- 
guard that  was  thus  clearing  the  way,  the  massive  columns 
of  infantry  and  artillery  of  Kutincheff's  army  were  moving 
into  position,  forming  up  on  the  heights  west  of  the  Kara- 
gach  hollow  and  extending  their  line  gradually  to  the 
northward  as  more  and  more  batteries  and  battalions  came 
up  to  the  front. 

By  midday  the  Bulgarian  gunners  were  sending  a  shower 
of  shells  into  Lule  Burgas.  For  two  hours  the  Turks  held 
on  to  the  place,  and  a  battalion,  intrenched  along  its  western 
side  and  lining  walls  and  inclosures,  drove  back  with  the 
fire  of  its  rifles  the  first  attempt  the  enemy  made  to  rush 
the  place  with  their  infantry.  South  of  the  town  Salih's 
cavalry,  with  the  carbine  fire  of  dismounted  men,  for  a 
while  successfully  defended  the  approach  to  the  railway 
station.  But  by  two  o'clock  the  increasing  fury  of  the  bom- 
bardment was  making  the  town  untenable,  and  a  Bulgarian 
firing  line,  working  gradually  forward  on  the  north  of  it, 
threatened  to  cut  off  the  retirement  of  the  garrison.     The 


388  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

Turks  withdrew  to  the  heights  to  the  eastward,  and  their 
retirement  uncovered  the  flank  of  Sahh's  cavalry  skir- 
mishers. Covered  by  the  fire  of  the  batteries  on  the  heights, 
Sahh  withdrew  his  men  behind  the  Hues  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  and  the  Bulgarians  rushed  the  railway  station. 

The  loss  of  these  advanced  points  was,  however,  of  no 
serious  importance.  Abdallah  Pasha  had  never  counted  on 
holding  them.  His  main  battle  line  was  intact,  and  his 
batteries  soon  made  Lule  Burgas  too  hot  for  the  victors 
to  remain  in  it.  During  the  afternoon  the  Ahmed  Abouk's 
men  on  the  Turkish  left  held  their  ground  well,  and  the 
artillery,  though  suffering  considerable  loss,  kept  up  a 
plucky  duel  with  the  Bulgarian  batteries  on  the  opposite 
heights.  Far  away  to  the  right  Mahmud  Mukhtar  had 
advanced  from  Viza  and  was  making  a  good  fight  against 
DimitriefFs  army.  In  the  center  Torgut  Shefket  actually 
gained  some  ground,  repelling  a  first  attack  of  the  Bul- 
garians and  then  pushing  forward  batteries  and  battalions 
about  Turk  Bey,  as  if  he  hoped  to  drive  in  the  left  of 
the  enemy's  main  attack  and  outflank  their  prolonged  firing 
linesi 

Abdallah  and  the  staff  were  very  hopeful  in  the  late  hours 
of  Tuesday  afternoon,  and  premature  news  of  victory  was 
sent  back  to  Constantinople.  But  there  were  very  dis- 
quieting features  in  the  situation.  As  the  day  went  on  the 
Bulgarians  were  bringing  more  and  more  batteries  into 
position,  all  of  them  armed  with  the  new  Schneider-Creusot 
quick-firers,  and  they  seemed  to  have  an  unlimited  supply 
of  ammunition,  for  they  kept  up  a  rapid  fire  hour  after 
hour.  The  training  of  the  gunners  was,  it  is  true,  not  as 
good  as  their  armament.  They  came  into  action  at  very 
long  ranges  and  burst  their  shrapnel  generally  too  high, 
and  they  wasted  hundreds  of  shells  on  ground  where  there 
were  few  hostile  troops.  But  if  they  thus  threw  away  many 
a  shell  by  wild  firing,  they  had  so  many  guns  and  such  a 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       389 

wealth  of  ammunition  at  their  disposal,  that  plenty  of  shots 
told  on  their  mark.  All  over  the  Turkish  position,  on  the 
fighting  lines  and  on  the  reserves  behind  them,  the  shower 
of  shrapnel  bullets  came  down  in  deadly  gusts  from  the 
bursting  shells.  Comparatively  few  men  were  killed  by  this 
bombardment,  but  the  number  of  wounded  was  enormous. 
And  often  when  one  man  was  wounded  it  meant  the  with- 
drawal of  two  or  more  from  the  fight,  for  there  were  few 
surgeons  with  the  army  and  no  ambulances  or  stretcher 
bearers.  Wounded  men  were  helped  rearwards  by  com- 
passionate or  half-hearted  comrades.  There  was  no  help 
at  hand  for  them,  and  their  one  hope  was  that,  after  roughly 
bandaging  their  wounds,  they  could  plod  wearily  back  over 
the  long  miles  to  Chorlu  and  there  obtain  railway  transport 
to  hospital,  perhaps  as  far  off  as  the  capital  itself.  So 
during  the  day  some  thousands  joined  the  stream  of  fugi- 
tives that  was  straggling  eastwards  behind  the  fighting  line. 
Just  before  sundown  there  came  a  sudden  change  in  the 
situation  on  the  Turkish  center.  Kutincheff,  anxious  at 
the  advance  of  the  Second  Corps  against  his  left,  had  rein- 
forced that  part  of  the  line,  and  the  Bulgarians  made  a 
counter-attack  that  swept  everything  before  it  and  drove 
Torgut  Shefket's  men  back  to  their  original  position  on  the 
heights.  The  Bulgarian  infantry  showed  itself  as  anxious 
to  come  to  close  quarters  as  the  Japanese  had  been  on  the 
battle-fields  of  Manchuria.  The  men  went  into  the  fight 
full  of  a  fanatical  personal  hatred  of  the  enemy  and  with 
the  determination  in  each  man's  breast  that  he  would  try  to 
kill  at  least  one  Turk,  and  kill  him  with  the  bayonet.  So 
in  battle  the  Bulgarians  showed  a  disposition  to  get  out  of 
hand,  not  with  any  tendency  to  go  backward,  but  with  a 
wild  impulse  to  disregard  the  lessons  they  had  learned  on 
the  parade  ground,  and  close  with  the  Turks  in  a  fierce  rush, 
reckless  of  the  cost.  As  the  firing  lines  went  forward,  sud- 
denly some  of  the  rank  and  iile  would  raise  tlie  cry  "  Na 


390  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

nas!"  ("With  the  bayonet!"  Hterally,  With  the  knife!) 
and,  despite  the  counter-orders  of  the  officers,  the  men  would 
spring  up  and  surge  forward,  followed  by  the  supports  — 
followed  even  by  battalions  breaking  away  from  the  reserves. 
It  was  before  such  a  rush  as  this  that  Torgut  Shefket's  Corps 
was  driven  in.  Only  the  close  fire  from  trench  and  battery 
on  the  heights  stopped  the  onset.  The  Bulgarians  paid 
dearly  for  their  success.  The  ground  in  front  of  the  Second 
Turkish  Corps  was  heaped  with  dead.  But  in  their  half- 
savage  temper  the  Bulgarians  could  endure  heavier  losses 
than  the  tactician  usually  takes  in  account. 

Darkness  ended  the  fighting.  The  Turks,  though  they 
had  held  their  ground,  were  in  a  pitiful  plight.  It  was 
bitterly  cold,  but  on  those  bare,  treeless  uplands  few  could 
find  enough  fuel  to  light  a  fire.  In  parts  of  the  position 
there  was  no  water.  And  worst  of  all,  there  was  hardly 
any  food.  Whole  battalions  had  eaten  nothing  all  day,  and 
now  had  to  spend  as  best  they  could  a  chilly,  foodless,  and 
almost  sleepless  night.  Even  some  of  the  generals  had 
nothing  to  eat  and  spent  most  of  the  night  walking  about, 
for  sleep  in  the  cold  was  impossible.  There  was  no  help 
for  the  wounded.  The  dead  were  left  unburied.  Many 
regiments  stood  to  their  arms  again  and  again  during  the 
hours  of  darkness,  when  there  came  a  false  alarm  that  the 
enemy  were  advancing.  On  these  occasions  there  were  some 
local  panics,  and  many  more  fugitives  stole  away  under  the 
cover  of  night,  unable  or  unwilling  to  endure  the  strain  any 
longer. 

As  the  sun  rose  on  Wednesday,  October  30,  a  white  mist 
hung  over  the  valleys  and  the  slopes  of  the  downs,  and 
for  some  time  the  gunners  on  both  sides  could  not  see  far 
enough  to  bring  the  artillery  into  action.  As  the  day  grew 
warmer  and  the  mists  cleared  away,  the  cannonade  began 
again.  It  was  soon  evident  that  Savofif  had  brought  up  all 
his    reserve   batteries   during   the   night,    and   the   Turkish 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LULE  BURGAS 


391 


artillery  was  heavily  outnumbered.  The  enemy  too  seemed 
to  have  an  unlimited  supply  of  ammunition  available,  but 
the  Turkish  gunners,  after  the  expenditure  of  the  previous 
day,  saw  to  their  dismay  that  they  had  very  little  left.  Had 
there  been  a  vestige  of  real  organization  in  the  Sultan's 
army,  ammunition  columns  would  have  come  up  during 
the  night  and  a  regular  distribution  would  have  been  made 
to  renew  the  supply  of  shells  and  cartridges  for  the  artillery 
and  infantry.  But  the  only  reserve  was  made  up  of  a  few 
wagon-loads  that  arrived  during  the  morning,  accompanied 
by  some  battalions  of  Redif  or  militia  infantry. 

It  was  no  wonder,  therefore,  that  during  the  morning  the 
fire  of  the  Turkish  artillery,  slow  from  the  first,  began  to 
slacken  still  more.  Some  of  the  unfortunate  batteries  had 
each  to  fight  six  times  the  number  of  hostile  guns.  The 
loss  among  the  gunners  was  heavy.  The  enemy  shot  well. 
After  the  fight  it  was  seen  that  numbers  of  the  Turkish 
guns  had  their  shields  nearly  knocked  out  of  all  shape  by 
fair  hits  of  the  enemy's  shells.  By  noon  numbers  of  the 
batteries  were  silent.  Either  their  fire  had  been  crushed 
out,  or  their  last  available  shell  had  been  fired.  And  still 
the  storm  of  shrapnel  from  the  enemy's  long  lines  of  canufMi 
rained  destruction  on  the  Turkish  positions,  and  hundreds 
of  wounded  were  constantly  dribbling  away  to  the  rear. 
Others  lay  with  the  dead  in  the  trenches  and  on  the  open 
ground. 

General  Savoll'  for  some  hours  seemed  to  rely  chielly 
on  the  effects  of  this  bombardment  to  break  down  the 
Turkish  resistance,  lie  developed  the  attack  of  the  P>ul- 
garian  infantry  with  a  slow  deliberation  that  was.  perhaps, 
inspired  by  the  fear  that,  if  pushed  forward  too  rapidly, 
they  would  again  get  out  of  hand  and  throw  themselves 
prematurely  upon  the  unshaken  Turkish  lines  in  disorderly 
onsets  that  might  end  in  disaster.  On  the  left,  however, 
the  hamlet  of  Turk  Bey  was  taken  after  a  brief  resistance. 


392  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

But  along  the  greater  part  of  the  hne  the  Bulgarian  infantry 
for  a  considerable  time  did  no  more  than  exchange  long- 
range  fire  with  the  Turks  in  the  trenches  on  the  opposite 
slopes.  Far  away  to  the  northward,  Mahmud  Mukhtar  was 
making  a  good  fight,  and  gradually  driving  Dimitrieflf's 
men  back  upon  Bunarhissar.  This  prevented  the  flank 
attack  proposed  by  Savoff  on  the  main  position  being  even 
attempted. 

At  the  other  extremity  of  the  battle-field  the  first  serious 
attack  was  made  by  the  Bulgarians  soon  after  midday.  Its 
objective  was  the  extreme  left  of  the  Turkish  position. 
Screened  by  the  plantations  on  the  low  ground  south  of 
Lule  Burgas  a  large  force  of  infantry  was  concentrated. 
To  prepare  the  way  for  its  attack  the  Bulgarian  artillery 
showered  its  shells  upon  the  positions  near  the  railway 
bridge,  and  the  slopes  to  the  northeast  of  it.  Then  sud- 
denly the  firing  line  of  infantry  pressed  forward,  and  be- 
hind it  came  line  on  line  with  fixed  bayonets,  charging 
forward  in  the  grim  silence  that  often  accompanied  a  Bul- 
garian advance.  In  the  rush  the  rearward  lines  overtook 
those  in  front,  and  the  charge  became  a  dense  mass  of  men. 
Before  this  attack  the  Turks  at  the  bridge  head  gave  way, 
and  it  seemed  that  the  bridge  itself  would  be  won. 

But  its  main  defense  was  still  untouched.  From  trenches 
at  the  southern  end  of  the  bridge,  and  from  others  on  the 
left  bank  at  the  bend  of  the  river  there  came  a  heavy  cross- 
fire of  musketry.  On  the  height  to  the  northeast  the  Turkish 
gunners  swung  round  their  pieces  and  sent  a  shower  of 
shells  into  the  mass  of  hostile  infantry.  The  Bulgarians 
could  not  stand  this  converging  fire  and  fell  back  to  the 
plantations  from  which  they  had  advanced. 

There  was  a  lull  in  the  battle.  The  unequal  artillery 
duel  continued,  but  the  infantry  on  the  Bulgarian  side  for  a 
while  either  remained  on  the  ground  it  held,  or  moved 
forward  very  cautiously.     The  Fourth  Corps,  on  the  Turk- 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       393 

isli  left,  was  very  short  of  ammunition  by  this  time,  and 
was  suffering  heavy  loss  and  could  do  little  more  than  make 
a  show  of  defense.  For  Abdallah  Pasha  the  fact  that  his 
army  had  so  far  held  its  ground  was  of  little  value,  for  he 
was  fighting  under  conditions  that  made  it  impossible  for 
him  to  maintain  much  longer  a  purely  defensive  attitude. 
Could  he  have  held  on  persistently  and  improved  the  in- 
trenchments  along  his  front,  repelled  the  Bulgarian  attacks, 
and  gradually  worn  down  the  enemy's  force,  he  might  hope 
that  Mahmud  Mukhtar  would  gain  a  victory  on  the  right 
and  then  turn  upon  the  exposed  flank  of  the  Bulgarian 
line.  But  with  a  starving  army,  that  was  besides  running 
short  of  ammunition,  he  could  not  afford  to  play  this  wait- 
ing game.  There  were  barely  enough  shells  and  cartridges 
left  to  make  some  show  of  replying  to  the  enemy's  fire. 
Of  food  there  was  next  to  none.  Thousands  in  that  hapless 
army  had  not  eaten  a  morsel  for  twenty-four  hours,  and 
some  had  starved  for  nearly  two  days.  It  is  an  almost 
incredible  scandal  that  such  a  state  of  things  should  be 
possible  with  an  army  fighting  on  European  ground,  in  its 
own  territorv  and  with  a  railway  running  back  to  its  base 
from  the  flank  of  the  position.  But  so  it  was.  Only  men 
like  the  patiently  enduring  Turkish  peasants,  who  filled  the 
ranks,  could  have  borne  such  privations  so  long.  But  to 
subject  the  men  to  a  continuance  of  the  strain  was  im- 
possible. y\b(lallah  knew  that  before  sundown  he  must 
make  an  effort  at  all  risks  to  obtain  some  decisive  result, 
for  he  could  not  afford  to  await  the  leisurely  development 
of  Savoff's  attack. 

His  most  efficient  force  was  the  Second  Corps,  com- 
manded by  Torgut  Shefket.  During  the  day  it  had  been 
joined  by  several  battalions  coiuing  up  from  Chorlu  with 
food  in  their  haversacks  and  plenty  of  cartridges  on  their 
belts.  He  therefore  sent  word  to  Torgut  to  make  a  counter- 
attack on  the  Bulgarians  about  Turk  Bey  with  every  avail- 


394  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

able  man.  At  the  same  time,  to  divert  the  attention  of  the 
enemy  from  the  preparations  for  this  move  and  perhaps 
to  lure  them  into  another  attack  on  the  bridge,  he  ordered 
a  division  of  Ahmed  Abouk's  sorely  tried  corps  on  the 
left  to  fall  back  some  distance  from  the  crest  of  the  ridge, 
that  was  swept  by  the  hostile  artillery. 

Now  came  the  crisis  of  the  battle.  What  followed  is  best 
described  in  the  striking  words  of  a  soldier  who  watched  it, 
a  veteran  of  many  campaigns.^ 

"  It  was  between  two  and  three  in  the  afternoon,"  he  sa3'S, 
"  when  the  center  division  of  Ahmed  Abouk's  Corps  began  to  retire 
from  its  forward  position.  The  first  movement  of  the  infantry 
was  heralded  by  a  crash  of  artillery  fire.  The  Bulgarian  gunners 
had  evidently  been  expecting  some  change  in  position,  either  for- 
ward or  backward,  on  this  front.  As  the  Turkish  infantry  got  up 
slowly  out  of  their  trenches  and  trooped  back  to  the  rear  with 
dignified  deliberation,  salvos  of  shrapnel  burst  above  heir  heads. 
The  whole  firmament  seemed  to  be  turned  into  a  Hades  by  the 
whip-like  crackling  of  this  devilish  instrument  of  war.  Let  the 
Bulgarian  gunners  burst  their  shrapnel  never  so  rapidly,  never  so 
accurately,  they  were  unable  to  make  those  Turkish  troops  move  one 
pulse  more  quickly  than  if  their  retirement  were  a  parade  operation. 

"  Then  on  the  far  right,  from  the  direction  of  Turk  Bey,  arose 
another  tumult.  The  head  of  Torgut  Shefket's  counter-attack  had 
risen  out  of  the  trenches.  The  Second  Army  Corps  was  making  its 
supreme  effort.  Down  the  slope  came  the  brown  infantry  in  rapidly 
moving  lines.  Of  a  truth  the  Turk  had  taken  the  offensive.  It  was 
a  wonderful  spectacle,  and  for  the  moment  it  looked  as  if  the  suc- 
cession of  waves  must  be  irresistible.  On  and  on  they  came  like  a 
swarm  of  bees  leaving  a  disturbed  hive.  Then  suddenly  from  in 
front  of  them  came  a  crash  of  fire.  It  was  as  if  a  million  rifles 
were  firing  as  one.  The  shrapnel  from  overhead  was  as  nothing  in 
comparison  with  this.  It  seemed  as  if  the  whole  line  of  advancing 
Turks  shuddered  under  the  shock.  There  was  no  period  to  the 
crash ;  it  was  but  a  prelude  to  a  sustained  series  that  demonstrated 
to  the  utmost  the  devastating  power  of  the  modern  firearm. 

"  The  line  of  advancing  Turks  shuddered  and,  shuddering,  the 
men  seemed  as  if  they  had  been  shaken  from  their  balance  by  some 
gigantic  earthquake.    .With  one  impulse  four  to  five  thousand  men 

'  Mr.  Lionel  James,  Correspondent  of  the  London  Times.  See  his 
work  "  With  the  Conquered  Turk,"  pp.  125-000. 


Bulgarians  ate 

Turks;  liD  Injantry  [^  Cavalry 

0ll.'S*f67 


No.  30  —  Battle  of  Lule  Burgas 
(Position  in  the  afternoon  of  October  30,  191 2) 


1 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS       395 

had  thrown  themselves  on  their  faces.  The  impetus  had  gone  out 
of  the  attack.  There  was  a  lull  in  the  crash  of  fire  from  the 
plantations  surrounding  Turk  Bey.  Spasmodic  efforts  were  made 
by  the  Turks  to  infuse  life  again  into  the  movement.  These  efforts 
were  but  the  signal  for  further  outbursts  of  terrific  fire  from  the 
enemy,  whilst  the  whole  hillside  seemed  shrouded  in  the  dust  which 
the  shrapnel  and  rifle  bullets  churned  up  around  the  prostrate  Turks. 
The  forward  impetus  was  killed. 

"  Suddenly  there  was  another  movement.  Again  the  hoarse- 
throated  quick-firers  spoke.  Again  the  wicked  automatics  poured 
forth  their  leaden  stream  of  destruction.  Again  the  Mannlicher 
breechblocks  worked  to  the  fullest  extent  of  their  mechanism.  The 
great  counter-attack  had  failed,  and  the  survivors  were  flying  back 
to  the  cover  of  their  position." 

On  the  left  the  partial  retreat  of  the  Fourth  Corps  and 
the  spectacle  of  Torgut's  failure  had  shaken  the  whole  of 
the  troops.  Ahmed  Abouk's  men  and  the  detachments  of 
Omar  Yaver's  Corps  on  their  right  began  a  general  retire- 
ment. The  officers  had  been  few  in  numbers,  even  at 
the  beginning  of  the  battle,  and  an  enormous  proportion 
of  them  had  already  been  killed  or  wounded.  It  was  there- 
fore all  the  more  difficult  to  steady  the  broken  ranks.  Salih 
Pasha  brought  up  his  cavalry  and  dismounted  a  long  line 
of  skirmishers  to  check  for  a  while  the  Bulgarian  advance. 
In  the  center  Torgut  made  another  attempt  to  attack,  which 
ended  even  more  quickly  and  disastrously  than  the  first. 
Two  batteries,  hurried  to  the  front  to  cover  the  movement, 
lost  in  a  few  minutes  most  of  their  men  and  horses  under 
the  concentrated  fire  of  more  than  sixty  hostile  guns. 

It  was  clear  that  the  fight  was  now  lost  for  Turkey. 
Even  on  the  far  right  Mahmud  Mukhtar's  advance  had 
been  stopped.  Until  the  afternoon  of  the  thirtieth  he  had 
made  steady  though  slow  progress,  but  by  this  time  SavofT 
had  reinforced  Dimitrieff's  army  with  all  the  men  and 
guns  he  could  spare  from  the  Bulgarian  right,  and  after 
three  o'clock  the  Turks  gained  no  further  ground. 

On  the  main  battle-field  that  afternoon  a  considerable 
part  of  the  Fourth  and  First  corps  had  begun  to  retreat 


396  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

towards  Chorlu.  All  who  saw  this  first  stage  of  the  Turkish 
retirement  agree  that  at  the  outset  it  was  perfectly  orderly. 
The  Bulgarian  guns  kept  up  a  heavy  fire,  so  that  over  the 
heads  of  the  retiring  troops  the  air  was  full  of  the  white 
smoke  rings  and  bright  flashes  of  the  bursting  shells.  But 
the  Turks  simply  shook  themselves  out  into  long  lines,  and 
the  wide  expanse  of  the  downs  was  dotted  with  men  walk- 
ing steadily  in  this  loose  order,  without  hurry  or  excitement, 
and  regardless  of  the  hostile  fire,  which  made  fewer  cas- 
ualties among  them  than  might  have  been  expected. 

Strange  to  say,  the  Bulgarians  made  no  attempt  to  rush 
the  position,  though  it  was  by  this  time  partly  abandoned. 
Only  a  few  guns  kept  up  a  slow  fire  from  the  crest  on  the 
left,  but  in  the  center  Torgut  Shefket  still  had  his  men 
well  in  hand  and  held  on  to  the  ground  opposite  Turk 
Bey.  It  would  seem  that  the  victors  themselves  were  ex- 
hausted by  the  protracted  struggle  and  in  no  mood  for  a 
further  effort  to  go  forward. 

The  night  that  followed  was  a  time  of  utter  misery,  both 
for  the  Turkish  troops,  who  still  kept  their  ground,  and  for 
those  who  were  wearily  plodding  through  the  darkness 
towards  Chorlu.  These  last,  famished,  exhausted,  encum- 
bered with  wounded  men  and  civilian  fugitives,  and  with 
the  cholera  already  claiming  victims  among  them,  were 
rapidly  becoming  a  mere  mob.  The  tales  told  of  their  hav- 
ing committed  atrocities  on  Bulgarian  peasants  who  fell 
into  their  hands  seem  to  have  had  no  foundation.  Few  of 
the  Bulgarians  of  the  district  had  remained  so  far  in  their 
farms  and  villages.  The  European  correspondents  who 
shared  the  miseries  of  the  flight  to  Chorlu  spoke  with  ad- 
miration of  the  patience  of  the  beaten  Turks,  of  courtesies 
they  received  from  men  and  officers,  one  Englishman  telling 
how  a  hungry  soldier  even  insisted  on  sharing  a  small  loaf 
with  him. 

Abdallah   Pasha  spent  the  night  at  Sakiskeui  with  his 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS      397 

staff.  Early  in  the  morning-  he  mounted  with  his  staff  and 
began  the  dreary  ride  back  to  Chorlu  amid  the  wreck  of 
his  army.  Torgut  Shefket,  with  what  was  left  of  his  corps, 
acted  for  a  while  as  a  rearguard,  holding  on  to  the  ground 
near  Turk  Bey  with  a  few  guns  and  many  rifles  in  action, 
until  at  last  the  Bulgarians  moved  up  the  heights  between 
him  and  the  Ergene  River  and  he  had  to  go.  The  only 
pursuit  that  the  victors  attempted  was  to  push  forward 
some  batteries  that  shelled  the  retiring  Turks,  whose  re- 
treat, orderly  at  first,  soon  became  a  broken  flight.  If 
Savoff  had  had  a  brigade  of  cavalry  with  him,  he  might 
have  collected  thousands  of  prisoners.  If  even  some  of 
his  infantry  and  artillery  had  been  fresh  enough  to  make 
a  short,  forced  march,  the  result  would  have  been  the  cap- 
ture of  great  numbers  of  the  Sultan's  broken  army.  But 
pursuit  there  was  none. 

While  the  last  remnants  of  the  Second  Corps  abandoned 
the  field  the  thunder  of  cannon  still  came  from  the  north- 
ward. Mahmud  Mukhtar,  reinforced  by  a  division  of 
Redifs,  had  renewed  the  fight  before  Bunarhissar.  During 
the  whole  of  the  thirty-first  he  continued  the  fight,  appar- 
ently in  ignorance  of  the  fate  that  had  overtaken  the  rest  of 
the  army.  It  was  not  till  the  morning  of  November  i  that 
he  realized  that  to  hold  on  any  longer  would  be  to  have 
the  whole  of  Savoff's  army  on  his  hands ;  and  to  avoid 
utter  disaster  he  began  his  retreat  through  the  wooded 
country  towards  Viza.  But  after  leaving  the  battle-field 
there  was  something  like  a  panic  among  his  men.  Some 
regiments  held  together.  Others  broke  up  into  a  mob  of 
fugitives.  Some  of  the  artillery  drivers  even  unhooked 
their  teams  when  they  found  the  gun  wheels  sticking  in 
the  muddy  track  and,  abandoning  the  guns,  rode  off  through 
Viza,  never  halting  till  they  reached  the  railway  line.  Here 
again  there  was  no  pursuit.  Two  days  after  the  battle 
Mahmud  Mukhtar  was  able  to  send  back  a  party  with  400 


398  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

draught  oxen,  which  brought  back  with  them  a  number  of 
guns  that  had  been  thus  left  on  the  road. 

At  Chorlu  the  wounded  and  many  unwounded  fugitives 
crowded  the  trains  that  went  oE  in  succession  to  Constanti- 
nople. Every  carriage  was  packed.  The  roofs  were 
crowded,  and  men  hung  on  footboards  and  buffers.  Others 
plodded  along  the  roads,  many  dying  by  the  wayside  of 
sickness,  wounds,  and  exhaustion.  At  Chorlu  Ahmed  Abouk 
rallied  part  of  his  corps  and  held  the  village  for  some  days, 
while  Salih  with  his  cavalry  watched  for  the  first  signs 
of  a  renewed  advance  of  the  Bulgarians.  But  for  some 
days  the  invaders  made  no  further  move.  This  gave  time 
for  the  beaten  army  to  reach  the  lines  of  Chatalja,  covering 
the  capital,  where  it  was  reorganized  and  joined  by  large 
reinforcements  from  Asia. 

There  were  no  newspaper  correspondents  present  at  the 
battle  on  the  Bulgarian  side,  and  the  accounts  sent  to 
Europe  by  various  journalists,  who  were  no  nearer  the 
battle-field  than  King  Ferdinand's  headquarters  at  Stara 
Zagora  in  Bulgaria  itself,  or  the  frontier  town  of  Mustapha 
Pasha  —  accounts  based  on  information  received  from  the 
staff  —  represented  the  battle  of  Lule  Burgas  as  having 
been  a  fight  to  a  finish,  ending  in  the  victors  storming  the 
Turkish  positions  and  routing  the  Sultan's  army.  This 
version  of  what  occurred  was  generally  accepted,  until  a 
comparison  of  the  story  with  the  narratives  of  several  inde- 
pendent and  experienced  war  correspondents  on  the  other 
side,  and  that  of  a  German  officer  serving  on  the  Turkish 
staff,  showed  that  the  defense  had  collapsed  for  the  reasons 
already  explained,  before  the  Bulgarian  attack  was  driven 
home,  and  that  the  only  prolonged  close  fighting  was  on 
the  Turkish  right  before  Bunarhissar.  The  Bulgarian  offf- 
cial  accounts  also  erred  in  representing  the  fighting  as  hav- 
ing been  continued  for  three  days  longer,  ending  with  a 
fierce  struggle  for  the  heights  along  the  Ergene  near  Chorlu, 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS      399 

where,  as  we  have  seen,  Ahmed  Abouk  was  able  to  rally  a 
strong  rearguard,  and  where  he  was  undisturbed  until  the 
War  Minister  ordered  him  to  join  the  rest  of  the  army  at 
the  Chatalja  position. 

The  Bulgarians  owed  their  success  to  their  artillery,  and 
still  more  to  the  imbecile  conduct  of  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment in  pushing  forward  its  army  to  Lule  Burgas  and 
leaving  it  to  starve  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  to 
fight  a  three  days'  battle  with  only  one  day's  supply  of 
shells  and  cartridges.  Even  so,  the  victory  was  a  costly 
one,  so  costly  that  the  amount  of  the  losses  incurred  by  the 
infantry  in  their  wild  attacks  was  concealed  by  the  Bulgarian 
Government.  That  it  must  have  been  heavy  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  the  First  Silistria  Regiment,  which  was  en- 
gaged in  the  fight  with  Torgut  Shefket's  Corps,  lost  50 
per  cent  of  its  men.  Against  better  trained  and  better 
supplied  troops  than  the  mixed  force  that  the  Turks  brought 
into  action,  there  is  no  doubt  that  such  wild  rushes  across 
exposed  ground  would  have  failed  as  completely  as  they 
collapsed  in  other  recent  wars.  The  days  of  Lule  Burgas 
afford  no  proof  that  the  old-fashioned  attack  in  mass  from 
a  distance  is  possible  in  the  face  of  modern  rifles.  The  easy 
destruction  of  the  great  Turkish  counter-attack  by  the  fire 
of  the  Bulgarian  infantry  enforces  the  lesson. 

The  conditions  that  so  gravely  handicapped  the  Turks  and 
gave  the  invaders  a  comparatively  easy  victory,  were  the 
result  of  the  prolonged  neglect  of  the  Sultan's  army  in 
time  of  peace,  and  the  lack  of  all  well-ordered  preparation 
for  war.  One  may  say  that,  to  a  great  extent,  it  is  true 
that  battles  are  now  won  in  the  years  that  precede  them. 
The  gigantic  effort  put  forth  on  the  modern  battle-field 
is,  as  it  were,  the  application  at  the  working  point  of  a  vast 
store  of  energy  accumulated  in  the  long  period  of  prepara- 
tion and  organization. 

All  that  has  yet  been  seen  in  war  —  even  such  a  battle 


400  FAMOUS    MODERN    BATTLES 

of  giants  as  that  of  Mukden  —  will  be  surpassed  on  the 
day  when  the  forces  of  two  great  military  powers  or  of 
two  great  leagues  of  armed  nations  meet  in  decisive  con- 
flict. It  is  quite  possible  that  in  a  European  war  between 
states  of  the  first  rank  more  than  a  million  men  will  meet 
in  combat  on  a  single  far  extended  battle-field  with  a  front 
of  a  hundred  miles  or  more. 

The  commander-in-chief  of  an  army  engaged  in  such  a 
battle  will  direct  the  fight  from  some  station  well  to  the 
rear,  perhaps  where  he  can  see  nothing  of  the  actual 
operations  and  can  only  hear  the  far-off  thunder  of  hundreds 
of  guns.  If  he  wishes  to  inspect  for  himself  his  battle  array, 
he  will  no  longer  —  as  in  old  times  —  ride  along  the  ordered 
lines  surrounded  by  his  staff  amid  the  welcoming  cheers  of 
his  men.  Instead  of  this,  he  will  sweep  swiftly  overhead, 
seated  beside  an  aviator  in  a  powerfully  engined  aeroplane. 
Then  he  will  fly  back  to  his  battle  station,  where  he  will 
find  himself  in  much  the  same  position  as  the  director  of 
a  military  war-game  worked  out  on  a  large  scale  map. 

On  the  table  the  staff  map  will  be  marked  out  with  the 
positions  of  friend  and  foe.  Field  telegraphs,  telephones, 
and  wireless  installations  will  link  him  with  every  army 
corps  and  division.  He  will  be  constantly  receiving  in- 
formation, and  from  time  to  time  dictating  orders,  which 
will  be  transmitted  over  the  wires  or  through  the  air.  All 
day  long  he  will  be  solving  problems  of  strategy  and  tactics 
undisturbed  by  the  terrors  of  the  actual  conflict.  War  has 
become  a  scientific  business  under  the  gigantic  developments 
of  our  day. 

Every  discovery  and  invention  of  applied  science  is  made 
tributary  to  the  needs  of  the  soldier.  Wireless  telegraphy 
has  facilitated  the  communication  of  orders  and  intelli- 
gence. Aerial  navigation  has  changed  the  whole  conditions 
of  the  conflict.  Over  the  embattled  armies  will  hover  air- 
ships and  aeroplanes.    They  will  be  the  scouts  of  the  future 


THE    BATTLE    OF    LULE    BURGAS      401 

battle-field,  and  perhaps  act  also  as  winged  messengers  of 
death,  showering  down  explosive  bombs  on  enemies  below. 
There  may  even  be  a  preliminary  struggle  for  the  command 
of  the  upper  air  as  a  prelude  to  the  fight,  thus  realizing  the 
poet's  vision  of 

"  The  nations'  airy  navies  grappling  in  the  central  blue." 

Such  a  battle  may  well  last,  like  that  of  Mukden,  for  days 
and  weeks,  with  a  hideous  toll  of  human  life.  The  only 
compensating  feature  in  this  immense  development  of  inter- 
national conflict  is  that  the  very  extent  of  the  struggle,  the 
huge  cost  of  war  and  battle,  makes  statesmen  hesitate  more 
than  ever  to  incur  the  responsibility  of  an  appeal  to  the 
arbitrament  of  the  sword.  Awful  as  modern  war  has  be- 
come, there  has  been  at  the  same  time  a  growing  disposition 
to  avoid  it,  even  at  the  cost  of  serious  sacrifices.  In  our 
time  of  armed  nations,  questions  find  a  peaceful  solution 
that  would  inevitably  have  led  to  hostilities  in  earlier  days, 
when  comparatively  small  armies  of  professional  soldiers 
were  sent  to  fight  out  leisurely  campaigns,  while  the  gen- 
eral life  of  the  people  suffered  little  disturbance,  except  in 
the  immediate  neighborhood  of  the  actual  operations.  So 
much  at  least  we  have  gained.  War,  if  more  terrible,  is  also 
far  less  frequent,  though  the  times  are  still  far  distant  — 
if  they  will  ever  come  —  when  the  dream  of  unbroken  and 
universal  peace  will  be  realized. 


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